PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

Citation: [2008] 8 S.C.R. 962

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM, MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA

Case summary

PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 8 S. C. R. 962 ~ . PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (Criminal Appeal No. 1167 of 2006) MAY 15, 2008 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ. ] " Penal Code, 1860- ss. 302 rlw 34, 348, 201and201 rlw 34 - Death - Due to burn injuries - Conviction of accused- ·c Appellants by Trial Court·- Appeal - High Court discarded statements made by the doctors, PWs. 3, 4 and 6, to the effect that the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set himself on fire and upheld conviction ofAppellants by placing reliance on the dying declaration allegedly given by deceased to the Revenue Divisional Officer (PW14) four days prior to his death - Challenge to - On facts held: High Court misconstrued the dying declaration since the deceased had categorically stated therein that he did not know who set him on fire - It also .

erred in discarding the statements made by PWs 3, 4 and 6 - Conclusions were arrived at by the High Court by misreading the evidence - Appellants accordingly acquitted - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 374. Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 32 - Dying declaration - Principles governing dying declaration summed up and re-iterated. According to the prosecution, A1 and A2 alongwith three other accused had poured petrol on the deceased and set him on fire. A1 to A4 were police officials and on the date of the incident were on duty. The Trial Court con- ·• victed all the five accused under s. 302 rlw s. 34 IPC. A1 and AS were additionally convicted under s. 348 IPC. A1 was further convicted under s. 201 IPC while AS were further convicted under 5. 201 r/w s. 34 IPC. High Court up- . ,. held the conviction of A1 and A5 i. e. Appellants but acquitted the other accused persons. It discarded the . statements made by the doctors, PWs.

3, 4 and 6, to the effect that the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set himself on fire and upheld conviction of the Appellants by placing reliance on the dying declaration allegedly given by deceased to the Revenue Divisional Officer (PW14) four days prior to his death. > In support of the present appeals, the Appellants sub- ·mitted that the High Court proceeded on presumptions that because the statements of the deceased to PWs, 3, 4 and 6 were made in the presence of a Constable, therefore, they were not voluntary; that on the contrary at the time when the statements were made, the relatives of the deceased were present as evident from the evidence of PW1 who took the deceased to the hospital. It was further contended that the High Court came to an erroneous conclusion by misreading dying declaration purported to be made before RDO that it was either A1 or A5 (the appellants) who had poured petrol on the deceased and set him on fire.

·The Respondent-State, on the other hand, submit- =t ted that the High Court had rightly relied upon the dying declaration made before the RDO and that the fact that • police officials were present when the statements were made by the deceased before the doctors made the position c'ear that the deceased was not speaking the truth. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. 1. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation • in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dis- )' has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant.

Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroboraterf. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as ~ . under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1992 SC 1817): (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State 8 of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 764)] (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is • true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi v.

State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164)] (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in· a ! it state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor (AIR 1976 SC 1994)] (iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) sec 264)1 (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v State of M. P (AIR 1982 SC 1021)] (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and Ors. v.

State of UP (1981 (2) sec 654) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu (AIR 1981 SC 617)] (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1505). 8 (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912)]. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said 0 declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of UP v.

Madan Mohan and Ors. (AIR 1989 SC 1519)]. (xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC 839)] 9. We find that the High Court has erroneously discarded the statements made by PWs. 3, 4 and 6 to the effect that the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set himself on fire. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant, even though one police official was present when the statement was made to PWs. 3, 4 and 6, yet large number of relatives of the deceased, more particularly, PW1 who had taken him to the hospital were present also. Additionally, the High Court has misconstrued the dying declaration. The deceased had categorically stated therein that he did not know who set him on fire.

The High Court observed, as if, the deceased had said A that either A1 or AS did so. The conclusions have been arrived . ,.. . at by misreading the evidence. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. The appellant in each case is acquitted of the charges. The appellants be released from custody forthwith unless required B in any other case. The appeals are allowed. B. B. B. Appeals allowed. H