NARAYAN BHONDOO PIMPUTKAR & ANOTHER v. LAXMAN PURSHOTTAM PIMPUTKAR & ORS.
Citation: [1974] 2 S.C.R. 116; 1973 INSC 193
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: HANS RAJ KHANNA , V.R. KRISHNA IYER, R.S. SARKARIA
Judgment date:
Case summary
1973 INSC 193. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1973-10-30. NARAYAN BHONDOO PIMPUTKAR & ANOTHER v. LAXMAN PURSHOTTAM PIMPUTKAR & ORS. Read the judgment...
Judgment text
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS NARA YAN BHONDOO PIMPUTKAR & ANOTHER ,\ V. LAXMAN PURSHOTTAM PIMlltJTKAR ·& ORS. October 30, 1973 [H. R. KHANNA, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARICAIUA; 11. } Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Ac&,. 1961 (Gμjarat Act 48 of 1961). 1. 4- fl. Aboiltioll nf 'oa1r-l watnns'-RiJ? ht nf watandar to execute deCree for possession of land, if affected. On the question whether, the right to execute a decree for the possession of watan land which has been obtained by the watandar came to an end, becal. 18e of the abolition 'by the Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Act, 1961, of patel watans and the cxtinguishment of all incidents appertaining to them under :ii. 4 of the Act, HELD : ( 1) There is nothing in the language of s. 4 which renders such decrees for possession to be inexecutable. Had the legislature intend9d. that such decrees should become inexecutable, tlie legislature would have indicated such intention by incorporating some provision to that effect.
f121Bl 1 (2) The words 'any decree or order of a Court'' in the opening clause of the section do not indicate that the decree or order of court could not be executed with effect from the appointed day. The opening clause of the section only indicates that irrespective of any usage or custom and irrespective of any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad or decree or order of a. court or the existing watan law. which might have defined and dtclared the incidents appertaining to patC'l watans, the results contemplated by the various clauses of the section would follow and nothing contained in such settlement etc. would prevent the operation of that section. [122E-123A] (3) The fact that pate! watans have been abolished and incidents appertain· ing to them hav"' been extinl'n! ished does not lead to the conclusion that the right of the erstwhile watandar to the possession of the watan lands also comes to an end.
Section 4(iv' expressly provides that the resumption of watan land consequent upon the abolition of patel watans would be subject to the provi. ~ sions of sections 6, 7 and 10. According to s. 6, the watan land, subject to the conditions mentioned in that section, shall_ be regranted to the watandar. He shall be deemed to be occupant of the said land, and he would be entitled to continue in possession if be complies with the provisions of that section. 'That is, so far as the quondam watandars are concerned, they are entitled to be in possession of the watan Jands, though not in their capacity as watandars but by -virtue of the operation of s. 6 of the Act. If the respondent would be entitled to be in russession of the land under s. 6, the right to execute the decree for poosession of land cannot be denied to him.
[121C-122] ( 4) If the respondent is entitled to execute the decree for possession of the Jand obtained against the app~llants the question whether the appellants, if allowed to remain in possession, could have applied for rcgrant to them_ under ' 10 is not relevant [122C-E] Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1573(N) of tn~ Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 3rd February, 1971 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Sec-Ond Appeal No. 639 of 1968. V. S. Desai, P. C. Bhartari and A. G. Meneses, for the appellants. D. V. Patel, P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for respondent ~1. S. K. Dholakia. and M. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 2. D. N. Mishra, for respondents Nos. 3a to 3d. NARAYAN v. LAXMAN (Khanna, J. ) 117 .. \ The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J. -Whether the decree for the possession of the land in dispute awarded in favour of LaXIUan Purshottam Pimputkar respon-de11t No.
1 (hereinafter described as the respqndentJ has become inexecutable after fhe ooming into force of the Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Act, 1961 (Gujarat Act 48 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is the short question which arises for determination in this appeal brought by special leave against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. The appellants and the respondent belong to one family. The reapondent represents the seniormost branch of the family. The family was granted Patilki Watan in a number of villages, including Solsumbha, in district Thana. The watan land situated in Solsumbha is the subject matter of the present dispute. Under the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 the person who actually performs the duty of a hereditary office for the time being is called an officiator. Purshottam, father of the respondent, was the officiator till 1921 when, be Mr. Patel, the t.
ight of the respondent to execute the decree and the liability of the appellants to hand over possession of the land lo the respondent under the decree have been kept intact by section 22 of the Act. The provisions. d day no office of pate! shall be hereditary and that subject to the provisions of section 6, 7 and 10 all watan lands are resumed and would be subject to the payment of land revenue. The question with which we are concerned is whether the NARAYAN v. LAXMAN (Khanna, J. ) 121 A right to execute the decree for the possession of watam land which -has boen obtained by the watandar against other persons comea. to an end bee"ause of the abolition of pate! watans . and the extinguishment of all incidents appertaining to the said watans. The a111wer to this question, in our opinion, should be in the negative. Thero is nothing in the language of section 4 which renders such decrees for possession to be inexecutable.
Had the legislature intended that the ll decrees for possession of the watan lands which bad been obtained by the watandars against third persons should 6ecome inexecutable, the legislature would have indicate4 such an inlention by incorporating some pr. ovision to that effect. In the absence of any such provisioR, ii is not permissible to read a prohibition in section 4 of the Act on ! he execution of a decree for possession of the '. 1-atan land obtained in favour of the watandar. c The fact that pate! watans have been abolished lind incidents appertaining to the watans have been extinguished does not lead to the conclusion that the right of the erstwhile watandar to ! he possession of the watan lands also comes to an end. Indeed, clause (iv) of section 4 of the Act expressly provides that the resumption of watan land consequent upon the abolition of pate) watans and the D extinguishment of incidents appertaining to the said watans would be .
subject to the provisions of sections 6, 7 and 10. According to section 6, the watan land, subject to the conditions mentioned in that section, shall be regranted to the watandar of the watan and he shill be deemed to be occupant of the said land. The watandar would be entitled to continue to be in possession of the watan lands, if he complies with the provisions of that section despite the abolition of E pate! watans and the extinguishment of incidents appertaining to the said watans. The object of the Act as would appear from its pre-amble was to abolish pate! watans because its hereditary character smacked of some kind of feudalism. At the same time, the legislature made it clear that it was not intended to deprive the watandar of the possession of the land if he complied 'II ith the conditions laid down in section 6 of the Act. It, therefore, cannot be said that there F was a severance of all connections between the watandar and. the watan hnd because of the abolition of pate!
watans and the extinguish· ment of incidents aooer! ,inirui: to such watans. A residual ri2ht was still there in the erstwhile watandar and that included the right to retain possession of watan land if the conditions mentioned in section 6 were complied with. Section 7 of the Act contains provisions for re atel watans. the result~ ""ontemplated by the various clauses of section 4 would follow and NARAYAN v. LAXMAN (Khanna, J. ) 123 A nothing contained in the settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or decree or order of the court or the existing watan law would prevent the operation of that section. In View of what has been held above, it is, in our opinion, not necessary to deal with the alternative argument of Mr. Patel that the execution proceeding)! taken by the respondent to recover possession of the land were also protected by section 22 of the Act. B Reference has been made by Mr. Desai to a Full Bench decision of Nagpur High Court in the case of Chhote Khan v.
Mohammad Obedulla Khan('). It was held by the majority in that cue that after the coming into force of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, M. ahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 the pre-emption decrees obtained by landlords are no longer executable becaUBe the c persons seeking to enforce. them have lost their proprietary interest. The aforesaid case cannot be of any help to the appellants beeause it has been conceded bv Mr. Desai that there were no provisions in the above ~ntioned Madhya Pradesh Act corresponding to seclions 6, 7 and 10 of the Act with which we are concerned. It is also consequently not necessary to express any opinion about the correct· ness <)f the view taken by the majority in the above mentioned Full D Bench decision. There is, in our opinion, no merit in this appeal which is accord- ·ingly dismissed with costs. V. P. S. <l) A. I. R. 1953 Nag. 361.
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