NAVEEN KOHLI v. NEELU KOHLI

Citation: [2006] 3 S.C.R. 53

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: B.N. AGRAWAL, A.K. MATHUR, DALVEER BHANDARI

Case summary

NAVEEN KOHLI v. NEELU KOHLI.pdf

Judgment text

NAVEEN KOHLI v. NEELU KOHLI MARCH 2I, 2006 [B. N. AGRAWAL, A. K. MATHUR AND DALVEER BHANDARI, JJ. ] Hindu Law: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (as amended by 1976 Amendment): Sections JO and 13. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage--Ground for divorce-Cruelty in matrimonial cases-Husbandfiled a petition for divorce alleging that the wife was a bad-tempered woman of rude behaviour-It was further alleged that she, in collusion with her parents, got sufficient business property transferred in her name and that she indulged in indecent behaviour-The wife filed criminal cases against the· husband and made efforts to get him arrested thereby revealing her deep and intense feeling ofrevenge against the husband- Wife also filed fQ[_ged complaints against the husband under Ss.

3971398 of the Companies Act before the Company Law Board alleging that the husband was a criminal, infidel, forger, alcoholic and her manager to denigrate his position from the proprietor to an employee of her company-The wife also filed a false complaint using all kinds of abuses against the husband-The husband was continuously harassed by the police-The trial court found that the husband was mentally, physically and financially harassed and tortured by the wife-The trial court stated that many a time efforts had been made/or an amicable settlement, but there was no cordiality left between the parties and there was no possibility oftheir living together-The trial court ordered cancellation ofthe marriage between the parties under S. I3 and directed the husband to pay Rs.

5 lacs as the wife's livelihood allowance-The husband deposited the amount as directed but the wife did not withdraw the amount- On appeal, the High Court set aside the trial court's judgment holding that the actions ofthe appellant amounted to misconduct, uncondonable separately for the purpose ofSection 13(/)(i-a)-Correctness of-Held: It is the obligation ofthe Court that the marriage status should, as far as possible, as long as possible and whenever possible, be maintained-But when the marriage is totally dead, in that event, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage which in fact has ceased to exist--ln the instant case, there has been total disappearance ofemotional substratum in the marriage-- The wife is bent upon treating the husband with mental cruelty~lt is abundant(y clear that the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably and there is no chance oftheir coming together, or living together again- Hence, marriage between the parties dissolved- Incorporation ofirretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for the grant of divorce recommended Words and Phrases: "Cruelty"-Meaning of-Jn the context ofS.

I3 (l){i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. ''Irretrievable breakdown of marriage'' -Meaning of-Explained The appellant and the respondent are husband and wife. The appellant-husband filed a petition for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 alleging that the respondent-wife was a bad-tempered woman of rude behaviour. It was further alleged that she, in collusion with her parents, got sufficient business property transferred in her name and that she indulged in indecent behaviours. The respondent filed criminal cases against the appellant and made efforts to get him arrested thereby revealing her deep and intense feeling of revenge against the appellant. The respondent also filed a forged complaint under Sections 397/398 of the Companies Act, 1956 before the Company Law Board calling him a criminal, infidel, forger, alcoholic and her manager to denigrate his position from the proprietor to an employee of her company.

The respondent also filed a false complaint using all kinds of abuses against the appellant. The appellant was continuously harassed by the police. The trial court found that the appellant was mentally, physically and financially harassed and tortured by the respondent. The trial court stated that many a time efforts had been made for an amicable settlement, but there was no cordiality left between the parties and there was no possibility of their living together. The trial court ordered cancellation of the marriage between the parties under Section 13 of the Act and directed the appellant to pay Rs. 5 lacs as the respondent's livelihood allowance. The appellant deposited the amount as directed but the respondent did not withdraw the amount. NAVEEN KOHLI v. NEELU KOHLI 55 On appeal, the High Court set aside the trial court's judgment holding that th·e actions of the appellant amounted to misconduct, uncondonable separately for the purpose of Section 13(l)(a) of the Act.

Hence the appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1. The petition for divorce was filed primarily oli the ground of cruelty. Prior to the 1976 amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cruelty was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. It was only a ground for judicial separation under Section IO of the Act. By the 1976 Amendment, cruelty was made a ground for divorce. The words· which have been incorporated are "as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party". Therefore, it is not necessary for a party claiming divorce to prove that the cruelty treatment is of such a nature as to cause an apprehension reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him or her to live with the other party is sufficient. [67-B-D) N. G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, 11975) 2 SCC 326, Sirajmohmedkhan Janmohamadkhan v.

Harizunnisa Yasinkhan, (1981) 4 SCC 250, Shoba Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, 11988) 1 SCC 105 and V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, 11994) 1 sec 337, retied on. Bertram v. Bertram, (1944) 59, 60; Cooper v. Cooper, (1950) WN 200 (HL), Kas/efsky v. Kaslefsky, (1950) 2 All ER 398, Blyth v. Blyth, (1966) l All ER 524, Wright v. Wright, (1948) 77 CLR 191 and Gollins v. Gollins, (1946) AC 644, referred to. D. Tolstoy: "The Law and Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes" 6th Edu. , p. 61, referred to. 1. 2. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions and their culture and human values to which they attach importance. Each case has to be decided on its own merits. 170-EJ 2. 1. The word 'cruelty' has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs.

Ifthe intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of, cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not made any difference in the case. There may be instances of cruelty by unintentional but inexcusable conduct of any party. The cruel treatment may also result from the cultural conflict between the parties. Mental cruelty can be caused by a party when the other spouse levels an allegation that the petitioner is a mental patient, or that he requires expert psychological treatment to restore his mental health, that he is suffering from paranoid disorder and mental hallucinations, and to crown it all, to allege that he and all the members of his family are a bunch of lunatics. The allegation that the members of the petitioner's family are lunatics and that streak of insanity runs through his entire family is also an act of mental cruelty. 171-G-H; 72-A-CI 2. 2.

Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other. 172-D-EI Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, [2002] 2 SCC 73, relied on. 2. 3. The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and degree.

If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties; first, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second, the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. [76-G-H; 77-A-C) Gananth Pattnaik v. State ofOrissa, 12002] 2 SCC 619, Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002] 5 SCC 706, Chetan Dass v. Kam/a Devi, (20011 4 SCC 250, Sandhya Rani v. Ka/yanram Narayanan, 11994) Supp. 2 SCC 588, Chandrakala Menon v.

Vipin Menon, (1993] 2 SCC 6, Kanchan Devi v. NAVEEN KOHLI v. NEELU KOHLI Promod Kumar Mittal. (1996] 8 SCC 90, Swati Verma v. Rajan Verma, (2004] I SCC 123, Prakash Chand Sharma v. Vimlesh. (1995( Supp. 4 SCC 642, V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994( I SCC 337, A. Jaychandra v. Aneel Kumar, (2005] 2 SCC 22 and Sobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988] I SCC 105, relied on. 3. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained ofshould be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner - spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married life". The conduct taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law.

Conduct has to be considered, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely ' essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section I0 of the Act.

Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party. (77-C-G] 4. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spous~'s conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty.

Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in 58 SUPREME COURr REPORTS [2006] 3- S. C. R. matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent. [77-G-H; 78-A-BI 5. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting on another. Tolerance to each other's fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences should not be exagerated and magnified to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. All quarrels must be weighed from that point ofview in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case and always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A too technical and hypersensitive approach would be counter-productive to the institution of marriage.

The Courts do not have to deal with ideal husbands and ideal wives. It has to deal with a particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a mere ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to the Matrimonial Court. [78-C-El Durga Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy, (20051 7 SCC 353 and lalitha v. Manickswamy. (2001) DMC 679 SC, relied on. 6. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Because of the change of * circumstances and for covering a large number of cases where the marriages are virtually dead and unless this concept is pressed into service, divorce cannot be granted. Ultimately, it is for the Legislature whether to include irretreivable breakdown of marriage as a ground of divorce or not but the Legislature must consider irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for grant of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. (78-H; 79-A-B) 7.

Once the parties have separated and the separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and one of them has presented a petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The Court, no doubt, should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile the parties; yet if it is found that the breakdown is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. The consequences of preservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties. (80-G-H; 81-A) 8. A law of divorce based mainly on fault is inadequate to deal with a broken marriage. Under the fault theory, guilt has to be proved; divorce ) NAVEEN KOHLI v. NEELU KOHLI 59 courts are presented concrete instances of human behavior as bring the institution of marriage into disrepute. 181-BJ 9.

Once the marriage has broken down beyond repair, it would be unrealistic for the law not to take notice of that fact, and it would be harmful to society and injurious to the interests of the parties. Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be surmised that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie the law in such cases does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. [81-B-DJ to. Public interest demands not only that the married status should, as far as possible, as long as possible, and whenever possible, be maintained, but where a marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest lies in the recognition of that fact. (81-D-E) 11. Since there is no acceptable way in which a spouse can be I - --- the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Because of the change of circumstances and for covering a large number of cases where the marriages are virtually dead and unless this concept is pressed into services, the divorce cannot be granted. Ultimately, it is for the Legislature whether to include irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground of divorce or not but in our considered opinion the Legislature must consider irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for grant of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The 7lst Report of the Law Commission of India briefly dealt with the concept of Irretrievable breakdown of marriage. This Report was submitted to the Government on 7th April, 1978. We deem it appropriate to recapitulate the recommendation extensively.

In this Report, it is mentioned that during last 20 years or so, and now it would around 50 years, a very important question has engaged the attention of lawyers, social scientists and men of affairs, namely, should the grant of divorce be based on the fault of the party, or should it be based on the breakdown of the marriage? The former is known as the matrimonial offence theory or fault theory. The latter has come to be known as the breakdown theory. In the Report, it is mentioned that the germ of the breakdown theory, so far as Commonwealth countries are concerned, may be found in the legislative and judicial developments during a much earlier period. The (New Zealand) Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, 1920, included for the first time the provision that a separation agreement for three years or more was a ground for making a petition to the court for divorce and the court was given a discretion (without guidelines) whether to grant the divorce or not.

The discretion conferred by this statute was exercised in a case in New Zealand reported in 1921. Salmond J. , in a passage which has now become classic, enunciated the breakdown principle in these word: "The Legislature must, I think, be taken to have intended that separation for three years is to be accepted by this court, as prima facie a good ground for divorce. When the matrimonial relation has for that period ceased to exist de facto, it should, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, cease to exist de jure also. In general, it is not in the interests of the parties or in the interest of the public that a man and woman should remain bound together as husband and wife in law when for a lengthy period they have ceased to be such in fact. In the case of such a separation the essential purposes of .

marriage have been frustrated, and its further continuance is in general not merely useless but mischievous:' In the Report it is mentioned that restricting the ground of divorce to a particular offence or matrimonial disability, causes injustice in those cases where the situation is such that although none of the parties is at fault, or the fault is of such a nature that the parties to the marriage do not want to divulge it, yet there has arisen a situation in which the marriage cannot be worked. The marriage has all the external appearances of marriage, but none of the reality. As is often put pithily, the marriage is merely a shell out of which the substance is gone. In such circumstances, it is stated, there is hardly any utility in maintaining the marriage as a fagade, when the emotional and other bounds which are of the essence of marriage have disappeared.

It is also mentioned in the Report that in case the marriage has ceased to exist in substance and in reality, there is no reason for denying divorce, then the parties alone can decide whether their mutual relationship provides the fulfillment which they seek. Divorce should be seen as a solution and an escape route out of a difficult situation. Such divorce is unconcerned with the wrongs of the past, but is concerned with bringing the parties and the children to terms with the new situation and developments by working out the most satisfactory basis upon which they may regulate their relationship in the changed circumstances. On May 22, 1969, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland accepted the Report of their Moral and Social Welfare Board, which suggested the substitution of breakdown in place of matrimonial offences.

It would be of interest to quote what they said in their basis proposals: "Matrimonial offences are often the outcome rather than the cause of the deteriorating marriage. An accusatorial principle of divorce tends to encourage matrimonial offences, increase bitterness and widen the rift that is already there. Separation for a continuous period of at least two years consequent upon a decision of at least one of the parties not to live with the other should act as the sole evidence of marriage breakdown. " Once the parties have separated and the separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and one ofthem has presented a petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The court, no doubt, should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile the parties; yet, if it is found that the breakdown is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld.

The consequences of preservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties. A law of divorce based mainly on fault is inadequate to deal with a broken marriage. Under the fault theory, guilt has to be proved; divorce · courts are presented concrete instances of human behaviour as bring the institution of marriage into disrepute. We have been principally impressed by the consideration that once the marriage has broken down beyond repair, it would be unrealistic for the law not to take notice of that fact, and it would be harmful to society and injurious to the interests ofthe parties. Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be surmised that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction; though supported by a legal tie.

By refusing to sever that tie the law in such cases do not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. Public interest demands not only that the married s_tatus should, as far as possible, as Jong as possible, and whenever possible, be maintained, but where a marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest lies in the recognition of that fact. Since there is no acceptable way in which a spouse can be compelled to resume life with the consort, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied for ever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to exist. Some jurists have also expressed their apprehension for introduction of irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for grant of the decree of divorce. In their opinion, such an amendment in the Act would put human ingenuity at a premium and throw wide open the doors to litigation, and will create more problems then are sought to be solved.

The other majority view, which is shared by most jurists, according to the Law Commission Report, is that human life has a short span and situations causing misery cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely. A halt has to be called at some stage. Law cannot tum a blind eye to such situations, nor can it decline to give adequate response to the necessities arising therefrom. When we carefully evaluate the judgment of the High Court and scrutinize its findings in the background of the facts and circumstances of this case, then it becomes obvious that the approach adopted by the High Court in deciding this matter is far from satisfactory. The High Court ought to have considered the repercussions, consequences, impact and ramifications of all the criminal and other proceedings initiated by the parties against each other in proper perspective.

For illustration, the High Court has mentioned that so far as the publication of the news item is concerned, the status of husband in a registered company was only that of an employee and if any news item is published, in such a situation, it could not, by any stretch of imagination be taken to have lowered the prestige of the husband. In the next para 69 of the judgment that in one of the news item what has been indicated was that in the company, Nikhil Rubber (P) Ltd. , the appellant was only a Director along with Mrs. Neelu Kohli whom held 94. 5% share of Rs. I00/- each in the company. The news item further indicated that Naveen Kohli was acting against the spirit of the Article of the Association of Nikhil Rubber (P) Ltd. , had caused immense loss of business and goodwill. He has stealthily removed produce of the company, besides diverted orders of foreign buyers to his proprietorship firm Mis Navneet Elastomers. He had opened bank account with forged signatures of Mrs.

Neelu Kohli and fabricated resolution of the Board of Directors of the company. Statutory authority-Companies Act had refused to register documents filed by Mr. Naveen Kohli and had issued show cause notice. All business associates were cautioned to avoid dealing with him alone. Neither the company nor Mrs. Neelu Kohli shall be liable for the acts of Mr. Naveen Kohli. Despite the aforementioned finding that the news item was intended to caution business associates to avoid dealing with the appellant then to come to this finding in the next para that it will by no stretch of imagination result in mental cruelty is wholly untenable. The findings of the High Court that the respondent wife's cautioning the entire world not to deal with the appellant (her husband) would not lead to mental cruelty is also wholly unsustainable. The High Court ought to have examined the facts of the case and its impact.

Jn the instant case, the following cases were filed by the respondent against the appellant. I. The respondent filed FIR No. I00/96 at Police Station, Kohna under Sections 379/323 ! PC 2. The respondent got a case registered under Sections 323/324 registered in the police station Panki, Kanpur City. 3. At the behest of the respondent FIR No. 156 of 1996 was also filed in the police station, Panki. 4. The respondent filed FIR under Section 420/468 IPC at the Police Station, Kotwali. 5. The respondent got a case registered under Section under Sections 420/467/468 and 471 ! PC. 6. The respondent filed a complaint against the appellant under Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC at Police Station, Kohna. 7. The respondent had even gone to the extent of opposing the bail application of the appellant in criminal case filed at the police station, Kotwali 8.

When police filed final report in two criminal cases at police station, Kotwali and police station, Kohna, the respondent filed protest petition in these cases. 9. The respondent filed complaint no. 125 of 1998 in the Women Cell, Delhi in September 1997 against the appellant's lawyer and friend alleging criminal intimidation. 10. The respondent filed a complaint under sections 397/398 before the Company Law Board, New Delhi. 11. The respondent filed a complaint in Case No. 1365 Of 1988 against the appellant. 12. Again on 8. 7. 1999, the respondent filed a complaint in the Parliament Street Police Station, New Delhi and made all efforts to get the appellant arrested. 13. On 31. 3. 1999, the respondent have sent a notice for breaking the Nucleus of the HUF. 14. The respondent filed a complaint against the appellant under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 15. The respondent had withdrawn Rs. 9,50,000/- from the bank account of the appellant in a clandestine manner. 16. On 22. 1.

0I the respondent gave affidavit before the High Court and got non-bailable warrants issued against the appellant. 17. The respondent got an advertisement issued in a national newspaper that the appellant was only her employee. She got another news item issued cautioning the business associates to avoid dealing with the appellant. The findings of the High Court that these proceedings could not be taken to be such which may warrant annulment of marriage is wholly unsustainable. Even at this stage, the respondent does not want divorce by mutual consent. From the analysis and evaluation of the entire evidence, it is clear that the respondent has resolved to live in agony only to make life a miserable hell for the appellant as well. This type of adamant and callous attitude, in the context of the facts of this case, leaves no manner of doubt in our mind that the respondent is bent upon treating the appellant with mental cruelty.

It is abundantly clear that the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably and there is no chance of their coming together, or living together again. The High Court ought to have appreciated that there is no acceptable way in which the parties can be compelled to resume life with the consort, - .. nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to exist. Undoubtedly, it is the obligation of the Court and all concerned that the marriage status should, as far as possible, as long as possible and whenever possible, be maintained, but when the marriage is totally dead, in that event, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage which in fact has ceased to exist. In the instant case, there has been total disappearance of emotional substratum in the marriage. The course which has been adopted by the High Court would encourage continuous bickering, perpetual bitterness and may lead to immorality.

In view of the fact that the parties have been living separately for more than I0 years and a very large number of aforementioned criminal and civil proceedings have been initiated by the respondent against the appellant and some proceedings have been initiated by the appellant against the respondent, the matrimonial bond between the parties is beyond repair. A marriage between the parties is only in name. The marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what is already defunct de facto. To keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially more prejudicial to the public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond. The High Court ought to have visualized that preservation of such a marriage is totally unworkable which has ceased to be effective and would be greater source of misery for the parties.

The High Court ought to have considered that a human problem can be properly resolved by adopting a human approach. In the instant case, not to grant a decree ofdivorce would be disastrous for the parties. Otherwise, there may be a ray of hope for the parties that after a passage of time (after obtaining a decree ofdivorce) the parties may psychologically and emotionally settle down and start a new chapter in life. In our considered view, looking to the peculiar facts of the case, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the order of the Trial. Court. In our opinion, wisdom lies in accepting the pragmatic reality of life and take a decision which would ultimately be conducive in the interest of both the parties. Consequently, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and direct that the marriage between the parties should be dissolved according to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

In the extra-ordinary facts and circumstances of the case, to resolve the problem in the interest of all concerned, while dissolving the marriage between the parties,. we direct the appellant to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty five lacs) to the respondent towards permanent maintenance to be paid within eight weeks. This amount would include Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lacs with interest) deposited by the appellant on the direction of the Trial Court. The respondent would be at liberty to withdraw this amount with interest. Therefore, now the appellant would pay only Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty lacs) to the respondent within the stipulated period. In case the appellant fails to pay the amount as indicated above within the stipulated period, the direction given by us would be of no avail and the appeal shall stand dismissed. In awarding permanent maintenance we have taken into consideration the financial standing of the appellant.

Before we part with this case, on the consideration of the totality of A facts, this Court would like to recommend the Union of India to seriously consider bringing an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for the grant of divorce. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking B appropriate steps. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. In the facts and circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs. v. s. s. Appeal allowed.