P. JOSEPH JOHN v. THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.
Citation: [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1011; 1954 INSC 112
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1954 INSC 112. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1954-11-25. P. JOSEPH JOHN v. THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN. Read the judgment and case details on...
Judgment text
S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1011 to stand as a candidate for election he shall not either be employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of the municipality or act as a legal practitioner against the Municipality. There is no fundamental right in any person to stand as a candidate for election to the Municipality. The only fundamental right which is guaranteed is that of practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business. There is no violation of the latter right in prescribing the disqualification of the type enacted in section 16(1) (ix) of the Act. If he wants to stand as a candidate for election it is but proper that he should divest himself of his paid brief on behalf of the Municipality or the brief against the Municipality in which event there will be certainly no bar to his candidature. Even if it be taken as a restriction on his right to practice his profession of law, such restriction would be a reasonable one and well within the ambit of artl.
Cle 19 clause 5. Such restriction would be a reasonable one to impose in the interests of the general public for the preserva-tion of purity in public life. We therefore see no substance in this contention of the appellant also. The appeal accordingly fails and stands dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. P. ·JOSEPH JOHN ti. THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN. [MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J. , MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ. ] Constitution of India, Arts. 166, 311, 320-0pportunity to show cause-Consultation with Public Services · Commission-E:ctent of- Travancore Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132)-"'0ur Government"-Meaning of-Covenant of United Staie of Travancore- Cochin-Article 20-Application of. An enquiry under the provisions of the Travap. core Public Servant• (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132) was held against the petitioner in pursuance of a resolution passed by the Council of Ministers.
The petitioner took part in the proceedings, denied the charges and raised legal objection to the competence of the Enquiry Commission to hold the enquiry. Some of the charges were held proved. The petitioner was asked by the Chief Secretary to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner's request for extension of time to show cause was granted twice but refused a third time. On his failure to avail himself of the opportunity to sho\. v cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, the report of the Enquiry Commissioner was submitted to the Public Services Commission and the latter approved of the action proposed to be taken against the petitioner. The proceedings relating to the enquiry were submitted to the Rajpramukh and thereupon an order in proper form for the removal of the petitioner from service was made by the Rajpramukh and authenticated by the Chief Secretary to Government. Held, (i) that under the provisions of Art.
311 of the Constitution a civil servant is entitled to have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and show cause, both at the ti1ne of enquiry into the charges brought against him and at the stage when definite conclusions have been come to on the charges and the actual punishn1ent to follow is provisionally determined upon. The position cannot be characterised as anomalous if the statute conten1plates a reasonable opportunity at more than one stage. In the present case the petitioner had reasonable opportunity to enter upon his defence at both the stages. He fully availed himself of the first opportunity, but refused to avail himself of the second opportunity which was offered to him. All the rules of natural justice were observed in the case. (ii) The provisions of Art.
166(1) and (2) are directory, not mandatory; and, in order to determine whether there has been co1n-pliance with the said provisions, all that is necessary to see is that the requirements of the sub-sections are met in substance. (iii) After the integration of the two States of Travancore and Cochin, the expression "Our Government" means "The Coui:cil of Ministers" under the new set up of democratic Government in the United State. The Rajpramukh as the head of the State is merely a constitutional head and is bound to accept the advice of his Ministers. (iv) The consultation envisaged by Art. 320(3) does not extend to review petitions which the petitioner may choose to file as many times as he likes. ( v) The sanction of the Rajpramukh under Art.. 20 of the Covenant of the United State of Tranvancore-Coch1n 1s necessary only before the institution of civil or criminal proceedings. Departmental proceedings do not fall within the ambit of the said Article.
Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay "Except with the previous sanction of the Raj- pramukh, no proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted against any person in respect of any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty as a servant of either Covenanting State before the appointed day". fhe High Court negatived this contention with the following observations: "Article 20 refers to the institution of civil and criminal proceedings, two well-known expressions which are terms of art and clearly relate to civil and criminal proceedings before civil and criminal courts. The said two kinds of proceedings do not exhaust the tota-lity of matters which can be called proceedings. It is only in respect of civil and criminal proceedings that the sanction of the Rajpramukh is required under Article 20 of the Covenant. It is not contended on behalf of the petitioner that the proceedings before the Commissioner are criminal proceedings.
The only contention is that they partake of the nature of criminal proceedings. In our judgment, Article 20 of the Covenant does not apply to proceedings which are not criminal but ·merely partake of that character". In these observations we fully concur. In our view departmental proceedings do not come within the ambit of the Article. Lastly it was urged that there was non-compliance with the provisions of Article 320, clause 3 ( c) of the Constitution which provides that on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil capacity, including memorials or petitions relating to such matters, the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted. In this case the Public Service Commission was in fact consulted in the matter of the action proposed against the pet1t1oner by removing him. The Public Service Commission agreed to the proposed action.
This consultation and the agreement as before the petitioner was asked to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The complaint . of the petitioner is that the consultation . with the Public Service Commission should ·have been after he was asked to show cause but the petitioner did not show cause and that being so, no question arose of consulting the Public Service Commission over again. It was contended that the Public Service Commission should have been consulted on the review petition. To accede to his argument will mean that the State will have to consult the Public Service Commission as many times as he may choose to file review petitions. In our opinion the consultation envisaged by Article 320 does not extend so far. In this case the report of the Commissioner was placed before the Public Service Commission and the latter approved of the action proposed to be taken.
The appellant was given another opportunity to show cause but he did not avail himself of that opportunity or submit any explanation or show any cause on which the Public Service Commission could be consulted. The order of dismissal having been made there was in the circumstances no further necessity to consult the Public Service Commission. In our opinion therefore there is no force in this contention as well. After having examined all the arguments of Mr. Thomas, we are of the opinion that all the rules of natural justice were fully observed during the enquiry in this case, and the petitioner had the fullest opportunity to put in his defence both before the Enquiry Commissioner and against the action proposed to be taken against him. It was by reason of his own default that he failed to avail himself of the second opportunity. He put in a belated review but such a review is not provided for under the rules and in .
our opinion, it was not necessary to consult the Public Service Commission at that stage. Such petitions are not within the contemplation of the Constitution. For the reasons given above this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. ;. -
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