OM PRAKASH GUPTA v. RATTAN SINGH AND ANOTHER
Citation: [1964] 1 S.C.R. 259; 1962 INSC 386
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA , P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
Judgment date:
Case summary
1962 INSC 386. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1962-12-17. OM PRAKASH GUPTA v. RATTAN SINGH AND ANOTHER. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
l S. C. R. SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS 259 1962 peculiar circumstances of each case for the exercise f'f discretion. It is sufficient to say that we find t take the m~tter in further appeal to the High Court. Against the decree for eviction the appellant went to the Rent Control Tribunal which dismisseol the appeal. The ap? ellant went in further appeal to the High ~ourt which also dismissed the appeal summarily. On special leave, it was contended that the appellant having denied the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter. l/eld, that undr. r the Rent Control Law, the special tribunal has to proceed on the basis of the relationship of land- lord and tenant existing bet .... ·ccn the parties but a rr1ere denial by the tenant of the tenancy would not s11fficc to oust the jurisdicti or other sections of the Act, assumes that the Controller has the jurisdiction to make the order, i. e.
, to determine the issue of relation- ship. In this case, when the Controller made the order for deposit of the arrears of rent due, under s. 15 (1), and on default of that made the order under sub-s. (7) of s. 15, striking out the defence, the Controller must be deemed to have decided that the appellant was a tenant. Such a decision may not be res judicata in a regular suit in which a similar issue may directly arise for decision. Hence, 1 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS. 267 any orders made by a Controlier under the· Act proceed on the assumption that he has the necessary power to do so under the provisions of the Act, which apply and which are meant to Coptrol rents and evictions of tenants. ·An order under s. 15 (1) is meant primarily for the protection and benefit of the tenant. If the appellant took his stand upon the plea that he was not a tenant he should have simply denied the relationship and walked out of •the proceedings. Instead of that, .
he took active steps to get the protection against eviction afforded by Act, by having an order passed by the Controller, giving him a locus poenitentiae by allowing further time to make the deposit of rent outstanding against him. The Controller, therefore, must be taken to have decided that' there was a relationship of land, lord and tenant between· the parties, and secondly, that the tenant was entitled to the protection under the Act. It is true that the Act does not in terms authorise the authorities under the· •Act to determine finally the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Act proceeds on the assumption that there is such a relationship. If the relationship is denied, the authorities · under the Act have to determine that question aho, because a simple denial of the relationship cannot oust the jurisdiction . of the tribunals under. the Act.
· True, they an: tribunals of the limited jurisdiction, the scope of their power and authority being limited by the provisions of the Statute. But a simple denial of the relationship either by the alleged tlandlord or by the alleged tenant would not have the effect . of ousting the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act, because the simplest thing in the world would be for the party interested to block 'the proceedings under the Act to· deny the relationship of land- lord and tenant. The tribunals under the Act being creatures of the Statute have limited jurisdiction and have to function within the four-comers of the Statute creating them. But within the provisions 1962 Om Prakash Gupla v. Rallan Singh· Sinha, C. J. 1961 011 Pr. UU. Gy14 •• lie• SiofA Su. A. , C. J. 268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
of the Act, they are tribunals of exclusive jurisdic- tion and their orders are final and not liable to be questioned in collateral proceedings like a sepa- rate suit or application in execution proceedings. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention that as soon as the appellant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant; the jurisdic- tion of the authorities under the Act was completely ousted. Nor is there any jurisdiction in the conten- tion that the provisions of sub-s. (7) of s. 15 of the Act had been erroneously applied to the appellant. The orders under those provisions were for his benefit and he must be deemed to have invited the Controller to pass those orders in his favour. Otherwise, he should have walked out of the proceedings after intimating to the Controller that he was not interested to contest the proceedings in as much as he was not a tenant, and that a third i;>arty was the tenant.
This order, of course, will bmd only the appellant and no one else, and as he failed to take advantage of the order passed in his favour under s. 15 (7), he cannot make a grievance 0f it. Whether or not a delay of one day should have been condoned was a matter of discretion with the appellate authority, and it is not for this Court to say that this discretion should have been exercised in one way and not in another. The crucial question is not whether the delay is of one day or more, but whether or not there was any justification for the delay. It isfor the appellate authority to determine whether or not the appellant had satisfied it as to the sufficiency of the ground for condoning the delay.
This question of condonation of delay is more or less of academic interest only, because the Tribunal not only considered the question of delay but also the appeal on its merits, and on merits also it came to the conclusion that there was no ground for interference with the orden passed by the Rent Controller. Hence, the question of condonation of delay is of no import- ance in this case. What is of greater importance is the 1 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 269 merit of the decision awarding possession to the land- lord. In this connection, it may be added that it was a little inconsistent on the part of the appellant to have taken all the advantages the Act affords to :i ·· tenant and then to turn round and to assert that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter, because he was not the tenant. The Rent Controller had to determine the controversy as between the parties for the purposes of disposing of the case under the Act.
If the appellant really was a tenant, he has had the benefit of the provision of the Act, including the six months' time as a period of grace after an order of the Rent Controller granting the landlord's prayer for eviction. If he was not the tenant, he has nothing to lose by the order of the Rent Controller. These proceedings cannot affect the interest of one who is not a party to the present case. Furthermore, a second appeal lay from the appe- llate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal against the order striking out his defence. No such second appeal was take~ to the High Court, though as already stated a second appeal was preferre. d against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the order of eviction.
The position is that the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal, dated March 6, 1962, dismissing the appeal against the order striking out his defence became final between the parties and is no more open to challenge. Hence, it is no more open to the appellant to challenge t! J. e jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act. In our opinion, therefore, 'there is no merit in his appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs . .. 4 ppeal dismissed. 1912 Om Prakash Gupta •• R•ttan Si"lh Sinha, C. J.
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