RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER
Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1056; 1952 INSC 27
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI , MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN , BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA , SUDHI RANJAN DAS , N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1952 INSC 27. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1952-05-05. RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER. Read the judgment and case details...
Judgment text
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER (AND OTHER CASES) [PATANJALI SASTR! C. J. , MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. ] Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (I of 1951 )-Law for abolition of zamindaries and intermediate tenures-Validity-Provision for compensation and public purpose -Necessity of-Right of eminent domain-Jurisdictfrm of Court to enquire into validity of Act-Constitution of India, 1950-- Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362; Sch. VII, List II, entries 18, 36, List l/l, entry 42-De/ega-tion of legislative powers-Fraud on the Constitution-Spirit of the 11 Constitution-Meanings of "public purpose , "law", "legislature" - Compulsory acquisitiq_n of Crown grants, charities and private pro~ perty of Rulers under covena~t of merger-Legality. Held by the ·Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J. , MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAR JJ. ).
-The Uuar Pradesh Za1nindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, is valid in its entir. ety. The jurisdiction of the court to question its validity on the ground that it does not provide for payment of compensation is barred by arts. 31(4), 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution. The said Act is not a fraud on the Constitution ; it does not delegate essential legislative power to the executive ; and is not liable to be impugned on the ground of absence of a public purpose. Per MAHAJAN J. -(i) The expression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and ex-clusion. The definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and the state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether it is in the interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual.
(ii) There, _is nothing in law to prevent the subject-matter of a Crown grant being compulsorily acquired for a public pur~ pose and land held by the taluqdars of Oudh does not therefore stand on a higher footing than that of other owners of Oudh. (iii) Property dedicated to charity by a private individuals is not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire property for a public purpose. (iv) Recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution 1952 when its provisions are explicit ; and when the fundamental law has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the Raja Suriya general powers conferred on the legislature it is not proper to Pal Singh ~ deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in v. the spirit of the Constitution. The State of U. P. (v) The provisions of art. 31(2) do not stand repealed by and Another. art. 31-A. On the other hand the proviso to art. 31-A keeps them -> alive.
The only difference is that with regard to estates the '-' President has been constituted the sole judge for deciding whether a State law has complied with art. 31(2). (vi) When a whole estate is being acquired and payment of _... compensation is based on the net income of the whole estate, it cannot be said that the legislation is of a confiscatory character merely because there are non-income fetching properties also in the estate. DAs J. -(i) The existeince of a public purpose and the necessity for payment of compensation cannot be said to be an inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of Government. ;, The Indian Constitution has in art. 31 (2) recognised these two c elements as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the po~rer of eminent domain, and as the impugned Act has been expressly taken out of the operation of those provisions, the question of invoking any imaginary spirit of the Constitution cannot be entertained.
·J The invocation of such an imaginary spirit will run counter to the express letter of arts. 31( 4), 31-A and 31-B. (ii) The claim of the Rulers with regard to their private properties is not within • art. 362; by offering compensation their ownership is recognised; in any event, art. 362 imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament or State Legislature, and art. 363 bars the jurisdiction of the court with respect to disputes 'arising out of covenants of merger. ~ CIVIL APPELLATE JuRrsmcTION. Cases Nos. 283 to 295 of 1951. Appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and decree dated 10th May, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Malik C. J. , Mootham, Chandiramani, Agarwala and Bhargava JJ. ) in Writ Application Nos. 23, 25, 3330, 3329, 3331 and 3332 of 1951 and Miscellaneous Judicial means uniform or consistent and ~me of these were destructive of one another. Mr. P. R.
Das, who opened the attack, reiterated the arguments he had addressed to us in the Bihar appeals and urged that the obligation to provide for compensation is implicit in the power conferred on the State Legislature by entry 36 of List II with respect to acquisitions, that the words "subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III" in entry 36 compel the court to construe entry 36 of List II along with entry 42 of List III and, when so construed, it is clear that compensation has to be provided for whenever power is exercised under entry 36, that there is no provision for payment of compensation in the impugned Act, the word "compensation" meaning the equivalent in money of the property compulsorily acquired, that the U. P.
Legislature had no power to enact this Act without making provision for payment of: compensation and in legal contemplation the Act is lh>t law, that article 31 (2) confers a fundamental right but has nothing to do with legislative, powers which have been conferred by articles 245 and 246 read with the three lists, that: article 31(4) does not in any way affect the rights conferred by article 31(2), which exist notwithstanding article 31 ( 4), and it only bars the remedy to challenge the Act on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2), that the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution, and lastly that the Act is void by reason of delegation of essential legislative power. On the question of the invalidity of tl1e Act for want of a provision for payment of compensation, Mr. P. R.
Das reinforced his arguments by reference to legislative practice in India and England and contended that even without any express provision for compensation in the different enactments to which our attention was drawn, the mere use of the word "purchase" implied that compensation was a con-comitant obligation of the exercise of the power to compulsorily acquire property. For the reasons given by me in the Bihar appeals I cannot accept this contention. If the Constitution was silent on the point and provided for compulsory acquisition, the position might have been different. Mr. Dhar, who appeared ·in some of the appeals, supplemented the arguments of Mr. Das on this point.
He contended that regarding half of the properties acquired, the Act was a piece of confiscatory legislation as these properties were non-income bearing, and that as regards the other half, though compensation at eight times the net income is provided, it is a mere sham inasmuch as the Act makes payment of compensation discretionary at the will and pleasure of the Government; the provision being that Government will pay when it chooses to do so and it may never make the choice. He further contended that the provisions of the Act regarding compensation are colourable because they completely ignore the potential incomes of the zamindars, take notice only of the income recorded in the khatuni entries which do not include the sir income, and acquire rent-free holdings and undeveloped mines without any compensation, that the deduction of agricultural income-tax .
from the gross-income was unjust and the object of deduction was to artiiicially reduce the net income, and the same procedure had been adopted in the case of forests. Dr. Ambedkar, who appeared m some of the appeals, suggested a new approach for declaring the Act to be bad. He contended that qua "estates" defined in article 31-A, Part I of the Constitution should be deemed as repealed and struck off from the Constitution. In deciding these appeals, therefore, we are to look at the Constitution without the chapter on Fundamental Rights ; but as the Constitution aims at securing liberty and equality for the people and gives only a restricted power to the State, the obligation to pay compensation when private property is taken is implicit in the very spirit of the Constitution. Mr. Das found the obligation to pay compensation implicit in entry 36, but Dr.
Ambedkar could not see eye to eye with him though he supported his contention by urging that the prohibition to acquire property by legislation without payment of compensation was implicit in the spirit of the Constitution. Mr. Varma, who appeared in some other appeals, supported Mr. Das's argument that entry 36 should be read subject to the provisions of entry 42 and further contended that the impugned Act was the culminating point of a series of enactments passed as a device to confiscate the properties of the zamindars after the passing of the resolution in 1946 by the U. P. Legislature. Having negatived the contentions of Mr. Das, I cannot for the same reasons accept the contentions of Mr. Dhar as sound. It is convenient now to examine the point made by Dr. Ambedkar that the obligation to pay compensation is implicit . in the spirit of the Constitution.
It is well-settled that recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provisions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter. When the fundamental law has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the general powers conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce a limitation from oomething supposed to be inherent in the spiirit of the Constitution. This elusive spirit is no guide in this matter. The spirit of the Constitution -cannot prevail as against its letter. Dr. Ambedkar Telied on the observations of Nelson J. in People v. Morris ('), quoted in the footnote, at p. 357 of Cooley's Constitutional Limitation. The footnote states :- "It is now considered an uni versa!
and fundamental proposition in every well regulated and pro-perly administered government, whether embodied in a constitutional form or not, that private property cannot be taken for strictly private purposes at all nor for public uses without a just compensation; and that the obligation of contracts cannot be abrogated or essentially impaired. These and other vested rights of the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even (1) l3 Wend. 325. against the plenitude of power of the legislative department. " Those observations of the learned Judge, however, do not lend support to the contention urged; on the other hand, it seems to me that the proposition stated by Dr. Cooley at page -351 (Vol. I) that the courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void, because in their opinion it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words, has an opposite application here.
It is difficult upon any general principle to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition except so far as the express words of a written constitution give that authority. The argument of Dr. Ambedkar cannot be accepted for the further reason that it is based on an unwarran-ted assumption that qua the estates of the zamindars, Part III of the Constitution stands repealed and is non est.
The truth is that Part III of the Constitution is an importa11t and integral part of it and has not been repealed or abrogated by anything contained in article 31-A of the Constitution ; on the other hand article 31-A, while providing that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III, clearly provides that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. This proviso in express term5 keeps alive the alternative provisions of Part III of the Constitution 'm article 31 (3) for judging whether the State law has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The provisions of article 31(2), therefore, <lo not stand repealed by article 31-A.
On the other hand, they are kept alive. The difference is that persons whose properties fail within the definition of the expression "estate" in article 31-A are deprived of their remedy under article 32 of the Constitution and the President has been constituted the sole judge of deciding whether a State Law acquiring estates under compulsory power has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The validity of the law in those cases depends on the subjective opinion of the President and IS not justiciable. Once the assent IS given, the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of article 31(2). It is true that the principles of payment of compensation stated in the Act do not give anything like an equivalent or quid pro quo for the property acquired and provide only for payment of what is euphemisti-cally described in the resolution of the U. P. Legislature as "equitable compensation".
Properties fetching no income pass to the State without payment of any separate compensation and as comprising part of an estate which yields some net income to the proprietor. According to the affidavit filed in the Balrampur Raj case, actual income of Rs. 1,42,000 that the owner receives at present, works out to a sum of Rs. 10,000 under the provisions of the Act and property worth several crores is being acquired for a mere fraction of it~ true value. Culturable waste which for~ twenty per cent. of the entire area of the estate, trees, sen:ral lakhs m number, water channels and irrigation works etc. , are being acquired along with the cultivated lands and income-fetching properties without :my separate provision for payment of compensation. But from those facts the conclusion cannot be drawn that the provisions as to compensation in the Act are illusory. In none of the cases could it be said that the provisions of the impugned Act would result m non-payment of compensation.
Great emphasis was laid on the circumstance that nothing was being paid for-non-income fetching properties. It has, however, to be observed that these non-income fetching properties are integral parts of an esate as defined m article 31-A and it cannot be said when payment of compensation is provided for on the basis of the net income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation is of a confiscatory character. Different coruidera-tions might have prevailed if the estates as a whole were not being acquired but different pieces of property were made the subject-matter of acquisiticn. Properties comprised in an estate may be income-fetching and non-income fetching, the value of these to the owner in the market may well be on the basis of income and if the Act has laid down the principle of payment of compensation on the foot of net income, it cannot be said tha. t the kgislattion is outside the ambit of entry 42 of List III. Dr.
Ambedkar frankly conceded that he was not prepared to go to the length of contending that the compensation ~provided for in the Act was illusory. He, however, said that it was inadequate, whether tested subjectively or objectively. During the period that the Balrampur Raj was under the supervision of the Court of Wards, part of the property acquired was purchased on payment of Rs. 24,09,705 fetching a net income of Rs. 25,915. This property, however, under the Act would be acquired on payment of Rs. 2,08,000. Under the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act the Government itself had valued properties in various places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act on standard multiples, viz. , from 37 to 20 times the net income. Price of part of the property acquired on this basis comes to Rs. 47,14,696, while compensation according to the Act payable would be about one-fourth of this amount.
Be that as it may, article 31 (4) is a complete answer to all these contentions, as held by me in the Bihar appeals. This Bill was pending in the legislature of the State on the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution came into force and this circumstance makes article 31 ( 4) applicable to all these cases. It was contended by Mr. Varma that the U. P. Assembly was prorogued on the 21st January, 1950, and the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th February, 1950, and on the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution came into force it could not be said to be pending as it had lapsed. This contention seems to be -based on a misapprehension as to the provisions of the Constitution Act of 1935 and the provisions of the present Constitution. Section 73 of the Government of India Act, 1931, and article 196 of the present Constitution provide in unambiguous terms that a Bill pending in the legislature of a State shall not lapse by reason of the prorogation of the House or Houses thereof.
In view of these clear provisions the content~on of the learned counsel that the Bill was not pending on 26th January, 1950, has to be rejected. Further the provisions of articles 31-A and 31-B completely shelter this law from any attack based on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. This proposition was not disputed. As the validity of the Act could not be impugned on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, that was the reason why the attack on its constitutionality was made on other grounds-ingenious but unsubstantial-lying outside the ambit of Part III. As regards the contention that the provisions with regard to payment of compensation would result in non-payment of it as it is payable at the pleasure of Government and the debts of the zamindars are to be deducted out of it, my view is that both these contentions are unsound. Under the provisions of the Act above cited, compensation becomes, due on the date of the vesting of the estate.
Interest at two and a half per cent. runs from that date and becomes payable forthwith. Section 27 of the Act makes it obligatory on the Government to pay compensation. Section 65 in clear terms provides that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation the amount declared in that behalf und_e. r section 60. Section 68 gives option to the Government to pay compensation either in cash or in bonds, or partly in cash and partly in bonds as: may be prescribed. If the Government does not prescribe anything, it is obvious that CClffipensation will be payable forthwith. If, on the other hand, Government makes any rules and prescribes that compensation will be payable at some remote time and not within a reasonable period it will be open to the parties affected to challenge the validity of the rules on the ground of abuse of power. These provisions, however, do not vitiate the Act and affect its validity.
So far as the debts are concerned, they were payable in certain instalments out of the income of the lands, they have been made payable at once and provision has been made that the amount be deducted from the amount of compensation. Instalments had been fixed because of the fact that they were recoverable from the income of the land. When the lands are converted into money, it follows as a matter of course that the right to recover the debts from the income of the lands is transferred to the compensation money and the provision regarding instalments becomes in-fructuous by the fact of acquisition. Dr. Ambedkar further contended that in fixing the amount of compensation the State was a judge in its own cause and this was against the spirit of the Constitution. There is no substance in this contention as the actual amount of compensation is to be determined by the compensation officer and his adjudication on the point is subject to an appeal.
Government is not the judge of the actual amount of compensation. So far as the law is concerned, it is the act o~ the legislature and being within its competence, no challenge can be made against the validity of the Act on this ground. The question that the Act does no postulate any public purpose and is thus unconstitutional was argued by Mr. Dhar and Dr. Ambedkar with some vehemence and it was contended that there was no public purpose behind this legislation. Mr. Dhar urged that the sole purpose of the acquisition of zamindars' estates was for increasing the revenues of the State and for selling the intermediaries' interests to private individuals, the intention being to make money by trading activities and at the same time root out the zamindars- who constitute one-fourth of the population of Uttar Pradesh.
It was contended that no community in Uttar Pradesh derived any benefit from the provisions of the Act because the tenants ·-whose status was intended to be raised, had been given sufficient relief under statutes already passed and what was humanly possible to do for them had been done, that they were at present more prosperous than the middle class: people and that the creation of a classless society by destroying a class was not a public purpose. Dr. Ambedkar on the other hand argued that he would have been content had the State nationalised the zammdaries because then the acquisition would be for a public purpose, but as under the impugned Act the State had merely constituted itself a trustee for distribution of the intermediaries' interests amongst t eh "h aves " an d not amongst tie I "h ave nots , " t. e. , .
amongst the bhumidars, sirdars, asamis and adhivasis and not amongst the landless, the Act was not for a public purpose at all but was an unfortunate piece of legislation as property was being acquired for the private benefit of persons and not for public use and that giving of property to gaon samaj also could not be held to be for public benefit or public use. In my opm10n, as already stated by me in the Bihar appeals, these arguments are unsound. The expression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and ex, clusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual. Prof.
Willis has summarized the present position in the United States on this subject, at pages 817 and 818 of his book, in these words :- "What is public use ? On this question there have been two view-points. One may be called the older view-point and the other newer view-point. According to the older view-point, in order to have a public use, there must be the use by the public . . . . . . . . . . According to the newer view-point there is a public use if the thing taken is useful to the public. This makes public use for eminent domain practically synonymous with public purpose for taxa-tion and somewhat like social interest for police power. Under this rule ·it is not necessary for the • benefit to be for the whole community, but it must be for a considerable number. " The High Court took the view that acquisition of property under compulsory powers for securing an aim declared in the Constitution to be a matter of State policy is an acquisition for a public purpose.
The following observations from the judgment of Bhargava J. may be quoted with advantage:- "The effect of the impugned Act is to vest the ownership and control of a considerable part of the material resources of the community in the State Government ; .............. the vesting in the State of the estate of the intermediaries is an indispensable preli-minary to the pursuit of measures for the eradication or mitigation of the principal causes of agricultural poverty. Two of such measures are embodied in the Act, which makes provision for three new classes of tenure-holders, bhumindar, sirdar and . asami, "and for t'll. e formation of co-operative farms. The provisions of Chapter VII of the Act, which depend in some measure for their efficacy on the transfer of property to the State effected by Part I of the Act, are clearly directed to the development of village self-government.
It can, we think, be inferred from the Act that the scope is given for more effective development of the State's agricultural resources than is at present ' "'- + possible. . . . . . . . . . . . . Reading the Act as a whole there ' . ,. . ,_ . can, we think, be no doubt that the primary object of the legislature is to effect a radical change in the system of the land tenure now prevailing in this State. " • In my opinion, legislation, which aims at elevating • the status of tenants by conferring upon them the • bhumidari rights to which status the big zamindats have also been levelled down cannot be said as wanting ' in public purposes in a democratic State. It aims at destroying the inferiority complex in a large number of citizens of the State and giving them a status of equality with their former lords and prevents the accumulation of big tracts of land in the hands of a few individuals which is contrary to the expressed intentions of the Constitution. Dr.
Ambedkar combated this view and urged that the expression "public purpose" was not a new concept when the Constitution of India was framed ; on the other hand, it had a settled meaning in the past legislative history of this country and it must be presumed that the Constitution used the expression in the same sense in which it had been used in the earlier Acts and in the Government of India Act, 1935, and that it should not be construed in the light of the directive principles laid down in Part IV of . the Constitution. He contended that had the constitution- , makers intended to give this concept a different meaning than it had acquired in .
the past, they would have clearly given expression to that intention by saying that the expression "public purpose" includes purposes which aim at implementing the directive ' principles of State policy and that Part IV of the Constitution merely contained glittering generalities which had no justification behind them and should not be taken into consideration in construing the phrase "public purpose". In my opinion, the contentions raised by Dr. Ambedkar, though interesting, are not sound because they are based on the assumption that the concept of • public purpose is a rigid concept and has a settled ~ meaning. Dr.
Ambedkar is right in saying that in the concept of public purpose there is a negative element in that no private interest can be created in the property acquired compulsorily ; in other words, property of A cannot be acquired to be given to B for his own private purposes and that theI'C is a positive element in the concept that the property taken must be for public benefit. Both these concepts are present in the acquisition l+-10 s. a. India 71 of the zamindari estates. Zamindaries are not being taken for the private benefit of any particular individual or individuals, but are being acquired . by the State in the general interests of the communit}'. Property acquired will be vested either in the State or in the body corporate, the gaon samaj, which has to function under the supervision of the State. Tenants, sirdars, asamis etc.
, · are already in possession of the lands in which their status is to be raised to that of bhumidars, Zamindars who are being reduced to the status of bhumidrs are also in possession of the lands.. There is no question in these circumstances of taking property. of A and giving it to B. All that the Act achieves is the equality of the status of. the different persons holding lands in the State. It is not correct to say· that Government is acquiring the properties for the purpose of carrying on a business or a trade. The moneys received from persons seeking bhumidari status or from the income of zarnindari estates will . be used for State purposes and. for the benefit of the community at large. For the reasons given above I hold that the impugned Act is not void by reason of the circumstance that it does not postulate a public purpose. As regards the question of delegation, our attention was drawn particularly to the proviqions of sections 6 ( e) and (g) and 68.
These sections provide for the prescription of the rate of interest by the executive government on mortgages and they also authorize the local government to determiille the period of redemption of the bonds and the fixation of the ratio between payment of compensation in bonds and payment in cash. In my opinion, the delegation is within the permissible limits and does not amount to delegation of essential legislative power. The main principles on these matters have been laid down in the Act and matters of detail have been left to the rule-making power. As regards the appeal of the Maharaja of Kapurthala (Appeal No. 285 of 1951), the facts are these: By article 12 of the Covenant of Merger dated the ·5th ' May, 1948, entered into between the Rulers of the States now comprised in the Pepsu Union, the properties which are the subject-matter of the appeal were declared and guaranteed as the private properties of the . Mararaja. The Maharaja was also guaranteed a privy purse of Rs.
2,40,000. It was. suggested that the Maharaj:a accepted this sum which was smaller in amount than what was allowed to other Rulers as privy purse because he was assured of the income of th. e Oudh estate. On these facts it was contended that the impugned Act contravened the provisions of article 362 of the Constitution inasmuch as it has not paid due regard to the guarantees contained in article 12 of the Covenant. As already held by me in the Madhya Pradesh petitions, this contention is devoid of force. The impugned Act has fully respected the Covenant of the 5th May, 1948, inasmuch as it has treated the Oudh estate as the private property of the Maharaja as disitingui:shed from th~ State Properties and it is on that basis that it has proceeded to acquire it on payment of compensation.
The allegation that the income of this estate was tlo supplement the privy purse and that the appellant accepted a lower sum by way of privy purse than given to the other ·Maharajas has been denied by the Government and we see no reason to hold in the asbence of any material to the contrary, that this denial is not true. This Act, therefore,· constitutes no breach of the guarantees given in article 362 of the Constitution. It was urged by the learned Attorney-General that article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of this Court from going into this question. Dr. Ambedkar, on the other hand, contended that this article has no application because of the fact that the Government of India was not a party to this Covenant. As at present advised, I see goOd deal of force in the point raised by the learned Attorney-General.
Not only did the Government of India sign the Covenant as a guarantor but it also signed it as a concurring party and that being so, the provisions of article 363 seem to be altracted to the case. The appeal of the Maharaja. therefore fails on this point. Mr. Bishan Singh, who appeared in Appeals Nos. 284, 285, 288, 289 and 290, argued the special cases of the taluqdars of Oudli. It was contended that the taluqdars were absolute owners of these • holdings at the time of the annexation of Oudh in February, 1856, that subsequently the British Govern• ment under the directions of Lord Dalhousie tried to take away the taluqdars' rights, but that after the mutiny they were reinstated in their earlier status and that status was reaffirmed by the enactment of the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1856, that the permanent and hereditary rights of the appellants under that Act in the lands granted to them under the sanads could not be affected by any legislation made by the succes.
sors in interest of the British Government and that Government could not derogate from its grant. It seems to me tl1at the lands held by nhe taluqdars stand on no higher footing . than the properties of other owners in Oudh. Be that as it may, the matter seems to have been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur fagannath. Baksh Singh v. United Provinces ('). At page 119 of the report it was observed as follows :- "It is, however, desirable to examine the particular grounds on which it is sought to induce the court to arrive at tliis paradoxical conclusion. Some of these are said to be based on tl1e general principle of law tliat tlie Crown cannot derogate from its own grant, others are said to depend on particular provisions of the Government of India Act. It has not been possible for tlie appellant to adduce any autlio-rity for tlie principle involved. which tlieir Lordships apprehend to be tl1at Parliament,.
whether Imperial, Federal or Provincial, in tlie absence of express prohibition, is debarred from legislating so as to vary the effect of a Crown grant. " The Crown carmot deprive a legislature of its leg'is-lative authority by the mere fact that in tlie exercise of its prerogative it makes a grant of land within tlie ~'9 territory over which such legislative authority exists and no court can annul the enactment of a legislative body acting within the legitimate scope of its sovereign competence. If therefore it be found that I • the subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the competence of a provincial legislature, nothing can prevent that legislature from legislating about it, unless the Constitution Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely or con-ditionally. Dr. Asthana, who appeared in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951, argued the case of the religious institutions.
He contended that the properties held by these institutions had already been dedicated for public purposes, that the income of these properties was being used for holding melas, feeding sadhus and other charitable purposes and tihat any reduction in that income would adversely affect those institutions imd the properties. that were already dedicated for public purposes could not be acquired under compulsory powers of acquisition. The argument is fallacious. A charity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. It is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them. Mr. Varma, who appeared in Appeal No.
295 of 1951, raised several new and ingenious points, none of which, however, he was able to substantiate. He contended that the impugned Act may not be void but the noti1ication which the Government was authorised to issue under the powers conferred on it by the statute would be void because the executive government could not infringe fundamental rights by a notification which remained unaffected by articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-R The argument does not seem to be valid because it suffers from the defect that if the statute is good, the notification which is of a consequential nature cannot be held to be bad. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the zamin-' daw had vested rights in existing law, namely, the Land Acquisition Act and the impugned statute could not deprive them of the benefits of the provisions of that Act.
Similar argument was raised in the Bihar appeals and for the reasons given therein it is repelled; It was then contended that in view of the provisions ;-. . J of the Religious Endowments Act, lands of religiowi endowments could not be acquired under the provisions· of the impugned statute. This contention seems to have been raised on some misapprehension as. to the scope and extent of the Religious Endowments Act, XX of 1863. It is not. proved that that Act has any application to the properties sought to be acquired under the impugned Act. Moreover, that Act only deals with management of certain properties and does not stand in the way of their acquisition. Great effort was made by Mr. Varma to establish that the impugned Act was a piece of fraud on the Constitution. It was contended that the U. P. Govern~ ....
ment had been &ince a long time enacting laws with the fraudulent intention of depriving the zamindars of compensation by reducing their incomes,-he made mention of half a dozen Acts that were enacted iri U. P. prior to the impugned Act. The argument, to my' mind, is based on a confusion of thought. The enactments referred to were enacted by · the legislature of U. P. ·between 1939 and 1949, before the Constitu'. tion came into force, and have no Connection what-ever with acquisition of properties. Mr. Vanna attacked the validitv of section 340 of ,~ -the Act which enacts that- , "where any orders had been made ................ or jurisdiction exercised under the provisions of th/! U. P. Agriculture Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, the provisions· of· the said Act shall be so read and construed as if the amendments mentioned in Schedule IV had · been made thercin and were in • force from the commencement of the said Act'" It wa~ contended that tpe U. P.
Agriculture T~nants (Acquisition of 'Privileges) Act, 1949, was an existing law in U. P. and had not been repealed by the impugned Act and that being so, this Act could not validate notifications made under that existing law. I have not been able to see the force of this suggestion. Be that as it may, the constitutionality of this section does not affect the legislation as a whole. The point was never raised before the High Court and has no substance. (1) [1946] F. C. R. 111, It was also contended that mere rights in land apart from the lands themselves could not be acquired uD:der compulsory power and that the U. P. Legislature could not acquire proprietary rights in lands and leave the bhumidari rights with the landlords. This proposition sounds strange. It is open to Government to acquire the whole of the rights of an owner or a ,part of that right.
Leasehold and other similar rights can always be acquired and if a person owns the totality of rights, it is not necessary to acquire the whole interest of that person if it is not needed for public purposes . Lastly, it was urged that in truth the legislation in question fell under legislative power conferred by ·entry 18 of List II and this power could only be exer. cised subject to the freedom guaranteed by article 19(f) of the Constitution, that the total abolition of the zamindaris could not be protected by the · provisions of clause 6 of article 19 in that it could not be regard-ed a reasonable restriction. on the exercise of the right to hold property. . This argument lose. 'l sight of the fact that no help can be oought in these cases from any of the provisions of Part III; moreover, the legislation in question has been enacted under legislative powers given by entry 36 of List II and not under entry 18 of that List. Mr.
Varma raised some other contentions also but during · the discussion he eventually abandoned them. ,. ·' The result therefore is·· that there is no substance in any one of the appeals and I ·would accordingly dismiss a:ll of them. I would however, make no order as to costs in any of them in view of the peculiar circumstances of these cases. The Constitution was amended during the pendency of the litigation and any costs allowed to the Government would further '1"educe the inadequate compensation that the Government is paying for the acqwsition . of these estates. MUKHERJEA J. -1 agree that these appeals should be dismissed. DAs J. -This group of appeals arises out of various proceedings instituted in the High Court of Allahabad under article 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No. I of 1951) hereinafter referred to as The Act.
On 8th August 1946, the United Provinces Legislative Assembly passed a resolution accepting the. princip1e of the abolition of the zarnindari system in the 'Province involving intermediaries between the cultivators and the State and reoolving that the rights of· such intermediaries should be acquired on payment of equitable compensation. To prepare the necessary . scheme a committee, called the Zamindari Abolition Committee, was appointed. That committee sub-mitted its r. eport in August, 1948, making various recommendations which have been summarised ·by Mr. S. K. Dhar appearing for some of the appellants· as follows :- (1) Abolition of zamindari on payment of Rs. 137 crores at 2i per cent. mterest ; (2) Establishment of gaon samai; . (3) Supply of rura:l credit by Government ; ('I) iintroduction of a modified form of peasant proprietorship combined with voluntary co-oper:nivc fanning; (5) Introiluccion of a restricted form of 'land lordism; {6) Pr.
ohibiting sub-letting and permitting aliena-tion only to 'llhe extem . that the alienee will not get more than 35 acres including n'is previous possessions. To give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act was introduced in the U. P. Legislative Assembly on 17th July, 1949. After having been passed by the U. P. Legislature the Bill received the assent of the President on 24th January, 1951. There is no dispute in this case that the provisions of article 31 (3) have been complied with. It is also clear, notwithstanding that at one stage it was disputed by one of the learned counsel evidently out of some misapprehension, that the Bill was pending before the Legislature at the commencement of the Constitution and comes within article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution. The title and preamble of the Act follow the word-ing of the resolution of the Legislature.
The preamble recites that it is expedient to provide for the abolition -of the zamindari system which involves intermediaries between the tillers of the soil and the State in the Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent upon such abolition and :acquisition and to make a provision for other matters connected therewith. The body of the Act is divided into two parts, each part containing six chapters. Chapter TI of Part I deals with acquisition ; Chapter III with assessment of compensation and Chapter IV with payment of compensation. Chapter V is concerned with rehabilitation grant, while Chapter VI deals with mines and minerals. Chapter VII, which is in Part II, deals with the constitution of gaon samaj and gaon sabha, Chapter VIII relates to tenure, Chapter IX to ·Adhivasis, Chapter X is concerned with land revenue and Chapter XI with co-operative farms.
Chapter XII deals with miscellaneous matters. · Broadly speaking, the Act provides for acquisition of the interest of intermediaries for a compensation calculat-ed at eight times the net income arrived at by deducting from the:. gross assets (which are the same as the gross income) the Government revenues, cesses and local rates, agricultural income"tax and costs of management. Before notification was issued by the State Government under section 4 of the Act, the intermediaries filed petitions under article 226 of the Constitution praying, inter aJia, for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or other appropriate directions, orders or writs calling upon the State to forbear from giving effect to or acting in any manner by virtue of or. under the Act. By a judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court delivered on 10th May, 1951, the petitions were dismissed.
The High Court, however, certified; under article 132 (1), that the cases involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The intermediaries accordingly have come up on appeal before us. Mr. P. R. Das who appears in support of several of these appeals raises the same questions as were raised by him in the Bihar appeals. Other learned counsel appearing for the other appellants mainly supported Mr. P. R. Das and also sought to reinforce. the appellants' cases on some additional grounds. Mr. S. K. Dhar has taken us through the provisions of the Act and drawn our attention to the facts and figures appearing in the affidavit of Sri J. Nigam filed in Appeal No. 285 of 1951 and the Report of the Zamindari Abolition Committee. He has contended that of the 20, 16, 783 zamindars in U. P.
about 20,00,000 are tillers of the soil also; that one-fourth of the cultivable lands is· with peasant proprietors and the remaining three-fourths is with tillers who pay rent to the zamindars. •Most of the tillers have OCCU' pancy rights and cannot be ejected. Since 1947, the Congress Government has carried out extensive agrarian reforms ; the zamindars' profits have gone down from 1108 crores in 1939-40 to 1,069 crores in 1945-46, that is to say, there has been a drop of about 39· crores ; cess has been raised by 27 lacs and income-tax has been imposed to the exte,;t ·of about one crore of rupees. The price of agricultural produce has gone up by 400 per cent. so that the price ~f produce aggre-gates· to about rupees 851 crores while the rent payable by the tenants is only 17 crores. Therefore; it is contended that there does not appear any essential or urgent public purpose for which the impugned Act was necessary at all. Dr. Ambedkar appearing for the appellants in Appeals Nos.
285 . and 288 of 1951 has addressed us at length as to the meaning of the expression "public purpose" as explained in various judicial decisions and. text books. He has contended that it is wrong to say that the Act proposes to acquire the zamindaries for the State. What, he asks, is the destination of the property acquired ? Under the Act the State assumes the. function of a trustee for distributing the property. The main purpose of the Act is to convert the tenants into bhoomidars, sirdars and so on. The net result of the Act, according to him, is that the property of the zarnindars is taken away and vested in the tenants. He points out that the Act makes no pro-v1s1on for the landless labourers. Dr. Ambedkar maintains that this cannot be called "acquisition for a public purpose". He submits that public purpose must be distinguished from a mere public interest or public ·benefit or public utility.
He further contends that the establishment of gaon samaj cannot be said to be a public purpose. As regards compensation Mr. Dhar points out that in fixing compensation under Table A regard is to be had only to income. Non-income yielding property goes without any compensation, e. g. , culturable waste. In point of fact Government acquired a large area of culturable waste at Rs. 300 per acre and yet no compensation will be paid under the Act for culturable waste. Abadi sites also will bring no compensation. Even income yielding property, e. g. , irrigation works like 600 miles of canal in Balrampur and 14. J.! miles in Bird estate, will yield no compensation although the Government will get additional revenue qut of them. Scattered trees in Balrampur alone will coine up to 85,000 . in number. The income of Seyer property will only be taken :i. t the figure recorded iri, Khataunis, although ii: is well-known that actual incomes are not recorded therein.
· Seyer and khud· khast were never assessed to revenue, but under the Act they will be so assessed. No compensation is, however, provided for the loss of status from Zamindari to Bhoomidari. Rent-free holdings granted by the zamindar which at present yield no income are not taken into account althougb there is always a possibi-lity of tbeir resumption. Agricultural income-tax is rlcducted and forest is valued on an average of 20 t10 40 years' income although forest industry is of a very recent growth. Finally, the income of mines is to be computed on an average of 12 years' income. The undeveloped mines or mines which have not started yielding any income will not fetch any compensation. These are, in short, the main objections of the landlords as summarised by Mr. S. K. Dhar as to the method of assessment of compensation. As regards the manner of payment of compensation Mr. S. K.
Dhar points out that the Act does not really provide for payment of compensation at all in the eye of the law. Under section 68 no time is fixed for payment. It is left to be prescribed by rules, but no rules have been made. Compensation payable, say in 40 years or SO years or 200 years, may be a charity or a dole but is certainly not compensation, prompt and certain such as is ·contemplated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sweet v. Rachel (') and several other •cases cited by him. He maintains that the compensation is illusory because- (i) it is based not on the actual income but on arbitrarily determined income ; (ii) the determination of time and manner of payment is left entirely at the discretion of the appropria-tor, and (iii) the source of payment is not the community as a whole but the expropriated proprietors' own property. In my judgment in the Bihar appeals I have dealt at length with the meaning of "public .
purpose" and I ha¥e also dealt with the question or compensation. (I) 40 L. Ed. 188 at pp. 196-97. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to reiterate the ,principles as I apprehend them. For reasons stated by me in that judgment the impugned Act cannot be questioned on the ground of ablience of a public purpose or absence of just compensation. If anything, the public purpose in the impugned Act is much . more evident and pronounced than it is in the Bihar Land Reforms Act. It is impossible to say that the impugned Act is not . a law with respect to principles on which compensation is to be determined and the manner of its payment. If the Government dpes not prescribe how much of the compensation will be paid in cash and how much will be paid by bonds as mentioned in section 18, the intermediaries will not suffer because under section 65 their right will remain en-forceable.
I have also dealt with the questions of fraud on the Constitution and the improper delegation of essential legislative power in my judgment in the Bihar appeals and I need not repeat the answers given by me. Suffice it to say that for reasons stated in my judgment in the Bihar appeals the main grounds on which the Act is impugned must be rejected. Dr. Ambedkar has urged that the spirit of the Constitution is a valid test for judging the constitutionality of the impugned Act. He maintains that our Constitution being one for establishing liberty and equality and a government of a free people it must be held to contain an implied prohibition against the taking of private property except for a public purpose and on payment of just compensation.
The necessity for the existence of a public purpose and for providing for compensation are, as I have said in my judgment in the Bihar appeals, provisions of article 31 (2) and, therefore, it is not necessary to have recourse to any spirit of the Constitution, for the letter of the Constitution itself re-quires the two requisites. Dr. Ambedkar, however, argues that, so far as the appellants are concerned, Part III of the Constitution does not exist and, therefore, the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum does not apply. I am not prepared to accept this argument u [1952] sound. It is true that. the appellants cannot question the impugned Act on the ground that it is inconsistent , with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III, but this circumstance does not imply tha,~ Part IiI is wholly erased out ~f the Consti~tion. It exists for all other purposes. For instance, article 31-A protects a law providing foi:. acqui.
-;ition by the State of any estate, but it does not protect a law providing for acquisition by the State oc any property which does not come within the expre~ sion "estate" as defined in that article. For all laws for acquisition of all other properties Part III certainly exists and if it is conceded that the provisions of Part III exist in so far as such other laws are concerned the provision of article 31 (2) requiring the existence of a public purpose and the provision for compensation must exclude any theory of the implied existence of those two requirements. In the next place, the spirit of the Constitution has to he inferred from some provi- &ion, express or implied, of the Constitution. Mr. P. R. Das based his argument on the implications to be deduced from the language of entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III. · Dr. Ambedkar, however, says that it is not necessary for him to go to any entry at all.
He points out that the American Courts have held that where in a Constitutlion there is a representa-tive form of government in which there is liberty and equality and when the government is a limited one such a Constitution carries with it the implication that the State cannot take private property except for a public purpose and on payment of compensation. I find it very difficult to accept this argument. The existence of a public purpose and the necessity for payment of compensation have been insisted upon from very old times when the constitutions of governments in different countries were entirely different from the Constitution of the United States. It follows, therefore, that these two elements cannot be said to be an inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of government. Our Cons. titution has in article 31 (2) recognised the · existence of the two elements as a prerequisite to the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The impugned Act having been expressly taken out of the operation of those provisions, the question of invoking any imaginary spirit of· the Constitution cannot be entertained. Indeed, invocation of such an imaginary spmt will run counter to the express letters of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B. Dr. Ambedkar appearing for the Maharaja of Kapurthala, who is the appellant in Case No. 289 of 1951, has also raised the point that the private property of the appellant is protected by article 362 of the Constitution and as the impugned Act does not pay any regard to those rights , it is void. On 5th May, 1948, certain covenants of merger were entered into between the Rulers of seven Punjab States. {Jnder article 12 of the covenant each Ruler is to be entitled to the . ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties. A list was furnished to . the Rajpramukh in which certain Oudh properties belonging to the appellant were shown as his private property.
·The appellant states that the amount of his privy purse was fixed at a low figure in consideration of the · income of the Oudh estate. These allegations are not admitted by · the respondents. I have already dealt with the correctness of a similar argument raised by Dr. Asthana on behalf of the Ruler of Khairagarh in petition No. 268 of 1951 which was concerned with the Madhya Pradesh Act. Shortly put, my view is that this claim to the private property is not within article 362, that by offering him compensation the Act has recognised his ownership, that, in any event, that article imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament or the State Legislature and, finally, that article 363 bars the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to any dispute arising out of the covenant of merger. Those covenants were entered into by the seven Rulers and the Government of the Dominion of India was a party thereto in that it concurred in the covenants and guaranteed the same.
In my opinion, for reasons stated in my judgment in the Madhya Pradesh petitions, there is no s. ubstance in this point. Dr. Asthana appearing for certain religious institutions which are appellants in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951 contended that their property already dedicated to a public purpose cannot be acq_uired for another public purpose. I see no substance in this contention. The property belonging to the religious institutions will only change its form, namely, from immovable property into money. Certain subsidiary points raised by Mr. Bishun Singh and Mr. Prem Manohar Varma have been dealt with by my learned brother Mahajan J. and it is unnecessary for me to add anything thereto. In. my judgment, for reasons stated in my judg-ments in the Bihar appeals and the Madhya Pradesh petitions and those mentioned above, these appeals should be dismissed. CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAB. J. -I agree that the appeals should be dismissed without any order ·as to costs. Appeals dismiSS1:tl•.
Agent for the appellant : S. S. Sukla. Agent for the respondents: C. P. Lal.
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