PADMASUNDARA RAO (DEAD) AND ORS. v. STATE OF T.N. AND ORS

Citation: [2002] 2 S.C.R. 383

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.P. BHARUCHA, R.C. LAHOTI, N. SANTOSH HEGDE, RUMA PAL, ARIJIT PASAYAT

Judgment text

PADMASUNDARA RAO (DEAD) AND ORS. v. STATE OF T. N. AND ORS. MARCH 13, 2002 [S. P. BHARUCHA, CJ. , R. C. LAHOTI, N. SANTOSH HEGDE, RUMA PAL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ. ] Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 6, Proviso to Section 6(1)- Declaration-Previous declaration quashed by Court-Subsequent declaratiort-Limitation for-Whether starts from the date ofNotification uls 4(1) or from the date ofquashing or order-Held, limitation would start from the date of Notification and not from the date of order-Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Interpretation ofstatutes-Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous-The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process-Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 6(1). Doctrines: Stare decisis-Applicability ofwhen a judicial decision has been nulified by Judgment laying down law-Subsequent legislation.

Ratio Decidendi-Applicability of-Courts not to place reliance thereon without considering the applicability offact situation. Notification u/s. 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) was issued before the commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 but after the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967. Notification for declaration under Section 6(1) was issued and published in the Official Gazette within the period ofthree years prescribed under proviso thereto. The same was quashed by High Court. Thereafter subsequent notification under Section 6 was issued. Appellants challenged the same on the ground that it was barred by limitation as the limitation for such notification was to be counted from the date of Notification under Section 4(1). High Court relying on Narsimiah's case held that it was validly issued as the limitation was to be counted from the date oforder quashing the earlier notification under Section 6. Hence these appeals.

In view of difference of opinion o~ the question of limitation under Section 6 ofthe Act among the various Benches ofthis Court, the matter was referred to the present Constitution Bench. In A. S. Naidu's case and Oxford English School's case, the opinion was that limitation in such cases is to start from the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, while in N. Narsimaiah's case and D. C. Nanjudaiah's case, the Court had opined that the limitation would start running from the da~e of receipt of the order quashing the declaration and not from the date of original notification under Section 4(1). "" Appellants contended that plain reading of Section 6 shows that the declaration has to be issued within specified time, therefore, if opinion in Narsimaiah 's case is accepted, it would amount to legislation by the Court which is not permitted.

Respondents contended that opinion in Narsi111aiah 's case was in line with the statutory intent, hence extension of time limit was permissible; that since K. Chinnathambi Gounder's case had held the field since long, principle ofStare Decisis was applicable; and that since many acquisitions had become final and if matters were re-opened and different views taken, it would cause hardship. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. 1. Once a. declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of the Notification under Section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (388-B-C; 394-H] A. S. Naidu and Ors. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. etc. , (SLP (C) Nos. 11353-11355/1988 and Oxford English School v. Government a/TamilNadu and Ors. , (1995] 5 SCC 206, affirmed. 1. 2.

It cannot be said that limitation of 3 years for publication of declaration would start running from the date of receipt of the order of the , High Court and not from t11e date on which the original publication under Section 4(1) of the Act, came to be made. (388-C-D; 394-H; 395-A] PADMASUNDARARAOv. STATE 385 N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. Stale ofKarna/aka and Ors. etc. , [1996) 3 SCC 88 and State ofKarnataka and Ors. v. D. C. Nanjudiaiah and Ors. , [19961 ~ 10 sec 619, overruled. Director ofInspection ofIncome Tax (Investigation) New Delhi and Anr. v. Pooran Mal andSons and Anr. , (1975] 2 SCR 104; Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders, (1980] l SCC 370 aud GrindlO)'s Bank Ltd v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta and Ors.. (1980] 2 SCC 191, referred to. 2. 1. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it.

If the view in Narasimaiah 's case and Nanjudiaiah 's case is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by ~ not only clause (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is -be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole st3;tute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have bten intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result," "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available. Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1996) l QB 878 and Luke v. ! RC. (1966) AC 557, referred to. [394-B-D] 3. In case the notification under Section 4(1) was published after .. :.

commencement ofLand Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, ' -before the Madras High Court which relied on the decision of a three-Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. ofKarnataka and Ors etc. , [1996] 3 sec 88 and held that the same was validly issued. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on an un-reported decision of this Court in A. S. Naidu and Ors. etc. v. State ofTamil Nadu and Ors. etc. , (SLP (C) Nos. 11353-11355/1988), wherein a Bench ofthree Judges held that once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed -!. period of the Notification under Sub-section (1) ofSection4 of the Act. It has -- - PADMASUNDARARAOv. STATE [ARIJITPASAYAT, J. ) 389 decisions relied on are Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v.

• - -thus: In a given case where the notification under Section 4(1) was published, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and declaration was published within one month and as the urgency in the opinion of the Government was such that it did not brook the delay of 30 days and immediate possession was necessary, but possession was not taken due to dilatory tactics of the interested person and the court ultimately finds after two years that the exercise of urgency power was not warranted and so it was neither valid nor proper and directed the Government to give an opportunity to the interested person and the State to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A, then the • ~ exercise of the power pursuant to the direction of the court will be fruitless as it would take time to conduct the enquiry.

If the enquiry is dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under Section 6(1) cannot be published within the limitation from the original date of the publication ofthe notification under Section 4(1). A valid notification under Section 4(1) become invalid. On the other hand, after conducting enquiry as per court order and, if the declaration under Section 6 is published within one year from the date of the receipt of the order passed by the High Court, the notification under Section 4(1) becomes ~ valid since the action was done pursuant to the orders of the court and compliance with the limitation prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of the Act would be made. " It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding the urgency in ~· terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned.

The purpose for providing the period ~ of limitation seems to be avoidance of inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from the date of Notification under Section 4(1). Section 11 provides that the valuation of the r-land has to be done on the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining the compensation. It provides that the market value ofthe land is to be fixed with reference to the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of _. ,, the Act The prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1994] I SCC 44, it was held by this Court that though no period was prescribed, action within a reasonable time was warranted. The said case related to a dispute which arose before prescription ofspecific periods. After PADMASUNDARA RAOv. STATE[AR! JITPASAYAT,J.

) 393 the quashing of declaration, the same became non-est and was effaced. It is ·A fairly conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no bar on issuing a fresh declaration after following the due procedure. It is, however, contended that in case a fresh notification is to be issued, the market value has to be determined on the basis of the fresh Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and it may be a costly affair for the State. Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost sight of. He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. Ifthe acquisition sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count. The rival pleas regarding re-writing of statute and casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.

A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was reiterated in Union ofIndia and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vusco De Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981. , In Dr. R Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc.

, AIR (1977) SC 842 it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of apriori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. [See Rishabh Agro Industries ltd v. P. N. B. Capital Services ltd, (2000) 5 SCC 515). 'The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(I) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah's case (supra).

In Nanjudaiah's case (supra), the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). Ifthe view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not >-only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a nonprescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole-appear to be well settled.

I Under the first principle a casus' omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four comers of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts ofa statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result'', said Danckwerts, L. J. , in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1966) l QB 878, "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available".

Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" l! nd so achieve that obvious intention and produce a . E rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. l. R. C. , (1966) AC 557 where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges". ] The plea relating to applicability ofthe stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered on 22. 6. 1979 i. e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason·why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it.

The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there iSi no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim 'actus ci;iria neminem gravibit' highlghted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case. The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case (supra) and Nanjudaiah's case (supra), is not correct and is over-ruled while that expressed in A. S. PADMASUNDARA RAOv. STATE [ARIJITPASAYAT, J. ] 395 Naidu 's case (supra) and Oxford's case (supra) is affirmed. A There is, however, substance in the plea that those matters which have attained finality should not be re-opened. The present judgment shall operate prospectively to the extent that cases where awards have been made and the compensations have been paid, shall not be reopened, by applying the ratio of the present judgment.

The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the B subsequent Notifications containing declaration under Section 6 of the Act are quashed. K. K. T. Appeals disposed of.