OM PRAKASH GUPTA ETC. v. DIG VIJENDRAPAL GUPTA ETC

Citation: [1982] 3 S.C.R. 491

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: A.D. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, R.B. MISRA

Case summary

The finding returned by the trial court was sought to be challenged on behalf or the tenant on the ground that the date of occupation should be taken to be the date of completion of the cqnstru~ion of the shop and not the date of the first assessment....

Judgment text

OM PRAKASH GUPTA ETC. v. DIG VIJENDRAPAL GUPTA ETC. • ii~ March 5, 1982 [A. D. KosHAL, V. BA. LAKRISHNA BRAD! AND R. B. MISRA, JJ. J U. P. Urban Building• (&gu/ation ofLetting, &nt and Eviction) Act 1972. S. 2 (1) and Expln. 1 ands. 39. Applicability ofth• Act-Act not to apply to building for a period oft411 ~ ytars from 'date ofcompletion ofconstruction'. Date ofcompletion ofconstruction--What is-'Date offirst assessmen1• ifasussed-'Date ofoccupation' when no record ofcompletion ofconstruction or of asstssnunt. · Interpretation of Statutes-Intention oflegislature-To ht ascertain«/ primarily Jrom words 11std by legislative-Question ofinterpretation . arises whtlt language ambiguous. Tho U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Lotting, Rent and (Eviction) Act, 1972 provided by sub~section (2) of section 2 that except as provided in the Act, the Act was not to apply to a building during a period of 10 years from the date on which its construction was completed.

Explanation I to the sub-section provided that the building shaU be deemed t have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction, and in case of a building subject to assessment. the date on which the first. assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different,_ the earliest of the said date, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied for the first time. The appellant-tenant was in occupation of a shop from the 16th June, 1967 and prior to his occupation the shop was in occupation of another tenant for about a month and a half. The first a8'essment of tho shop took place on ! st of April, 1968. The respondent-landlord filed a suit for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the Act did not apply to the shop ·and the tenant was liable to eviction.

The Trial Judge finding that the construction of the shop was completed in the year 1967 and that 10 years having not elapsed since then, held that tho provisions of tho Act did not apply and decreed tho suit. The appellant's 492 SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s. c. R. petition under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was dis.. missed. In bis revision petition to the-High Court under section llS of the Civil Procedure Code the appellant contended that the date of occupation should be taken to be the date of completion of the construction of the shop and not the date of first assessment. The High Court overruled the contention and held that the constru:tion of the shop would be deemed to have been completed on 1st of April, 1968 the date of the first assessment and ten years not having elapsed, 8 the Act would not be applicable to the building and dismissed the revision petition.

In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant: (1) that by Virtue of sub-s~ction (2) of s'! ction 2, the Act would be applicable to the shop in question and that the e. :ttemption created by the sub-section did not embrace bui1diogs constructed prior to the commencement of the Act and (2) that the building should be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th June, 1967 and not on the date or the first assessment. and that the appellant wa~ entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act. Dismissing the appeal, HELD: l(i) The suit was rightly decreed by the Courts below. The Act had no application and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section 39. [498 G-H] (ii) Primarily, the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the legislature. The first and primary rule of construction is'that the intenti~n of the legislature must be _found in the words used by the legislature itself.

The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambigUoua and, therefore capable of two interpretations. [497 F) (iii) The language of sub-section (2) of section Zof the Act is explict and unambiguous and is not capable of two interpretations. [497 Gl In 'the absence of ally ambiguity there is no question of taking any external aid for the interpretation of the sub-section. The sub-section contem- ' plates that the Act shall not apply to a building during a period of 10 yesrs from the date on which its construction is completed. It no where says that the build- ' ing should have been constructed after the enforcement of the Act and to inter· . J, pret it in such a way would be to add words to the sub-section. which is not .. permissible. [497 D-F) '-. ,.

- 2 (i) Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation wollld be taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment thereof. If there is an assessment, as in the instant case it will be the date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the construction. The building had not therefore become more than ten years' old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court and consequently there was no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of the Act to the appellant. [498 D-F] OM PRAKASH v. DIGVUENDRAPAL (Mi8ra, J. ) 493 (ii) In order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of the commencement of the Act which was 15th of July, 1972. (498 F] In the instant case the suit was filed ou 23rd of March 1974 long after the commencement of the Act.

(498 F] (iii) In view of sub-section (2) of section 2, the Act is not applicable to a building which has not a standing of ten years. If the Act itself was riot appli- . • cable, it would be &bsurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable. [498 O] . Rattan Lal Shlnghal v. Smt. Murti Devi (1980) 4 S. C. C. 258 andRam Saroop Rai v. Lilavati (1980) 3 S. C. C. 452, over-ruled. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1314 of 1978. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd March, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 1906 for 1976. WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 2436 OF 1981 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20th August, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6909 of 1979. AND .. CIVIL APPEAL. No. 1710 OF 1981 From the judgment and Decree dated the 13th March, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 6167 of 1979. AND SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.

3573 OF 1979 From the judgment and order dated the 3rd January, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 3714 of 1978. G. L. Sangh! , Mrs. A. Verma and D. N. Mishra for the Appellant in CA. No. 1314 of 1978. , J. P. Goyal, S. Markandeya and C. K. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent in CA. 1314 of 1978. - ,), period of ten years from th~ date on which its construction is completed : Explanation I. For the purposes of this sub-section: (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in the ca~e of a building subject to_ assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof OM PRAKASH v. DIGVIJENDRAPAL (Misra, J.

) 497 comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the build- • ing under construction) for the first time : . " The precise contention on behalf of the appellant is that the exemp· tion created by this sub-section does not embrace buildings constructed prior to the enforcement of the Act. In support of his contention, Mr. Sanghi, relied upon Rattan Lal Shinghal v. Smt. Murti 1 Devi. ( ) The same contention was raised by him in that case also and a Division Bench of this Court accepted the contention and held that Act 13 of 1972 was prospective and applied only to build· ings brought into being de nova after the Act came into force. In that case there is no discussion except this bald observation.

This 2 Court in a subsequent case Ram Saroop Rai v. Li/avati( ) held to the contrary. It is on this account that the present appeals were referred to a larger Bench. There ~ no ambiguity in the language of sub· section (2) of section 2 and in the absence of any ambiguity there is no question of taking any external aid for the interpretation of the sub-section. In plain words the sub. section contemplates that the . Act shall not apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. It nowhere says that the buildieg should have been constructed after the enforce· .. . ment of the Act and to interpret it in the way the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to interpret it, we would be adding words to the sub-section, which is not permissible. Primarily the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the legislature.

The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambiguous and, therefore, capable of two interpretations. In the present case the language of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act is explicit and unambiguous and it is not capable of two interpretations. (I) [1980] 4 s. c. c. 258. (2) [1980] 3 s. c. c. 452. • As a second limb to the first argument, it is contended that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th of June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment, and that if this he so, the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court on 23rd of March, 1978.

In order to appreciate this argument it will be expedient to refer to Explanation I to sub-section (2) of section 2 which has already been extracted. Explanation I provides that the building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authorities I:taving jurisdiction, and in case of a buildlng subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect and where the said dates are-different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of anv such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied . for the first time. A perusal of Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation wonld be taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment, thereof.

If there is an assessment, as in tbe present case it is, it will be the date of tbe first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of tbe construction and in that view of the matter the building had not become more than ten years' old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court, and therefore there was no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of tl1e Act to the appellant. Further, in order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of July, 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on 23rd of March, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act. There is yet another reason why section 39 wilt have no application to the present case.

In view of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act the Act is not applicable to a building which bas not a standing of ten years and if the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable. Considered from any angle the Act bas no application to the present case and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section 39. The suit bas, therefore, been rightly decreed by the courts below. H. We find no force in either of the contentions raised by Mr. Sanghi. The counsel for the appellants in the other appeals and OM PRAKASH v. DIOVIJENDRAPAL (Misra, J. ) 499 the petitioner in the special leave petition, adopted the arguments of Mr. Sanghi. For the foregoing discussion the appeals and the special leave petition are dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

' • We, however, direct that the order of eviction in each case shall not be executed before 30th of June, 1982 on condition that each of the appellants in the appeals and the petitioner in the special leave petition files an undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today to the following effect : I. that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord-respondent on or before 30th of June, J982; - 2. that he will pay to the respondent arrears of rent, if any, within a month from today; 3. that he will pay to the respondent future compensation for use and occupation of the suit premises for each calendar month by the l0th of the succeeding month; and 4. that he will not induct any other person in the suit premises as a sub-tenant or licensee or in any other capacity whatsoever.

We further direct that in default of compliance with any one or more of the conditions of the undertaking or if the undertaking is not filed within the stipulated time, the decree of eviction shall F. .. become executable forthwith . N. V. K. Appeal dismissed.