PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA

Citation: [2001] 2 S.C.R. 389

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: U.C. BANERJEE, K.G. BALAKRISHNAN

Judgment text

_... PAWANKUMAR V. ~ STATE OF HARYANA MARCH 13, 2001 [U. C. BANERJEE AND K. G. BALAKRlSHNAN, JJ. ] Evidence Act, 1882 : _;t Suicide-By married ivonian-A. hetment r~f-Presurnption as f(J-Do1v1y torture-lieId: In the circumstance o,f the case, accused co1n1ni1ted cruelty toivards his deceased-1v~fe-Hence, High Cou1t rightly presunied accusPd abetred suicide uf his wife-Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 306, 498-A, 201and193. Criminal Trial : l'ircumstantial Evidence-Conviction based upon-Just~fication byfield: Chain of events 1nust be so complete as to leave no doubt that the act is done by the accusedperson-\Vlzile it is true that there should be no rnissing links but every link ne~d not appear on the suiface o. fthe evidence, since so1ne 1 links may only be infelTe:. f1vm proven fact-St1vng s~tspicion is not sufficient to justify conviction-Where t\vo vie111s are possible the one in favour of tlze accused must be accepted.

-;_ The appellant-accused was convicted by the trial court for offences under Sections 306, 498-A, 201 and 193 of the Penal Code, 1860. The conviction was upheld by the High Court. Hence this appeal. According to the prosecution, the appellant's ,vjfe was subjected to frequent dowry harassments as a result of which there was a strained relationship between them. On the fateful day; the appellant's wife was found lying burnt in her kitchen and the Assistant Sub-inspector of Police recorded her dying declaration in which she had stated that nobody was responsible for the fire which was accidental. However, the trial court and the High Court rejected the dying declaration and held the appellant guilty of abetment of suicide. > On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the dying dcclara- ... tion itself would negate any suicidal death but depicted a clear accidental ·· incident resulting iu the death of the deceased. Dismissing the appeal, the Court --· HELD : 1. 1.

Success of the prosecution on the basis ofcircnmstantial evidence "ill depend on the availability of a complete chain ofevents so as not to leave any doubt for the conclusion that the act must have been done by the accused person. While, however, it is true that there should he no missing links, in the chain of events so as far as the prosecution is con• cerned, it is not that every one of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these links may only be inferred from the proven facts. Circumstances of strong suspicion without, however, :any conclusive evidence are not sufficient to justify the conviction and it is on this score that great care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial evidence. In any event, on the availability of two inferences,. the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. [391-G-H] State of U. P. v. As/wk Kumar Srivastava, AIR (1992) SC 840, referred to. I. I.

The evidence on record, ascribed to be circumstantial, ought to justify the inference of the guilt from the incriminating facts and circum· stances, which are incompatible with the innocence of the accused or gnilt of any other person. [392-F] Ba/winder Singh v, State ofPunjab, AIR (1987) SC 350, relied on. 2. 1. The circumstances in the contextual facts and the materials on record substantiate the requirements of Section 113-A ofthe Evidence Act, 1882 and ha,ing regard to the language used in Section 498-Aof the Penal Code, 1860 it is clear that cruelty is written large as regards the conduct of the appellant towards bis deceased-wife. [397-D] 2. 2.

The death of the deceased was caused by burn injuries only and having considered the nature of injuries and since one cannot hut rule out an accidental death, the death of the deceased cannot but he attributed to be suicidal on the basis of the circumstances as are available on record with the situation existing and ha,ing regard to statutory presumption, this Court cannot hut lend concurrence to the opinion expressed by the High Court. The circumstances pointedly point out the accused as a guilty person as an abettor and on the wake of the aforesaid the order of conviction cannot be interfered with. [397-H; 398-A-B] Balwinder Singh v. Stale ofPunjab, AIR (1996) SC 607; Lakhjit Singh v. Stale ofPunjab, (1994) Supp. I SCC 173; State ofPunjab v. Gurdip Sing/' (1996) 7 SCC 163 and Sharad Binlhichand Sardo v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 sec 116, held inapplicable. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 1386 of 1999. From the Judgment and Order dated 21. 5.

99 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. A. No. 184-SB/87. R. K. Jain, Sushil Kumar, Saajeev Sachdeva and Sanjay Jain for the Appellant. Ms. Monika Balhara, S. R. Sharma, V. Sudheer and Mahabir Singh for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BANERJEE, J. The appellants, charged for the offences under Sections 306, 498A, 201 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code, were found guilty of offences by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra under Sections 306 and 498(A) of the Code and were sentenced to undergo R. l. for six years. The High Conn thongh dismissed the appeal qua appellant No. I, Pawan Kumar but as regards the appellant Nos. 2 and 3, sentences were reduced to six mouths under both cour. ts respectively and . it is this order of dismissal which is under challenge before this Court in the appeal by the grant of special leave. Before advening to the rival contentions, be it noted that the entire matter hinges on circumstantial evidence.

There is also however existing on record, a dying declaration, but its effect on the matter, shall be discussed shortly hereafter in this judgment. Incidentally success of the prosecution on the basis of circumstantial evidence will however depend on the availability of a complete chain of events so as not to leave any doubt for the conclusion lhat the act 111ust have been done by the accused person. While however, it is lrUe that there should be no missing links, in the chain of events so far as the prosecution is concerned, but it is not that every one of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these links may only be inferred from the proven facts. Circumstances of strong suspicion without however, any conclusive evidence are not sufficient to justify the conviction t and it is on this score that great care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial evidence.

In any event, on the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted and the law is well settled on this score, as such we need not dilate much in that regard excepting however, noting the observations of this Court in the case of State of U. P v. As/wk Kumar Srivastava, AIR (1992) SC 840 wherein this Court in paragraph 9 of the report observed:- "The Court has, time out ofnumber, observed that while appreciating circumstantial evidence the Court must adopt a very cautious approach and should record a convicti0n only if all the links in the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused and every hypothesis of innocence is capab]e of being negatived on evidence. Great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted.

The circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however, far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise. The other aspect of the issue is that the evidence on record, ascribed to be circumstantial, ought to justify the inferences of the guilt from the incriminating facts and circumstances which are incompatible with the innocence of the accused or- gllilt of any other person. The observations of this Court in the case of Ba/winder Singh v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1987) SC 350, lends concurrence to the above.

Referring to the prosecution case at this stage it appears that Ekta, the sister of Sudarshan Kumar was married to Pawan Kumar appellant No. I. After four months of the marriage, Ekta went to Sudarshan Kumar alongwith her husband Pawan Kumar and told him that a sum of Rs. 10,000 was being demanded by Pawan Kumar, his father and mother. Sudarshan promised to pay that amount after a couple of days after arranging for it. Accordingly, three days thereafter Sudarshan accompanied by one Jag Pal Saini went to the house of the accused at Shahbad and paid the amount of Rs. 10,000 to Smt. Kaushalya Devi. After about one year, Ekta again came to the house • of Sudarshan with a definite grievance about being pestered for money by her husband and parents-in-law. At that time, she stayed at the house of 1 Sudarshan for eight months and never wanted to go back by reason of consistent harassment with beating.

As a matter of fact, a feeling of being fed up together with despondency has completely over-powered her. Subsequently, a panchayat was held and at the asking of village Panchayat, Sudarshan agreed to send and did send Ekta with Ram Asra to the house of her parents-in-Jaw at Shahbad. However, the appellants continued harassing Ekta for dowry. Sudarshan came to know of this fact whenever he visited Ekta _; at Shahbad and as and when she came to meet her parents at karera Khurd. It is further the case of the prosecution that about two months prior to the occurrence, Sudarshan booked a marnti van for himself and appellant-Pawan Kumar came to know about it. He went to the house of Sudarshan and-told him that either the said van be given to him or he may book another van for bim.

Su ooking of a Maruti Van by the complainant which was asked to be delivered to the accused/appellant, on refusal, however, to comply with the demand for delivery of the van by the complainant, the relationship was further estranged and PW 3 was given a warning as regards the events to follow and it is only thereafter this incident of burn injury took place. A number of relatives were also examined and their evidence corroborate this > state of affairs as narrated by the complainant PW. 3. The learned Senior Advocate in support of the appeal further contended that the factum of the hospitalization of Ekta in any event negates any ill treatment or t01ture, but to be treated as a positive evidence of goodwill and affection. We are, however, unable to record our concurrence therewith • having due regard to the evidence and other materials available on record.

>· There is thus preponderance of evidence of dowry torture and it is on this couut that Section 113(A) of the Evidence Act ought to be taken note of. Section 113(A) reads as below:- "113(A). Presumption a' ta abetment ofsuicide bya married woman. - When die question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman 1 had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide bad been abetted by her husband or by such relative of . Ji. her husband. Explanation:- For the purposes of this Section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the! ndian Penal Code (45-1860). " Incorporation of Section !

13(A) of the Evidence Act in the statute book, depicts a legal presumption though however, the time period of within seven years of marriage is the pre-requisite for such a presumption. The circumstances as noticed hereinbefore in the contextual facts and the materials on record substantiate the requirements of Section 113 (A) and having regard to the language used in Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code there cannot be any hesitation in coming to a finding that cruelty is written large as regards the conduct of the appellant herein towards Ekta.

Needless to state that Section 113(A) itself by way of an explanation provides that 'cruelty' shall "I have the same meaning as is attributed under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code which reads as below:- "(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where snch harassment is with a view --{ to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand. for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her, to meet such demand.

" On the wake of the aforesaid and by reason of the fact and the death of Ekta was caused by bum injuries only and having considered the nature of injuries and since one can not but rule out an accidental death as discussed -4 hereinbefore, the death of Ekta cannot but be attributed to be suicidal on the basis of the circumstances as is available on record with the situation existing and having regard to statutory presumption, this Court can not bnt lend < ;·. ; '• concurrence to the opinion expressed by the High Court. The decisions of this Court as relied upon by Mr. Sushi! Kwnar (viz. : Balwillder Singh v. Slate of Punjab, AIR (1996) SC 607: Lakhjit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, [1994] Supp I SCC 173: State of Punjab v. Gurdip Singh & Ors. , (1996] 7 SCC 163 Sharad Birdhiclumd Sarda v. State ofMaharashtra, [1984) 4 SCC 116, do not however, advar. ce the matter any further since each ca.

<e shall have to be dealt in the light of its own factual sphere and judicial precedents do not render any assistance whatsoever by reason of the peculiar factual matrix. In the facts of the matter under consideration, the circumstances pointedly point out the accused as a guilty person as abettors and on the wake of the aforesaid the order of conviction cannot be int~rt'ered with. The High Court has been lenient enough in dealing with the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 by reducing the sentence, but since there is no cross appeal, we do not wish to record any contra view as regards the sentence as well. In that view of the matter, this appeal fails and thus stands dismissed. v. s. s. Appeal dismissed. ,;. ;,:, •I', ) : j. 1 .