NEELAVATHI AND ORS. v. M. NATARAJAN AND ORS (2)

Citation: [1980] 2 S.C.R. 307

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P.S. KAILASAM, A.D. KOSHAL

Case summary

37 ofthe Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act relates to Partition Suits. As the cowt fee was not paid,- the Trial ·E Court dismissed the suit, by its judgment dated 7-2-1974.

Judgment text

> ,.... ~ NEELAVATHI AND ORS. v. ' ... ' M. NATARAJAN AND ORS. "I November 30, 1979 tS. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ. J Court Fee payable-The question of Court fee payable must be i:on. iidercd in the light of the allegations made in the plaint. ~~Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act-Section 37-Plaint allegation is tliat the plaintiffs were illl joint possession· and the prayer was for partition and separate possession-The correct court fee payable is governed by Section 37 (ii) and not 37 (i). The plaintiffs, appellants filed a suit for partition and separate possession of their individual share as per law and paid a court fee at the rates prescribed under section 37 (ii) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees ·and Suit Valuation Act. There was a specific allegation that they were in joint possession. The Trial Court decreed the suit but directed the plaintiffs appellants to pay the court fee under Section 37 (1) of the Act.

As the difference in court fee was not paid the trial Court dismissed the suit. Two appeals were filed by the appellants i11 ttie High Court, one against the decision that they were liable to pay court fee on the market value of the property under section 37 (1) and another against the order dismissing the suit. The High Court heard the two appeals together and disposed of the appeals accepting the contention of the respondents/defendants that the Court fees are payable both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeals under Section 37 (1) of the Act. Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court HELD : 1. It is settled l3w that the question of Court fee must be considered in thei light of the allegation made in the plaint and its decision cannot be p influenced either by the_pleas in the written st~tement or by the final decision of the suit on merits. AU the material allegations contained in the plaint should be construed and taken as a whole.

[311 D-EJ In the instant case: (a) on reading of the plaint as a whole, it is clear that throughout the plaint, the plaintiffs/appellants have asserted that they were in joint possession and therefore the observation of the High Court that recitals in all the paragraphs is merely a · formal statement repeating the statutory language is not correct. (b) the plea that they were not given their due share would not amount to dispossession. Reading the plaint at its worst against the plaintiffs, all that could be discerned is that as the plainitffs were not given their share of the income, they could not remain in joint possession. The-statement that they are not being paid their income, would not amount to having been excluded from possession. The averment in the plaint cannot be understood as R stating that the plaintiffs were not in possession. In fact, the defendants unde1sklOd the plaint as stating that the plaintiffs are in joint possession of the suit properties.

In varagraph 18 of the written statement the defendants r,lead. :d T T that the plaintiffs have framed the suit as though they are in joint possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. Asserting that the plaintiffs were out of possession, the defendants stated: "While it is so, the allegation that they are ,, in joint possession of the suit properties, is not correct. " The mere fact that the plaintiffs were not paid their share of the income or were not in actual possession would not amount to the plaintiffs having been excluded from joint possession to which they are in law entitled. p1lD, 312 B-F] · S. Rm. Ar. S. Sri Catharina Chettiar v. \S. RM. Ar. Rm Raman:atl1en Chettiar, [1958] SCR 1021 @ PP 1031-32; followed. 2. Under section 37(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, relating to partition suits, the Court fee is payable, if the plaintiff . J. o;i ~·excluded" from possession of the property. The general principle of law is lhat in the 9.

-Se of co-owners, the possession of one is in law possession of all, unless ouster or exclusion is proved. To continue to be in joint possession in la. w if is not necessary that the. plaintiff should be in actual possession of the whole or part of the property. Equally it is not neces~ry that he ~hould be getting a share or some itlcome from the prpperty. So long as his right to a share and the nature of the property as joint is not disputed the law presumes that he is in joint possession unless he is excluded from such pos. ~ession. Before the pla,intiffs could be called upon to pay court fee under section 37 D Judge granted preliminary decree for partition and possession of the plaintiffs' 1/72 share in B. Schedule properties, and to certain shares in deposit in State Bank of India at Pollachi, and to the share in the Gnanambika Mills, on payment of court fees by th~ plaintiffs under S. 37(i) of the Court Fees Act. The Court granted time for payment of court fee till 15-2-1973.

As the cowt fee was not paid,- the Trial ·E Court dismissed the suit, by its judgment dated 7-2-1974. The plaintiffs filed two appeals-AS. No. 811 of 1975 against the decision of the Subordinate Judge holding that the plaintiffs are liable to pay cou~ fee _on the market value of the property under S. 37(1) of the Court Fees Act 'and A. S. No. 924 of 1974 against the order ,,. ·F dismissing the suit. The High Court heard both the appeals together and disposed them of by a common judgement. When the appeals were taken up, the defendants/respondents contended that the court fee ought to have been paid on the plaint under S. 37(1) and also on the ntemorandtim ·G of appeal before the High Court and as the proper court fee has not been paid, the appea1s ought to be dismissed. The High Court accepted the contention raised by the defendants and held that the plaintiffs are liable to pay court fee under S. 37(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees Act.

In coming to its conclusion, the High Court mainly relied on paragraph 12 of the plaint which reads as follows:- "Since the death of Vanavaraya· Gounder tl1e defendants 1 to 6 failed to give the plaintiffs their share of. income and NEELAVATHI v. M. NATARAJAN (Kailasam, !. ) 311 the plaintiffs could not remain·in joint possession. Therefore, the plaintiffs repeatedly demanded partition and the defendants 1 to 6 were evading. The 3rd plaintiff sent a notice through her counsel to defendants l, 2 and 5 to which the 3rd plaintiff received replies containing false and ' ' untenable a)legations. " ' The High Court proceeded to observe that while the statement that the plaintiffs· were in joint possession with the defendants occurring in other paragraphs of the plaint is merely a formal statement repeati..

ng the statutory language, the statement contained in paragraph 12 of the plaint constitutes a statement of fact in the context in which paragraph 12 occurs and consequently paragraph 13 of the plaint contains a clear avcrment that the plaintiffs could not remain in joint possession and that was the reason why they repeatedly demanded partition. If so, on the date of the suit, the plaintiffs were not in possession. The High Court held that court fee is payable under S. 37(1) of the Court Fees Act. On reading of the plaint as a whole, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court. It is settled law that the question of court fee must be considered in the light of the allegation made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on merits. All the material allegations contained in t11e plaint should be construed and taken· as a whole vide S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S.

Ram Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar('). The plaint in paragraph 5 states that Muthuknrnaraswamy Gounder died intestate• and undivided and Muthuknmaraswamy's father Vanavaraya Gounder was managing all the ancestral joint family property as the head of the Hindu· undivided joint family till his death. In paragraph 8 the plaintiffs stated that on the death of Muthukumaraswamy Gounder his 1/3rd share in the joint family properties devolved upon his sons and daughters. It further alleged that the plaintiffs were in joint possession of the properties alongwith Vanavaraya Gounder and his other sons. In paragraph 9, it is stated that each of the plaintiffs is entitled to a share in the suit properties as heirs of the late Muthukumaraswamy Gounder and also as heir of the late Vanavaraya Gounder. In paragraph 11, it is stated that since the death of Vanavaraya Gounder defendants 1 to 6 are receiving the income from the properties and are liable to account to the plaintiffs.

In paragraph 12, it is stated that since the death of Vanavaraya Gounder defedants I to 6 failed to give the (1) [1958] S. C. R. 1021 at pp. 1031 32. . ,, 312 SUPREME COU. RT REPORTS [1980] 2 S. C. R. plaintiffs their share of income and the plaintiffs cou! d not remain in joint possession. Therefore the plaintiffs demanded partition and the defendants 1 to 6 were evading. Again in paragraph . l 3, it is claimed that each of the plaintiffs as co-owners is in joint possession of the suit properties, and this action is laid to convert the joint possession into l ,, separate . possession so far as the shares of the plaintiffs are concerned. Throughout the plaint, the plaintiffs have asserted that they are in • joint possession. We are unable to agree with the High Court that recitals in all the paragraphs is merely a formal statement repeating the statutory language. The plea in paragraph 12 which was relied on by the Hi~ Court states that the defendants I to 6 failed to.

give~ the plaintiffs their share of the income and the plaintiffs could not remain in joint possession. The plea that they were not given their dUe' '· share would not amount to dispossession. Reading the plaint at its '· · worst against the plaintiffs, all that could be discerned is that as the plaintiffs were not given their share of the income, they could not remain in joint possession. The statement that they are not being paid their income, would not amount to having been excluded from possession. The averment in the plaint cannot be understood as stating that the plaintiffs were not in possession. In fact, the defendants understood the plaint as stating that the plaintiffs are 'in joint possession of the suit properties. In paragraph 18 of the written statement the defendants . pleaded that the plaintiffs have framed the suit as though they are in joint possession and enjoyment of the suit properties.

Asserting that the plaintiffs were out of possession, the defendants stated : "While it is so, the allegation that they are in joint possession of the suit properties, is not correct. " The Trial Court has not placed any reliance on the recitals in para 12 of the plaint on which the judgment of the High Court is based. The Trial Court found on evidence that the plaintiffs never enjoyed the suit properties at any time. This finding is not enough for, the mere fact that the plaintiffs were not paid their share of the income or were not in actual physical possession, would not amount to the plaintiffs having been excluded from joint possession to which they are in law • entitled. On a consideration of the plaint as a whole and giving it its natural meaning, we are unable to agree with the conclusion arrived · at by the High Court. S. 37 ofthe Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act relates to Partition Suits. S.

37 provides as follows :-- 37( 1) In a suit for partition and separate possession of a share of joint family property or of property owned, jointly NEELAVATHI v. M. NATARAJAN (Kailasam, I. ) 313 or in common, by a plaintiff who has been excluded from possession of such property, fee shall be computed on the market value of the plaintiff's share. 37(2) In a suit for partition and separate possession of joint family property or property owned, jointly or in com- 8 mon by a plaintiff who is in joint possession ·of such property, fee shall be paid at the rates prescribed. • · II will be seen that the court fee is payable under S. 37 (1) if the . plaintiff is 'excluded" from possession of the property. The plaintiffs who are sisters of the defendants, claimed to be members of the. Joint Family, and prayed for partition alleging that they are in joint por. sesion. Under the proviso to S.

6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956) the plaintiffs being the daughters of the male Hindu who died after the commencement of the Act, having at the time of the death an interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property, acquired an interest by devolution under rhe Act. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs are entitled to a share. The property to which the plaintiffs are entitled is undivided. 'joint family property! '; though not in the strict sense of the term. The general principle of law is that in the case of co-owners, the possesion of one is in law possession of all, unless ouster or exclusion is proved. To continue to be in jolnt possession in law, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should be in actual possession of the whole or part of the property. Equally it is not necessary that he should be getting a share or Some income from the, property.

So long as his right to a share and the nature of the property as joint is not disputed the law presumes that he is in joint possession unless he is excluded from such possession. Before the plaintiffs could be called npon to pay court fee under S. 37(1) of the Act on the ground that / they had been excluded from possession, it is necessary that on a reading of the plaint, there should be a clear and specific av&ment in the plaint that they had been "exclnded" from joint possession to which • . they are entitled in law. The averments in the plaint that the plaintiff could not remain in joint possession as he was not given any income from the joint family property would not amount to his exclusion from possession. We are unable to read into the plaint a clear and specific admission that the plaintiff had been excluded from possession. In the result the appeal is allowed with cost.

Ae we have found that the Trial Court was in error in directing the plaintiffs to pay the ff court fee under S. 37(1), the. preliminary decree for partition and possession of 1/72 share in the B. Schedule properties and the shares in 21-868SCI/79 ______,___ ~ -,. ,,- -··,... , - 314 SUPREMR COURT REPORTS [i980] 2 S. C. R. A deposit in State Bank of fodia at Pollachi, and in the share in the Gnanambika Mills,. is confirmed. The direction by the Trial Court as to payment of Court Fee under S. 37(1) of the Court Fees Act and the judgment of the High Court in A. S. No. 924/1974 and A. S. 811/75 are set aside. B S. R. Appeal allowed. • ,·~ ( ,; . . k - •