RAM CHANDER v. STATE OF HARYANA

Citation: [1981] 3 S.C.R. 12

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: O. CHINNAPPA REDDY, BAHARUL ISLAM

Case summary

1 : 2; · In the instan't c'ase·, the questions put by the learned Sessions Judge, particularly the threats held out to the witnesses that if they changed their statements th~y would involve themselves in prosecution for perjury were certainly intimidating, coming as they did...

Judgment text

RAM CHANDER ·v. :STATE OF HARYANA February 25, 1981 . '. (0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ. J · Role ofa Judge trying a criminal i;ase explained-Evidence Act, se~tio~ j65 read with section 172{2) ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure, whethef a 'Judg~' in crimi11,al case.. 111ay put any quesfion. t() /~e wiflless and jf so,,,what are its /imitations-Ev'illence Act, sectioi1 }! , ~;ope of. · · ·"' · = ' . ;,~ ·~. • ' ·L '·; • ·•,;'• ' 1 . ,,:, · The appellantRam Cha11der ss, or of the parties, about any fact, . relevant or irrelevant". But this he must. clo,· without unduJy. trespassing upon the functions of the public prosecutor and the defence'counsel, without any hint· of partisanship and without appearing to frighten, coerce, confuse, intimidate or bully wilnesse~. ·He must take the prosecution and the . defence with him. The Coi1rt, the prosecution and the defence must work as a team whose goal isjustice, 0 team whose captain is ! he'judge.

The judge, ''like the conductor· of a choir, itmst, by force of personality, induce his team.. to work in harmony; subdue the raucous, encQwage the timid; conspire with the_young, flatter aryd"<>I, - ·'~ . ;i. ; -· . 1 -_. ·;i·; " ' ;,,j·'. i.. f·r. ~"'. : -:-. -'. ~ ;·, ,-. ' ·. -_. ·! ·. ;. ·; :~ ;_. ;1-. ;; ~;. ::;·_•1;:·1 ;~,-'. ~;-_;_ tU. ,\'il:Juit1soicr10N:Crliri1i1. t1 Aiiperu·Nd; 390/75. ~i:'; :ai t of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case". Beg, J, apparently had the first part of Section 11 in mind and thought that the presence of the daughters at the scene was inconsistent with the failure of the father to refer to their presence in the first information report having regard to the circumstances under which the report must have been made. Even assuming that under certain circumstances it .

is permissible to use the first information report under the first part of Section 11 (we say nothing about the correctness of the view), there is in the present case no question of invoking the first part of Section 11, which is inapplicable since the first information report is now not sought to be used as being inconsistent with the prosecution case. Nor do we think that the first information report can b. e used by resort to the second part of section 11. The Evidence Act contains detailed provisions dealing with statements of persons who cannot be called as witnesses and former statemenLS of persons who are called as ·witnesses. These <ll [1975] 3 s. c. R. 519@ s22 . provisions would appear to become redundant if the evidence of a witness is to be tested and accepted or rejected with reference to the former statement of another witness, on the ground that such former statement renders the evidence _highly probable or improbable.

We can do no better than to refer to Stephen, the framer of the Section who said : "It may possibly be argued that the effect of the second paragraph of Section 11 would be to admit proof of such facts as these (viz. statements as to facts by persons not called as witness; transactions similar to but unconnected with the facts in issue; opinions formed by persons as to facts in issue or relevant facts). It may, for instance, be said: A (not called as a witness) was heard to declare that he had seen B commit a crime. This makes highly probable that B did commit that crime.

Therefore A's declaration is a relevant fact under Section 11 this was not the inten- +- tion of the section as is shown by the elaborate provision contained in the following part of Chapter 11 (Sections 31 to 39) as the particular classes of statements, which are regarded as relevant facts either because the circumstances under which they are made invest them with importance, or because no better evidence can be got. The sort of facts which the section was intended to include are facts which either exclude or imply more or less distinctly the existence of the facts sought to be proved". We, therefore, do not think that section 11 may be invoked in the present case, in the manner suggested by the learned counsel. In the result we acc)pt the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and direct the appellant to be set y at liberty forthwith. - - V. D. K. Appeal allowed.