POONAM VERMA AND ORS. v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Citation: [2007] 13 S.C.R. 552

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, H.S. BEDI

Case summary

POONAM VERMA AND ORS. v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.pdf

Judgment text

POONAM VERMA AND ORS. 4 ? '"" ' v. ,.. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY DECEMBER 13, 2007 [S. B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ. ] -l - Urban Development: Delhi Development Act, 1957-ss. 41 and 56-Direction by Central Governmentfor creation of 'out ofturn quota'for allotment offlats--Legality of-Held: Central Government couldnot issue such directions-It did not have any quota under the Act or the Schemes. 41 envisages that Central Government could issue directions having nexus with efficient administration ofthe Act and not in the matter of allotment offlats-Moreso, Scheme was closed and could not be revived thereafter-Guidelines being advisory in character per se did not confer any legal right-Also doctrine oflegitimate expectation was not invokable-Thus, purported decision being wholly without jurisdiction is a nullity-Administrative law-Legitimate expectation. The respondents floated the SelfFinancing Registration Scheme, 1982 for the allotment offlats.

The appellants got themselves registered under the Scheme, but were not successful in obtaining the flats. The 1 - Schemewas closed. Thereafter, public noticewas issued for release of more flats and the unsuccessful registrants were given chance to apply. Appellants did not respond to the notice, however, were allotted flats in category III. Appellants did not make payments whereas raised a claim for includingtheirnames in VI andVI ASchemes. Respondents rejected the claim. Aggrieved appellants filed complaint before the Consumer Forum on theground ofdeficiency ofservice and unfair trade practice. Theywere unsuccessful in the first round oflitigation. Appellants then approached the Ministry ofUrban Affairs. The Joint Secretary ( D& L) by letter dated 24. 08. 2000 addressed to Vice Chairman, DDA AUTHORITY directed that the VC, DDA would cover the case ofpending registrants A (three in number) under the out ofTurn Allotment Quota, being hard cases and action would be taken to allot flats.

Despite availability of flats, the Ministry's orders were not complied with. Appellant's application beforethe State Commissionwas dismissed. Appellants then filed application before Lok Adalat. Lok Adalat held thatthe DDA did not acceptthe recommendations sinceSFS Scheme had become defunct ' -> and the scheme ofOTA was no longer in existence and thus, directed the appellants to approach appropriate forum. Both the Writ Petitions as also Letter Patent appeals thereagainstwere dismissed. Hence the present appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1. Section 41 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 only envisages that the respondentwould carry outsuch directions that may be issued by the Central Governmentfrom time to time for the efficient administration oftheActItspeaks about policydecision. Any direction issued must have a nexus with the efficient administration ofthe Act.

The same does not take within its fold an orderwhich can be passed by the Central Government in the matter of allotment of flats by the Authority in respect ofa particularscheme. [Para 12] [560-G; 561-A, BJ 1. 2. The Central Government does not have any quota under the Act. It did not have any quota under the Scheme. The Central - t Government had no say in the matter either on its own or under the p Act. In terms ofthe Brochure, Section 41 ofthe Act does not clothe any jurisdiction upon the Central Government to issue such a direction. [Paras 13and14) [561-B, D,E] 1. 3. The submission that the Central Government could issue the G said direction in exercise ofrule making power under section 56 ofthe Act is wholly misplaced. In issuing the letter dated 24. 08. 2000, the Central Government did not exercise its legislative power nor could it do so.

The Central Government in terms oftheAct apart from Section 41 did nothave any power and, thus, could nothaveissued any direction in terms thereof. Hsection 41 ofthe ActorforthatmatterSection56(2)(r) thereof were not applicable, the question of issuing any direction purported to be in terms ofSection 21 ofthe General Clauses Act did not arise. [Paras 15and16] (561-E, F, G] MP. Gangadharan and Ors. v. State ofKera/a and Ors. , (2006] 6 sec 162, distinguished. 1. 4. All the authorities under the Act including the Central Government beingthe creature ofstatutewere bound to actwithin the four comers thereof. Aspecific grievancewas raised by the appellants that the action on the part ofthe authority amounted to unfair trade practice and there was deficiency of service. The same had been negatived.

The courts having appropriate jurisdiction having found neither unfair trade practice nor there being deficiency in service and in thatview ofthe matter, the CentralGovernment ordinarilyought not to have interfered in the matter. Appellants took recourse to remedies on administrative sidewhich stricto sensu were not available. (Paras 19 and 20] (562-B, C, DJ 1. 5. Some officers ofthe respondent by themselves could not have evolved a Schemewhich was beyond the purview and scope ofthe Act. Respondent being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is bound to fulfill the constitutional scheme contained in Article 14 thereof. The Central Government itselfdirected the authority to confine the 'outoftum allotment' quota by reason ofa _ 1 direction issued in June, 2000 only for widows ofGovernment servants who dies in harness and thosewho were killed by terrorists.

Itwould be preposterous to suggestthatthe Central Government could actbeyond its professed policy decision. Thus Central Government, acted illegally and withoutjurisdiction in purporting to take a decision that the hard cases may be broughtwithin the purview oftlie 'OutofTum Allotment' Quota, as therefor there was no legal sanction. Having professed to abide by the Brochure which contained the policy ofreservation, the Central Government could not in absence ofany statutory provision directed creation ofany quota and thattoo after closure ofthe Scheme. The Scheme after its closure could not even have been revived Such a AUTHORITY purported decision beingwhollywithout jurisdiction, is a nullity. [Paras21,22 and 23] [562-D,E, F, G; 563-A, D,E] Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Ors. , AIR (1979) SC 1628 and Harjit Singh and Anr. v. The State ofPunjab andAnr. , (2007) 3 SCALE 553, relied on. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 US 535 referred to. 1. 6.

Guidelines per se do not partake to the character ofs_tatute. Such guidelines in absence ofthe statutory backdrop are advisory in nature. Guidelines being advisory in character per se do not confer any legal right. [Para 24] [563-E; 564-C] P. M Ashwathanarayana Setty and Ors. v. State ofKarnataka and Ors. , AIR (1989) SC 100 and State ofHimachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Kai/ash ChandMahajan andOrs. , [1992] Supp 2SCC351,distinguished. D Narendra Kumar Maheshwariv. Union ofIndia andOrs. , AIR(1989) SC 2138; Narendra Kumar Maheshwariv. Union ofIndia andOrs. , [1990] (Supp) SCC 440; Maharao Sahib Shir Bhim Singh}iv. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1981] l SCC 166; JR. Raghupathy and Ors. v. State ofA. P. and Ors. , [1988) 4 SCC 464 and Uttam Parkash Bansal and Ors. v. L. 1 C. of India, (2002) (100) DLT 487, referred to. 1. 7. The doctrine ofLegitimateExpectationwould apply onlywhen . t a practice is found to be prevailing. It has a positive concept.

But, in case ofthis nature where purported expectation is based on an illegal and unconstitutional order, same is wholly inapplicable,as it cannot be founded on an orderwhich is perse illegal and without foundation. [Para 27) [564-G, H; 565-A] Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State ofBihar and Ors. , [2006) 8 SCC381;JP. Bansa! v. StateofRajasthan, [2003) 5SCC 134: (2003)3 SCALE 154 and Union ofIndia v. KP. Joseph and Ors. , [1973) 1SCC 194: AIR (1973) SC 303, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5874 of From the final Judgment dated 18. 08. 2006 with orders dated L..... _ 25. 4. 2006 and 20. 3. 2006 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Civil Writ No. 19633-35 of2005. Poonam Verma Appellant-In-Person. - Ashwani Kumar for the Respondent. The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by -l. - S. B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Respondent is an authority created under the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (for short "the Act").

The Act was enacted to provide for the development of Delhi according to plan and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto. Respondent floated a scheme known as Fifth SelfFinancing Housing Registration Scheme, 1982 (for short "the Scheme"). Appellants herein r pursuant to an advertisement issued in this behalfregistered themselves; their registration numbers being 13463, 16602 and 13464. For the purpose ofallotment offlats, lots were drawn on various occasions, viz. , in June, 1987, November, 1987, March, 1989, July, 1990, January, 1991, January, 1993. Appellants were not successful therein and, thus, were unable to get flats in locality of their choice. The Scheme was closed. However, with a view to give a chance to those who were not successful in the lots on the earlier occasions, a public notice was issued in some newspapers on 8. 12. 1993 for release ofabout 3000 flats which included some built and ready-built ones situated in Kondli-Gharoli.

Registrants under the Scheme were entitled to apply therefor. In the public notice, it was categorically stated that the registrants ofthe said scheme who had not applied for an allotment in that release would not be eligible to apply again for allotment. It was further stated that in the case registrants of 5th SFS did not avail ofthis opportunity or if they surrendered allotment/ allocation after being successful, they shall be deemed to have opted out ofthe scheme and action shall be taken to refund their registration money. 3. Appellants did not respond to the said notice. Despite the same allegedly they had been allotted Category- III flats. They were called upon ... ~ to pay the price specified therefor and to take delivery thereof. They declined to do so. They asked their names to be included in the VI and VI-A SelfFinancing Schemes which were issued later on. Respondent did not agree thereto. 4.

A complaint was filed by the appellants before the Consumer Disputes Redressal District Forum -II on or about 16. 01. 1995 inter alia -~ for a direction upon the respondent herein that their registration should not be cancelled and they should be considered in future draw oflots till they could be allotted flats in the locality oftheir choice. By a judgment and order dated 24. 07. 1995, the said application was allowed holding that the action of the respondent in not considering the cases of the appellants for allotment through the process ofdraw oflots amounted to unfair trade practice, apart from being unilateral and unjustified. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the respondent preferred an appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi and by an order dated 30. 11. 1998 allowed the said appeal and set aside the order of the District Forum.

Appellants herein thereafter filed a revision application before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. During pendency ofthe said application, they approached the Finance Member and Chairman ofthe respondent to place their case before the 'out of court settlement committee'. By an order dated 25. 11. 1999, the National Commission dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellants herein relying inter alia on Clause 16 ofthe Brochure wherein it had categorically been stated that "DDA reserves the right to 't withdraw the Scheme at any time". A Special Leave Petition preferred thereagainst was dismissed. 5. Although the appellants were not successful in their attempt to obtain any remedy on the judicial side, they purported to approach the Ministry ofUrban Affairs in 1997. They made certain representations. Allegedly, the Joint S:! cretary (D&L) by reason of a letter dated 24. 08.

2000 addressed to the Vice-Chairman of Delhi Development Authority directed as under: "I am directed to refer to D. O. letter No. F. 1 (Misc. ) 5th SFS & onwards/2000/SFS, dated the 15th May, 2000 from Shri Arvind Kumar, the then Commissioner (Housing), on the subject noted ' i - . -... above, and to state that the matter pertaining to giving one more opportunity to the left out registrants of5th and subsequent Self Financing Schemes was discussed in the Chamber ofUDM with VC, DDA some time back. After discussion, it was agreed that instead ofa general scheme, VC, DDA would cover the pending petitioners, especially, the hard cases under the OTA quota. It was also mentioned by the VC, DDA that there are only three such -lcases. It is, therefore, requested that further action to allot the flats to these three petitioners may please be taken and action taken in the matter may be intimated to this Ministry in due course. " 6.

The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was again approached. The application ofthe appellants was dismissed. Another application was filed by them before the Permanent Lok Adalat for noncompliance oforders ofMinistry ofUrban Development despite availability of flats. By an order dated 6. 09. 2005, the Lok Adalat observed: "On 12. 4. 2005, Lok Adalat had recommended that the case of the petitioner is a hard case and instead of General Scheme the case ofthe petitioner should be considered under the Out ofTurn Allotment quota particularly when there are only three cases left. In this connection a Jetter ofMinister ofUrban Development & Poverty Alleviation dated 24. 8. 2005 refers to. This letter clearly provides that according to the Vice-Chairman, DDA there are only three such cases left and in such a situation the case ofthe petitioner 'I should be covered under OTA Quota being a hard case.

This recommendation has not been accepted by the DDA presumably for the reason that the scheme ofSFS under which the petitioner had applied had become defunct. The scheme ofOTA under the quota is also no longer in existence and as such the case of the petitioner cannot be considered under this category. The petitioner cannot be considered under this category. The petitioner cannot be allotted a flat as the flats which arc lying vacant for which the petitioner has applied for the DDA has merged the flats with the Higher Income Group. In other words, the DDA in the aforesaid circumstances has opposed such allotment to the petitioner. There POONAM VERMA v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT is no meeting ground between the parties, the matter is closed as unsettled. The petitioner is at liberty to approach appropriate Forum/Court of Law for redressal of his grievances if she is so advised. " 7. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed before the Delhi High Court which was marked as Civil Writ No.

19633-35 of2005. By an order dated 20. 03. 2006, the said petition was dismissed. Letters Patent Appeal preferred thereagainst by the appellants being LPA No. 652-654 of2006 has also been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment dated 25. 04. 2006. A review application filed thereagainst also stand dismissed. 8. Mr. Ram Prakash, representing the appellants, in support ofthis appeal inter alia would submit: (i) As in the Brochure, a policy ofreservation was provided, the High Court committed a serious illegality in opining that no legal right accrued in their favour in terms ofthe said letter dated 24. 08. 2000. (ii) The Central Government, having regard to Section 41 read with Section 56(2)(r) ofthe Act, could direct allotment offlats from 'out of tum quota' keeping in view the cases of the appellants who were three in number, as falling in the category of hard cases.

(Iii) The Central Government in a situation of this nature was entitled to formulate a Scheme for the left out registrants. The authorities ofthe respondent having participated in the meeting with the Minister ofUrban Development, pursuant whereto the said letter dated 24. 08. 2000 was issued, the respondent was bound to implement the same in view of the principles of Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel. (iv) As a large number offlats had been vacant, as would appear from the statement made by the Vice-Chairman of the respondent on 8. 11. 2002 by reason ofallotment ofthe flats, nobody else would be prejudiced. 9. Mr. Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalfofthe respondent, on the other hand, submitted: (i) Appellant do not have any legal right in obtaining allotment of flats.

(ii) They having failed to deposit the amount as far back in 1994 cannot now be pennitted to claim an equitable right despite their unsuccessful attempt before the Forums created under the Consumer Protection Act, 1985. 10. Indisputably, the Scheme was an independent one. It was a Self Financing Housing Registration Scheme. Other similar schemes following the same were also wholly independent ofeach other. The Brochure issued for enforcing the said Scheme is a self-contained document. It provides for the mode and manner in which flats are to be allotted, the categories ofthe allotment of flats thereof, mode ofpayment as also cancellation thereof. Indisputably, despite the fact that the appellants were not successful in obtaining the flats by reason ofdraw oflots and despite the fact that r they did not respond to the notice issued by the respondent, those cases had not been considered in the year 1994. On what ground, we do not know, flats were allotted in their favour.

They were asked to make deposits. They did not do so. They, on the other hand, made a totally untenable claim of continuing their registration again in VI and VI-A Schemes. 11. We have noticed hereinbefore that their claim based on deficiency ofservice and/ or unfair trade practice was rejected by the Higher Forum i ~ on the pmt ofthe respondent. They lost their battle upto this Court in the first round oflitigation. 12. Having failed to establish any legal right in themselves as also purported deficiency in services on the part of the respondent before competent legal forums, they took recourse to remedies on administrative side which stricto sensu were not available. It has not been shown as to on what premise the Central Government can interfere with the day to day affairs ofthe respondent.

Section 41 ofthe Act, only envisages that the respondent would carry out such directions that may be issued by the Central Government from time to time for the efficient administration ofthe Act. The same does not take within its fold an order which can be passed by the Central Government in the matter of allotment offlats by the Authority. Section 41 speaks about policy decision. Any direction issued must have a nexus with the efficient administration ofthe Act. It has nothing to do with carrying out ofthe plans ofthe authority in respect of a particular scheme. 13. The Central Government does not have any quota under the Act. It did not have any quota under the Scheme. The reservations envisaged in terms ofthe Scheme were as under: "a) 25% ofthe flats for the persons belonging to SC/ST. b) 3% ofthe flats for MPs. c) 2% ofthe flats for persons who have won national recognition in the field ofsports, art and music. d) 1%ofthe flats for physically handicapped. " 14.

Evidently, the Central Government had no say in the matter either on its own or under the Act. In terms ofthe Brochure, Section 41 ofthe Act does not clothe any jurisdiction upon the Central Government to issue such a direction. 15. Submission of Mr. Ram Prakash that the Central Government could issue the said direction in exercise of its rule making power under Section 56 ofthe Act is wholly misplaced. In issuing the said letter, the Central Government did not exercise its legislative power nor could it do so. The Central Government in terms of the Act apart from Section 41 did not have any power and, thus, could not have issue any direction in terms thereof. 16. lfSection 41 ofthe Act or for that matter Section 56(2)(r) thereof were not applicable, the question of issuing any direction purported to be in terms ofSection 21 ofthe General Clauses Act, as has been submitted by Mr. Ram Prakash, did not arise. 17. MP. Gangadharan and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors.

, [2006] 6 SCC 162, whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Ram Prakash, has no application in the instant case. 18. The Scheme in question was closed as far back as in the year 1994. The Central Government in terms ofthe provisions ofthe Act or otherwise had no jurisdiction to revive the same. 19. All the authorities under the Act including the Central Government being the creature ofstatute were bound to act within the four comers thereof. A specific grievance was raised by the appellants herein that the action on the part of the authority amounted to unfair trade practice. Deficiency ofservice was also pleaded. The same had been negatived. The courts having appropriatejurisdiction having found neither unfair trade practice nor there being deficiency in service and in that view ofthe matter, the Central Government ordinarily ought not to have interfered in the matter. 20. The purported letter dated 24. 08.

2000 does not specify as to how the Central Government assumed any jUiisdiction in the matter. 21. Some officers ofthe respondent by themselves could not have evolved a Scheme which was beyond the purview and scope ofthe Act. Respondent being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution ofIndia is bound to fulfill the constitutional scheme contained in Article 14 thereof. It could not, going behind the professed scheme as contained in the Brochure, create a quota Such a purported decision being wholly without jurisdiction, is a nullity. The Central Government itself directed the authority to confine the 'out oftum allotment' quota by reason ofa direction issued in June, 2000 only for widows of: (a) Government servants who dies in harness. (b) Those who were killed by terrorists. It would be preposterous to suggest that the Central Government could act beyond its professed policy decision. 22.

The Central Government, thus, acted illegally and without jurisdiction in purporting to take a decision that the hard cases may be brought within the purview ofthe 'Out ofTurn Allotment' Quota, as therefor there was no legal sanction. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton [359 US 535] stated: "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged...... Accordingly, if B dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed...... This judicially evolved rule ofadministrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword. " [See also Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority ofIndia and Ors. , AIR (1979) SC 1628 : [1979] 3 SCC 489, Harjit Singh & Anr. v. The State ofPunjab & Anr. (2007) 3 D SCALE 553]) 23.

Having professed to abide by the Brochure which contained the policy ofreservation, as noticed hereinbefore, the Central Government could not in absence ofany statutory provision directed creation ofany quota and that too after closure of the Scheme. The Scheme after its closure could not even have been revived. 24. Guidelinesper se do not partake to the character ofstatute. Such guidelines in absence ofthe statutory backdrop are advisory in nature. Mr. Ram Prakash himself has relied upon a decision of this Court in Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , AIR (1989) SC 2138 wherein it has been laid down: "I00... This is because guidelines, by their very nature, do not fall into the category oflegislation, direct, subordinate or ancillary. They have only an advisory role to play and non-adherence to or G deviation from them is necessarily and implicitly permissible ifthe , . -+ circumstances ofany particular fact or law situation warrants the same.

Judicial control takes over only where the deviation either involves arbitrariness or discrimination or is so fundamental as to undermine a basic public purpose which the guidelines and the statute under which they are issued are intended to achieve. " [See also Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1990] Supp SCC 440 at 508; Maharao Sahib Shir Rhim Singhji v. UnionoflndiaandOrs. , [1981] 1SCC166at232;JR Raghupathy and Ors. v. State ofA. P. and Ors. , [1988] 4 SCC 464 (paragraph 31) and Uttam Parkash Bansal and Ors. v. L. JC. ofIndia, (2002) 100 DLT 487] * . Guidelines being advisory in characterper se do not confer any legal right. 25. Reliance has also been placed upon P. M Ashwathanarayana Setty and Ors. v. State ofKarnataka and Ors. , AIR (1989) SC 100 for the proposition that the State cannot rely on an evasive reason.

We fail to understand how a case relating to Court Fees and Suit Evaluation Act, would assist us in invoking the principles in regard to the r discriminatory impact ofthe matter in a case ofthis nature. 26. Mr. Ram Prakash has also placed reliance upon State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. , [1992] Supp (2) SCC 351 wherein this Court was considering the statutory conditions ofservices framed under a regulation made in terms of Electricity (Supply) Act. In that context, this Court considered the question as to whether the term ofappointment can be confined to a single person. Reliance placed on the said decision is wholly misplaced. A reasonable classification is permissible although a class legislation is not, but the same will have no application in a case where an executive order was passed wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the constitutional scheme relating to fixation ofquota for certain categories ofpersons. 27.

An endeavour has been made to invoke the principles of Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel. The doctrine of Legitimate Expectation would apply only when a practice is found to be prevailing. It has a positive concept. But, in a case of this nature where purported expectation is based on an illegal and unconstitutional order, the same is wholly inapplicable, as the same cannot be founded on an order which is per se illegal and without foundation. Strong reliance has also been placed on a decision ofthis Court in Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. , [2006] 8 SCC 381 wherein a Bench ofthis Court opined: "15. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right. It is an expectation ofabenefit, reliefor remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The term "established practice" refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain conduct, process or activity ofthe decision-making authority.

The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by the courts, for judicial review ofadministrative action. It is procedural in character based on the requirement ofa higher degree offairness in administrative action, as a consequence of the promise made, or practice established. In short, a person can be said to have a "legitimate expectation" ofa particular treatment, ifany representation or promise is made by an authority, either expressly or inipliedly, or ifthe regular and consistent past practice of the authority gives room for such expectation in the normal course. As a ground for relief, the efficacy ofthe doctrine is rather weak as its slot is just above "fairness in action" but far below "promissory estoppel".

It may only entitle y an expectant: ( a ) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or ( b ) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice. A legitimate expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public interest, change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid or bonafide reason given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to negative the "legitimate expectation". The doctrine oflegitimate expectation based on established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise), can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a recognised legal relationship with the authonty. ...

" The said decision, thus, instead ofassisting the appellants runs counter to their contention. ... _ __ 28. Mr. Ram Prakash has also placed strong reliance on JP. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, [2003] 5 SCC 134 : 2003 (3) SCALE 154. Therein itself, it is laid down: "... The Constitution requires that action must be taken by the authority concerned in the name ofthe Governor. It is not till this formality is observed that the action can be regarded as that of the State. Constitutionally speaking, the Council ofMinisters are advisers and as the Head ofthe State, the Governor is to act with the aid or advice ofthe Council of Ministers. Therefore, till the advice is accepted by the Governor, views of the Council of Ministers do not get crystallised into action ofthe State... " 29. This decision is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that the government order, so as to confer a legal right, must conform to the provisions contained in Article 166 ofthe Constitution ofIndia. 30.

Questioning the correctness ofthe observation ofthe Division bench that the communication contained in the letter dated 24. 08. 2000 did not confer any legal right, Mr. Ram Prakash, would submit that an administrative order may also confer a legal right. No doubt, it was so stated in Union ofIndia v. K. P. Joseph and Ors. , [1973] 1 SCC 194: AIR 1973 SC 303 but then it was a case where an executive order was. passed which was within thejurisdiction ofthe State in terms ofthe proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution oflndia. The Bench, it is interesting to note, hastened to add: +- "11. We should not be understood as laying down any general proposition on this question. But we think that the Order in question conferred upon the first respondent the right to have his pay fixed in the manner specified in the Order and that was part of the A conditions ofhis service. We see no reason why the Court should not enforce that right. " 31.

We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances ofthis case, however, there B shall be no order as to costs. N. J. Appeal dismissed.