NARENDRA GOPAL VIDYARTHI v. RAJAT VIDYARTHI

Citation: [2008] 16 S.C.R. 961

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, CYRIAC JOSEPH

Case summary

NARENDRA GOPAL VIDYARTHI v. RAJAT VIDYARTHI.pdf

Judgment text

[2008) 16 S. C. R. 961 ,_1 NARENDRA GOPAL VIDYARTHI v. RAJAT VIDYARTHI (Civil Appeal No. 7010 of 2008) DECEMBER 02, 2008 [S. B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ] f Indian Succession Act, 1925 - ss.

74, 81 and 82 - Will - Interpretation of - Held: Will is to be read as a whole - , Intention of testator must be asserted from the words used and the surrounding circumstances - On -facts, testator executed Will and within one month purchased immovable property from the amount set apart for the benefit of his widowed daughter in law and her son - Order of High Court that by way of Will only limited interest bequeathed in favour of beneficiary and his mother, not sustainable - From the Will it can only be concluded that amount was set apart only for 1 benefit of widow and her son - It might have been invested in > immoveable property but only thereby they could not have been deprived of the amount - Thus, title to said property , vested in the son - Though use of word 'wakf' was not appropriate but it only shows that testator intended to divest himself of the said property.

Words and Phrases: Wakf - Meaning of - Held Is taking out of one's ownership and passing it on to God's ownership dedicating its usufruct-without regard to indigence or affluence, perpetually and with the intention of obtaining Divine pleasure ..... It is for persons and individuals, or for institutions or mosques and graveyards, or for other charitable purposes - Wakf is neither gift nor trust. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s. 100 - Second appeal - Maintainability of - Held: Can be entertained if substantial question of law arises for its consideration and not otherwise ,_ 961 - Finding of fact arrived at by first appellate court is ordinarily final - Finding of fact may give rise to a substantial question of law when the same are based on no evidence or is otherwise perverse or that correct legal principle§ were not applied - On facts, question formulated by High . Laxmi & Anr. (2007 (1) SCALE 188].

-1 (3) In any event, the High Committed a serious error insofar as it misconstrued and misinterpreted the · said Will dated 21. 11. 1965 tg hold that by reason thereof, only a li. mited interest iri favour of the appellant Rad been bequeathed. ···: -. J. ,, 1a. Or. Saxena, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit : (1) No objection having been raised by the appellant ~ befqr~ the High Court, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant now to contend that the substantial question of law formulated by the High Court was not correct. (2) A bare perusal of the Will dated 21 . 11 . 1965 would clearly show that the testator who was proficient in 1 Urdu having used the word 'wakf and a board of ~ trustees consisting of four persons named therein having been constituted, no absolute interest had been or could have been conferred in the appellant. 13..

One of the issues which arose for consideration before the High Court was as to whether the property in question was a joint family property. The learned Trial Judge answered the question in the affirmative. The same was reversed by the first appellate court. A finding of fact arrived at by the first appellate -~ court is ordinarily final. Its correctness can be questioned if, inter aila, the same was based upon no evidence or is otherwise · perverse or that correct legal principles were applied. The question formulated, namely, as to whether the property in dispute is. a Joint Hindu Family property, per se, is not a . ~' substantial question of law. 14. The High Court, however, proceeded on the basis that if the judgment is based on no evidence or is otherwise perverse, a substantial question of law would arise for ·H ; . - ~ " ~ . . . ,, I- [2008] 16 S. C. R. \ .. l. consideration. It is so but therefor also a substantial q1,. 1e$tion )'--of law must be framed.

In terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High . Court can entertain a ~e~nf;i ~ppeal if sub§tantial question of law arises for its consideratlofi f:lR€1 not otherwise. 15. A finding of fact may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no ~ evidence and/or while arriving at the said finding, relevant " admissible evidences have not been taken into consideration t or inadmissible evidences have been take" if! tQ consideration. I= 16. We fail to understand as to on what basis, the ~ejg question of law was formulated. Before an additional question is formulated, the procedure laid down therefor must be complied with. This aspect of the matter stands concluded by this Court in Krishn;:m's case (supra), wherein it was held : il10. Under the amended S@~ti9n, 100 CPC the High Court has to frame substantial questit;1n$ @f l?. '! V and can decide T the second appeal only on those queeti@fl§ frerried.

A perusal of the questions framed shows that no QUi§t! @~ @f law was framed as to whether the finding of fact of the First Appellate Court that Lakshmi and Ramayee are one and the same person, is based on no evidence or is perverse. 11. ! t may be men,tioned that the First Appellate Court urider Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court f. , tn second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the First Appellate Court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a 4question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect In the present case no question was framed-by the High Court as to . whether the finding of the First Appellate Court thcit Ramayee and Lakshmi are \ NARENDRA GOPAL VIDYARTHI v.

RAJATVIDYARTHI 973 ~ one and the same person is a finding based on no 1 1 evidence or is pery~rn~, Hence the findings of the First Appella~e Qgyrt \Rat Ramayee and Lakshmi are one and \~~ §aff\e person, could not have been interfered with by t\'le High Court. '' {See also Subramaniaswamy Temple, Ratnagiri v. V. Kanna Gounder (Dead) by LRs. [2008 (9) SCALE 386]}. -. l. _, Yet again in Boodireddy Chandraiah's case (supra), this Court opined: "8. The phrase 'substantial question of law', as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying 'question of law', means-of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence,, or academic merely.

However, l it is clear that th§ legislature has chosen not to qualify the ~ 1 scgg~, Q,f §ub~tantial question of law' by suffixing the words 1 ~f ~~neral Importance' as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1 )(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta the phrase ·~ubstantial question of law' as it was employed in the last ·~ clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and Their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Chunilal case the Constitution Bench expressed agreement wlth the ~ following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v.

Noony Veeraju: (Chunilal case) f. - . ~ .. ,.. _ '5. ... when a question of law is fairly arguable,. where there is room for difference of opinion. on it or where th~ court thought it necessary to deal with · that question at some length and discuss alternative. views, then the question would be ~ substantial 8 question of law. On the other hand if th@ Q! ,l? §tien was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the g~neral principles. to be >-- ..... applied in determining the. question are weff settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. ' 12. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relev~mf · for this case may be summarised thus : 0 (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of y law.

Construction of a document involving the ~ application of any principle of law, is also a question oflaw. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of · I a document or wrong application of a principle of 1 . law ;in construing a document, it gives rise to a · question of law. · · (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case ·. involves a substantial question of law, and not a ~· mere question of law: A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a sut:>stantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from A 1 binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal ~ issue. A substantial question of law will-also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is. clear, either on account of express provisions of law • / NARENPRA GOPAI,, VIDYARTHI v. RAJAT VIDYARTHI 975 [S. 8. SINHA, J.

] I or binding pr~c~dents, but the court below ha~ ~ decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the· law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled ·position of law. k 13. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere '· with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is . not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised · exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignoreq material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof.

When we refer to 'decision based on no evidence', it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case; where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably 1 ; capable of supporting the finding. " 17. This Court, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, should ordinarily upon setting aside the judgment of the High Court, remit the matter to it. However, we, in view of the fact that the suit was filed in the year 1995 and the principal controversy between the parties is construction of the said Will dated. 21. 11. 1965, though~ it proper to dispose of the matter ourselves. . 4: 18. Before adverting to the said question, we may place on record that we have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length on 17. 7. 2008. Appellant had furnished . · to us an unofficial translation of the said Will, correctness Whereofwas disputed by Dr. Saxena. We, therefore, entrusted the job to the official translator.

Acopy of the said Will, as translated by the official translator, has been placed before us. It is accepted by the counsel for both the parties that the said translation, to put it simply, even does not carry any meaning. 976 SUPRE~E ·COURT REPO~T§ We, therefore, chose to igno. re the same. 19. The translated. portions of the Will which are disputea one are as under : Extract of Will Official Translation Correct Translation ~ anM ~ t My last willing~ness H\§ nw lsst wish fcp. ~ tfl{A" ~ is that I shall cancel my th9t PY WiW §f thi!? ~ \... ,,... ~ earnings a sum of the half of which i~ 'iqi CITTCIT 'f,. ,,~ if ~ Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees only Rs. 15,0~Q/. ,, 11crfalf tfi~ 6'\ilH fifteen thot1sand only) (Rupees fifteen 30,000/- ~ ~ be §pared QF s13t apart thoμsand only) may f'R:q;jq~ ~ afR fcITT:fT Sahay son of Lala Sibo q;)- -rl-:l- Sahay hereby gifting the make the Will, and no ~ ~ lR "''~ Mundaraja amount of other person has any ~crm:;n:rr~~ r ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ thirty thousand only) quarrel.

As such in which has been depo- my comple~e i! l

~ He, therefore, wanted to make a 'wakf in their favour so as, to • enable them not only to maintain themselves but also to spend for the education and upbringing as well as marriage of Narendra Gopal. He declared that apart from himself, nobody else had any interest therein nor anybody can raise any dispute in regard thereto. He made his sof1S the Executors of the wakf. He as; indicated hereinbefore, used the word 'wakf. 23. What should be the tflie meaning of the said word is the question. Whereas, Mr. Mehta submits that it should be treated as ;gift', according to Dr. Saxena, the same connotes '1 ~ a trust. The ordinary meaning of 'wakf is taking out something out of one's ownership and passing it on to God's ownership dedicating Its usufruct - without tegard to indigence or affluence, perpetually and with the intention of obtaining Divine pleasure - for persons and individuals, or for institutions or mosques and graveyards, or for other charita61e purposes.

It is in their true sense neither gift nor trust. 24. Gift of some amount in cash does not require ~ registration nor does the statutory requirements as contained in Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act are attracted therefor. 25. Was it the amount which was the subject matter of the Will or an immoveable property which was to be purchased from the said amount, meant to be transferred in favour of the respondent absolutely is the question. 26. The Will provides that if the sum of Rs. 30,000/- is found IL ' J r to be inadequate for purchase of an immoveable property, the t- ' amount of Rs. 10,000/- which was available with the partnership Ifirm vidyarthi & Sons·be utilized which would be determinative r factor as regards the extent of title of the property.. ; . 27. The word used in the Will ·is 'karar'. ·1t may mean 8 determination; it may also mean agreement. But if the extent of the title is ·to be de! ermined, the same will have a direct :I r- ).

nexus with the amountspent from the sum of Rs. 10,000/- which • 'j 1-was with the partnership firm. If determination of the extent of I rthe title has a nexus with the amount spent from the said sum ofRs. 30,000/- vis-a-vis the said sum of Rs. 10,000/-, title was 1-- ' to be passed in favour of the beneficiary. 28. This gives rise to two questions which. are of some ~ importance. When a sum is to be invested in the immoveable property and in the event, any further sum is necessary; the extent·of title is required to be determined, does it demonstrate. the intention on the part of the testator. In our opinion, it does. Wakf is a 'final dedication'. a goes out of the control of ( . dedicator. The use of the said word may not be appropriate in a situation of this nature but that only goes to s~ow that the testator intended to divest himself of the said property. 29.

The very fact that the-testator categc:ically stated that the extent of title in the property will depend upon the amount of additional contribution required to be made from the fund of Vidyarthi and Sons itself is an indication to show that his wish was that title should vest in the. beneficiaries to the extent of the property which represented the amount of Rs. 30,000/- out of the total amount of consideration required to acquire the same. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that his intention also was that the entire cash may not be paid to Chandramukhi. as she was of gullible character. Sheeoutd be made to part therewith by any other person by sweet words. A precaution was, therefore, required to be taken. The amount was required to be spent wisely. T. he amounl which was required for their maintenance and education of appellant whether derived from NARENDRA GOPAL VIDYARTHI v. RAJATVIDYARTHI · 983 [S. S. SINHA, J. ] the inte(est or from the rental only was to be handed over.

It is ~ only for the aforementioned limited purpose, the trust was created. The sole beneficiary of the trust, in our opinion, was· merely the· appellant and his mother. It may be true that the property Was purchased in the name of the testator himself. The High Court commented that the same could have been done , . in the name of the appellant and his· mother or at least the purchase could have been a joint one. But the Will is required . ,. ( to be construed on the basis of the terms used therein and not otherwise. 30. The answer to the question may be difficult one. Only ·because there does not exist any straight forward answer, the same would not mean that beneficiaries under the Will shall be deprived therefrom only because the property was purchased in his own name by the testator. The testator had a long wish to purchase an immoveable property. He even thought of acquiring a property, price whereof might exceed Rs. 30,000/- . If he wanted to keep apart the said sum of Rs.

30,000/- for the . 1 benefit of the appellant and his mother, we think he also wanted to bequeath the immoveable property purchased out of the said amount. 31. The Indian Succession Act contains provisions for construction of the Will. We may notice some of them. "74 -Wording of Will-It is not necessary that any technical words or terms of art be used in a Will, but only that the wording be such that the intentions of the testator can be known therefrom. · • 82 - Meaning or clause to be collected from entire Will-The meaning of any clause in a Will is to be collected from the entire instrument, and all its parts are to be construed with reference to each other. Illustrations (i) The testator gives to B a specific fund or property at ..

the death of A, and by a subsequent clause gives the twhole of his property to A The effect of the several clauses taken together is to vest the s·pecific fund or property in A for life, and after his decease iri s; it appearing from the bequest to B that the testator meant to use in a restricted sense the words in which he describes what he gives to A. (ii) Where a testator having an estate, one part of which ). is called Black Acre, bequeaths the whole of his estate to A, and in another part of his Will bequeaths Black Acre to ~ B, the latter bequest is to be read as an exception out of the first as if he had said "I give Black Acre to 8, and all I the rest of my estate to A". I l 84-Which of two possible constructions preferred- I Where a clause is susceptible of two meanings according t to one of which it has some effect, and according to the ~ other of which it ·can have none, the former shall_ be ~ r preferred. " .. 32.

Applying the principles of construction of Will, as contained in the aforementioned provisions, we are of the opinion that if the Will is read as awhole and if the surrounding circumstances are to be given effect to, the only conclusion that ~ can be reached was that the aforementioned amount of Rs. 30,000/-was set apart only for the benefit of the appellant and his mother. It might have been invested in immoveable property but ~mly thereby they could norhave been deprived of ? -the amount. 33. How a Will has to be interpreted is no_ longer res \integra. Intention of the testator must be ascertained from the words used and the surrounding circumstances. The Court will Pl.! t itself in the armchair of the testator. )... _ In Navneet Lal v. Gokul [(1976) 1 SCC 630] it has been held: . , ! - _"8. From the earlier decisions of this Court the following -1 principles, inter alia, are well established: .

(1) In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered; but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning ~ -4 of the words which have actually been employed. (Ram Gopal v. Nand La~ (2) In construing the language of the will the court is entitled to put itself into the testator's armchair (Venkata Narasimha v. Parthasarathy) and is bound to bear in mind also other matters than merely the words. used. It must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense... But all -, ,,f this is solely as an aid to arriving at a righf construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by that particular testator in that document. (Venkata Narasimha case and Gnanambal Ammal v. T.

Raju Ayyar) (3) The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching importance to isolated expressions but by reading the will as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as redundant or contradictory. (Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. Thakurain Bakhtraj Kuer) (4) The court must accept, if possible, such construction as would give to every expression some effect rather than that which would render any of the expressions inoperative. The court will look at the circumstances under which the testator makes his will, such as the state of his prop,erty, of . ,_ his family and the like: Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by giving full effect to every word used in a d. ocument, such a construction should be accepted instead of a construction which would have the effect of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the testator.

Further, where one 9f the two reasonable constructions would lead to intestacy, that should be )- discarded in favour of a construction which does not create any such hiatus. (Pearey Lal v. Rameshwar Oas) ~ r (5) It is one of the cardinal p~inciples of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect I should be given to every disposition contained in ) ·o I the will unless the law prevents effect being given I • I to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant · provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created Is valid the subsequent interest r ' .. cannot . take . effect but a Court of construction will . proceed to the farthest extentto avoid repugnancy, ' so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will. (Ramachandra Shenoy v. Hilpa Brite Mrs)'. " {See also Arunkumar & Anr. v. Shriniwas & Ors. [(2003) 6 SCC·98]} j-- . • This.

aspect oUhe matter has recently been considered in Bajrang Factory Ltd. v. University of Caiucutta_[(2007) 7 SCC 183], whereir it was held: "39. With a view to ascertain the intention of the maker of the will, not only the tern;is thereof are required to be tc;tken A.. into cQns. ideration but also all circumstances attending tllereto. The will as a whole must, thus, be considered for the said purpose and not_1:qerely the particular part ~hereof. / ) 1 As the will if read in its entirety, can be given effect to, it is imperative that nothing should be read therein to invalidate the same. 40. In construing a will, no doubt, all possible contingencies are required to be taken into consideration, but it is also 8 a well-settled principle of law that only because a part of . ,--4 a document is invalid, the entire document need not be invalidated, if the former forms a severable part. The legatee admittedly did not have any issue, nor did he adopt or appoint any person.

In a situation of this nature, effect can be given to Clause 12 of the will, if it is read as occurring immediately after Clause 5 of the original will. fa. s the said clause stands on its own footing, its effect must be considered vis-a-vis Clause 6, but the court may not start with construction of Clauses 6 and 7, which may lead to a conclusion that Clause 5 is also invalid. The contingencies contemplated by Clause 6 may not have any i ,. effect on Clause 7, if it does not take place at all. The property which should have been purchased with the sale proceeds could have been the subject-matter of the bequest and in terms thereof the University of Calcutta became the beneficiary on the death of the original legatee. We do not find any reason as to why the same cannot be given effect to.

We have indicated hereinbefore that it is possible to construe Clause 7 of the will and in fact a plain reading thereof would, thus, lead to the -~ conclusion that it merely provides for an option given to the legatee to take recourse thereto. We have also indicated hereinbefore that the term "devise" in the context of Clause 7 does not carry any meaning and, therefore, the same for all iritent and purport should be substituted by the word "desire". As a matter of fact, the appellant in the copy of A the will supplied to us had also used the word "desire" in place of the word "devise", which would also go to show that even the appellant understood Clause 7 in that fashion. Clause 7, if so read, will have no application to the . ,. ... properties which were to be substituted in place of the ~immbvable properties belonging to the testator. The benefit of the sale proceeds, thus, in absence of any action on the part of the legatee in terms of Clause 7 shall also vest in the University.

Moreover, the questions as to whether the deed of sale purported to have been executed by the legatee in favour of Chamong Tea Co. Ltd. or other instruments executed by him in favour of the appellants . ~. herein are pending for consideration before the High Court. ' ' " ' rwhich may have to be determined on its own merit. In the event the said transactions are held to be: void, the question of giving any other or further effect to Clause 6 of the will may not arise. " In Anil Kak v. Kumari Sharda Raje & Ors. [2008 (6) SCALE 597], this Court stated : "The testator's intention is collected from a consideration of the whole Will and not from a part of it. If two parts of t the same Will are wholly irreconcilable, the court of law ~ would not be in a position to come to a finding that the Will dated 4. 11. 1992 could be given effect to irrespective of the appendices. In construing a Will, no doubt all possible contingencies are required to be taken into consideration.

Even if a part is invalid, the entire document need not be invalidated, only if it forms a severable part. [See Bajrang Factory Ltd. and Anr. 'v. University of Calcutta and Ors. [(2007) 1 sec 1831 -;-- In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth edition, Volume 50, page 332-33, it is stated : '462. Leading principle of construction: The 1. eading principle of construction which is applicable to all wills without qualification and overrides every. >--. ' other rule of construction is that the testator's intention is collected from a consideration of the whole will taken in connection with any evidence [S. S. SINHA, J. ] properly admissible, and the meaning of the will and i of every part of it is determined according to that intention'. " In Shyamal Kanti Guha (0) Through LRs. & Ors. v. Meena Bose [2008 (9) SCALE 363), it is stated : "Keeping in mind the aforementioned backdrop, the Will .. ,. 4. should be construed.

It should be done by a Court indisputably placing itself on the arm-chair of the testator. The endeavour of the Court should be'to give effect to his intention. The intention of the testator can be culled out not only upon reading the Will in its entirety, but also the " background facts and circumstances of the case. " Following the said principles, we have no hesitation to hold that the title to the said property vested in the appellant. 34. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the view that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside t . ~ accordingly. Appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 50,000/-. N. J. Appeal allowed.