NARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB
Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 395; 1952 INSC 3
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI , MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1952 INSC 3. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1952-01-25. NARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 395 (I) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was never interpreted as prohibiting deprivation of property by P. private individuals. Its restoration, therefore, in the same form in article 31, after omission in the original draft article 19, could lead to no inference in support Central of the petitioner's contention, which indeed proceeds India on the fundamental misconception that article 19(1) (£) and article 31(1), which are great constitutional safe. guards Vagainst State aggression on private property, are directed against infringements by private individuals for which remedies should be sought in the ordinary law. · In this view 1t 1s unnecessary to deal with certain other objections to the maintainability of the petition raised by the Solicitor-General on . behalf of the Bank. The petition is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. Agent for the respondent : Rajinder Narain, NARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB (and 13 other petitions). lPATANJALI SAsTRr C. J. , MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ. ] Preventive Detention-Ordt;r of detention challenged as illegal- Fresh order superseding previous order-Validity-Question of bad faith-Habeas corpus proceeding-Legality of detention must be determined as at date of return. In the absence of bad faith the detaining authority can super-_ sedc an earlier order of detention which has been challenged as defective on merely formal grounds and make a fresh order wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies with the . requirements of the law in that behalf. The question of bad faith, if raised, must be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case. In habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceedings. Basanta Chandra Glzose v.
King Emperor ( [ 1945] F. C. R. 81) followed. Naranjan Singh v. The State of Punjab (unreporte position, but took exception to the first as being no longer tenable after the Indian Constitution came into force. It was urged that article 22 lays down the procedure to be followed in cases of preventive detention and the said procedure must be strictly observed as the only prospect of release by a court must be on the basis of technical or formal defects, a long line of decisions having held that the scope of judicial review in matters of preventive detention is practically limit-ed to an enquiry as to · whether there has been strict compliance with the requirements of the law. This is undoubtedly true and this Court had occasion in the recent case of Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab (Petition No.
308 of 1951) (1) to observe "it cannot too often be emphasised that before a person is depriTed of his personal liberty the procedure estab-lished by law must be strictly followed and must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person 2ffected". Th~ proposition, however, applied with equal force to cases of preventive detention before the commencement of the Constitution, and it is difficult to see what difference the Constitution makes in regard to the position. Indeed, the position is now made more clear by the express provisions of section 13 of the Act which provides that a detention order may at 11ny time be revoked or modified and that such revoca-tion shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under section 3 against the same person.
Once it is conceded that in habeas corpus proceedings the court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceed-ing, it is difficult to hold, in the absence of proof of bad faith, that the detaining authority cannot super-sede an earlier order of detention challenged as illegal and make a fresh order wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies with the reqmre-ments of the law in that behalf. (1) [1945] F. C. R. 81. As regards the observation in Naranjan Singh's case. we do not understand them as laying down any general proposition to the effect that no fresh order of detention could be made when once a petition chal-lenging the validity of an earlie. r order has been filed in court. The learned Judges appear to have inferred from the facts of that case that the later . order was ( 1) Since reported as [ 1952] S. C. R. 368.
not made bona fide on being satisfied that the petitioner's detention was still necessary but it was Singh "obviously to defeat the present petition". The question of bad faith, if raised would certainly have to be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case, but the observations in one case cannot be regarded as a precedent in dealing with other cases. We accordingly remit the case for further hearing. This order will govern the other petitions where the same question was raised. Petitions remitted. Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta. SHRIMANT SARDAR BHUJANGARAO DAULATRAO GHORPADE v. SHRIMANT MALOJIRAO DAULATRAO GHORPADE AND OTHERS. [PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J. , DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ. ] Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s.
4(a)-Saranjam-Dispute between branches of grantee's •family-Government Resolution regulating succession-Suit to declare Resolution ultra vires, for declaration of sole right as saranjamdar, and for injunc· tion against other branches-Governtnent impleaded as party- Maintainability of suit. The position of the Gajendrcigad estate which had been recog· nised by the British Government as a saranjam and which had been declared by the Bombay High Court in 1868 to be partible, was re-examined in 1891 and Government passed a Resolution in 1891 that "the whole of the Gajendragad estate was a saranjam continuable as hereditary in the fullest sense of the word. It ls continuable to all made legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest.
" In 1932 by another Resolution Government formally resumed the grant and re-granted it to the plaintiff who belonged to the first branch of the family of the original grantee with a direction that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector. The other two branches felt aggrieved and in 1936 Government passed another Resolution which confirmed the Resolution of 1891 and modified the Resolution of 19321, by declaring that the portions of the
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