OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS

Citation: [2010] 15 S.C.R. 302

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM, B.S. CHAUHAN

Case summary

OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2010) 15 (ADDL. ) S. C. R. 302 OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 998 of 2007 etc. ) OCTOBER 8, 2010 8 (P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, JJ. ] Urban Ceiling Act, 1976: ss. 2(q), 6 and 10(3) - 'Vacant land' - HELD: Any land not being agricultural land but falling within an urban agglomeration constitutes vacant land as defined in s. 2(q) - In the instant case, the lands constituted 'vacant land' on the date of filing of declarations u/s 6 by owner in 1978 - The land-owners themselves termed the land as 'grazing lands' and 'vacant land' in their declaration u/s 6(1) - The notification u/s 10(3) stating that the surplus land would be deemed to have been acquired by State Government and the same would vest absolutely in it, was issued in 1981 - Proceedings under the ULC Act not challenged by owners at any stage, and allowed to become final.

Judgements: Doctrine of Merger - HELD: Once leave was granted by Supreme Court in special leave petitions filed against the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court and the consequent appeal is allowed by Supreme Court, in Audikesava Reddv's case, the judgment of the Division Bench lost its identity and merged with the judgment of Supreme Court and the said judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be relied upon for any purpose. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or. 20 and Or. 41, r. 31 - Judgments and decree - - ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

Judgement - Elements of - Decree - Preparation of - Requirements - Explained - HELD: Preparation of decree follows the judgment - Decree shall agree with the judgment - Operative part of the judgment should be so clear and precise that in the event of an objection being laid, it should not be -difficult to find out by a bare reading of the judgment and decr~e whether the latter agrees with the former and is in conformity therewith - In Audikesava Reddv's case, the decision of the Supreme Court has been correctly drafted in the decree by the Registry and there is no ambiguity therein.

Res Judicata: Constructive res judicata - Writ petitions before High Court - Decision of High Court challenged before Supreme Court - Matter decided in Audikesava Reddv's case - Later, writ petition before High Court raising the issue of the lands being agricultural land - HELD: Principle of res judicata/ constructive res judicata is applicable to writ proceedings - ·The subsequent writ petitions are barred by principle of constructive res judicata - The adjudication in Audikesava Reddy's case was in relation to the same property between the same parties - The validity of ULC Act was squarely in issue - All contentions which p; fies might and ought to have litigated in the previous litigation cannot be permitted to be raised in subsequent litigations - Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976. The owners of the land in S\lrvey No. 83 . ,. admeasuring 526. 07 acres executed a registered General Power of Attorney on 7. 7. 1974 in favour of a partnership firm.

On coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, ninety nine acres of the said land was declared as surplus in the hands of the four declarants and the possession was taken on 11. 4. 1975. On coming into force of the Urban Ceiling Act, 1976, the owners, through their GPA, filed declarations u/s 6 (1) of the ULC Act. The affect of allowing the appeals filed by the State in in Audikesava Reddy's case is that the Competent Authority issued statements u/s 9 declaring the surplus area with each of the declarant, and on 30. 1. 1980 issued the notification u/ s 10 (1). By G. 0. Ms. No. 391 dated 23. 6. 1980, the Master Plan, as on 17. 2. 1976, was amended and the land of Survey No. 83 was inclu. ded in the Second Master Plan w. e. f. 19. 9. 1980, resultantly, the said land was recomputed and 468 acres thereof were allotted to the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA). By ,. C G. O. Ms No. 733 dated 31. 10. 19088 read with G. 0. Ms.

No. 289 dated 1. 6. 1989 and G. 0. Ms. No. 217 dated 18. 4. 200, exemption up to an extent of 5 acres was granted to each holder of excess land. Various persons including the appellants purchased small extents of the land in Survey No. 83 by registered sale deeds between January and P March 1991. However, the District Registrar on 3. 9. 1993 ordered cancellation of the sale deeds. The said order was challenged in Writ Petition Nos. 18385 of 1993 and 238of1994, and was set aside by the Single Judge of the High Court, nullifying the sale deeds regarding the land in question. The writ appeals filed by the State were . :dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on . ~28. 10. 1994 and 4. 12. 1996. The matter was taken to the 1 ? Supreme Court, which in the case of Audikesava Reddy disposed of all the appeals and set aside the judgements of_ the Division Bench of the High Court. Thereafter the . ·Sta1e Government in exercise of its powers u/s 23 of the ULC Act issued G. 0. Ms. No.

161 dated 13. 2. 2006 purporting to allot 424. 13 acres of the land in Survey No. 83 to the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (APllC). Writ petitions filed by the purchasers (W. P. Nos. 4121 and 4144 of 2006), owners ( W. P. No. 4141 of 2006) and a Co-operative Housing Society ( W. P. No. 5776 of 2006) were dismissed by the 1. State of Andhra pradesh and Ors. v. N. Audikesava Reddy and Others 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 162 = (2002) 1 sec 227. ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. High Court. Aggrieved, the writ petitioners filed the instant appeals. The main question for consideration before the Court was: whether the proceedings before the' Competent Authority u/ss 8, 9 and 10 of the ULC Act in relation of 6 the land in Survey No. 83 declared by the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgments dated 28. 10. 19094 and 4. 12. 1996, as void, stood restored by virtue of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Audikesava Reddy's case. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1.

The doctrine of merger is attracted as soon as 'leave' has been granted in a special leave petition. It is clear that once leave was granted by this 0 Court in the special leave petitions filed by the State Government against the judgment dated 04. 12. 1996 delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 918 of 1994 as also the judgment dated 28. 10. 1994 delivered by it in Writ Appeal No. 1220 of 1994, finality of the said judgment and all findings contained therein stood destroyed, and when the consequent civil appeals arising from the said ~pecial leave petitions were allowed by this Court, in Audikesava Reddy's case, the judgments of the Division Bench, which held that the proceedings under the ULC Act were vitiated, lost its identity and merged with the judgment of this Court. The logical sequitor of this is that the writ petitions filed by the appellants are deemed to have been dismissed.

The said judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, cannot be relied upon for any purpose whatsoever. Once a decision of the High Court is set aside by this Court, it ceases to exist. It falls on all four corners and not open to a contention subsequently that a particular aspect or argument was not considered by this Court or that it can be relied upon. Besides, a judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be collaterally challenged on the ground that certain points had not been considered. [para 21-23, 27,33 and 36] [356-B-C] Dharam Dutt and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 151 = (2004) 1 SCC 712; Mis Gojer Bros. (Pvt. ) Ltd. vs. Shri Ratan Lal Singh, 1975 (1) SCR 394 = (1974) 2 SCC 453; Kunhayammed and Others vs. State of Kera/a and Another 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 538 = (2000) 6 SCC 359; Kausalya Devi Bogra (Smt. ) and Others vs.

Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad and Another, 1984 (2) SCR 900 =(1984) 2 SCC 324; Ballabhdas Mathurdas Lakhani and Others vs. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, (1970) 2 SCC 733; Mis Kesho Ram and Co. and Others Etc. vs. Union of India and Ors. , 1989 (. 2) SCR 1005 = (1989) 3 SCC 151; and Director of Settlements, A. P. and Others vs. M. R. Apparao and Another 2002 ( 2) SCR 661 =(2002) 4 SCC 638; Anil Kumar Neotia and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 1988 ( 3 ) SCR 738 = (1988) 2 sec 587; Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and Another vs. State of Gujarat and Others, 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 552 =(2004) 12 SCC 645; A. V. Papayya Sastry and Others vs. Govt. of A. P. and Others, 2001 (3) SCR 603 = (2007) 4 sec 221 - relied on. Hunter vs. Chief Constable [1982] 1 A. C, Diplock referred to 1. 2.

A close reading of para 15 of the judgment in Audikesava Reddy's case makes it clear that in the said case the Court was "not concerned with the question as to the consequences of filing of a statement by a person under a wrong impression that the vacant land held by him is in excess of the ceiling limit. " The appellants are not correct in contending that the lands regarding which declaration was filed by them was not vacant land at all, and they would not be covered by the observations made by this Court in para 15 of the judgment in Audikesava Reddy's case, since the same is ex-facie intended to cover ANDHRA PRADESH & O. RS. only such cases where the factum of the land in issue being vacant land is admitted. Bl! t thereafter, a submission was made that the vacant land declared to be excess land was in fact not excess land. 1[para 19) [338- E-H; 339-A] 1. 3.

As rightly observed by the High Court, what is utmost relevant is the final judgment of the superior Court and not the reasons in support of that decision. Apart from the legal position and the effect of allowing. of the appeals and dismissing the writ petitions by this Court, the contention with regard to the land being agricultural land was raised in the writ petitions which were the subject matter of the appeals filed in this Court. In these proceedings, the State categorically took the stand ! hat · . the lands are not agricultural lands. It was brought to the notice of the Court that the appellants in the instant appeals, as respondents in the earlier round, did not urge this plea before this Court and no such arguments were advanced before this Court. In view of the same, the appellants are not entitled to raise any such contention now. The effect of allowing the earlier appeals in Audikesava Reddy's case is that W. P. Nos.

18385 of 1993 and 238 of 1994 stood dismissed, and the orders passed under the ULC Act have attained finality. The declarations which had been made and statements filed on 06. 09. 1976 and 25. 07.. 1977 stand till today and these declarations are not even sought to be withdrawn. In these circumstances, the prayer on the part of the owners in W. P. No. 4141 of 2006 made for the first time in 2006 after 32 years of filing of the statements u/s 6 and after 26 years of the conclusion of ULC proceedings was completely misconceived and was rightly rejec~ed. [para 39) [357-G-H; 358-A-D] [357-G-H; 358-A-D] 1. 4. In Audikesava Reddy's case, it was not the case of the State that the original owners filed any statement or declaration under the ULC Act under a wrong impression. On the other hand, this was a contention of the. purchasers.

However, in paragraph 15 of Audikeshava Reddy's case, this Court did not even go into the question because the owners were not before it and perhaps the purchasers could not raise that plea. This Court said, "tJ:iis question is left open to be d~cided in an appropriate case. " This means that this was not a fit case for going into this issue and when a proper case filed by owner comes with such a plea then the Court would consider the same. It follows that the appeals were allowed "for the aforesaid reasons" a11d this means on account of two reasons -the first reaso,n' is the overruling of Atia Begum's case and the second one is that the Court was not prepared to examine the declaration filed by the owners at the behest of the purchasers. In these circumstances, 0 there was no necessity to remand and, thus, there is no order for remand.

Therefore, the expression "appeals are allowed" can have only one meaning and that is the judgment of the High Court is set aside and writ petitions are dismissed and the determination of ceiling already made remains intact and undisturbed. [para 40) (358-F- H; 359-A-C] State of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. N. Audikesava Reddy and Others 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 162 = (2002) 1 SCC 227 - explained Atia Mohammadi Begum vs. State of UP. and Ors. 1993 (2) SCR 295 = (1993) 2 sec 546 - stood overruled 2. 1. E'1en on merits, it cannot be said that the lands . , in issue became amenable to the ULC Act only upon I extension of Master Plan thereto on 23. 06. 1980 and that ' the declaration made prior to such date is non est. As a , matter of fact, the stand of the State Government has throughout been that the lands in issue were not agricultural lands but were vacant lands under the ULC ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

Act even in 1976 when the declaration was made by the owners u/s 6 thereof, therefore, the declaration and all action taken consequent thereto are valid in law. This position or stand of the State Government is clear and reiterated in the counter affidavit filed by it in the writ appeal before the Division . Bench of the High Court and before this Court in the instant proceedings. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that the appellants conceded before the High Court that the lands in issue were part of urban agglomeration even when the declaration u/s 6 of the ULC Act was enforced. Besides, it. was also brought to the notice of the Court that by an agreement dated 09. 08. 1974, the lands in issue were sold by the owners to a society (the ,appellant in C. A. No. 5776 of 2006) which got a layout plan sanctioned on 20. 10. 1975 for construction of houses on the said lands.

These o materials clearly show that the lands were not agricultural lands even prior to declaration filed u/s 6 of the ULC Act by the owners in 1976. Any land not being agricultural land and falling within an urban agglo. meration, constitutes vacant land as defined in s. 2(q) of the ULC Act. The lands in issue, therefore, constitute vacant land on the date of filing of declaration u/s 6 of the ULC Act by the owners in 1976. As per s. 6 of the ULC Act, declaration was required to be filed in respect of vacant land, such declaration was correctly filed by the owners. Therefore, subsequent extension of Master Plan to the lands in issue on 23. 06. 1980 has no relevance to the validity of the declaration made in 1976 ',Qr to the proceedings initiated under the ULC Act pQr~uant to such declaration. [para 23] [344-A-G] i'2-. ,Besides, the owners themselves have described the land ii't-:Sl! l:Vey No.

83 as "grazing lands" and "vacant land" in the relevant-columns of their declaration u/s 6(1) and, therefore, the proceedings of the competent authority u/ss 8, 9 and 10 are ,valid. Though the said aspect had not been disputed by the appellants, however, it is pointed out that the mentioning of "grazing lands" in the said declaration is not conclusive. However, in view of the doc. umentary evidence, their statements in the form of declarations before the authorities concerned cannot be denied. [para 45] [362-C-D] 2. 3. It is not in dispute that the proceedings under the ULC Act were not challenged by the owners at any stage as provided by the statute. The notification u/s 10(3) of the ULC Act stating that the surplus land would be deemed to tiave been acquired by the State Government and the same shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances was issued even as early as on 24. 01.

1981 which was allowed to become final in the absence of any appeal being filed against such notification as provided by the statute. Once vesting takes place u/s 10(3) of the Ceiling Act, the State has absolute title and ownership over it. The owner has no further say in respect of the land that has vested in the State. [para 23] [344-H; 345-A-C] Smt. Sulochana Chandrakant Galande vs. Pune Municipal Transport & Ors. , 2010 (7) Scale 571 - relied on 3. 1. From the decree prepared by the Registry in Audikesava Reddy's case, there is no doubt as to setting side the entire judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and the pa,rties cannot claim that certain issues have been kept open or untouched.

About the decree prepared by the Registry, though as per the Rules, the parties are permitted to point out error or defect before the official concerned, if the same is not in accordance with the decision, till date, the appellants have not questioned the correctness of the decree, nor is there any application for its correction. On the other hand, the decree is consistent with the judgment and makes it clear ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS that allowing of the appeals filed by the State in Audikesava Reddy's case clearly means that the High Court judgment is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. The decision of this Court has been correctly drafted by the Registry in the form of a decree and there is no ambiguity therein. [para 25-26 and 33] (351-A-B; 350-H] Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan vs. Hari Prasad Bhuyan, 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 275 = (2003) 1 SCC 197 - held inapplicable. 3. 2. The direction that the appeals are allowed can have only one meaning, i. e.

that the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petitions ·are dismissed. In view of the same, there is no occasion for making any correction even suo motu and that too after a lapse of nine years from the date of the judgment. [para 26] (351- H; 352-A] 3. 3. A judgment comprises three segments (i) the ' facts and the point at issue; (ii) the reaso. ns. for the decision and (iii) the final order containing the decision. \ Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires 1a judgment to contain all the issues and findings or decision thereon with the reasons therefor. The judgment has to state the relief allowed to a party. The preparation of decree follows the judgment. The decree shall agree with the judgment. The decree shall contain, inter alia, particulars of the claim and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit.

The very obligation cast by the Code that the decree shall agree with the judgment spells out an obligation on the part of the author of the judgment to clearly indicate the relief or reliefs to which a party, in his opinion, has been found entitled to enable the decree being framed in such manner that it agrees with the judgment and specifies clearly the relief granted. The operative part of the judgment should be so clear and precise that in the event of an objection being laid, it should not be difficult to find out by a bare reading of the judgment and decree whether the latter agrees with the former and is in conformity therewith. [para 27] [352-B-F] 3. 4. The obligation is cast not only on the trial court 8 but also on the appellate court.

Order 41, Rule 31 CPC casts an obligation on the author of the appellate judgment to state the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision and when the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. [para 27) (352-F-G] 4. 1. The proceedings in the instant case are barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. The adjudication contained in Audikeshava Reddy's case, admittedly, was in relation to the same land in Survey No. 83 between the same parties. The validity of the ULC Act was squarely in issue. The effect of allowing the State appeals in Audikeshava Reddy's case is that all contentions which parties might and ought to have litigated in the previous litigation cannot be permitted to be raised in subsequent litigations. (para 4 and 37) (322- F-G; 357-E] Forward Construction Co. & Ors. vs. Prabhat Manda/ & Ors. , 1985 (3) Suppl. SCR 766 =(1986) 1 SCC 100 - relied on Hoystead vs.

Commissioner of Taxation (1926) 1 Appeal Cases 155 - referred to. 4. 2. As regards the plea of the appellants that the High Court had recorded a finding that the land was agricultural and the State had taken up a ground saying that the land was not agricultural land and was a vacant land but that point was not pressed before this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case and, therefore, to that extent the ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. High Court judgment would operate with binding effect in view of principles of constructive res judicata, it is true that the principle of res judicata/constructive res judicata is applicable to the writ proceedings. However, in the instant case, the finding of the Division Bench with respect to nature of land in a writ petition filed by purchasers does not survive after appeals of the State were allowed and after this Court refused to go into the question of filing of statements by owners under a wrong impression.

If this Court wanted the nature of land to be separately considered then it would have done so or remanded the matter. However, paragraph 15 of Audikesava Reddy's case shows a clear intent to leave the declaration of the owner filed under the ULC Act intact. No part of the judgment of the High Court would survive after the appeal is allowed unless and until it is expressly 0 and specifically preserved. In any case, the owners are bound by the determination of surplus land by the Competent Authority on the basis of their own declaration and the various orders passed under the ULC Act. They cannot be permitted to re-open the chapter after about 25 years. [para 41] [359-D-H; 360-A] Gajraj Singh & Ors. vs. State of UP. & Ors. 2001 (3) SCR 344 = (2001) 5 SCC 762; Saraf Chandra Mishra & Ors. vs. State of Orissa & Ors. 2006 (1) SCR 116 = (2006) 1 SCC 638 and State of Haryana & Ors. vs. M. P. Moh/a 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 926 = (2007) 1 SCC 457- held inapplicable.

Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association vs. State of Mahrashtra and Others 1990 (2) SCR 900 =(1990) 2 SCC 715; lshwar Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Another 2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 903 = (2005) 7 SCC 190 referred to. 4. 3. Moreover, the determination of surplus land based on the declaration of owners has become final long back. The notifications issued u/s 10 of the Act and the panchanama showing the possession taken is also final. On behalf of the State, it was asserted that the possession of surplus land was taken on 20. 07. 1993 and the Panchanama was executed showing that the possession has been taken. It is signed by witnesses. It is settled law that where possession is to be taken of a large tract of land then it is permissible to take . possession by a properly executed Panchanama. It is not in dispute that the Panchnama has not been questioned in any proceedings by any of the appellants.

In view of the same, the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken by the State legally and validly through a Panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld. [para 42-43] [360-E-H; 361-A-B-C] Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi vs. Lieutenant Governor, Govt. of NCT, Delhi 2009 (14) SCR 507 = (2009) 10 sec 501 - relied on 5. As regards the appellants' claim for the exemption benefits of G. O. Ms. No. 733 dated 31. 10. 1988, the amendment made in G. 0. Ms. No. 217 by G. O. Ms. No. 733 dated 31. 10. 1988 is applicable only in the cases in which the possession of land had not been taken over by the Government u/s 10(5) and 10(6). In the instant case, possession was handed over to the Manda! Revenue Officer, even prior to the specified date, inasmuch as the said land was allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development Authority by G. O. Ms. No. 5013 dated 19. 12. 1980. Admittedly, the said Government Order was not challenged by the appellants.

In the circumstances, the appellants cannot be allowed to take the benefit of G. O. Ms. No. 733 since this is not merely a case where the appellants were dispossessed but the property was transferred initially in favour of Hyderabad Urban ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. Development Authority and later to APll9 for utilizing the same to set up IT Park Project. It is also clear from G. O. Ms. No. 455 and 456 dated 29. 07. 2002 that occupation/ possession is sine qua non for the allotment of surplus lands. [para 46) [363-A-E] Case Law Reference: 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 162 explained para 1 1993 (2) SCR 295 stood overruled para 7 1990 (2) SCR ~00 referred to. para 11 2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 903 referred to para 11 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 151 relied on para 20 1975 (1) SCR 394 relied on para 20 0 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 538 relied on para 22 2010 (7) Scale 571 relied on para 23 2002 (4) Suppl.

SCR 275 held inapplicable para 26 1984 (2) SCR 900 relied on para 28 (1970) 2 sec 733 relied on para 29 1989 ( 2 ) SCR 1005 relied on para 30 2002 (2) SCR 661 relied on para 31 [1982) 1 A. C referred to para 32 1988 (3) SCR 738 relied on para 33 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 552 relied on para 34 2007 (3) SCR 603 relied on para 35 1985 (3) Suppl. SCR 766 relied on para 38 (1926) 1 Appeal Cases 155 referred to. Para 39 'A 2001 (3) SCR 344 held inapplicable para 42 2006 (1) SCR 116 · held inapplicable para 42 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 926 held inapplicable para 42 2009 (14) SCR 507 relied on para 42 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 998 of 2007. From the Judgment & Order dated 17. 1. 2007 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W. P. No. 4144 of 2006. WITH Civil Appeal No. 1024 of 2007 Civil Appeal No. 997 of 2007. Civil Appeal No. 6115 of 2007. K. Rajendra Chowdhary, Rakesh Diwedi, L. Nageswara Rao, S. Ganesh, Basava Prabhu S. Patil, A. K. Ganguly, P. S. Patwalia, Dr. R.

Prakash, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Bina Madhavan, Mis. Lawyer's Knit & Co. , K. Ashok Reddy, . P. Venkat Reddy, B. Ramana Murthy, Anil Kumar Tandale, Ranjeet Kumar, Devdath Karnath, Anirudh Sanganeria, Nishant Patil, Guntur Prabhakar, Amit Singh, Priteeka Dwivedi, Ankit Dalela, Rituvenda Singh, G. N. Reddy, V. Pattabhi Ram, Pravin Bahadur, Mallika Joshi, Rajiv Dubey, Rajan Narain, Sridhar Potaraju, D. Julius R. , Gaicharpou G. , B. Subrahmanya Prasad, Ajay Kumar M. , V. N. Raghupathy, Aman Sinha, Sanjai K. • Pathak, lshtia Sinha, Nupur Sinha, D. K. Sinha, R. Santhana l ok. It is settled law that where possession is to be taken of a large tract of land then it is permissible to. take possession by a properly executed Panchanama. [vide Sita· Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi vs. Lieutenant ~overnor, Govt. of NCT, Delhi, (2009) 10 SCC 501] ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J. ] 43. It is not in dispute that the Panchnama has not been questioned in any proceedings by any of the appellants.

Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society is in possession at one stage and Shri Venkateshawar Enterprises was given possession by f~e owners and possessi. on was also given to Golden Hill Construction Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are not in possession. In view of the same, the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken by the State legally and validly through a Panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld. 44. It is relevant to point out the conduct of the appellants in the previous proceedings which were highlighted by learned senior counsel for the State as well as APllC. They are: (a) The appellants themselves described the land in Survey No.

83 as "grazing land" in their declarations filed under Section 6(1 ); (b) The appellants filed declarations under the Land Reforms Act subjecting the land to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; (c) filing declarations under the ULC Act treating the land in Survey No. 83 as vacant land; (d) the transaction of agreement of sale entered into between GPA and Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing Society; (e) Owners and Society filed applications for exemptions which were rejected; (f) Chanakyapuri Society pursued its remedies against such rejection of exemption up to this Court in which the owners through their Power of Attorney were sailing with the Society. In fact these instances were projected in their counter affidavit before the High Court by the State and APllC to non-suit the appellants. Though learned senior counsel for the appellants pointed out that these aspects were not highlighted before the High Court. the conduct of the appellants as regards the above aspects cannot be ignored.

45. It is pointed out that the owners themselves have described the land in Survey No. 83 as "grazing lands" and "vacant land" in the relevant columns of their declaration under Section 6(1) and, therefore, the proceedings of the competent authority under Sections 8, 9 and 10 are valid. Though the said aspect had not been disputed by the appellants, however, it is pointed out that the mentioning of "grazing lands" in the said declaration is not conclusive. However. as observed earlier, their statements in the form of declarations before the authorities concerned cannot be denied. In fact, we were taken through those entries which are available in the paper-book in the form of annexures. 46. About the sales under G. O. Ms. No. 733 dated 31. 10. 1988 and G. O. Ms. No. 289 dated 01. 06. 1989, it is the stand of the appellants that those government orders were passed on the basis of a policy to encourage building activity and in public interest under Section 20(1 )(a) of the ULC Act.

According to the appellants, they are entitled to the benefits of G. O. Ms. No. 733 dated 31. 10. 1988 and they are entitled to the same benefits as any other holder of excess vacant lands is entitled to as they are in actual physical possession even as on date irrespective of whether the Act became applicable on 17. 02. 1976 or 29. 09. 1980. It is brought to our notice that the amendment made in G. O. Ms. No. 217 vide G. O. Ms. No. 733 dated 31. 10. 1988 is applicable only in the cases in which the possession of land had been taken over by the Government under Section 10(5) and 10(6) and according to the State Government, in this case, possession was taken after 31. 10. 1988 as pointed out by learned senior counsel for the -H ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J. ] respondents, the declarants cannot avail the said benefit since even, according to them, they were . not in possession as on 31. 10. 1988. The benefit of G. O. Ms. No.

733 may be available ifthe declarants were in possession and up to 31. 10. 1988 and possession was taken by the Government subsequent thereto. As rightly observed by the High Court, G. O. Ms. No. 217 cannot be interpreted as entitling the declarants to claim benefit of exemption even in cases where they were not in possession as on 31. 10. 1988. The same was handed over to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Sherlingampally, even prior to that, the said land was allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development Authority vide G. O. Ms. No. 5013 dated 19. 12. 1980. Admittedly, the said Government Order was not challenged by the appellants. In those circumstances, the appellants cannot be allowed to take the benefit of G. O. Ms. No. 733 since this is not merely a case where the appellants were dispossessed but the property was transferred initially in favour of Hyderabad Urban Dev~lopment Authority and later to APllC for utilizing the same to set up IT Park Project.

We are satisfied that the appellants are not entitled to claim benefits under G. O. Ms. No. 733. It is also clear from G. O. Ms. No. 455 and 456 dated 29. 07. 2002 that occupation/possession is sine qua non for the allotment of surplus lands. 47. Various third parties have filed separate applications by way of I. As in these appeals praying for certain reliefs. In view of the disposal of the appeals, they are free to approach the appropriate authority/court to vindicate their grievance if the same is permissible under law. 48. In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeals filed by the appellants. Consequently, they are dismissed. No order as to costs. R. P. Appeal dismissed.