PANCHAM CHAND AND OTHERS v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS

Citation: [2008] 3 S.C.R. 888

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, V.S. SIRPURKAR

Case summary

PANCHAM CHAND AND OTHERS v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 3 S. C. R. 888 ~ PANCHAM CHAND AND OTHERS ,,. v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS (Civil Appeal No. 1732 of 2008) MARCH 4, 2008 [S. B. SINHA AND V. S. SIRPURKAR, JJ. ] ' ,.. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988- ss. 2(41), 2(47), 70 and 72 - • Stage Carriage Permit - Grant of - Application for permit filed directly before Chief Minister - Permit granted under the direction of Chief Minister - Correctness of - Held: Chief Minister or any authority, other than statutory authority could not have entertained application for grant of permit nor usurp the function of Regional Transport Authority - Also, Director Transport erred in forwarding the same to Regional Transport Officer with recommendations of Chief Minister - Such r interference violates the constitutional scheme - It interferes 1 with the independent functioning of quasi judicial authority - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 162.

Appellant-bus owners applied for grant of stage carriage permits for different routes before the Regional Transport Officer. Respondent no. 4 owner of fleet of buses had political connection. He applied for the route permit directly to the Chief Minister. The Office of Chief Minister communicated the order indicating approval for grant of I.. "' a route permit in favour of respondent no. 4 to respondent no. 2-Director Transport twice. Respondent no. 2 acted • thereupon. It advised the Regional Transport Authority to proceed after obtaining a proper application from respondent no. 4 in that behalf. Thereafter, stage carriage permit was granted in favour of respondent no. 4 for the route. However, the appellants were not granted the permit though they applied prior to respondent no. 4. Aggreived, ,.. appellants filed writ petition which were dismissed. Hence the present appeal.

HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS ~ The question which arose for consideration in this ~ appeal was whether the application for grant of permit of a Stage Carriage Permit in terms of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 could be filed before Chief Minister or any other Authority other than those specified under the Act. Allowing the appeal, the Court " ' .. HELD: 1. 1 Regional Transport Authority being a statutory body is bound to act strictly in terms of the provisions thereof. It cannot act in derogation of the powers conferred upon it. While acting as a statutory authority it must. act having regard to the procedures laid down in the Act. It cannot bye-pass or ignore the same.

Nothing has been placed on record to show that the Chief Minister in his capacity even as a Member of the Cabinet was authorized to deal with the matter of transport in his ~ official capacity, he had even otherwise absolutely no business to interfere with the functioning of the Regional Transport Authority. [Para 18) [896-G; 897-A, BJ 1. 2 The facts goes to show that prior thereto no proper application was filed before the Regional Transport Authority. Such an interference on the part of any authority upon whom the Act does not confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It violates the constitutional . ) scheme. It interferes with the independent functioning of ' a quasi judicial authority. A permit, if granted, confers a ~ valuable right. An applicant must earn the same. Therefore, the application of the respondent No. 4, was to be entertained alongwith other similarly situated persons. [Para 19) [897-C, D, F] 1.

3 In the matter of grant of permit to individual applicant, the State has no say. Therefore, the Chief ·J. , Minister or any authority, other than the statutory authority could not entertain an application for grant of permit nor could issue any order thereupon. Even any authority under the Act, including the appellate authority cannot .. issue any direction, except when the matter comes up before it under the statute. (Para 20) [897-G; 898-A] 1. 4 It is not a case where the statutory authority was hearing a grievance from the public that buses are not 8 plying in a particular route as a result whereof the villagers were suffering. [Para 23] (899-B] ' .. 1. 5 The political connection of respondent no. 4 • encouraged him to file an application for grant of permit before the Chief Minister directly. The Chief Minister could not have entertained the same nor usurp the function. of the Regional Transport Authority. Similarly, the respondent No.

2-Director Transport committed a serious illegality in forwarding the same to the respondent No. 3 with the purported recommendations of the Chief Minister.. 0 [Paras 24 and 25) (899-B, C, DJ 1. 6 It cannot be understood as to how an independent quasi judicial body, like the respondent No. 3, could affirm an affidavit together with the State. Its duty before the High Court, in response to the rule issued by it, to place the facts as borne out from the records. It was not supposed to take any stand one way or the other. It had no business to defend the State or the Chief Minister. [Para 26) (899-D, E) , 1. 7 As a limited notice was issued no consequential order is passed which is within the realm of the Regional Transport Authority. A cost of Rupees one lakh is imposed upon the State which may be paid to the National Legal Services Authority. (Paras 27 and 28) (899-F, G) D. Nataraja Mudaliar vs. The State Transport Authority, Madras AIR 1979 SC 114; Commissioner of Police vs.

Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16; Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and ,.. Ors. AIR 1978 SC 851 -referred to. ~ CIVILAPPELALTE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1732 of 2008. From the final Judgment and Order dated 15. 9. 2005 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in C. W . P. No. 1217/2004. Ravi Bakshi and Yash Pal Dhingra for the Appellants. .. . -; J. S. Attri, Dr. R. P. Sharma, T. C. Sharma and V. N . l". Raghupathy for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. Leave granted. 1. Whether Chief Minister of a State has any role to play in a matter of grant of permit of a Stage Carriage Permit in terms of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the Act) is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment ~ ,. and order dated 15th September, 2005 passed by a Division · Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, Shimla, in C. W. P. •. No. 1217 of 2004. t. 2.

The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. Appellants ate the bus owners. They applied for grant of stage carriage permits for different routes before the Regional Transport Officer as envisaged under Section 70 of the Act. While Appellant No. 1 had applied for grant of route - Tikri to ,J ' Palampur, Palampur to Chahiar and Palampur to Jaisinhpur, Appellant No. 2 had applied for grant of permit for the route • Palampur to Jaisinhpur, Jaisinhpur to Baijnath and Jaisnhpur to Palampur, Appellant No. 3 had applied for the route lndora to Kaaza, Maclodganj to Mandi and Damtal to Manali. 3. Fourth respondent, who is said to have a political connection being a leader of C rity it must act having regard to the procedures laid down in the Act. It cannot bye-pass or ignore the same. 19. Factual matrix, as indicated hereinbefor,e, clearly goes to show that the fourth respondent filed the application before the Chief Minister straightaway.

Office of the Chief Minister communicated the order of the Chief Minister, not once but twice. Respondent No. 2 acted thereupon. It advised the Regional Transport Authority to proceed, after obtaining a proper application from respondent No. 4 in that behalf. This itselfgoes to show that prior thereto no proper application was filed before the Regional Transport Authority. Such an interference on the part of any authority upon whom the Act does not confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It violates the constitutional scheme. It interferes with the independent functioning of a quasi judicial authority. A permit, if granted, confers a valuable right. An applicant must earn the same. In D. Nataraja Mudaliarvs. The State Transport Authority, Madras : AIR 1979 SC 114 =(1978) 4 SCC 290 this Court held: "9.

The Authority must, remember that a permit holder has an ordinary right of renewal unless it is shown that outweighing reasons of public interest lead to a contrary result. Permits are not bounty but right, restricted reasonably by the Motor Vehicles Act. " The application of the respondent No. 4, therefore, was to be entertained alongwith other similarly situated persons. 20. In the matter of grant of permit to individual applicant, the State has no say. The Chief Minister or any authority, other than the statutory authority, therefore, could not entertain an application for grant of permit nor could issue any order thereupon. Even any authority under the Act, including the • appellate authority cannot issue any direction, except when the matter comes up before it under the statute. 21. In Commissioner of Police vs. Gordhandas Bhanji : AIR 1952 SC 16, this Court held:- " It is clear to us from a perusal of these rules that the only .

person vested with authority to grant or refuse a license ~ for the erection of a building to be used for purposes of public amusement is the Commissioner of Police. It is also clear that under Rule 250 he has been vested with the absolute discretion at any time to cancel or suspend any license which has been granted under the rules. But the power to do so is vested in him and not in the State Government and can only be exercised by him at his discretion. No other person or authority can do it. " 22. Yet again in Mohinder Singh Gill and another vs. The ChiefElection Commissioner, New Delhi and others :AIR 1978 sc 851 =(1978) 1 sec 405 "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on accou.

nt of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanj1~: "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made l' by public authorities are nieant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be "' construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. " Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older. " 23. It is not a case where the statutory authority was hearing a grievance from the public that buses are not plying in a . - > particular route as a result whereof the villagers were suffering. ~ 24. Respondent No. 4 appears to be the owner of a fleet of buses.

He had a political connection. Such political connection encouraged him to file an application for grant of permit before the Chief Minister directly. The Chief Minister could not have entertained the same nor usurp the function of the Regional Transport Authority. 25. Similarly, the respondent No. 2 committed a serious ,. illegality in forwarding the same to the respondent No. 3 with the purported recommendations of the Chief Minister. 26. We also fail to understand as to how an independent quasi judicial body, like the respondent No. 3, could affirm an affidavit together with the State. Its duty before the High Court, in response to the rule issued by it, was to place the facts as borne out from the records. It was not supposed to take any stand one way or the other. It had no business to defend the .... State or the Chief Minister. 27. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed . with costs. The impugned judgment is set aside.

As a limited notice was issued, we need not pass any consequential order which is within the realm of the Regional Transport Authority. 28. We impose a cost of Rupees one lakh upon the State which may be paid to the National Legal Services Authority. The said amount may be deposited within a period of four weeks ·~, failing which it will be open to the National Legal Services Authority to realize the same with interest@ 12 % per annum. N. J. Appeal allowed.