PANDHARINATH SHRIDHAR RANGNEKAR v. DY. COMMR. OF POLICE, THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Citation: [1973] 3 S.C.R. 63; 1972 INSC 298
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: HANS RAJ KHANNA , Y.V. CHANDRACHUD
Judgment date:
Case summary
1972 INSC 298. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1972-12-11. PANDHARINATH SHRIDHAR RANGNEKAR v. DY. COMMR. OF POLICE, THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA. Read the...
Judgment text
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS PANDHARINATH SHRIDHAR RANGNEKAR v. DY. COMMR. OF POLICE, THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA December 11, 1972 (H. R. KHANNA AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ. ] Bombay Police Act (22 of 1951)-Ss. 56, 59-Externment Or,ler- Duty to infonn "the general nature of the material allegations"-Full dis~ closure of particulars if necessary--! / the externing authority and the State government should give reasoned order-Order of extern. ment if shou! d be restricted to area chosen for unla•~'ful activities. Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act provides that whenever it shall appear, in Greater Bomb&y, to the Commissioner (a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or are calculateJ to c&:.
ise alarm, danger or harm to person or property or (b) that there >re reooonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of offence involving force or violence or an offence pun_ishable under Chapter 22, 16 and 17 of the Indian Penal Code, and when in the opinion of such officer witnesses are not willing to come fon\·ard tv give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension o:i their part as regards safety of their person or property, the said officer may by order in writing direct such person to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction or such area and any district or districts, or any pa. rt thereof contiguous thereto, within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the said are::. from which be was directed to remove himself. Section 59(1) requires that before an order under s.
56 is passed against any person the officer shall inform that person in writing "of the general nature of the material allegations against him'' and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding those allegations. The appellant was served with . , notice under s. 56 of the Act. The allegations were that the appellant's acts and movements were causing alarm and danger to the residents of certain localities within the jurisdic· tion of Vile Parle Police Station, that he was given to assaulting the resi· dents of the localities either because they were suspected to be police informants or because thev failed to accede to the demands of money, that he had committed robberies in the particular localities, and that witnesses were not willing to come forward to depose against him in public. The appellant offered his explanation and examined his witnesses to refute the allegations.
On a consideration of the explanation and the evidence tendered by the appellant an order was passed externing him from the limits of Greater Bombay and the District of Thana for a period of two ye~rs. :rhe order wa. s confirmed in appeal by the State government. A ~nt petition to the High Court was dismissed. In the appeal to this Court ti was contended (i) the allegations that witnesses were not willing to come forward to depose against the appellant in public was falsified by ! he very r. eco~d of _the present proceedings; (ii) the particulars contained 10 the notice tSsued under s. 59 of the Act were so vattue that the appel· !
ant i;:ould not possibly meet the allegations made against him and thus he was denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself; (iii) the externing authority had the duty to pass 111 reasoned order or else the right of appeal would become illusory; and the State Government also ought to ha_ve given reasons in support of the order dismissing the appeal and its failure to do so showed non-application of mind; and (iv) the order of (1973] 3 S. C. R. externment imposed unreasonable restrictions on the personal liberty of the appellant in that, whereas his activities were· alleged to be restricted to an area. within the jurisdiction of the Vile Parle police station, the order of externment not only extended to the whole district of Greater Bombay but to the district of Thana also. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : (I) In order to attract the operation of section 56 of the Act the officer concerned has to satisfy himself that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public.
But it is not neces .. sary that all the witnesses must be found unwilling to give e\idence. The circum5tance, therefore, that in two criminal cases certain witnesses came forward to depose against the appellant cannot falsify the assertion that witnesses were unwilling to give evidence against the appellant to public. [68C] Dlwgubhai Dul/abhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana & Ors. [1956] S. C. R. 533, referred to. (2) The relevant provisions of the Act show that the reasons which 1 necessitate or justify the passing of an extemm. ent order arise out of extra-ordinary circumstances. An order of extemment can be passed under clause (a) or (b) or selection 56 if, and only if, the authority concerned is satisfied that witnesses are unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public against the proposed extemee by reason of apprehension on their part 2. 6 regards the safety of their person or property.
A full and complete disclosure of particulars such as is requisite in an open proseci. t-tion will frustrate the very purpose of externment proceedings. There is a brand of lawless element in society which it is impossible to bring to book by established methods of judicial trial, because, in such trials, there can be no conviction without legal evidence. And, legal evidence is impossible to obtain because out of fear of reprisals witnesses are unwilling to depose in public. That explains why section 59 of the Act imposes but a 1imited obligation on the authorities to inform the proposed extemee "of the general nature of the material allegations against him". That obliga· tion fixes the limits of the correlative right of the proposed extemee. He is entitled before an order of externment is passed under s. 56 to know F the material allegations against him and the general nature of those allegations. He is not entitled to be infor.
'tled of ipecific particulars relating to the material aHegations. Though the provisions of s. 56 make a serious inroad on personal liberty, such restraints have to be·suffered in the larger interests of society. However, care must be taken to ensure that the terms of sections 56 and 59 are strictly complied with and that the slender safeguards which those provisions offer are made available to the pro· posed extemee. [? OE] G Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bpmbay and another, (19521 S. C. R. 737; Bhagubhai Du/labhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate 1'hana & others (1956] S. C. R. 533; Hari Khemu Gawali v .. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay and Another (1956] S. C. R. 506 and State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Mehboob Khan Usman Khan etc. (1968] 3 S. C. R. 746, referred to. H I View of the Bombay High Court in Criminal application No. 332 of I 1971 in judgment dated April 29, 1971 disapproved. I J P. s. RANGNEKAR v. DY. COMMR. POLICE (Chandrachud, I.
) 6 5 (3) Precisely for the reason for which the proposed externee is -only entitled to be informed of the general nature of the material alleptions, neither the externing authority nor the State government in appeal can be asked to write a reasoned order in the nature of a judgment. If those authorities were to discuss the evidence in the case it would be easy to fix the identity of the witnesses who were unwilling to depose in public agafost the proposed extemee. [72H] ( 4) It is primarily for the externing authority to decide how best the externment order can be made effective so as to subserve its real purpose. An excessive order can undoubtedly be struck down because no greater restraint on personal liberty can be premitted than is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. An order of externment restricted to the particular area chosen by tbe externee for his unlawful activities and to a small periphery thereof may in certain circumstances fail of its true purpose.
A larger area may conceivably have to be comprised within the externment order so as to isolate the externee from his moorings. [73 B, DJ Balu Shivling Dombe v. The Divisional Magistrate, Pandharpur s. 71 Bombay Law Reporter, 79, held inapplicable. The High Court of Bombay has, on similar facts, consistently repelled challenges made to externment orders on the ground that they extended not only to the district of Greater Bombay but also to the District of Thana. In matters of such local colour and conditions, the view so consistently expressed by the learned judges of the Hip Court ·must be accepted as correct. [75C] Criminal Applicotion No. 1427 of 1968, judgment dated March 17, 1968; Criminal Application 30 to 93 of 1970 judgment dated February 23, 1970, 73 Bombay L. R. 442; Criminal Application No. 149 of 1972 decided on March 3, -1972, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 1972.
Appeal by special leave trom the judgment and order dated August 11, 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Cr!. Application No. 618 of 1971. S. B. Wad, for the appellant. M. C. Bhandare and B. D. Sharma, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated August 11, 1971 of the High Court at Bombay, dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to challenge an order of externment passed by the 1st respondent. On October 9, 1969 a notice of even date was served on the appellant under section 59 of the Bombay Police Act 22 of 1951, asking . him to appear before the Assistant C~ioner of P~lice, . M' Division: Bomb~y, in answer to allegations contamed m the notice. Bnefly, the· allegations were that the appellant's acts and movements were causing hann, ~L631Sup.
Cl/73 alarm and danger to the residents of certain localities within the jurisdiction of Vile Parle Police Station, that he was given to assaulting the residents of those localities either because they were suspected to be police infonnants or because they failed to accede to the demands of money, that he had conuuitted robberies in the particular localities, that since March 1969 he had committed several acts of the above description and that witnesses were not willing to come forward to depose against him in public. The appellant appeared before the Assistant Commissioner of Police, offered his explanation and examined 16 witnesses to refute the allegations.
He contended that the allegations were vague and general, that they were made at too instance of one Damayanti Deshpande who was inimical to him, that he was a social worker of some standing, that he was a member of the Congress Party and that in two criminal cases which were filed against him he was acquitted in spite of the evidence led by the prosecution. Later, the appellant was heard by · Shri G. K. Nadkarni, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-IV, Greater Bombay. On a consideration of the explanation and the evidence tendered by the appellant, the Dy. Commissioner passed an order dated July 23, 1970 under section 59 of the Act, externing him from the limits of Greater Bombay and the District of Thana, for a period of two years. The order of externment was directed to take effect within two days of the decision of two criminal cases which were then pending against the app~llant and in case he was sentenced in se allegations.
He is not entitled to be infonned of specific particulars relating to the material alleg8! 1ions. It is true that the provisions of section 56 make a serious inroad on personal liberty but such restriants have to be suffere<l in the larger interests of society. This Court in Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bombay and Another(') had upheld the validity of section 27 ( 1) of the City of Bombay Policy Act, 1902, which corresponds to section 38. of the Act. Followin)! ; that decision, the challenge to the constitutionality of section 56 was repelled in Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana & Others('). We will only add that care must be taken to ensure that the terms of sections 56 and 59 are strictly i:om-plied with and that the slender safeguards which those provisions offer are made available to the proposed externee. i•n Hari Khemu Gawa/i v.
The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay and Another(•), in which an order of externment was passed under section 57 of the Act. it was held by this Court on an examination of the general scheme of the Act that the provisions of sections 55, 56, 57 and 59 cannot be held to be invalid on the 11:rounds that only tire general nature of the material allegations is requ. ired to be disclosed to the externee, and that it would be difficult for him to get the matter judicially examined. Sinha J .. speaking for the majority, observed : "Tne grounds available to an externee had necessa-rily to be very limited in their scope because if evidence were available which could be adduced in public, such a pe. rson could be dealt with under the preventive sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example, under section 107 or section 110.
But the special provisions now under examination proceed on the basis Jhat the person dealt with under any of the sections 55, 56 ~r 57 is of such a character as not to permit the ordinary laws of the land being put in motion in the ordinary way, nanrely, of examining witnesses in open c"urt wh" should be cross-e. itamined by the party agamst whom they were deposing. ' The provisions we Me now examinin1t are plainlv intended to be used in soecial cases requirin11: special treatment that is cases • wbich cannot be dealt with under the p~eve. ,ntiv~ sections of the Code of Criminal Procedu~. " (1) [19S2) S. C. R. 737. (2) [19S6] S. C. R. S33. (3) [19S6] S. C. R. S-06. In State of Gujarat and Anr. etc. v. Mehboob Khan Usman 1 Khan etc. ( ) this Court, reversing the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat, rejected the argument that a notice substantially similar to the one in the instant case was bad for vagueness.
lt was held that the person proposed to be exte~ was entitled to be informed of the general nature of the material allegations and not to the particulars of those allegations. As to the meaning of the phrase "general nature of the material allegations", it was observed: "Without attempting to be exhaustive we may state that when a person is stated to be a 'thief', that allegation is vague. Again, when it is said that 'A' stole a watch from X on a particular day and at a particular place', the allegation can be said to be particular. Again, when it is stated that' X is seen at crowded bus stands and he picks pockets' it is of a general nature of a material allegation. Under the last illustration, given above, will <;ome the allegations, which, according to the Gujarat High Court, suffer from being too general, or vague.
Considering it from the point of view of the party against whom an order of externment is proposed to be passed, it must be emphasised that when he has to tender an explanation to a notice, under s. 59, he can only give an explanation, which can be of a general nature. It may be open to him to take a defence, of the action being taken, due to mala fides, £ malice or mistaken identity, or he may be ab'le to tender proof of his general good conduct, or alibi, during the period covered by the notice and the like. " We must therefore reject the argument that the particulars contained in the notice are vague. We endorse the view of the High Court that Criminal Application No. 332 of 1971 in which judgment was delivered on April 29, 1971 by another Division Bench of that court was not correctly decided, to the extent to which the notice therein was held to be vague. The view taken in that case is inconsistent with the view expressed by this Court in M eh boob Khan's case.
The third and fourth point have the same answer as tile second point iust dealt with by us. Precisely for tile reasons for which the proposed extemee is only entitled to oo informed of the general nature of the material allegations, neither tile exteming authority nor the State Government in appeal can be asked to write a reasoned order in the nature of a judgment. If those authorities were to discuss the evidence in the case, it would be easy to fix the identity of witnesses who were unwilling to depose in )! ) [t96SJ i s. c. R. 746. P. s. RANGNEKAll v. DY. COMMR. POLICE (Chandrachu'il, !. ) 73 public against the proposed extemee. A reasoned order con-taining a discussion of the evidence Jed against the externee would probably spark off another round of tyranny and harassment. As regards the last point, it is primarily for the externing authority to decide how best the extemment order can be made effective, so as to subserve its real purpose.
Now Jong, withiil 8 the statutory limit of 2 years fixed by section 58, the order shall oper~e and to what territories, within the statutory limitations. of section 56 it should extend, are matters which must depend for their decision on the nature of tlie data which the authority is able to collect in the externment proceedings. There are cases and cases and therefore no general formulation can be made that the order of extemment must always be restricted to the area to which the illegal activities of the externee extend. A larger area may conceivably have to be comprised within the externment order so as to isolate the externee from his moorings. An excessive order can undoubtedly be struck down because no greater restraint on personal liberty can be permitted that is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Balu Shivling Dombe v.
The Divisional Magistrate, Pandharpur (71 Bombay Law Reporter 79) is an instance in point where an externrnent order was set aside on the ground that it was far wider than was justified by the exigencies ~f the case. The activities of the extemee therein were confined to the city of Pandharpur and yet the externment order covered an area as extensive as the districts of Sholapur, Satara and Poona. These areas are far widely removed from the locality in which the extemee had committed but two supposedly illegal acts. The exercise of the power was therefore arbitrary and excessive, the order having been passed wiithout reference to the purpose of the externment. But Balu Shivling's case furnishes no analogy in the instant matter. A vast city liki~ Bombay presents its own peculiar problems of Jaw and order. It has an ever-growilll! industrial com-plex and ·the city has spread its areas far and wide.
A fair pro-portion of its teeming population is mobile, with large multitudes streaming in and out of the city in the oursuit of their daily avoca· tions. An order of externmen t restricted to the particular area chosen bv the extemee for his unlawful activities and to a small periphery thereof would in such circumstances fail of its true purpose. It would be imoossible to secure obedience to such an order and its enforcement would raise practical problems which would imoair the efficacy of the order. An order in the instant case if restricted, sav. to the areas within the iurisdiction of the Vile Parle nolice station and its perinhery would not serve its puroose. Rather than solving a problem of Jaw and order, it would create vet one more. That is why, on similnr facts, the Bombay HiAA Court has consistently repelled challenges made to externment orders on the ground that they extended not only to the district of Greater Bombay but to the district of Thana as well.
In Criminal Application No. 1427 of 1968 a Division Bench (Kotval C. J. and Kamat J. ) observed in their iudgment of March 17, 1968 :- "In the present case the area of activity of the externee was uridoubtedly stated to be Santacruz, but Santacruz is a fairly wide area. Moreover, it is very intimately connected with the surrounding area of Thana district. It is common knowledge that Thana town in the surroundin)! '. area is also an area where large indus-tries have )! '. rown contiguous wi'lh the industrial area of Greater Bombay and that . the entire industrial area is connected together by several means of communication including suburban trains of which there are several during each day, by taxis plyinll to and from Greater Bombay and by bus services operating between Greater Bombay and several parts of Thana District.
Therefore, the Police could reasonably have thought that it would not be sufficient to ask the petitioner to keep off only from the area of Greater Bombay which has an equally busy and highly industrialised area contiguous to it. Therefore, the order was extended to Thana District. " A similar view taken by Palekar and Gatne JJ. in Criminal Applications 30 and 93 of 1970 decided on February 23, 1970; by Tulzapurkar J. in 73 Bombay Law Reporter 442 iit pp. 453-454 and by Bhasme and Kania JJ. in Criminal Application No. 149 of 1972 decided on March 3, 1972. As against the judgment last mentioned the ·~xternee had filed special leave petition No. 487 of 1972 in this Court, one of the grounds stated therein being that the externment order was void because the externee was asked to remove himself not only out of the district of Greater Bombay but from the limits of Thana district as w:! ll. The petition was dismissed by this Court ( Palekar and Dwivedi JJ. ) on Sep-tember 20, 1972.
These judgments of the Bombay High Court have taken tr. ~ view that the cjistricts of Greater Bombay and Thana form, so to say, a sin. gie unit. Palekar J. observes in his judgment in Criminal Applications Nos. 30 and 93 of 1970 : "It may be that the area of operation may be in a particular locality, but if the externment is limited only to that area, then it might be impossible to prevent the externee from visiting that area every day. Any part in Bombay is easily connected by transport with any other part of II Greater Bombay and also the Thana District, and if, for example, an externee is externed outside the limits of Greater Bombay, then he should not take more than 15 minutes to reach Kurla P. s. RANGNEKAR V, DY. COMMR. POLICE (Chandrachud, J. ) 75 A from a place like Thana if the latter is excluded from externment. The very object of externment is to make it as difficult as possible to the externee to return to the field of his activities. '' Tulzapurkar J.
expressed the same view by saying that "the contiguous area of Thal)a district is intimately conectr. :d with the industrial area of Greater Bombay with cheaper and quicker means of B transport and communication. " According to Bhasme J. who delivered the judgment of the Bench in Criminal Application No. 149 of 1972, "By reason of the means of communication and proximity, the districts of Greater Bombay and Thana are for all practical purposes one local area or one district. " Deshmukh J. in the judl(ment under appeal, says that "Greater Bombay and c Thana districts are . . . intimately connected by several commu-nications". In matters of local colour and conditions the view so consistentlv expressed by the learned Judges of the High Court mu~t. in our opinion, be accepted as correct. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. K. B. N. Appeal dismissed.
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