NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA

Citation: [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 1141

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N. VARIAVA, B.P. SINGH, H.K. SEMA, S.B. SINHA

Case summary

NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA.pdf

Judgment text

NATHI DEVI v. RADHA DEVI GUPTA DECEMBER 17, 2004 [N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S. N. VARIAVA, B. P. SINGH, H. K. SEMA AND S. B. SINHA, JJ. ] Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 : Section 14D-Eviction-Right to immediate possession by a Widow- Pre existent tenant-Held, not available to transferee widow landlady. Interpretation of Statutes : Court-Interpretative function-To find out the true legislative intent-"- Every word used by the legislature be given effect to--Object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. Respondent after acquiring the tenanted premises filed eviction petition under Section 14D of the Act claiming herself to be widow and as such entitled to immediate possession. Appellant being the pre existing tenant sought leave to defend which was refused.

Noticing the conflict in the views taken by the two benches of three learned judges on reference of the word 'let out' whether to refer only to creation of tenancy or it refers to mean, in the context of Section 14A, that even a transferee landlord can invoke the said provision. Appellant contended that the premises in question had not been let out either by the respondent or her late husband, the petition under Section 14D, therefore, was not maintainable. The widow who applies for eviction of the tenant in occupation of the premises must establish that the premises were let out by her late husband or that the pre,mises were let out by her and that she requires the same for her own residence. The language employed leaves no room for doubt that the widow open whom a special right has been conferred to claim immediate possession of premises after evicting the tenant must satisfy the condition that the premises were let out by her or by her husband.

Clearly, therefore, if f - immediate possession of the premises for his own use. Only in the case of his death his dependant under Section 14-A, <'. nd his widow under Section 14D can seek immediate possession of the premises. The use ofthe expression, "let out by him" in Section 14B and 14C and the expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" in Section 14D have significance. If it was unnecessary in the scheme of these Sections as to who had actually let out the premises, the legislature wo11ld not have used the term "let out by him" or "let out by her, or by her husband". In interpreting a provision one cannot assume that the words employed by the legislature are redundant. Section 14D gives a right to file an application under that provision only to a widow ? -1 who had let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises. Consequently, ifthe premises had been let out by someone else, Section I4D \ NATHI DEVl v. RADHA DEVI GCJPTA (SINGH, J. ] 1159 "' will no(apply.

As pointed out in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) the expression used in Section 14B is "the premises let out by him", unlike the expression used in Section 14 (1) (e) where the legislature employed the expression "the premises let out for residential purposes". Thus in the case of a landlord belonging to the general category it was immaterial whether the premises was let out by him or by someone else, as long as he was the landlord . of the premises at the time of making an application seeking eviction of the tenant. But the expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" conveys a different meaning altogether. The widow's right to recover immediate possession of the premises arises only if the premises were let out by her or by her husband, and not by anyone else. It appears to us that the legislature has purposely employed a different expression in Section 14D as also in Section l4B and 14C.

We are here concerned with an application filed under Section 14D which specifies in clear terms that a widow can invoke the provisions only if she has let out the premises, or if her husband had let out the premises. If, as observed in Kanta Goel (supra), the expression, "the premises let out by him" has been used only to convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly, and not that he had himselflet out the premises, the legislature would not have then used the expression "let out by her, or by her husband. " The very fact that the Section specifies that the premises must be one which was let out bythe widow or by her husband implies that the provision would not apply to a premises let out by any other person.

If the intention of the legislature was to confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord, the use of the words "the premises let out by her, or by her husband" would have been unnecessary and the Section would have simply read as follows:- "Where the landlord is a widow and the premises are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. " By expressly providing that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband, the legislature has clearly excluded from the purview of the said provision "premises let out by any other person" even if in course of time the widow may have become its landlord. We are obliged to read the provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly employed by the legislature. The expression, "let out by her, or ; -~ by her husband" is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore, give it its normal meaning.

So understood the conclusion is inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a special right on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who let the premises or whose husband had let the premises before his death, and which premises the widow requires for her own use. Ifa widow becomes a landlord in relation to the tenanted premises, she in terms of Section 14(6) of the Act cannot evict the tenant before expiry } of 5 years from the date of purchase, as noticed hereinbefore. When two provisions of the same statute become applicable in a given case a harmonious construction should be taken recourse to. (See : Imdad Ali v. Keshav Chand and Others, [2003] . :1 SCC 635 para 7 and Ba/want Singh and Others v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Others, [2003] 3 SCC 433). Sections 14(6) and l4D of the Act, ifthe rule of harmonious construe• tion is not applied, would lead to an anomaly.

Such an anomaly can be removed ifthe negative test contained in Section 14(6) ofthe Act is applied in the construction of Section l 4D thereof, that is to say, as in terms of the earlier provision a transferee landlord cannot evict a tenant before expiry of five years from the date of purchase, Section 14D which provides for immediate recovery of the tenanted- premises would not be applicable. Furthermore, it is now well-settled that a statute should be read in a manner which would give effect to all the words used in the Act and in the event the decision of this Court in Kanta Goel (supra) is read in a manner suggested, the expressions "let out by her or by her husband" and "such· premises" in Section 14D would be otiose. Such a construction is not contemplated in law in view of the well settled principle that endeavour should be made to give effect to all the expressions used in a statute. There is another aspect ofthe matter.

Section 14D uses the expression, ~ "premises let out by her, or by her husband" which are required by the widow for her own residence. She may apply to the Reni Controller for recovering the immediate possession of "such premises". "Such premises" obviously is relatable to the premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot take within its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by any other person. We, therefore, find substance in the submission urged on behalfofthe appellant that Section 14D benefits only a class of widows viz. _,. _- f a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession ofthe premises owned by her and the expressions, "let out by her or by her husband" and "such premises" in Section 14D would be redundant.

The High Court, therefore, fell in error in thinking that only two conditions were required to be fulfilled for the application ofSection l 4D namely, the landlady is a widow, and the premises are required by her for her residence. In addition to these two requirements, in our view, Section 14D insists that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14D to evict a preexisting tenant. We, therefore, prefer the reasoning in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) which took the same view. Kanta Gael's case really was decided on another point, since it was held that the application of the landlord was not maintainable to evict another tenant on the same grounri, after he had already evicted a tenant on the same ground from another premises. Moreover, in Kanta Goel the parties had entered into a compromise and a decision on this point was, therefore, not necessary.

Since we have held that the respondent was not entitled to invoke the provisions of Section l4D of the Act, it would be futile to remit the matter to the Court of Additional Rent Controller for granting leave to defend. We therefore, aliow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order ofthe High Court as well as that of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi and c'. ismiss the application filed by the respondent under Section 14D of the Act. B. K. Appeals allowed. . -... _