PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS

Citation: Civil Appeal No. 1012 of 2002

Court: Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench)

Bench: Rao. Therefore, if as a consequence of the decision in

Case summary

Minerva Mills, the unamended Article 31-C continues in force, there can be no question of any amendment was undoubtedly to expand the scope of the immunity granted by Article 31-C.

Judgment text

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 1012 of 2002 [2024] 11 S. C. R. 1 : 2024 INSC 835 Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 1012 of 2002) 05 November 2024 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, Hrishikesh Roy, B. V. Nagarathna,* Sudhanshu Dhulia,* J. B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

] Issue for Consideration (1) Whether Article 31C (as upheld in Kesavananda Bharati case) survives in the Constitution after amendment to the provision by the forty-second amendment was struck down by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills case; and (2) Whether the interpretation of Article 39(b) adopted by Justice Krishna Iyer in Ranganatha Reddy case and followed in Sanjeev Coke case must be reconsidered; and whether the phrase 'material resources of the community' in Article 39(b) can be interpreted to include resources that are owned privately and not by the State. Headnotes† A. Constitution of India - Art. 31C - Art. 31C (as upheld in Kesavananda Bharati case), if survives in the Constitution after amendment to the provision by the forty-second amendment was struck down by the Supreme Court in Minerva Millscase - Held: Article 31C to the extent that it was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati case remains in force.

Held [per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, J. B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, * Author Ed. Note: There are three judgments. One judgment was pronounced by Hon'ble Dr Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, on behalf of himself, Hon'ble Mr Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Hon'ble Mr Justice J B Pardiwala, Hon'ble Mr Justice Manoj Misra, Hon'ble Mr Justice Rajesh Bindal, Hon'ble Mr Justice Satish Chandra Sharma and Hon'ble Mr Justice Augustine George Masih. Hon'ble Mrs Justice B V Nagarathna and Hon'ble Mr Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia pronounced their separate judgments. 2 Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma, and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )]: 1. Article 31C to the extent that it was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati v Union of India remains in force. [Para 229(a)] 2. 1.

By Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment, the words "the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39" in Article 31-C were replaced with the words "all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV. " This is a case of substitution. Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment was subsequently struck down in Minerva Mills. Where an amendment substituting certain text with certain alternate text is invalidated, the effect is that the unamended text continues in force. This is because the legislative intent of repeal and enactment in such cases is composite and cannot be separated. To give effect to the repeal and not the enactment would result in an outcome which does not correlate with legislative intent, and, as Justice Hidayatullah noted in Laxmibai "leave the original section truncated" resulting in absurd outcomes.

This would in effect invalidate the original, valid and constitutional provision despite there being no constitutional fault with it nor the legislature intending to repeal it. Thus, the presumption would be that after Minerva Mills, the unamended Article 31-C would continue in force. Indeed, it is evident that cases such as Bhim Singh and Sanjeev Coke proceeded on this presumption. [Para 69] 2. 2. The only plausible exception to this presumption would be if it could be demonstrated that Parliament, when enacting the Forty-Second Amendment would have repealed the words "the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39" independent of their enactment of the words "all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV. " In this case, no reference to the broader legislative proceedings or external aids is necessary to arrive at the inference that Parliament would not have independently repealed these words.

The text of the amendment adopted by Parliament itself makes it abundantly clear that there was no independent intention to repeal. The effect of Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment was to expand the scope of the immunity provided by Article 31-C to legislation. Under the unamended Article Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 31-C, immunity was only provided to legislation if it gave effect to the Directive Principles found in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39. However, by Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment, the scope of this immunity was significantly expanded to immunise legislations that gave effect to any or all of the Directive Principles in Part IV of the Constitution. Thus, the intention of Parliament in enacting Section 4 of the constitutional amendment was undoubtedly to expand the scope of the immunity granted by Article 31-C.

This being the situation, it cannot be suggested that Parliament would have repealed the words "the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39" if it did not simultaneously enact the broader language expanding the scope of Article 31-C. If Parliament had independently repealed these words, it would have not just reduced the scope of Article 31-C but altogether eliminated the effect of the Article. Without the words "the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39" in Article 31- C, the provision would have been rendered nugatory. Given Parliament's manifest intention to expand the scope of Article 31-C by Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment, it is not plausible to hold that Parliament independently sought to repeal the words "the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39" from Article 31-C.

Therefore, it is evident that the legislative intent of Parliament when adopting Section 4 of the FortySecond Amendment was composite, to repeal and enact (i. e. , to substitute) through one single action. This Court cannot therefore disaggregate the steps of repeal and enactment and give effect to the repeal even after invalidating the enactment. After Minerva Mills invalidated Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment, the composite legal effect of Section 4 is nullified and the unamended text of Article 31-C stands revived. [Para 70] 2. 3. The text of the unamended Article 31-C was challenged, and the first part of the Article was upheld by thirteenjudge decision in Kesavananda Bharati while the latter half of the Article was invalidated.

Therefore, the first half of unamended Article 31-C, which is the subject matter of the present controversy, was undoubtedly constitutional as held by the thirteen-judge decision in Kesavananda Bharati 4 and further by the Constitution Bench in Waman Rao. Therefore, if as a consequence of the decision in Minerva Mills, the unamended Article 31-C continues in force, there can be no question of any unconstitutionality or adverse consequences associated with the unamended Article 31-C. Indeed, both the Constitution Benches in Minerva Mills and Waman Rao expressly noted that the first half of Article 31-C had been held to be constitutional in Kesavananda Bharati. Further, given that the unamended Article 31-C has been given effect for over four decades as demonstrated by the decisions in Bhim Singh and Sanjeev Coke, no argument can be raised concerning any legal or practical difficulties with the operation of the unamended Article 31-C.

Given these findings, the unamended Article 31-C continues in force. [Para 71] 2. 4. An amendment can be invalidated when it modifies, obliterates, or adds some feature to the Constitution that is anathema to the principles that emerge upon a structural reading of the constitutional text. If an amendment is invalidated because it causes a drastic deviation from the principles that govern our constitutional democracy, the consequences must be a return to those principles. Article 31-C represented a delicate balance between the goals of Part IV and the rights of Part III of the Constitution. This balance was held to not impermissibly deviate from the core principles that govern our Constitution by the thirteen judges' decision of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati. However, in Minerva Mills, Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment was held to violate these core principles that form the basic structure.

The logical result of such a ruling is that the constitutional text must return to within the fold of the basic structure. To give effect to the repealing portions of Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment while also invalidating the enactment would not result in a return to a constitutional text that is in conformity with the basic structure. Rather, it would result in a novel third outcome, the constitutionality of which would be uncertain, untested, and may itself violate the basic structure. Therefore, the consequence of invalidating Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment must be that the unamended Article 31-C is revived. [Para 72] Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Held (per B. V. Nagarathna, J.

) (Concurring): I am in complete accord with the reasoning that, in the absence of any indication that Parliament intended a "repeal without substitution," the original text of Article 31C as it existed before the Constitution (Forty Second) Amendment Act, 1976 must be reinstated following the invalidation of the said amendment. In Minerva Mills case, when the amendment was struck down for deviating from constitutional principles, the logical consequence that must follow the declaration of invalidity of the amendment is to revert to those original principles which the amendment deviated from. This is by giving effect to Article 31C, to the extent it was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati case. This represents a return to the Constitution's original text, aligning with the basic structure of the Constitution. Consequently, invalidating Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment should automatically result in the restoration of the unamended Article 31C.

I agree that Article 31C to the extent that it was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati remains in force. [Paras 3 and 23(a)] Held (per Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. ) (Concurring): The unamended Article 31-C to the extent held valid in Kesavananda Bharati survives. [Para 2] B 1. Constitution of India - Art. 39(b) - Whether the phrase 'material resources of the community' used in Art. 39(b) includes privately owned resources - Held [per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, J. B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma, and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

)] (Majority opinion) - Theoretically, the answer is yes, the phrase may include privately owned resources - However, one cannot subscribe to the expansive view adopted in the minority judgement authored by Justice Krishna Iyer in Ranganatha Reddy case and subsequently relied upon in Sanjeev Coke case - Not every resource owned by an individual can be considered a 'material resource of the community' merely because it meets the qualifier of 'material needs' - The inquiry about whether the resource in question falls within the ambit of Art.

39(b) must be context-specific and subject to a non-exhaustive list of factors such as the nature of the resource and its characteristics; the impact of the resource on the well-being of the community; 6 the scarcity of the resource; and the consequences of such a resource being concentrated in the hands of private players - Public Trust Doctrine evolved by Supreme Court may also help identify resources which fall within the ambit of the phrase "material resource of the community" - Held (per B. V. Nagarathna, J. ) - Yes, privately owned resources except "personal effects" can come within the scope and ambit of the phrase "material resources of the community" provided such resources get transformed as "resources of the community" - Held (per Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. ) (Dissenting) - The view of the learned Chief Justice in this case (i. e.

the majority opinon) ultimately holds that not all privately owned resources are "material resources of the community" - Not only this it further limits the hands of the legislature to a non- exhaustive list of factors to determine which resources can be considered as "material resources" - There is no need for this pre-emptive determination - The definition of "material resources of the community" was purposely kept in generalized and broad-based terms - Privately owned resources are part of "material resources of the community" - Provisions in Article 39(b) & (c) have to be read in light of Art. 38 of the Constitution - Once one does that, one cannot but give an expansive meaning to the phrase "material resources of the community". B 2. Constitution of India - Art.

39(b) - Interpretation of - Whether interpretation of Article 39(b) adopted by Justice Krishna Iyer in Ranganatha Reddycase and followed in Sanjeev Coke case must be reconsidered - Held [per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, J. B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma, and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )] (Majority opinion) - The majority judgment in Ranganatha Reddy expressly distanced itself from the observations made by Justice Krishna Iyer (speaking on behalf of the minority of judges) on the interpretation of Art. 39(b) - Thus, a coequal bench of this Court inSanjeev Coke erred by relying on the minority opinion - Held (per B. V. Nagarathna, J. ) (Dissenting) - On merits it cannot be held that Sanjeev Coke violated judicial discipline - One cannot lose sight of the fact that in Sanjeev Coke Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.

this Court did not decide the case only on the basis of the opinion of Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy- Therefore, Sanjeev Cokeis good law insofar as on the merits of the matter is concerned - Held (per Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

) (Dissenting) - In Sanjeev Coke, when the Five Judge Constitution Bench unanimously followed the minority judgement inRanganatha Reddy, it did not violate judicial discipline of not following the majority, since inSanjeev Coke, the Five Judges did not go against the law laid down by the majority Judges in Ranganatha Reddybut only adopted the logic of the Three Judges on which the majority of Four Judges were silent - The five learned judges in Sanjeev Coke relied upon the decision of the minority judges in Ranganath Reddyas they were persuaded by the logic and the interpretation given by Justice Krishna Iyer to the phrase"material resources of the community"- The broad and inclusive meaning given to the expression "material resources of the community" by Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in Ranganatha Reddyand Sanjeev Cokerespectively has lost none of its relevance, or jurisprudential value, nor has it lost the audience which appreciates these values. B 3.

Constitution of India - Art. 39(b) - Phrase 'material resources of the community' in Article 39(b) - Meaning of - Single-sentence observation in Mafatlal case to the effect that 'material resources of the community' include privately owned resources - Effect of - Held [per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, J. B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma, and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )] (Majority opinion) - The single-sentence observation in Mafatlal case to the effect that 'material resources of the community' include privately owned resources is not part of theratio decidendi of the judgement - Thus, it is not binding on the Court -Held (per Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. ) (Concurring) - The majority opinion in Mafatlal constitutes obiter dicta and is not binding on this Court -Held (per B. V. Nagarathna, J.

) - The single-sentence observation in Mafatlal to the effect that "material resources of the community" include privately owned resources may be obiter but has great persuasive value. 8 B 4. Words and Phrases - Term 'distribution' - Meaning and connotation of - Distribution by the State - Whether acquisition of private resources falls within the ambit of the term 'distribution - Held [per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, J. B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma, and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )] - The term 'distribution' has a wide connotation - The various forms of distribution which can be adopted by the State cannot be exhaustively detailed - However, it may include the vesting of the concerned resources in the State or nationalisation - In the specific case, the Court must determine whether the distribution 'subserves the common good' -Held (per B. V. Nagarathna, J.

): The term "distribution" has no doubt a wide connotation but vesting in the State of a particular privately owned "material resource" or nationalisation of the same are only conditions precedent to distribution which have to comply with Article 300A of the Constitution - Further, a resource which has vested in the State or a resource retained by a State on nationalisation could be utilised by the State to subserve the common good as a material resource of the community - The public trust doctrine would apply to such material resources - Alternatively, the State could decide to actually distribute the "material resources of the community" to eligible and deserving persons by way of assignment, lease, allotment, grant, etc. - The same would also come within the scope and ambit of the expression "distribution" -Held (per Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

): It is for the legislature to decide how the ownership and control of material resources is to be distributed in order to subserve common good - How to control and distribute a material resource is also the task of the Legislature, but while doing so what has to be seen is that the control and ownership of the material resource be so distributed that it subserves common good of the community - If it does not, then such a legislation can be struck down as the Judiciary is not deprived of its powers of judicial review. Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Held [per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, J. B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma, and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )] (Majority Opinion): 1. Article 39(b) is not a source of legislative power.

The inclusion or exclusion of 'privately-owned resources' from the ambit of the provision does not impact the power of the legislature to enact laws to acquire such resources. The power to acquire private resources, in certain situations, continues to be traceable to other provisions in the Constitution, including the sovereign power of eminent domain. [Para 203] 2. The interpretation of Article 39(b), i. e. that all private property is covered within the ambit of Article 39(b) is inconsistent with the text of Article 39(b). [Para 204] 3. There is a distinction between holding that private property may form part of the phrase 'material resources of the community' and holding that all private property falls within the net of the phrase. It is here that the judgment by Justice Krishna Iyer in Ranganatha Reddy, and the consequent observations in Sanjeev Coke fall into error.

Justice Krishna Iyer cast the net wide, holding that all resources which meet "material needs" are covered by the phrase and any attempts by the government to nationalise these resources would be within the scope of Article 39(b). He clarified that not only the "means of production" but also the goods so produced fall within the net of the provision. The illustration which he provides in Ranganatha Reddy indicates the unworkable nature of such an interpretation. Justice Krishna Iyer observed, by way of an illustration, that not only do factories which produce cars fall within the net of Article 39(b), but even privately owned cars are covered by the provision. Similarly, even in Sanjeev Coke, the net is cast wide and this Court observed that "all things capable of producing wealth of the community" fall within the ambit of the phrase. In both decisions, it was observed that all resources of the individual are consequentially the resources of the community. [Para 209] 4.

An interpretation of Article 39(b) which places all private property within the net of the phrase "material resources of the community" only satisfies one of the three requirements of the phrase, i. e. that the goods in question must be a 10 'resource'. However, it ignores the qualifiers that they must be "material" and "of the community". The use of the words "material" and "community" are not meaningless superfluities. One cannot adopt a construction of the provision which renders these terms otiose. The words "of the community" must be understood as distinct from the "individual". If Article 39(b) was meant to include all resources owned by an individual, it would state the "ownership and control of resources is so distributed as best to subserve the common good". Similarly, if the provision were to exclude privately owned resources, it would state "ownership and control of resources of the state ... " instead of its current phrasing.

The use of the word "of the community" rather than "of the state" indicates a specific intention to include some privately owned resources. [Para 211] 5. In essence, the text of the provision indicates that not all privately owned resources fall within the ambit of the phrase. However, privately owned resources are not excluded as a class and some private resources may be covered. The resource in question must meet the two qualifiers, i. e. it must be a "material" resource and it must be "of the community". [Para 212] 6. To declare that Article 39(b) includes the distribution of all private resources amounts to endorsing a particular economic ideology and structure for our economy. Justice Krishna Iyer's judgment in Ranganatha Reddy, which was followed inter alia in Sanjeev Coke and Bhim Singhji, was influenced by a particular school of economic thought.

In essence, the interpretation of Article 39(b) adopted in these judgements is rooted in a particular economic ideology and the belief that an economic structure which prioritises the acquisition of private property by the state is beneficial for the nation. [Para 213] 7. The Constitution was framed in broad terms to allow succeeding governments to experiment with and adopt a structure for economic governance which would subserve the policies for which it owes accountability to the electorate. The role of this Court is not to lay down economic policy, but to facilitate this intent of the framers to lay down the foundation for an 'economic democracy'. The doctrinal error in the Krishna Iyer approach was, postulating a rigid economic theory, which Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. advocates for greater state control over private resources, as the exclusive basis for constitutional governance.

The foresighted vision of our framers to establish an 'economic democracy' and trust the wisdom of the elected government, has been the backbone of the highgrowth rate of India's economy, making it one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. To scuttle this constitutional vision by imposing a single economic theory, which views the acquisition of private property by the state as the ultimate goal, would undermine the very fabric and principles of our constitutional framework. [Paras 214, 215 and 216] 8. The right to property was included in the Constitution as a fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(f) and Article 31. Subsequently, the right to property was deleted from Part III of the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. However, a modified version was inserted and the right to property continues to be constitutionally protected under Article 300A.

Although no longer in the nature of a fundamental right, the provision has been characterised as a constitutional and human right. The interpretation of Article 39(b), both as a pre-cursor to the protection of Article 31C and as an aspirational Directive Principle, cannot run counter to the constitutional recognition of private property. To hold that all private property is covered by the phrase "material resources of the community" and that the ultimate aim is state control of private resources would be incompatible with the constitutional protection. [Paras 217, 220] 9. A construction of Article 39(b) which provides that all private property is included within the ambit of Article 39(b) is incorrect. However, there is no bar on the inclusion of private property as a class and if a privately owned resource meets the qualifiers of being a 'material resource' and 'of the community', it may fall within the net of the provision.

"Material resources of the community" refers to either natural resources (which are those of the nation) or those resources which in a large sense can be said to be of community, even though they may be in private hands. [Para 221] 10. There are various forms of resources, which may be privately owned, and inherently have a bearing on ecology and/or the well-being of the community. Such resources fall within 12 the net of Article 39(b). To illustrate, non-exhaustively, there may exist private ownership of forests, ponds, fragile areas, wetlands and resource-bearing lands. Similarly, resources like spectrum, airwaves, natural gas, mines and minerals, which are scarce and finite, may sometimes be within private control. However, as the community has a vital interest in the retention of the character of these resources, they fall within the ambit of the expression "material resources of the community". [Para 223] 11.

The majority judgment in Ranganatha Reddy expressly distanced itself from the observations made by Justice Krishna Iyer (speaking on behalf of the minority of judges) on the interpretation of Article 39(b). Thus, a coequal bench of this Court in Sanjeev Coke erred by relying on the minority opinion. [Para 229(b)] 12. The single-sentence observation in Mafatlal to the effect that 'material resources of the community' include privately owned resources is not part of the ratio decidendi of the judgement. Thus, it is not binding on this Court. [Para 229(c)] 13. On the limited question of whether the acquisition of private resources falls within the ambit of the term 'distribution', to hold that the term "distribution" cannot encompass the vesting of a private resource would amount to falling into the same error as the Justice Krishna Iyer doctrine, i. e. to lay down a preference of economic and social policy. The term 'distribution' has a wide connotation.

The various forms of distribution which can be adopted by the state cannot be exhaustively detailed. However, it may include the vesting of the concerned resources in the state or nationalisation. In the specific case, the Court must determine whether the distribution 'subserves the common good'. [Paras 227, 228 and 229(f)] 14. The direct question referred to this bench is whether the phrase 'material resources of the community' used in Article 39(b) includes privately owned resources. Theoretically, the answer is yes, the phrase may include privately owned resources. However, this Court is unable to subscribe to the expansive view adopted in the minority judgement authored by Justice Krishna Iyer in Ranganatha Reddy and subsequently relied on by this Court in Sanjeev Coke. Not every resource Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.

owned by an individual can be considered a 'material resource of the community' merely because it meets the qualifier of 'material needs'. [Para 229(d)] 15. The inquiry about whether the resource in question falls within the ambit of Article 39(b) must be context-specific and subject to a non-exhaustive list of factors such as the nature of the resource and its characteristics; the impact of the resource on the well-being of the community; the scarcity of the resource; and the consequences of such a resource being concentrated in the hands of private players. The Public Trust Doctrine evolved by this Court may also help identify resources which fall within the ambit of the phrase "material resource of the community". [Para 229(e)] Held (per B. V. Nagarathna, J. ): 1.

Articles 37, 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India which are part of the Directive Principles of State Policy have to be interpreted by bearing in mind the changing economic policies of the State and not in a rigid watertight compartment. The flexibility of interpretation is having regard to the dynamic changes in the Indian socio-economic policies meant for the welfare and progress of the people of India. An interpretation of the aforesaid Articles or for that matter any other provision of the Constitution must be viewed in the historical backdrop of the period in which the interpretation was made by this Court during the course of adjudication.

Any interpretation which was found to be sound and in consonance with the socio-economic policy of the State during a particular period of time, cannot be critiqued at a later point of time in any quarter including by a court of law merely because the socio- economic policies of the State have changed over a period of time or there is a paradigm shift in the thinking and policies of the State. [Para 22(I)] 2. Articles 37 and 38 of the Constitution have to be borne in mind by the Courts while considering the validity of any policy or statute which intend to further any of the Directive Principles of State Policy. [Para 22(II)] 3. Article 39(b) has to be read in the context of Article 39(c). Articles 39(b) and (c) supplement and complement each other and cannot be construed in silos. Article 39(b) comprises of 14 following five components, namely, (i) ownership and control; (ii) material resources; (iii) of the community; (iv) so distributed; and (v) as best to subserve the common good.

(i) The expression "ownership and control" must be given its widest connotation in the context of "distribution of" "material resources of the community" "as best to subserve the common good". (ii) "Material resources" can in the first instance be divided into two basic categories, namely, (i) State owned resources which belong to the State which are essentially material resources of the community, held in public trust by the State; and (ii) privately owned resources. However, the expression "material resources" does not include "personal effects" or "personal belonging" of individuals, such as, clothing or apparel, household articles, personal jewellery and other articles of daily use belonging to the individuals of a household and which are intimate and personal in nature and use. Excluding "personal effects", all other privately owned resources can be construed as "material resources".

Thus, all resources whether they are public resources or privately owned resources which come within the scope and ambit of the expression "material resources" as stated above are included within that expression. (iii) "Material resources" which are privately owned could be transformed as "material resources of the community", inter alia, in the following five ways: a. by nationalisation, which could be either by way of an enactment made by the Parliament or a State legislature or in any other manner in accordance with law; b. by acquisition, which could be by way of a special enactment made by the Parliament or a State legislature having regard to Entry 42 - List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Alternatively, the acquisition could be made under the extant Parliamentary or State laws dealing with acquisition; c.

by operation of law, such as vesting of private resources in the State, which could be by virtue of statutes dealing with land reforms, land tenures, abolition of inams, village offices or any other law where by operation of law there would be vesting Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. of private material resources in the State or in any other manner in accordance with law; d. by purchase of the material resource from private persons by the State, its agencies and instrumentalities in the manner known to law; and e. by the private owner of the material resource converting his "material resources" as a "material resource of the community" by donation, gift, creation of an endowment or a public trust or in any other manner known to law. (iv) In (a) to (d) above, the provision of Article 300A which is a constitutional right to property has to be complied with.

(v) The "material resources of the community" have to be "distributed as best to subserve the common good". Distribution could be in two ways: Firstly, by the State itself retaining the material resource for a public purpose and/or for public use; and Secondly, privately owned material resources when converted as "material resources of the community" can be distributed to eligible and deserving persons either by way of auction, grant, assignment, allocation, lease, sale or any other mode of transfer known to law either temporarily or permanently depending upon the mode adopted and unconditionally or with conditions depending upon:(a) nature of the resource and its inherent characteristics; (b) the impact of the resource on the well-being of the community; (c) the scarcity of the resource; (d) the consequences of such a resource being concentrated in the hands of the private owners; and (e) any such factors.

(vi) The expression "common good" would, inter alia, mean that the distribution of the "ownership and control of material resources of the community" would not lead to concentration of the wealth and means of production in the hands of few which is a Directive Principle in clause (c) of Article 39. Thus, "distribution of material resources of the community" cannot violate the Directive Principle in clause (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. [Para 22(III)] 4. The majority judgment of this Court in Ranganatha Reddy and the judgment in Abu Kavur Bai relate to nationalisation of contract carriages/State carriages which were upheld by this 16 Court. Nationalisation of coking coal mines was upheld by this Court in Sanjeev Coke. In Bhim Singhji and Basantibai, certain provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the provisions of MHADA respectively were upheld on the touchstone of Article 39(b) of the Constitution.

The nine-Judge Bench in Mafatlal referred to the judgments of this Court in Ranganatha Reddy, Abu Kavur Bai etc. in the context of the submission made before, i. e. , the Indian Constitution envisages Justice - social, economic and political, to all citizens of India as enshrined in the preamble. This was by way of an obiter but having persuasive value. [Para 22(IV)] 5. The majority judgment in Ranganatha Reddy, no doubt, did not concur with the views of Krishna Iyer, J. expressed in his separate opinion. However, in Sanjeev Coke the Constitution Bench of five-Judges independently upheld what was challenged in the said case, namely, the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and while doing so in paragraphs 19 and 20 referred to the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy and made certain observations on the majority judgment in Minerva Mills. However, A. N. Sen, J. did not express any opinion on the judgment of this Court in Minerva Mills.

What is significant is that the judgments in Ranganatha Reddy as well as in Sanjeev Coke upheld the respective Nationalisation Acts. Therefore, on merits it cannot be held that Sanjeev Coke violated judicial discipline. One cannot lose sight of the fact that in Sanjeev Coke this Court did not decide the case only on the basis of the opinion of Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy but on merits on the validity of the Nationalisation Act. Therefore, Sanjeev Coke is good law insofar as on the merits of the matter is concerned. [Para 23(b)] 6. The single-sentence observation in Mafatlal to the effect that "material resources of the community" include privately owned resources may be obiter but has great persuasive value. [Para 23(c)] 7.

Yes, privately owned resources except "personal effects" as explained above can come within the scope and ambit of the phrase "material resources of the community" provided such resources get transformed as "resources of the community" as discussed by me above. [Para 23(d)] Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 8. I agree that the inquiry about whether the resource in question falls within the ambit of Article 39(b) must be context-specific and subject to a non-exhaustive list of factors such as the nature of the resource and its characteristics; the impact of the resource on the well-being of the community; the scarcity of the resource; and the consequences of such a resource being concentrated in the hands of private players. The Public Trust Doctrine evolved by this Court may also help identify resources which fall within the ambit of the phrase "material resource of the community".

In addition, I also reiterate my discussion and conclusion on how privately owned material resource can be transformed as "material resource of the community". [Para 23(e)] 9. The term "distribution" has no doubt a wide connotation but vesting in the State of a particular privately owned "material resource" or nationalisation of the same are only conditions precedent to distribution which have to comply with Article 300A of the Constitution. Further, a resource which has vested in the State or a resource retained by a State on nationalisation could be utilised by the State to subserve the common good as a material resource of the community. The public trust doctrine would apply to such material resources. Alternatively, the State could decide to actually distribute the "material resources of the community" to eligible and deserving persons by way of assignment, lease, allotment, grant, etc. The same would also come within the scope and ambit of the expression "distribution".

[Para 23(f)] 10. The judgments of this Court in Ranganatha Reddy, Sanjeev Coke, Abu Kavur Bai and Basantibai correctly decided the issues that fell for consideration and do not call for any interference on the merits of the matters. The observations of the Judges in those decisions would not call for any critique in the present times. Neither is it justified nor warranted. [Para 24] Held (per Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. ): 1. The question as to whether privately owned resources are part of "material resources of the community" as used in Article 39(b), has been answered by the learned Chief Justice as "yes", "the phrase may include privately owned resources", but not in the expansive manner as held by the three learned 18 judges in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddyand later in Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. The judgment further sets limits on what could be "material resources of the community".

I am unable to accept the above proposition as this view ultimately holds that not all privately owned resources are "material resources of the community". Not only this it further limits the hands of the legislature to a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine which resources can be considered as "material resources". In my opinion there is no need for this pre-emptive determination. The definition of "material resources of the community" was purposely kept in generalized and broad-based terms. I entirely endorse the view taken by the Three learned Judges in Ranganatha Reddy and by the Five learned Judges in Sanjeev Coke, as to the scope and ambit of "material resources of the community". Privately owned resources are a part of the "material resources of the community". [Para 3] 2. "We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we cannot have both. " This expression is attributed to Justice Louis D.

Brandeis, an eminent Jurist and a former Judge of US Supreme Court. Without doubt, when Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India were being incorporated in Part IV of our Constitution, a similar thought dominated the minds of the framers of our Constitution. It is for this reason that Granville Austin calls the Indian Constitution, "first and foremost a social document". Our Constitution is not merely a roadmap for governance, it is also a vision for a just and equitable society. [Para 5] 3. In Mafatlal, the question before this Court primarily was of unjust enrichment. The observations of Justice Jeevan Reddy are only incidental and were not related to the core issue. I agree with the learned Chief Justice on this point and I adopt the detailed reasoning given by him in holding that the majority opinion in Mafatlal constitutes obiter dicta and is not binding on this Court. [Para 24] 4.

The question is that when in Sanjeev Coke, the Five Judge Constitution Bench unanimously followed the minority judgement in Ranganatha Reddy did it violate judicial discipline of not following the majority but the minority decision. In my opinion, it did not break any judicial discipline, since in Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Sanjeev Coke,the Five Judges did not go against the law laid down by the majority Judges in Ranganatha Reddy but only adopted the logic of the Three Judges on which the majority of Four Judges were silent. [Para 30] 5. It is difficult to even come to the conclusion that the Four Judges in Ranganatha Reddyentirely disagreed with the minority opinion of Justice Krishna Iyer. It merely says "we must not be understood to agree with all that he has said in his judgment in this regard. " This is not exactly a disagreement. The majority of the Four Judges chose to remain silent on the subject.

It cannot be said that the Four Judges, in any way, said anything contrary or in opposition to what was laid down by the Three Judges in Ranganatha Reddy,and therefore, no judicial discipline was broken by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy when he authored the unanimous judgment in Sanjeev Coke by adopting the logic of the Three Judges in Ranganatha Reddy. The logic is very clear, in cases where a Judge or Judges of the Supreme Court in minority have given a decision on a point on which the majority has remained silent, that it would be binding on the High Courts and all other Courts, and for this Court the least it will have is persuasive value. The five learned judges in Sanjeev Cokerelied upon the decision of the minority judges in Ranganath Reddy as they were persuaded by the logic and the interpretation given by Justice Krishna Iyer to the phrase "material resources of the community". [Para 31] 6.

The provisions in Article 39(b) & (c) have to be read in the light of Article 38 of the Constitution of India. Once one does that, one cannot but give an expansive meaning to the phrase "material resources of the community". The meaning which must be given to "material resources of the community" is what has been given to it in Ranganatha Reddy by the Three Judges and what has been followed in the Constitution Bench decision in Sanjeev Coke. To my mind, this has been the interpretation of the phrase "material resources of the community". [Para 48] 7. It is for the legislature to decide how the ownership and control of material resources is to be distributed in order to subserve common good. Once the expansive meaning of "material resources of the community" is determined, there is 20 no necessity of drawing further guidelines for the legislatures to determine as to what will constitute material resources.

How to control and distribute a material resource is also the task of the Legislature, but while doing so what has to be seen is that the control and ownership of the material resource be so distributed that it subserves common good of the community. If it does not, then such a legislation can be struck down as the Judiciary is not deprived of its powers of judicial review. The legislation in question has to establish a nexus with the principles specified in Article 39(b) and (c) to be a valid legislation. This is the law in terms of Kesavananda Bharati and Minerva Mills. To put it differently what and when do the "privately owned resources" come within the definition of "material resources" is not for this Court to declare. This is not required. The key factor is whether such resources would subserve common good. Clearly the acquisition, ownership or even control of every privately owned resource will not subserve common good.

Yet at this stage we cannot come out with a catalogue of do's and don'ts. We must leave this exercise to the wisdom of the legislatures. [Para 49] 8. The incorporation of Article 38 as well as Article 39(b) and (c) in Part IV of our Constitution was based on the prevalent philosophy of the time and the path of development India chose to follow. The interpretation given to the above provisions by this Court, particularly in Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Coke also has its contextual relevance. Perhaps in some ways situations have changed. What has not changed, however, is the inequality. There is today a political equality and there is also an equality in law, yet the social and economic inequalities continue as cautioned by Dr. Ambedkar in his speech in the constituent Assembly on November 25, 1949. The inequality in income and wealth and the growing gap between the rich and the poor is still enormous.

It will therefore not be prudent to abandon the principles on which Articles 38 and 39 are based and on which stands the Three Judge opinion in Ranganatha Reddy and the unanimous verdict inSanjeev Coke. [Para 50] 9. The broad and inclusive meaning given to the expression "material resources of the community" by Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Cokerespectively has stood us in good Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. stead and has lost none of its relevance, or jurisprudential value, nor has it lost the audience which appreciates these values. I must also record here my strong disapproval on the remarks made on the Krishna Iyer Doctrine as it is called. This criticism is harsh, and could have been avoided. The Krishna Iyer Doctrine, or for that matter the O. Chinnappa Reddy Doctrine, is familiar to all who have anything to do with law or life.

It is based on strong humanist principles of fairness and equity. It is a doctrine which has illuminated our path in dark times. The long body of their judgment is not just a reflection of their perspicacious intellect but more importantly of their empathy for the people, as human being was at the centre of their judicial philosophy. [Para 50] Case Law Cited In the judgment of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI: Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [1983] 1 SCR 1000 : (1983)1SCC147 : 1982INSC93 and State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy [1978] 1 SCR 641 : (1977)4 SCC471 : 1977INSC196[Minority opinion of Justice Krishna Iyer] - held, erroneous. State of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore. [1977] 1 SCR 1002 : (1977) 1 SCC643; DK Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat [1986] 1 SCR 479 : (1986)Supp. SCC20; Shamarao Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana [1952] 1 SCR 683 : (1952) 2 SCC1 : 1952INSC63; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re : Special Reference No.

1 of 2012 [2012] 9 SCR 311 : (2012)10 SCC1 : 2012INSC428; Shaukat Khan v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1975] 1 SCR 429 : (1974) 2 SCC376; Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) v. Union of India [1985] 2 SCR 287 : (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1984INSC231 - relied on. State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Khetan [1986] 1 SCR 707 : (1986)2SCC516 : 1986INSC40; Minerva Mills v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 206 : (1980)3SCC625 : 1980INSC142; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1973)4SCC225 : 1973INSC91; Waman Rao v. Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 1 : (1980)3SCC587 : 1980INSC216; Mafatlal Industries Ltd v. Union of India [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 585 : (1997) 5 SCC536 : 1996INSC1514; IR Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 394 : (1999)7SCC580 : 1999INSC394; Malpe 22 Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra [1997] Supp. 6 SCR 717 : (1998)2SCC1 : 1997INSC831; Supreme Court Advocates- On-Record Association v.

Union of India [2015] 13 SCR 1 : (2016) 5 SCC1 : 2015INSC285; Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 862 :(1981) 1 SCC166 : 1980 INSC219; ATB Mehtab Majid v. State of Madras [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 435 : (1963)14 STC 355 : 1962INSC342; Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. Rangappa Baliga [1969] 3 SCR 40 : (1969) 1 SCC 255 : 1968INSC335; The Property Owners' Association and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 230 : (1996)4SCC49 : 1996INSC598; Property Owners' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra (2001)4SCC455; Property Owners' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra (2013)7SCC522; Mulchand Odhavji v. Rajkot Borough Municipality (1971) 3 SCC53; BN Tewari v. Union of India [1965] 2 SCR 421; T Devadasan v. Union of India [1964] 4 SCR 680 : 1963INSC183; B Banerjee v. Anita Pan [1975] 2 SCR 774 : (1975)1SCC166 : 1974INSC246; State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. L. Abu Kavur Bai & Ors. [1984] 1 SCR 725 : (1984) 1SCC515; Jijubhai Nanbhai Kachar v.

State of Gujarat [1994] 1 SCR 807 : (1995) Supp 1SCC596; National Textile Corp Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. [1986] 2 SCR 187 : AIR 1986 SC 1234 : 1986 INSC61; Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. [1987] 2 SCR 841 : (1987)2SCC720 : 1987INSC100; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors. [1989] 2 SCR 544 : (1989)3SCC 709 : 1989INSC128; N. Parthasarathy v. Controller of Capital Issues [1991] 2 SCR 329 : (1991)3SCC153 : 1991INSC104; Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1990] Supp. 2 SCR 480 : (1991)Supp 1 SCC81; Assam Sillimanite Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India & Ors. [1990] 1 SCR 983 : (1992)Suppl 1 SCC692 : 1990INSC89; Mahinder Kumar Gupta v. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (1995)1SCC85; Tata Iron & Steel Co v. UOI [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 808 :(1996) 9SCC709 : 1996INSC770; Victorian Granites Pvt. Ltd. v. P. Rama Rao & Ors. [1996] Supp. 5 SCR 692 : (1996)10SCC665 : 1996INSC1018; Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

[1996] Supp. 10 SCR 585 : (1997)5SCC536; Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. v. Reliance Industries Ltd. [2010] 5 SCR 704 : (2010)7SCC1 : 2010INSC290; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra v. State of Maharashtra [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2SCC673; Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022] 15 SCR 516 : 2022SCCOnLine SC1247 : 2022INSC 975; Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra [2021] 15 Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. SCR 715 : (2021)8SCC1 : 2021INSC284; Rajnarain Singh v. Patna Administration Committee [1955] 1 SCR 290 : (1954)2SCC 82 : 1954INSC69; Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India [2019] 4 SCR 222 : (2019)20SCC705 : 2019INSC378; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018)10 SCC1 : 2018INSC790; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [2021] 4 SCR 633 : (2021)15SCC125 : 2021INSC210; Sita Soren v.

Union of India [2024] 3 SCR 462 : (2024)5SCC 629 : 2024INSC161; Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : (2003)6SCC697 : 2003 INSC391; Secunderabad Club v. CIT [2023] 12 SCR 979 : 2023 SCCOnLine SC1004 : 2023INSC736; State of Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Assn. [2018] 9 SCR 106 : (2018)6SCC21 : 2018 INSC329; State of Madras v. Champakan Dorairjan [1951] 1 SCR 525 :AIR 1951 SC 226 : 1951INSC26; Mohd Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar [1959] 1 SCR 629 : 1957SCCOnLine SC17; Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [1967] 2 SCR 762 : [1967]SCC OnLine SC14 : 1967INSC45; Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 43 : (2003)7SCC589 : 2003 INSC427; M. R. F. Ltd. v. Inspector, Kerala Govt [1998] Supp. 2 SCR 632 : (1998)8SCC227 : 1998INSC423; Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [1992] 3 SCR 409 : (1992)3SCC336 : 1992INSC164; Pathumma v. State of Kerala [1978] 2 SCR 537 : (1978)2SCC1 : 1978INSC7; State of Gujarat v.

Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat [2005] Supp. 4 SCR 582 : (2005)8SCC 534 : 2005INSC525; State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas [1976] 1 SCR 906 : (1976)2SCC310 : 1975INSC224; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [1984] 2 SCR 67 : (1984)3SCC161 : 1983INSC203; Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India [2008] 4 SCR 1 : (2008)6SCC1 : 2008INSC473; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51 : (1985)3SCC545: 1985INSC151; S. R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 621 : (2001)7SCC126 : 2001INSC373; K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [2017] 10 SCR 569 :(2017)10SCC1 : 2017 INSC1235; Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Thana Electric Supply Co. [1989] 2 SCR 518 : (1989)3SCC616 : 1989INSC 127; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [1989] 2 SCR 544 : (1989)3SCC709 : 1989INSC128; Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India [1990] 1 SCR 983 : (1992)Supp. 1 SCC 692 : 1990INSC89; Hardeep Singh v.

State of Punjab [2014] 2 SCR 1 : (2014)3SCC92 : 2014INSC21; Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma [2012] 13 SCR 47 : (2013)11SCC451 : 24 2012 INSC 509; Chandigarh Housing Board v. Major General Devinder Singh [2007] 3 SCR 1049 : (2007) 9 SCC6 : 2007INSC 291; Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram [2007] 2 SCR 980 : (2007) 10SCC448; Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2020] 1 SCR 749 : (2020)2SCC569 : 2020INSC23; Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors. [2024] 5 SCR 831 : 2024INSC435; M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 12 : (1997)1SCC388 : 1996INSC1482; M. I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu [1999] 3 SCR 1066 : (1999)6 SCC464 : 1996INSC1482; Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. v. Minguel Martins [2009] 3 SCR 1 : (2009)3SCC571 : 2009 INSC39; Intellectuals Forum v. State of A. P. [2006] 2 SCR 419 : (2006)3SCC549 : 2006INSC101; Vedanta Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu [2024] 2 SCR 1121 : 2024INSC175; Centre for Public Interest Litigation v.

Union of India [2012] 3 SCR 147 : (2012)3 SCC1 - referred to. Property Owners' Association v. State of Maharashtra, 1991 SCC OnLine Bom 521; Laxmibai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 Nag 94; Shriram Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh (1952) 3 STC 343 - referred to. Frost v. Corporation Commissioner, 278 U. S. 505; Texas Company v. Cohn Wash, 2d 360 (17 April 1941, Supreme Court of Washington); Mazurek v. FM Ins Company, Jamestown 320 Pa 33 (Pa. 1935) (25 November 1935, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania) - referred to. In the judgment of B. V. Nagarathna, J. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [1983] 1 SCR 1000 : (1983) 1 SCC 147 : AIR 1983 SC 239; State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Abu Kavur Bai [1984] 1 SCR 725 : (1984) 1 SCC 515 : 1984 INSC 17 and State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan[1986] 1 SCR 707 : (1986) 2 SCC 516 affirmed. Property Owners' Association v. State of Maharashtra [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 230 : (1996)4SCC49; H. H.

Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1973)4 SCC225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461; State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy[1978] 1 SCR 641 : AIR 1978 SC 215; Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 585 : (1997)5SCC536; IR Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 394 : (1999) 7SCC580 : 1999INSC394; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [1981] 1 SCR 206 : (1980)3SCC625 :AIR 1980 SC 1789; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] 1 SCR 284 : AIR 1952 SC 75; Supreme Court Advocates-On-Record Association v. Union of India [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 659 :(1993)4SCC441; Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India [2005] 1 SCR 913 :AIR 2005 SC 2677; Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd. ) v. Union of India [2017] 10 SCR 569 : (2017)10SCC1; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India [2014] 5 SCR 119 : (2014)5SCC438; Joseph Shine v.

Union of India [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019)3SCC39; Navtej Johar v. Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018)10SCC1; Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India [2007] 12 SCR 991 : AIR 2008 SC 63; Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Punia [2020] 3 SCR 833 : (2020)7SCC469; Lt. Colonol Nitisha & Others v. Union of India [2021] 4 SCR 633 : AIR 2021 SC 1797; Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 234; Waman Rao v. Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 1 : (1980)3SCC587 : 1980INSC216;AIR 1981 SC 271; Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India [2012] 3 SCR 147 : (2012)3SCC1; In Re : Natural Resources Allocation, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 [2012] 9 SCR 311 :(2012)10SCC1; H. H. Maharaja Rana Hemant Singhji v. CIT [1976] 3 SCR 423 : (1976)1SCC996; State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [1954] 1 SCR 587 : AIR 1954 SC 92; Jilubhai v. State of Gujarat [1994] 1 SCR 807 : AIR 1995 SC 142; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 : AIR 1970 SC 564; State of Bihar v.

Kameshwar Singh [1952] 1 SCR 889 : AIR 1952 SC 252; Coal India Ltd. v. CCI [2023] 7 SCR 827 : (2023)10SCC345; Madhusudan Singh v. Union of India [1984] 1 SCR 849 : (1984) 2SCC381; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [1989] 2 SCR 544 : (1989)3SCC709; Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India [1990] 1 SCR 983 : (1992)Supp. 1 SCC692; Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah [2024] 5 SCR 831 : 2024INSC435 - referred to. In the judgment of Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy[1978] 1 SCR 641 : (1977) 4 SCC 471 [Minority opinion of Justice Krishna Iyer]; and Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [1983] 1 SCR 1000 : (1983) 1 SCC 147 : AIR 1983 SC 239 - impliedly affirmed. Minerva Mills v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 206 : (1980) 3 SCC625; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 26 1 SCR 1 : (1973)4SCC225; State of Madras v.

Champakam Dorairajan [1951] 1 SCR 525 : 1951SCCOnLine SC30; In Re : Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [1959] 1 SCR 995 : 1958SCCOnLine SC8; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and others v. State of Bihar and others [1959] 1 SCR 629 : 1957SCCOnLine 17; State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas [1976] 1 SCR 906 : (1976)2SCC310; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and others [2005] Supp. 4 SCR 582 : (2005)8SCC534; Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 585 : (1997)5SCC536; Waman Rao & Others v. Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 1 : (1981)2SCC362; State of T. N. v. L. Abu Kavur Bai [1984] 1 SCR 725 : (1984)1 SCC515; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [1989] 2 SCR 544 : (1989)3SCC709; Madhusudan Singh v. Union of India [1984] 1 SCR 849 : (1984)2SCC381; State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan [1986] 1 SCR 707 : (1986)2SCC516; Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India [1990] 1 SCR 983 : (1992) Supp 1 SCC692; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v.

State of Gujarat [1994] 1 SCR 807 : (1995) Supp 1 SCC596; KT Moopli Nair v. State of Kerala [1961] 3 SCR 77 : 1960SCC OnLine SC7; Shankari Prasad Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [1952] 1 SCR 889 : (1952)1SCC528; State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee [1954] 1 SCR 558 : (1953) 2 SCC 648; Vajravelu v. Special Deputy Collector [1965] 1 SCR 614 : 1964SCCOnLine SC22; State of Madras v. D. Namasivaya Mudaliar [1964] 6 SCR 936 : 1964 SCCOnLine SC169; Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India [1967] 1 SCR 255 :1966SCCOnLine SC15; State of Gujarat v. Shri Shantilal Mangaldas & Ors. [1969] 3 SCR 341 :AIR 1969 SC 634; RC Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 :(1970) 1SCC248; Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 731 : (1990)3SCC87; Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board. v. A. Rajappa & Others [1978] 3 SCR 207 : (1978)2SCC213; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978)1SCC248; MH Hosket v.

State of Maharashtra [1979] 1 SCR 192 : (1978)3SCC544; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (I) [1979] 3 SCR 169 : (1980)1 SCC81; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [1980] 2 SCR 557 : (1980)3SCC488; Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala [1986] 3 SCR 518 :(1986)3SCC615; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [1997] 3 Supp. SCR 404 : (1997)6SCC241; K. S. Puttaswamy Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Union of India [2017] 10 SCR 569 :(2017)10SCC1; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC1 - referred to. V. Padmanabha Ravi Varma Raja v. Deputy Tahsildar, 1962 SCC OnLine Ker 98; Mahinder Bahawanji Thakur v. S. P. Pande, 1963 SCC OnLine Bom 28; Sudha Tiwari v. Union of India, 2011SCC OnLine All 253; Raja Suryapal Singh v. U. P of Govt. , 1951SCC OnLine All 183 - referred to. Hunter v. Southam Inc (1984)2 SCR 145 (Canada Supreme Court); Fay v. New York 332 U. S. (1947) (Jackson, J. ) - referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited In the judgment of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI: DD Basu, 'Constitution of India', Vol 9, p. 9917; Advanced Law Lexicon by Ramanathaier, 3rd Edn. , Vol. III, p. 2509; Halsbury, 2nd Edn, Vol 19, para 556; Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. , 1892); HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol 2 (4th ed, Universal Law Publishing 2002) 1934-40; Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol VII (15th November 1948); Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, South Asian Edition, 2015; Hughes, The Supreme Court of The United States, (1930) American Bar Asson. Journal. ; Rahul De, A History of Economic Policy in India: Crisis, Coalitions, and Contingency, 2023 (Oxford University Press); Ministry of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs), Government of India, The Indian Economy: A Review, January 2024; Ministry of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs), Government of India, Economic Survey 2023-24, July 2024 - referred to.

In the judgment of Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. Mr. Justice Brandeis, Great American: Press Opinion & Public Appraisal (The Modern View Press, Saint Louis, 1941), Pg. 42; Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, Second Impression 2000), Pgs. 50, 51; Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2006), Pgs. 4-5, 308; Aharon Barak, Purposive 28 Interpretation in Law (Universal Law Publishing Co. , 2007), Pgs. 370, 372, 377; Aharon Barak, Hermeneutics and Constitution Interpretation, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 767, (1992-93), Pg. 772; A. M Zaidi et al. , The Encyclopaedia of The Indian National Congress (VOL. -10: 1930-1935): The Battle For Swaraj (S. Chand & Co. Ltd. , 1980), Pg. 183; Rakesh Batabyal (ed. ), The Penguin Book of Modern India Speeches (Penguin Books, 2007), Pg. 365; O. Chinnappa Reddy, The Court and The Constitution of India: Summits and Shallows (Oxford University Press, 2008), Pg.

137, 139; Bipan Chandra, Nationalism & Colonialism in Modern India (Orient Longman, 1979), Pgs. 145, 158; Sir P. Thakurdas, Jrd Tata et al. , A Plan of Economic Development for India (Part II) (1944); Sanjay Baru (ed. ), The Bombay Plan (Rupa Publications India Pvt Ltd. , 2018), Pg. 292; Aditya Mukherjee, Political Economy of Colonial and Post-Colonial India (Primus Books, 2022), Pg. 192; Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, The Court and The Constitution of India: Summits and Shallows (Oxford University Press, 2008), Pgs. 74-75, 76; Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. I, Pg. 62; Vol. II, Pg. 316; Vol. V, Pg. 341; Vol. VII, Pgs. 41, 225, 473, 518-19 and 539; Vol. IX, Pg. 1195; Vol. XI, Pg. 979; P. K. Tripathy, Spotlights on Constitutional Interpretation (N. M Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. , 1972), Pg. 295; Shylashri Shankar, Scaling Justice: The Supreme Court, Social Rights and Civil Liberties in India (Oxford University Press, 2009), Pg. 124; H. M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th Ed. , Vol.

II, 1993), Pgs. 1923-1924, 1932; Lael K. Weis, Constitutional Directive Principles, 37 (4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 916 (2017), Pg. 923; Parliamentary Debates (Part II-Proceedings Other Than Questions and Answers), Pgs. 8830, 8831-8832; Aditya Mukherjee, Political Economy of Colonial and Post-Colonial India (Primus Books, 2022), Pg. 511; C. H Hanumantha Rao, Rural Society and Agricultural Development in Course of Industrilisation: Case of India, 26 Economic and Political Weekly (1991), Pg. 691; Report of the Monopolies Inquiry Commission 1965; Lok Sabha Debates (Part II- Proceedings Other Than Questions and Answers), Vol-III, Pgs. 4833-4834; A. Moin Zaidi, The Great Upheaval 1969-1972 (Orientalia, 1972), Pgs. 103-105; Anatole France et. al. , Crainquebille (Dodd, Mead & Co. , Inc. , 1922), Pg. 171; Global Hunger Index 2024; National Multidimensional Poverty Index: A Progress Review 2023, Niti Aayog, Government Of India - referred to. Property Owners Association & Ors. v.

State of Maharashtra & Ors. List of Keywords Article 31C of the Constitution; Amendment struck down by Supreme Court; Interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution; Article 300A; Phrase 'material resources of the community'; Kesavananda Bharati case; Minerva Mills case; Sanjeev Coke case; Ranganatha Reddy case; Privately owned resources; Qualifier of 'material needs'; Public Trust Doctrine; Minority opinion; Term 'distribution'; Distribution by the State; Vesting of resources in the State; Nationalisation; Common good. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE/ ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1012 of 2002 From the Judgment and Order dated 13. 12. 1991 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Maharashtra in WP No. 2673 of 1986 With Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 4367, 5204, 5777, 6191-6192, 7950, 8797 of 1992, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6744 of 1993, Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 2303 And 13467 of 1995, Writ Petition (Civil) No.

934 of 1992, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 660 of 1998, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 342 of 1999, Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 469 And 672 of 2000 and Writ Petition (Civil) No. 66 of 2024 Appearances for Parties R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Zal Andhyarujina, Balbir Singh, Rakesh Dwivedi, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Shyam Divan, Ms. Uttara Babbar, Dr. Harshvir Pratap Sharma, Santosh Paul, Rajiv Dutta, Sr. Advs. , H. Devarajan, Sameer Parekh, Ms. Sonali Basu Parekh, E. R. Kumar, Sumit Goel, Ishan Nagar, Jayom Mahesh Shah, Ashok Rajagopalan, Abhishek Thakral, Ms. Aditi, Ms. Apurba Pattanayak, Abhay Jadeja, Ms. Dhanyashree Jadeja, Varun Satiya, Arun Unnikrishnan, Ms. Revati Desai, Ms. Akanksha Agrawal, Ms. Serena Jetmalani, Shayan Bisney, M/s. Parekh & Co. , D. Ashok Rajagopalan, Ms. Madhu Tyagi, Kunal Jain, S. C. Birla, Subrat Birla, Ujjwal A. Rana, Himanshu Mehta (for M/s. Gagrat And Co. ), S. R.

Setia, Amarjit Singh Bedi, Gaganpreet Sandhu, Varun Chandiok, Ms. Riya Seth, Dinesh Kumar, Jay Kishan Dev, P. N. Gupta, Mrs. Bharti Gupta, Pushp Raj Gupta, Ms. Aashima Gupta, T. Srinivasa Murthy, Hemant 30 Pathak, Mrs. Manisha Chanwani, Samit Shukla, Ashish Wad, Manoj Wad, Mrs. Tamali Wad, Ajeyo Sharma, Ms. Akriti Arya, M/s. J S Wad And Co, P. Narasimhan, Sushant Dogra, Dhananjay Kataria, Kartikay Aggarwal, Raman Yadav, Ms. Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Ms. Oorjasvi Goswami, Chitvan Singhal, Abhishek Kr. Pandey, Chirag M. Shroff, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Kanu Agrawal, Naman Tandon, Madhav Sinhal, Gaurang Bhushan, Ms. Monica Benjamin, Ms. Anu Sura, Ranjeev Khatana, Shyam Gopal, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Prahlad Singh, Shashank Bajpai, Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Nipun Saxena, Ms. Astha Sharma, Srisatya Mohanty, Ms. Anju Thomas, Sanjeev Kaushik, Ms. Mantika Haryani, Shreyas Awasthi, Eklavya Dwivedi, Himanshu Chakravarty, Ms.

Aditi Gupta, Ms. Jahnvi Dubey, Ms. Trisha Chandran, Ms. Shivani Vij, Ms. Tanya Srivastava, Vishal Sinha, Madhav Gupta, Ms. Ripul Swati Kumari, Bhanu Mishra, Ms. Muskan Surana, Ms. Lihzu Shiney Konyak, Archit Adlakha, Ms. Saumya Saxena, Aditya Raj Pandey, Shrutanjaya Bharadwaj, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Manu Krishnan, Ms. Anwesha Padhi, Yash Momaya, Ms. Shivani Agarwal, Udayaditya Banerjee, Aditi Deshmukh, Shaurya Rai Ranjan, Aryan Rachh, E. C. Agrawala, Ms. Daisy Hannah, Ms. Oindrila Sen, Ms. Rayana Mukherjee, Samarth Mohanty, Tejas Patel, Mrs. Meera Kaura, Mrs. Stuti Jain, Paras Joshi, Akshu Jain, Akul Krishnan, Amit Seth, Dibyanshu Pandey, Radhe Shyam Sharma, Varun K Chopra, Mehul Sharma, M/s. Vkc Law Offices, Ms. Sujata Kurdukar, Gopal Balwant Sathe, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, M/s. Manoj Swarup And Co. , Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Ms. Nandini Gore, Ms. Sonia Nigam, Mohammad Shahyan Khan, Akarsh Sharma, Rabin Majumder, Pramod B.

Agarwala, Sriharsh Nahush Bundela, Vedant Mishra, Virendra Mohan, M/s. Lawyer S Knit & Co, Sunil Kumar Verma, Manu Krishnan G, Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Vivek Sharma, R. Nedumaran, Haresh G. Ganatra, Ms. Anuradha H. Ganatra, Siddharth Dutta, Ms. Neha Singh, Ms. Subhashree Jaganathan, C. Aravind, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Brij Kishor Sah, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Ms. Apurva, Vignesh Singh, Aditya S. Jadhav, Alok Kumar, Diwakar Sharma, Arun Kanwa, Ms. Aliya Singh, Kanishk Chaudhary, Prabal Chaudhary, Mrs. Chitra Chaudhary, Prashant Chaudhary, M. C. Dhingra, Gaurav Dhingra, Piyush Kant Roy, Surendra Gautam, Abhishek Lakra, Rishab Kumar Singh, Arvind Kumar Singh, Shashank Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties. Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI Table of Contents* A. Background ...................................................................... 6 i.

Genesis of the Reference ......................................... 6 ii. The three reference orders ....................................... 12 iii. Scope of the present reference ................................ 18 B. Issues ................................................................................ 21 C. Article 31C ........................................................................ 23 i. Brief History of Article 31-C ...................................... 23 ii. The present dispute concerning Article 31-C and rival contentions ...................................................... 35 iii. Precedents concerning invalidation of amendments ........................................................... 46 iv. Analysis and Conclusions concerning Article 31-C 75 D. Article 39(b) ...................................................................... 84 i. Submissions ............................................................. 84 a.

Submissions of the appellants and intervenors ..... 84 b. Submissions of the Respondents and Intervenors.... 89 ii. Judicial Discipline: Observations in Sanjeev Coke and Mafatlal ............................................................... 95 a. The resurrection of the minority view in Ranganatha Reddy by Sanjeev Coke ............................... 95 b. Sanjeev Coke erred in relying on the observations of the minority in Ranganatha Reddy ...................... 103 c. The error has been carried forward in subsequent decisions ............................................................... 110 d. The single-line observation in Mafatlal is obiter dicta ...................................................................... 112 iii. Interpreting Article 39(b) ........................................... 123 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment. 32 a.

Article 39(b) as a pre-requisite to protection under Article 31C ............................................................ 123 b. Article 39(b) as a Directive Principle ......................... 128 iv. Historical Context: Constituent Assembly Debates 135 a. Debates about the purpose of Directive Principles... 135 b. Debates about the text of Article 39(b) ..................... 142 c. Inferences from the discussions in the Constituent Assembly .............................................................. 150 v. Interpretation of Article 39(b) that has been doubted ...................................................................... 156 vi. Correctness of the above interpretation of Article 39(b) ........................................................................... 175 a. The interpretation is inconsistent with the text of Article 39(b) ........................................................... 176 b.

The interpretation amounts to endorsing a particular economic ideology ................................. 180 c. The interpretation is incompatible with the right to property ................................................................. 184 d. Determining the 'materiality' and 'community element' of the resource ........................................ 186 e. The provision may include the 'vesting' of private resources in the state ............................................ 189 E. Conclusion ....................................................................... 191 1. The reference to this Constitution Bench raises significant questions about Articles 39(b) and 31-C of the Constitution. Answering the reference has been an adventure through the intricacies of constitutional interpretation and the annals of constitutional history.

However, an interpretation of these provisions must involve an understanding of not only their historical context but also the social and economic values which guide the present and are likely to guide the future. Directive Principles of State Policy1 such as Article 39(b) and safe harbour provisions such as Article 31-C are unique creations of our Constitution. Understanding them is a delicate task 1 "Directive Principles" Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. that involves balancing competing yet coexistent values embedded in our Constitution - the recognition of the individual rights of all citizens and an aspiration towards a welfare state which secures socio-economic justice. 2. Before proceeding, it would be appropriate to briefly refer to the provisions of the Constitution which form the heart of the reference and controversy before this Court.

Article 39(b), a part of the Directive Principles contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution, reads as follows: "39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State. --The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-- ... "(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;" 3. Article 31C of the Constitution provides certain legislations a safe harbour and protects them from being challenged under Articles 14 and 19. The only requirement is that the legislation must give effect to "the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39". In a sense, Article 31C is the ying to the yang of Article 39(b), which gives it a unique colour and texture and provides it with far-reaching consequences.

Once it is established that a particular legislation has a nexus with the principles specified in Article 39(b), Article 31C provides the legislation with a lifeboat - protecting it from a challenge to its constitutionality under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. 4. With this broad context in mind, we first delve into the journey of the reference to this Constitution Bench and define the scope of this judgement. A. Background i. Genesis of the Reference 5. Mumbai is the most populous city in India and one of the most densely populated cities in the world. A persistent problem faced by its residents has been the large number of old, dilapidated buildings which continue to be inhabited despite becoming unsafe due to lack of repairs and reconstruction. It is estimated that over sixteen 34 thousand buildings in the city were constructed before 1940. 2 The antiquity of the buildings in the island city is compounded by the geographical location of the city.

Situated on the western coastline, the saline air of the city contributes to the reduction in the lifespan of its structures. The monsoon rains create pressing challenges for the safety of human settlements and residential buildings. Every year before the monsoon, the Mumbai Building Repair and Reconstruction Board issues a list of dangerous buildings deemed unfit for human habitation. It issues eviction notices to the people living in such buildings and asks occupants to vacate the buildings to avert untoward incidents. Yet, despite these efforts, the city still grapples with the recurring tragedy of building collapses, resulting in loss of life and property, a reminder of the ongoing struggle to ensure safe and secure housing for its residents. 3 6. The erstwhile Bombay was originally a group of seven islands. These islands were merged by a series of land reclamation projects to create the present-day 'Island City of Bombay'.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the island city emerged as a major textile centre. With the growth of the textile industry, there was a significant inflow of workmen from outside of the city. This necessitated the construction of additional residential buildings to house the workmen and their families. The colonial government leased properties for this purpose and a large number of buildings were constructed. During World War II, the scarcity of housing accommodation became even more acute and there was an unprecedented increase in the rents. To mitigate this, Rent Control legislations were introduced. 7. The use of the buildings by more people than they could accommodate resulted in a steady deterioration of the structures and the dilapidation of the buildings over a period of time. Therefore, the Bombay Housing mhada. gov. in/en/content/m-b-r-r-board-history.

3 See Hindustan Times, 1 dead, four hurt as portion of nearly 100-year-old building collapses in Grant of-nearly-100-year-old-building-collapses-in-grant-road-101721503683871. html; Indian Express, Dongri building collapse: In 37 years, 894 people died in accidents involving MHADA, 17 July 2019, in-accidents-involving-mhada-buildings-5832965/; Indian Express, Mumbai building collapse: Bhendi indianexpress. com/article/cities/mumbai/mumbai-building-collapse-bhendi-bazaar-accident-death-tollrises-to-22-4822665/ Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Board Act 1948 was enacted which provided for the setting up of a Housing Board of Bombay to execute housing schemes and construct new residential buildings in the island city. Although the enactment helped increase the housing stock, it could not address the issue of existing buildings, which were collapsing from time to time, resulting in loss of life and property.

To address the alarming rate of collapses, which were resulting in the loss of life and property, and exacerbating the existing housing shortage, urgent measures were needed, particularly in light of the rapid population growth of the city due to influx from various parts of the country. The Bombay Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act 1969 was introduced. Under this enactment, the Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board was set up and a cess was introduced to generate funds for the repair and reconstruction of dangerous buildings. A part of the cess was borne by the owners, while the remaining part was borne by the tenants. However, despite these efforts, due to the unprecedented scale of the problem and lack of financial resources, the problem persisted. 8. Accordingly, the state legislature of Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act 1976,4 which received the assent of the President on 25 April 1977.

The long title stipulates that it is an Act to "unify, consolidate and amend the laws relating to housing, repairing and reconstructing dangerous buildings and carrying out improvement works in slum areas. " Pre- existing laws such as the Bombay Housing Board Act 1948, t