MURUGAN AND ANR. v. STATE REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, MADRAS, TAMIL NADU ANR

Citation: [2008] 13 S.C.R. 1160

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT, MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA

Case summary

MURUGAN AND ANR. v. STATE REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, MADRAS, TAMIL NADU ANR.pdf

Judgment text

• [2008] 13 S. C. R 1160 MURUGAN AND ANR. V. STATE REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, MADRAS, TAMIL NADU ANR. (Criminal Appeal No. 1278 of 2001) SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ] Code of Criminal Procedure; 1973; s.. 378 - Appeal against acquittal - Power of appellate Court - HELD: s. 378 imposes no restriction on powers of appellate Court in dealing with appeals against order of acquittal - While protection given to the accused by criminal process is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed 'r legitimization of trivialities would hamper administration of ~ criminal justice -- In the instant case, grounds of acquittal relied upon by trial court were rightly held by High Court untenable - Analysis made by High Court to se,t aside order of acquittal passed by trial court does not suffer from any infirmity - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 307.

The appellants-accused, namely, A-1 to A-3, were prosecuted for commission of offences punishable ulss 307 and 3071109 IPC. The prosecution_ case was that a quarrel took place between the mother of PWs 1 and 2 ·an~. the wife of A-3 and PW-2 pacified them. The accused . came to know of the quarrel and got an impression that PW-2, in support of his mother, abused the wife of A-3. The . following morning at about 7. 30 A. M. , A-1 to A-3 waylaid PWs 1 and 2 near the well when they were going to take bath. A-3 caught hold of PW-2 from behind his back and A-1 and A-2 attacked him indiscriminately with 'Aruval'. When PW-1 and PW"5 tried to intervene, the accused . th. re~tened· to kill. them. On account of the multiple inju- > : ·. PROSECUTOR, MADRAS, TAMIL NADU ANR. ries received, PW-2 fell down and became unconscious. The accused fled away. PW-1 and PW-5 took the victim to the hospital.

The trial court acquitted the accused, but the· High Court convicted them u/s 307 IPC and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for four yeas and to pay a ~ fine of Rs. 5,000/- each. In the instant appeal filed by the accused, it was contended for the appellants that an order of acquittal cannot be interfered by the appellate court except for compelling reasons and, in the instant case, the High Court did not keep in view the. parameters of appeal against acquittal. It was submitted that even if two views were possible, the view supporting the accused had to be accepted and since the trial court had precisely done it, there was no reason for interference. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: . 1 Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 imposes no restrictions on the powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against acquittal.

When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to de~ · termination by:the High C-ourt in an appeal against an or~. der of acquittal. In Chandrappa's* case, this Court has culled out the general principles regarding powers of appellate court while dealing an appeal against order of acquittal. [para 22 and 46] [1174,A-B; 1188,C] *Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2007(2) SCR 630=2007 (4) SCC 415. ; Sanwat Singh v. State. of Rafasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120; Bhagwan Singh v. State o'f M. P (2002) 4 SCC 85; Harijana ,T;hirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Courl of A. P 2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 379 = (2002) 6 SCC . 470; Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003t12 SCC 606; Kallu v. State of MP (2006) 10 SCC 313; Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC 36; Surajpal Singh v.

State 1952 SCR 193; Atley v. State of UP AIR 1955 SC 807; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1974 (1) SCR 489 =1973 (2) sec 793 - relied on. Shea Swarup v. R. Emperor (1934) 61 IA 398; Nur Mohd. v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151 - referred to. Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953) SCR 418; Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955) 2 SCR 1285; M. G Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963) 2 SCR 405; K. Gopal Reddy v. State ofA. P 1979 (2) SCR 265 = (1979) 1 SCC 355; Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat 1996 (2) Suppl, SeR 265 = (1996) 9 sec 225; and Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat 2002 (1) SCR 1011= (2002) 3 sec 57- referred to. ' 1. 2 A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to "proof' is an exercise particular to each case.

Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice. [para 47-49] [1189,C-D; 1189,H; 1190, A-B, 1190,D] PROSECUTOR, MADRAS, TAMIL NADU ANR. "The Mathematics ofProof//" by Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p. 340 - referred to State of UP v. Krishna Gopal 1988 (4) SCC 302; Krishnan and Anr v.

State represented by Inspector of Police 2003 (7) ·sec 56 - relied on. 2. 1 In the instant case, the ground of acquittal as recorded by trial Court that there was no reason for PW-7 to obtain complaint from PW-1 when the victim (PW-2) was conscious, is not at all a proper ground. Merely because P. W. 2 was conscious at that time, it cannot be said that the statement should not have been recorded from P. W. 1 and the same is doubtful. No law prohibits the police officer from recording complaint relating to the occurrence, ~ and that too, from an eye-witness. Even assuming that 0 P. W. 2 was consc;ious, nine serious injuries found on various parts of body of the victim would clearly show that' he could not have been able to give full details to P. W. 7. In the circumstances, obtaining of the complaint (Ext. P-1) from P. W. 1 is quite proper.

From the evidence of PWs 1,2 and 5, it is clear that PW-2 was indiscriminately attacked by A-1 and A-2 with 'Aruval;', as a result of which he fell on the ground. [para 7,11 and 12] [1170,F-H; 1170,A] 2. 2 The reasoning given by the trial court that PW-1 could not have seen the occurrence, is not based on evi" dence, According to both P. Ws. 1 and 2, they went one after another to the well to take bath . P. W. 5 stated that after hearing the cry of P. W. 2, P. W. 1 and others came to the scene. This would. not mean that P. W. 1 did not accompany P. W. 2. As a matter of fact, even according to P. W. 5, P. Ws. 1 and 5 took the victim in a taxi to the Hospital. The occurrence took place in a day light at 7. 30 A. M. The house · of the accused and P. Ws. 1 and 2 is situated nearby and· the well also is just two furlongs away from the village. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that P. W. 1 could not have accompanie! d P. W. 2 to take bath.

Therefore, this ground of acquittal was rightly hefd by the High Court to be untenable. [para 13-15] [1171,A-DJ 2. 3 When the factual position is analysed in the background of the conclusions arrived at by the High Court, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court's judgment is correct. The analysis made by the High Court to set aside the order does not suffer from any infirmity. [para 16 and 51] [1190,G; 1171,D] Case Law Reference AIR 1945 PC 151 referred to para 28 AIR 1954 SC 36 relied on para 29 1952 SCR 193 . relied on para 31 ,,. (1953) SCR 418 referred to para 32 AIR 1955 SC 807 relied on para 33 (1955) 2 SCR 1285 referred to para 34 (1961) 3 SCR 120 relied on para 35 (1963) 2 SCR 405 referred to para 36 1974 (1) SCR 489 relied on para 37 1979 (2) SCR 265 referred to Para 39 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 265 referred to para 40 2002 (1) SCR 1011 referred to para 41 c2002) 4 sec 85 relied on para 42 2002 (1 t Suppl.

SCR 379 relied on para 43 (2003) 12 sec 606 relied on para 44 (2006) 10 sec 313 relied on para 45 2007(2) SCR 630 relied on para 46 1988 (4) sec 302 relied on para 49 2003 (7) sec 56 relied on para 50 fVlURUGAN & ANR. v, STATE RsP. BY PUBLIC 1165 PROSECUTOR, MADRAS, T. NADU ANR. CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminalf'. ppeal No. 1278 of2001 From the final Judgment and Ordet d? tect--20. 7. 2001 / 17. 8. 2001 of tne High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crimi- · · nal Appeal No. 223 of 1993 · · K. K. Mani and C. K. R. Lenin Sekar for the Appellant. R. Nedumaran for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR.. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court setting aside the judgment of acquittal recorded by learned . Principal, Assistant Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli.

The appellant faced trial·along with one Velliah for alleged commission of offences punishable urider Section 307 and307 readwith Sec- . tion 109 of the. lflElian Penal Code, 1860 (in 'short 'IPC'). Though the trial Court found that the prosecution has hot est~blished· the case, in appeal filed by;the State it wo:s held by the High Court that the prosecutioil. established the accusations against . the appellants. But the acquittal so fa_r as the Velliah A3 is cohcerned, the High Court confirmed the acquittal. 2. Background facts in . a nutshell are as follows: Sankaralingam (PW1),. Ramaiah (PW2) and Paramasivam · (PW6) are brothers. They resi. de at MarugaU Privy Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acql,Jittal was " wrong. " • The Court concluded as follows: "9.

The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Shea Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (1) 'substantial and compelling reasons', (i1) 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) 'strong reasons' are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.

" 36. Again, in M. G Agarwalv. State of Maharashtra (1963) 2 SCR 405, the point was raised before a Constitution Bench of this Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, it was observed as follows: "17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, 'the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can· be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons': vide Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State otPunjab (1953 SCR 418), it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against · the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are 'very substantial and compelling reasons to do so'.

In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be-reversed only for 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons' or for 'strong reasons'. In appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be remembered that these observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not . intended, and should not be read to have intended to introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to emphasize is that the approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in Sheo Swarup the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused 'is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial'.

Therefore, the test suggested by the· expression 'substantial and compelling reasons' should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That isfhe effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for iristance, in Sanwat Singh v.. State of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp 1 SCR 104) and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterise the findings recprded therein as perverse. " (emphasis supplied) 37. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court held that in India, there. is_o_ojurisdictional limitation on the powers of appellate court.

"In law there are no fetters on the plenary · power of the appellate court to review the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the· weighty thought that ttie-rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding without very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration. " 38. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court 8 observed as follows: "6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation.

The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro' the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then breakdown and lose credibility with the community.

The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville Williams in Proof of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent. ... ' In short, ourjurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminaljustice potent and realistic.

A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent · free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. " (emphasis supplied) 39. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State ofA. P (1979) 1 SCC 355, the Court was considering the power of the High Court against an order of acquittal under Section 378 of the present Code. After considering the relevant decisions on the point it was stated as follows: "9. The principles are now well settled. At one time . it was P thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for 'substantial and compelling reasons' only and courts used to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the search for them were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120.

In Sanwat Singh case this Court harked back to the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed those prindples. After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan this Court has consistently recognised the right of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in Shea Swarup case. Occasionally phrases like 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly unjust', have been used to describe the orders of acquittal which warrant interference. But, such expressions have been used more as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance of H. the appellate court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. ln some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of A. P, (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v.

State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may be added the further principle that 'if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly~balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him.

If the preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the beni:~fit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that . any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, ·the benefit of which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable. " · (emphasis supplied) 40. In Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225, this Cour1 said: "While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the > PROSECUTOR, MA. ORAS, T. NADU ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ] appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed.

Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only- .. reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions. " 41. In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3 . SCC 57, referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated: "7. The paramount consideration ·of the court should be to avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis and not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to reappreciate the evidence in ~ acquittal appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether the accused has committed any offence or not.

Probable view taken by the trial court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is such a view which is based upon legal and admissible evidence. Only because the accused . has been acquitted by the trial court, cannot be made a basis to urge that the High Court under all circumstances should not disturb such a finding. " 42. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of MP. (2002) 4 SCC 85, the trial court acquitted the accused but the High Court con- .. victed them. Negativing the contention of the appellants that the High Court could not have disturbed the findings of fact of the trial court even if that view was not correct, this Court observed: "7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court could not disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even If It found • that the view taken by the trial court was not proper.

On the basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in ~. an appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with the order of acquittal because by passing an order of acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced. The golden thread which runs 8 through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction limitation on the appellate court but judge-made guidelines for circumspection. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided.

A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view ignoring the admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether all or any of the accused has committed any offence or not". 43. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A. P (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said: "12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened.

The High Court would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court . )~ PROSECUTOR, MADRAS, T NADU ANR. [DR ARIJIT PA$AYAT, J. ] to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise th~ judgment will suffer from serious infirmity. " ! s- 44. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) 12 .. SCC 606, this Court observed: 8 "21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the·order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal.

The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that iftwo views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused . and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount p consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of ·I' justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where a::lmissible evidence is ignored, a duty is. cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committecj . any offence or not: 45. Again in Kallu v. State of M. P (2006) 10 SCC 313, this Court stated: "8.

While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the pow! '! r exists to review· the enti're evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with; by ~n appellate court, where the judgment Of the trial court is based on evidence . ' an. d the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not revers~the decision of the trial court merely because a '". •· ~ different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Fwther if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of ~ the trial court. " (emphasis supplied) 46. From the above decisions, in Chandrappa and Ors. V.

State of Karnataka (2007 (4) sec 415), the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon ,. which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.

Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that .. in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocen. t unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. 8 (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 47.

A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be cpnvicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree ofprobability amounts to "proof" is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, a learned author says [see "The Mathematics of Proof II": Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review,, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)): "The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent w_hen they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be . said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent.

A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer gliilt from the fact · that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, ·· and guilty rather thah innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other. " 48. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response. Doubts must be aotual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is • not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. 49.

The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained ~ intuitions of the Judge. ·while the,protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State of UP v. Krishna Gopal (1988 (4) SCC 302). 50. The above position was highlighted in Krishnan and Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2003 (7) SCC 56) and in Criminal Appeal No.

572 of 2001 entitled Valson & ~ 1 · Anr. v. State of Kerala (decided on 01• August, 2008). 51. When the factual position is analysed in the background of the conclusions arrived at by the High Court, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court's judgment is correct. The appeal is dis. missed. The appellants who are directed to be released on bail by order dated 10. 12. 2001, shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence. ~ R. P. Appeal dismissed. t:t.