NEW PRAKASH TRANSPORT CO. LTD. v. NEW SUWARNA TRANSPORT CO. LTD.
Citation: [1957] 1 S.C.R. 98; 1956 INSC 48
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS , NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, S.K. DAS
Judgment date:
Case summary
1956 INSC 48. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1956-09-30. NEW PRAKASH TRANSPORT CO. LTD. v. NEW SUWARNA TRANSPORT CO. LTD. Read the judgment and case...
Judgment text
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19571 instance, and (2) on the ground that the interest which Rajes gets under the trust deed either as regards the general properties covered by the deed or as regards premises No. 44/2, Lansdowne Road, is contingent, are untenable. If, as a fact, either the debts remain undis-· charged or the alternative accommodation has not so far been provided, how the rights of persons affected thereby are to be safeguarded is not a matter that arises for consideration before us and we express no. opinion thereupon. This. appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismi. be considered by a Regional Transport Authority at the time of disposing of an application. for a stage carriage permit are set out in s. 47. They include the interest of the public generally, the adequacy of exist-ing road transport service and tht: benefits to any particular locality. The Authority is also enjoined to.
take into consideration aay representations made hv persons already providing road transport facilities along the proposed route or by any local authority QC police authority within whose jurisdiction the proposed route lies. Section 48 empowers a Regional Transport Authority, after taking into consideration matters set forth in s. 47, ·to restrict the number of stage carriages and to impose conditions on stage carriage permits. Section 64 provides for right of appeal against specified kinds of orders passed by the Provincial or Regional Transport Authority to the "prescribed authority". It also in terms provides that on an appeal being filed to the prescribed authority, it shall give the appellant and the original authority, that is to say, the authority against whose orders the appeal had been brought, "an opportunity of being heard.
" Section 64 which crcatC5' the right of appeal docs not in terms speak of a like opportunity being given to the persons against whom the appeal had been filed. But r. 73 framed by the Government in pursuance of its rule-making power conferred by s. 68, lays down that the authority to decide an appeal against the orders of a Regional Transport Authority under s. 64 of the Act shall be the Chairman and two members of the Provincial Transport Authority. The rule further Rrovides that on receipt of an appeal, the Chairman shall appoint the time and place for hearing the appeal and shall give not less than thirty days notice to the appellant, the original authority, and "any other person interested in the appeal" and on such appointed or a_djourned date the Appellate Authority "shall hear such persons as may appear and, after such further enquiry, if any, as it may .
deem necessary, confirm, vary, or set aside the order against which the appeal is preferred and make any consequential or incidental order rhat may be just or proper". It will thus be seen that though the substantive section creating the right of appeal does not in terms create any r. ight in a respondent to be heard, the rules framed providing for the procedure before the Appellate Authority contemplate that sufficient notice shall be given to "any other person interested in the appeal" which expression must include persons other than the appellant who may be interested in being heard against the points raised in support of the appeal. Neither tlie sections nor the rules framed under the Act contemplate anything like recording oral or documentary evidence in the usual way as in courts of law.
Besides, the parties interested in the grant of stage carriage permits or those interested against it, the police authority of the locality is also entitled to be heard both at the original stage and at the appellate stage. Thus the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed " thereunder with particular reference to the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority do not contemplate anything like a regular hearing in a court of justice. No elaborate procedure has been prescribed as to how the parties interested have to be heard in connection with the question, who is to be granted a stage carriage· permit. The judgment of the High Court under appeal has made copious quotations trom the decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in support of its conclusion that the principles of natural justice had not been sufficiently complied with in the present case by simply reading out the subsequent police report at the time the Appellate Authority/ was hearing the appeal.
The learned Judges of the Appeal Court have observed that the contents of a long report such as the second report was, could not be carried in one's head. :fhey also observed that in order to present its case effectively the first respondent was entitled not only to have the report read out but also to study it so that it could understand it and state its case fully and effectively before the Appellate Authority. We have to examine those several precedents relied upon by the High Court to see how far its conclusions are supported by authority. But before we do that, it has got to be 107 supplier of transport _facilities. Such a report is meant more for the use of the authority in making or refusing a grant than for the use of the several applicants or any one of them. In other words, it is in the nature of information supplied by the police in order to assist the authority in making up its mind.
In the present case when the subsequent police report was read out by the Chairman, neither the appellant nor the first respondent, nor for the matter of that any of the other parties, raised any objection to the use of that docu-ment or asked for an adjournment on the ground either that it had been taken by surprise or that it had materials to offer in opposition to the report. The learned Judges of the High Court have observed in the course of their judgment under appeal that though it is the essence of the business of tribunals like the one under the Motor Vehicles Act to transact business expeditiously, the business of the authority would not have suffered much if a copy of the report had been given to the parties concerned and the case adjourned for- a short time. It appears that no such adjournment had been prayed for on behalf of any of the parties who, it appears, had been represented by counsel.
But then the High Court has observed further that "the duty is laid not upon counsel who appears but upon the tribunal which administers justice. It is incumbent on every tribunal which acts judicially to see that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, and that the elementary rule of natural justice of giving a fair and proper hearing to every one concern-. ed is followed. We think that the Appellate Authority erred in rushing through without giving a proper and· effective chance. to the appellant to state its case. " In our opinion, the High Court has made a number of assumptions in making those observations which do. not appear to be justified by the scheme of the legislation we are dealing with or by any a priori considera-. tions of what has been characterized as "natural justice".
The tribunal in question was not administer-ing justice as a court of law, though while deciding as between the rival claims of the applicants for a permit it had to deal with them in a fair and just manner. ,,,. r·' But a tribunal even acting "judicially" is not obliged to grant an adjournment suo motu without any application on behalf of any of the parties interested. We do not find that any of the parties made at that time any grievance about the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority. But the question appears to have been raised for the first time before the High Court after the Appellate Tribunal had decided to grant the permit to the appellant. In this connection it has also to be observed that the subsequent police report had said nothing directly against the first respondent which it would be interested in controverting.
The subsequent police report had only withdrawn some of the adverse com-ments against the conduct of the appellant which had been found to have been made under a misunderstanding. But the subsequent report still contains some minor complaints against the appellant. Those matters were apparently considered by the Appellate Authority not to be so serious as to stand in the way of the appellant getting the permit, especially when that authority had previously decided upon the policy that monopoly of supplying transport facility should not be allowed to continue in favour of the first respondent. Hence, in our opinion, there was nothing in the rules requiring a copy of the police report to be furnished to any of the parties, nor was there any circumstance necessitating the adjournment of the hearing of the appeal, particularly when no request for such an adjournment had been made either by the first respondent or by any other party.
At that time none of the parties appears to have made any grievance about the police report only being read at by the Chairman or any request for an adjournment in order to adduce evidence pro anci con. The rules framed under Chapter IV for "the conduct and hearing of the appeals that may be preferred under this chapter (s. 68 (2)(b))" do not contemplate any such facilities being granted to the parties, though it is open to the Appellate Authority to make any such "further enquiry, if any, as it may . deem necessarv. " But the High Court Bench appears to have taken the •iew that, rule or no rule, request or no request for an adjournment, the rules of natural justice made it incumbent upon the Appellate Authority to stay its hands in order that "a proper and effective chance was given to the first respondent to state its case. " There was not much of a case to state because, each party applying for the permit must be presumed to have pressed its claim upon the Appellate Authority.
We have therefore to examine the precedents discussed in detail jn the judgment under appeal to see how far the Appellate Bench was justified in holding that the rules of natural justice had been contravened by the Appellate Authority. The earliest decision of the House of Lords brought to our notice in this connection is the case of Spackman 1 v. Plumstead Board of Works( ). In that case the question arose on a prosecution for infringement of an Act of Parliament making provision for fixing the "general line of buildings" in a road. The certificate of the superintending architect as to the general line of buildings came in for discussion as to whether the architect, before deciding as to how the general line has to be fixed, had to hear the parties concerned. In that connection that Earl of Selborne, L. C.
, made the following observations :- "No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons, to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any . k. ind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice.
But it appears to me to be perfectly consistent with reason, that the statute may have intentionally omitted to provide for form, because this is a matter not of a kind requiring form, not of a kind requiring litiga-tion at all, but requiring only that the parties should. ha,ve an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound such considerations as in their judgmerit ought to be brought before him.. When that is done, from the nature of the case no further· proceeding as to summoning the parties, or as to doing anything of that kind which a judge might have to do, . " 1s necessary. (1) (1885) IO A. C. 229, 240. Another leading case on the subject is the decision of the House of Lords in the well-known case of Board of 1 Education v. Rice( ). Their Lordships in that case had to discuss the duty of the Board of Education under s. T of the Education Act, 1902. Lord Loreburn, L. C.
, in the course of his speech referred to the provisions of the Act and made the following observations as to. the duty to decide certain questions relating to non-provided schools :- "Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upoR departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in many others, what comes for determination is sometimes a matter to be. settled by dis-cretion, involving no law. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases. the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything.
But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and. need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they thirik best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. u (1) [19tt] A. C. 179, 182. How far judicial opinion may vary as to the content of the rule of natural justice is amply illustrated by the case of Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex parte 1 Arlidge ( ), at different stages. The rule nisi for a certiorari was first heard by Ridley, Lord Coleridge and Bankes, JJ. The case related to the powers of the Local Government Board under the Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c. 44) refusing to terminate its orders closing a dwelling-house as unfit for habitation and the procedure for hearing an appeal against such an order.
Section 29 of the Act provided that such an appeal shall be heard and disposed of according to the procedure laid down by the Local Government Board, provided that the rules shall provide that the Board shall not dismiss any appeal without having first held a public local inquiry. It was unanimously held by the Court discharging the rule that the Local Government Board was not bound to hear the appellant or any one on his behalf after the report of the inspector on the public local inquiry had been received, before dismissing the appeal. At the public local inquiry the owner of the house affected bv the closing order had been represented. But at the • time the appeal was finally disposed of, there was no hearing of the appellant or his representative as in a court of law. The Court repelled the argument that the appellant had a right to be heard by the Local Government Board and to know the contents of the report made by the inspector who had held the public local inquiry.
Relying mainly upon the judgment of Lord Loreburn, L. C. , in the case of Board of Education v. Rice (supra), the Court decided that the procedure indicated by the rules framed under the statute in question had been followed and that there was no other or further obligation on the Board to hear the appellant either personally or through his representative or counsel, because there was no indication in the statute to that effect. The matter was taken in appeal in Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex parte Arlidge('), and the Court of Appeal by a majority (Vaughan Williams and Buckley, L. JJ. , Hamilton, LJ. dissenting (1) (1913] I K. B. ¢3. (2) [1914] I K. B. 16o. S-75 S. C. Indiaf59 allowed the appeal holding that it was contrary to the principles of natural justice that the Board should have dismissed the appeal without disclosing to the appellant the contents of their inspector's report and without giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard in support of the appeal.
They, therefore, quashed the order dismissing the appeal. The majority judgment pointed out that the Act and the rules framed thereunder except for certain matters were silent as to the procedure and that in the absence of such specific provisions the non-disclosure of the inspector's report was contrary to principles of natural justice on which English law is based. It further held that the appellant before the Board was entitled to a hearing and that as the appellant had not the opportunity of seeing and considering the report and the documents which the deciding authority had before it, the a ppel-lant had been denied full opportunity of being heard. It went to the length of observing that the non-disclosure of the report and the documents which were taken into consideration by the Board when the disclosure had been asked for, was itself inconsistent with natural justice. Hamilton, L. J.
, in his dissenting judgrntnt pointed out that the report of the inspector • in the case, as in other Government departments, is only a statement of facts made for the information of the officials of the department and that it could not be assumed that the kgislature meant all such reports to be communicated to those interested where it does not say the contrary. He further pointed out that the practice was the other way, namely, to specify how and to whom such reports were to be communicated, (when they are intended to be communicated at all. ) Dealing with the question how far the requirements of natural justice had been fulfilled, the Lord Justice observed at p 199 that "It has often been pointed out that the expression (natural justice) is sadly lacking in precision. " Then he referred to a number of precedents dealing with the question of ·natural justice as to how the connotation of the expression differed in different contexts. He further observed at pp.
201 & 202 :- "The Local Government Board here is a statutory tribunal, . anomalous as compared with common law Courts, created by the Legislature for a special class of appeals and endowed by it with the . power of formula" ting its own procedure. " He also adopted the dictum of Loreburn, L. C. , in Board of Education v, Rice (supra) that the Board must "act in good faith and fairly listen to. both sides. " Against the judgment of the majority of the CQurt quashing the determination of the appeal by the Board there was an appeal to the House of Lords.. The House of Lords unanimously adopted the opinion of Hamilton, L. J. (later Lord Summer), allowed the appeal and set aside the majority decision. [Vide Local 1 Government Board v. Arlidge( ) ]. In the course of his speech Viscount Haldane, L. C. , made the following observations :- "My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially.
They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same. " His Lordship adopted the _dictum· of Lord Loreburn, LC. , in the leading case of Board of Education v. Rice (supra). Lord Shaw in his speech made the following observations which are very apposite to the facts and circumstances of this ca~e :- "The judgments of the majority of the Court below appear to me, if I may say so with respect, to be dominated by the idea that the analogy of judicial methods or procedure should apply to departmental action. Judicial methods may, in many points of administration, be entirely unsuitable, and produce delays, expense, and public and private injury.
The department must obey the statute. " (lJ [1915) A. C. 120, 132. He further observed at p. 138 as follows :- "And the assumption that the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate those of Courts of justice 1s wholly unfounded. This is expressly applicable to steps of procedure or forms of pleading. In so far as the term 'natural justice' means that a result or pro-cess should be just, it is· a harmless though it may be a high-sounding expression; in so far as it attempts to reflect the old jus naturale it is a confused and un-warranted transfer into the ethical sphere of a term employed· for other distinctions; and, in so far as it is resorted. to for other purposes, it is vacuous.
" Lord Parmoor in his speech also reiterated the prin-ciple governing the procedure of · a quasi-judicial tribunal in these words :- "Where, however, the question of the propriety of procedure is raised in a hearing before some tribunal other than a Court of law there is no obligation to adopt the regular forms of legal procedure. It is sufficient that the case has been heard in a judicial spirit and in accordance with the principles of substantial justice. " Another recent decision of the House of Lords in the 1 case of General Medical Council v. Spackman( ) was relied upon by the High Court in the judgment under appeal. In that case the General Medical Council, which had been con.
tituted a domestic forum to determine whether a case had been made out for striking off the name of a medical practitioner from the medical register "for infamous conduct in a professional respect," was the appellant before their Lordships, and the respondent had been found guilty by the Divorce Court of having committed adultery. In the proceed-ings before the Medical Council the medical practitioner proceeded against desired to call fresh evidence on the issue of adultery and requested the Council to rehear that issue. The Council declined to reopen the issue and to hear fresh evidence and directed his name to be erased from the register. The Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the view of the dissenting Judge in the Court of first instance that there had been no (1) [1943] A. C. 827. S. C. R. SUPR! ME COURT REPORTS 115 "due inquiry" as required by s. 29 of the . Medical Act, 1858. The Appeal Court set aside the majority decision of Viscount Caldecote, C. J. , and Humphreys, J.
, who had held that the requirements of the law had been satisfied by adopting the judgment and decree of the Divorce Court. On appeal by the Medical Council to the 'House of Lords, the House unanimously agreed with the unanimous decision of the Appeal Court and held that the requirement of due Inquiry enjoined by the Act creating the Tribunal had not been satisfied. Viscount Simon, L. C. , examined the provisions of the Act and the relevant rules and pointed out that they require the practitioner proceeded against "to state his case, and to produce the evidence in support of it. " The Lord Chancellor in the course of his speech observed that the General Medical Council was not a judicial body in the ordinary sense, was master of its own procedure and was not bound by strict rules of evidepce. It was bound to satisfy the requirements of the law and the rules made thereunder. The Council had to decide on sworn testimony after due inquiry.
He also adopted the language of Lord Loreburn, L. C. , in the aforesaid case of Board of Education v. Rice (supra). Lord Atkin in the course of his speech pointed out that the rules under the Act provided that the Council was bound, if requested, to hear all the evidence that the practitioner charged wished to bring before them. He also pointed out the antithesis between convenience and justice by saying "convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. " His Lordship further pointed out. the difference between the procedure which may be prescribed in re! i! Ject of different tribunals which were t. i;eations of statutes, in these words :- "Some analogy exists, no doubt, between the various procedures of this and other not strictly judicial bodies, but I cannot think that the procedure which may be very just in deciding whether to close a school or an insanitary house is necessarily right in deciding a charge of infamous conduct against a professional man.
I would, therefore, demur to any sug-gestion that the words of Lord Loreburn, L. C. , in Board of Education v'. Rice (supra) afford a complete guide to the General Medical Council in the exercise of their duties. As I have said, it is not correct that 'they need not examine witnesses. ' They must examine witnesses if tendered, and their own rules rightly provide for this. Further it appears to me very doubt-ful whether it is true that 'they have no power to administer an oath'. '' It may be noticed that the Lords who sat on that case particularly emphasized the requirements of the law as laid down in the statute and the rules framed thereunder. In view of these statutory provisions they found it necessary to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal which had set aside the judgment and orders of the King's Bench Division which had taken the contrary view, to the effect that the decree in the Divorce Court was conclusive evidence on which the Medical Council could act.
The case is therefore authority for the proposition that the rules of natural justice have to be inferred from the nature of the tribunal, the scope of its enquiry and the statutory rules of procedure laid down by the law for carrying out the objectives of the statute. There is another class of cases which lay down that if a person is to be deprived of his professional status, he must be heard and be given effective opportunity of meeti_ng any allegation made against him on the quest10n of his fitness to pursue his profession.
If the tribunal constituted by the statute in question to decide about the fitness of an individual to pursue that profession, decides against him without giving him an opportunity of meeting any allegations against him bearing on his capacity or qualification for the profession to which he claims admission, it has been held that it was improper for the tribunal acting in a quasi-judicial capacity to act to his prejudice upon evidence or adverse report without his having an opportunity of meeting such r~lcvant allegations made against him. To that class belongs the case of R. v. Architects Registration Tribunal( ). In that case the King's Bench Division issued an order of certiorari to quash (1) [19451 2 A. E. R. 131. the tribunal's · decision refusing an application for registration as an architect. The cases of Leeson v. General Council of Medical 1 Education and Registration( ), and Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (2) also belong to that category.
They deal with the power of the General Council of Medical Education under the Medical Act (21 & 22 Viet. c. 90) to strike off a medical practitioner for unprofessional conduct. Those were cases in which the Medical Council had to function as a quasi-judicial body and had to proceed according to the procedure laid down in the rules framed under the Act aforesaid. They had therefore to function, not exactly as courts of law, but as domestic tribunals created by the statute to function according to the statutory rules in a fair and just manner, that is to say, that they should have no personal interest in the controversy and should have given a full and fair opportunity to the person proceeded against to place. his case before the tribunal. Another class of cases is illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury( 3 ).
In that case the Archbishop of Canterbury reviewing the order of the Bishop refused to approve the clerk presented by the patron to a benefice. Acting under s. 3 of the Benefices (Exercise of the Rights of Presenta-tion) Measure, 1931, the Court repelled the argument on behalf of the disappointed patron that as the decision involved a deprivation of property rights there was an obligation upon the Archbishop to act in a quasi-judicial manner. Lord Greene, M. R. , who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed that there was no "justification for regarding the matter when it comes before the Ai-chbishop as in any sense, or by any re-mote analogy, a ! is inter partes". Hence the Court on a true construction of s. 3 of the Measure came to the conclusion that the Archbishop was not required to arrive at his decision by conducting a quasi-judicial enquiry. This case, therefore, is an authority for the (1) (1890] 43 Ch. D. 366. (3) (1944] 1 A. E. R. 179 (g) (1894] I Q. B. 750.
proposition that simply because property rights are involved, - the authorities charged with the duty of deciding claims to such rights are not necessarily, apart from the provisions of the statute, required to function as quasi-judicial tribunals. As already· pointed out, the Appellate Authority had to function in a quasi-judicial capacity in accordance with the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act. That Act has made ample provisions for safeguarding the interests of rival claimants for permits. The prov1S1ons of the Act were examined in detail by a Bench of five Judges of this Court in the case of Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (t ). This Court examined elaborately the provisions of the Att vis-a-vis the authorities created by the Act to administer its provisions relating to the grant of stage carriage permits. It also examined how far the High Court exercising its special powers to issue writs under Art.
226 of the Constitution could interfere with the orders made by those authorities. In the course of its judgment this Court made the following observations at page 596, which are very relevant to the present purpose:- "Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had.
" Keeping in view the observations of this Court quoted above and the principles of natural justice discussed in the several authorities of the highest Courts in England, we have to see how far the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder justify the criticism of the High Court that the Appellate Authority did not give full and effective opportunity to the first respondent to present his point of view before it. As alread. Y indicated, the statutory (1) (1952] S. C. R. 583. S. CR. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119 provisions do not c~ntemplate that either the Regional I956 Transpor~ Authority or the App. rlla. te Authority ~a~ to New Prakash record evidence or to proceed as 1f they were funct10mng Transport co. Ltd as a court of law. They had to decide between a v. number of applicants . as to which of them was suitable New Suwarna for the grant of the fresh permit a pp lied for. They Transport Co. Ltd.
took into consideration all the relevant matters and --- 1 came to their decision which has not been attacked as Sinha · parti:,tl or perverse. The only ground which survived before the Appellate Bench of the High Court was that the requiremt:>nts of natural justice had not been satisfied. The only question that we ha veto determine is whether the Appellate Authority was justified in miing the second report made by the police, though it had not been placed into the hands of the parties. That report did not directly contain any allegations against the first rmipondent. Hence there was nothing in that report which it could be called upon to meet. The only effect of the report was that many of the objections raised against the suitability of the appellant had been withdrawn by the police on further consideration of their records. The police report is more for the information of the authorities concerned with the granting of permit8 than for the u.
se of the several applicants for such permits. In our opinion, therefore, the fact that the Appellate Authority had read out the contents of the police report was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice. We have also pointed out that no grievance was made atthe time the Appellate Authority was hearing the appeal by any of the parties, particularly by the first respondent, that the second report should not have been considered or that they wished to have a further opportunity of looking into that rep~rt and to controvert any matter contained therein. They did not move the Appellate Authority for an adjournment of the hearing in order to enable it to meet any of the statements made in that report. But the learned counsel for the respondent suggested that the requirements of natural justice could not be waived by any of the parties and that it was incumbent upon the Appellate Authority to observe the so-called rules of natural justice.
In our '95 opinion, there is no warrant for such a proposition. New P. akash Even in a court of law a party is not entitled to raise ·ransport co. Ltd. the question at the appellate stage that he should v. have been granted an adjournment which he did not " New Suwarna pray for in the court of first instance. Far less, such ransport Co. Ltd. a claim can be entertained in an appeal from a tribunal Sinha J. which is not a court of justice, bu~ a statutory body functioning in a quasi judicial way. For the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, the judgment under appeal is erroneous and must be set aside and we are further of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge of that Court had taken the more correct view of the legal position. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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