RAMESHWAR DASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR

Citation: [2007] 13 S.C.R. 527

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, H.S. BEDI

Case summary

RAMESHWAR DASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.pdf

Judgment text

__.. , }- RAMESHWAR DASS V. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. DECEMBER 13, 2007 [S. B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ. ] -A_ Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 304B, 405 & 406/Dowry Prohibition Act; Ss. 3 &4: Unnatural death of wife/Dowry Death-Torturing of wife by husband and in-laws for demand ofdowry forcing her to commit suicide-Relationship between husband and deceased-Whether cordial-Held: Accused-husbandcouldnotprove on the basis ofletters allegedly written bythe deceased that his relationship with the deceased i. was cordial-Acquittal ofaccused in complaint casefiled against him later alleging commission ofan offence by him u/ss. 405 & 406 ! PC and ss.

3 & 4 ofDowry Prohibition Act not relevant as charges in the present case were not same-Apartfrom oral testimony ofprosecution witnesses, the accused himselfsent a telegraph message to hisfat herin-law to come immediately, which is a pointer to the fact that the spouses were not on good terms-A pregnant woman ordinarily would not commit suicide unless relationship with her husbandreaches astage . I> that she would be compelled to do so-Accused could not explain his absencefor six days since his wife committed suicide-Defence taken by the accused that he along with DWI got the deceased admitted in the hospital, has not been established-No reason found to interfere with thejudgment ofconviction ofaccused uls. 304B /PC by the Courts below-Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973-S. 313-Evidence Act, 1872-S. 65. Presence ofaccused-husband withdeceased-wife in the hospital- Onus ofproof-Held: Onus ofprooflies upon the accused-Who has not discharged it. ) Compounding ofan offence u/s. 304B !

PC-Held: An offence u/ { , s. 304B ! PC is not compoundable. Conviction ofaccused u/s. 304B ! PC-Quantum ofsentence- Reduction to-Held: Not allowedas minimum sentence ofsevenyears has been awarded to the accused. Appellant-husband and his parents allegedly tortured the deceased-wife for demand ofdowry. A telegraphic message was sent by the accused-husband to his father-in-law to resolve the misunderstanding ensued between them. Later, brother-in-law ofthe deceased-PW! alongwith his brother-in-Law-PW2 visited the house of the deceased, he found the accused quarreling with the deceased in connection with demand ofdowry. He tried to pacify them and then left the house. When he came back, he found the house locked. On an enquiry having been made from the neighbours, he was informed that the deceased had been taken to hospital as she had consumed . r something. When he reached the hospital his sister had expired. The deceased was pregnant at the time ofher death.

On receipt ofa report, Police investigated the matter and arrested the accused-husband. The trial Court convicted him underSection304B ofthe Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonmentfor seven years. An appeal filed thereagainst by the accused was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal.

Accused-appellant contended that the relation between him and thedeceased beingcordia~ theprosecution cannot besaid to have proved its case of causing harassment by him to the deceased; that the prosecution has not been able to prove demand ofdowry; that father of the deceased in his previous statementdid not state about the demand ofdowry; that acomplaint petition waslateron filed by thefather ofthe deceased against him under Sections 405 and 406 ofthe Indian Penal Code and Sections3and 4ofthe Dowry ProhibitionActwhich ended in acquittal by the trial Court and a revisim, ;etition filed thereagainst by PW-11 was withdrawn,which clearly ffltablishes innocence on his part; and that even after the conviction,a settlement had been arrived at by RAMESHWAR DASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB -> and between the parties and in fact the cousin of the deceased was marriedto theappellant whereafter an application for compromise had also been filed Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1.

The defence ofthe appellantwas that the relationship ' ~ between the parties was cordial. An attemptwas made to prove a few letters allegedly written by the deceased to the accused. Thesaid letters were soughtto be proved by DWl. [Para 16) (536-E, F] 1. 2. Adocument in terms ofSection 65 ofthe Evidence Act is to be proved by a person who is acquainted with the handwriting ofthe authorthereof. DW-1 claimed his acquaintancewith thehandwriting of the deceased on the basis ofthe letters written to him and his wife. He claimed thatthe deceased had written a large number ofletters. Itwas, therefore, expected that some ofthem would be preserved. He did not produce any letter. [Para 17) [537-B, CJ 1. 3. DW-1 was a prosecution witness. He evidently was won over and, thus, prosecution did not examine him as its witness. Submission ofthe counsel for the appellant that hewas the only independentwitness whowas available andwas notexamined must be considered from that angle.

In response to the questions posed by the trial Court, he even denied making any statement before the police. The Magistrate was ,__) requested to recall the investigating officer to bring the earlier statementsofDW-1 to his notice. Unfortunately, no suchstepwas taken. Furthermore, this Courtfailed to comprehendas to why the father and brother of the deceased in the course of their depositions were not confronted with the said letters. In ordinary course, it should have been done. Why such acourseofactionwas nottaken recourseto is anybody's guess. The purported explanation ofthe appellant that the said letters __... were taken into custody ofthe investigatingofficerand lateron returned a, to him is wholly unbelievable. An investigatingofficerwould not seize letters without preparing any seizure list. [Para 18) (537-C, D, E, F] 1. 4.

Ifseizure list had been prepared, there does not appear to be any reason whatsoever as to why the letters purported to have been ,> written by the deceasedwould not be mentioned in the seizure list. This -( Court does notfind any reason to differwith theview taken by the trial Court as also the High Court in this behal~ [Para 18) [537-F, G] 2. 1. A complaint made subsequently by father ofthe deceased as against the appellant for commission ofan offence under Sections 405 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act ended in acquittal ofthe accused, the same is not very relevant. [Para 19] [538-A] 2. 2. Thejudgment ofacquittal was passed on 5. 11. 1992, whereas judgment ofthetrial Courtwas passed on 18. 10. 1989in the instant case. The chargt~s in both the cases were not same. They were based on different tnmsactions. Further, no attemptwas made even to bring the judgment dated 5. 11. 1992 to the notice before the High Court.

Had an application for adducing additional evidence been filed, the High Court not only could have considered the same, it could have also called for t the record ofthe said case to examine the matter at some length. [Para 20) [538-D, E, F] 2. 3. The fard-bayan was recorded in the hospital. When the investigating officer on receipt ofthe report went to the hospital, there was none. In normal course, the appellant should have been in the hospital The first informant arrived atthehospital within afew minutes. He upon receipt ofthe news ofhis sister's death made a statement at the hospital at about2. 30 p. m. In a situation ofthis nature, hewould not "-. ,, make a statement which is imaginary so as to implicate the appellant falsely. Apart from the oral testimony ofthe prosecution witnesses, the very fact that the appellant himselfhad sent the telegram askingPW- 1, father ofthe deceased, to come immediately is also a pointer to the fact that the spouses were not on good terms.

[Para 21] [539-A, B, CJ 3. 1. There appears to be a ring oftruth in the statementofthe first ..... informant, brother ofthe deceased, that a telegram was sent. He came • to see his sister. His brother-in-law was the resident ofthe samevillage. After he spent his night at his brother-in law's place, he had visited tlie appellant's house togetherwith him. He tried to pacify them. Onlywhen RAMESHWARDASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB the appellant went out, they also went out and came back after a few lf~ > ·. ii hours to find the door closed. Appellant evidently tried to show that he had gone to office. Itwas a Sunday and as such the question ofhis going to office did not arise. [Para 22) [539-D, E] 3. 2. Another factor which is ofsome significance cannot also be lost sight of. The deceased was in the family way. Shewas carryingfor .. ), 5-6 months. Apart from the statement ofher father and brother to that effect, even the post mortem report clearly proved the said fact. [Para 23) [539-E, F) 3. 3.

Apregnantwoman ordinarilywould notcommitsuicide unless relationship with her husband comes to such a pass that she would be compelled to do so. [Para23) [539-F, G] 3. 4. An attempt had also been made to show that there was death oftwo children in the family as also a brother ofthe deceased. Itwas stated that one ofsisters committed suicide and the 'taveej' was given for her warding off the evil spirits of her deceased sister. No such evidence has been brought on record. (Para 24) [539-G; 540-A) 4. 1. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, the appellant accepted that at the time ofhis marriage, a demand for Rs. 40,000/- was made from the parents of the deceased and they showed their inability to pay the same. [Para 25) [540-B] _,. 4. 2. Itwas only on 12. 06. 1988 that the Sub-Inspector had arrested him.

Why he was not available for six days has not been explained by the appellant Even therewas nothingon record to show thatitwas either DW-1 or the appellant, who gotthe deceased admitted in the hospital. The prosecution has discharged its primary onus, as envisaged under Section304B ofthe Indian Penal Code. In terms ofSection 113B ofthe Indian Evidence Act, onus of proofwas upon the appellant. As the defence taken by the appellant has not ber. n established, he cannot be held to have discharged the said onus. [Para 25) [540-C, D, E] State ofKarnataka v. M V Manjunathegowda and Anr. , [2003] 2 sec 188, relied on. 5. An offence under Section 304B ofthe Indian Penal Code is not compoundable. Why and under what circumstances the cousin ofthe deceased, ifany, has been married to the appellantis not known. Only because such a marriage has allegedly taken place, the same by itself cannot be said to be a ground for rejectingthe prosecution story.

These B contentions cannot also persuade this Court to impose a lesser punishment upon the appellant as in terms ofSection304Bofthe Indian Penal Code the minimum sentence is seven years rigorous imprisonment Appellanthas been awarded onlythe minimumsentence. This Court, therefore, cannot even interfere with the quantum ofthe sentence. [Para28] [540-G; 541-A, BJ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1021 of 2002. From the final Judgment and Order dated 4. 4. 2002 ofthe High Court D ofPunjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Cr!. Appeal No. 467 SB of 1989. Rajiv K. Garg and Ashish Garg (for Annam D. N. Rao) for the Appellant. Gagan Deep Sharma, Ajay Pal, Kuldip Singh, V. Kadam and Suruchi Aggaiwal for the Respondent. The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. 1. Appellant stood trial for commission of an offence under Section 304B ofthe Indian Penal Code in connection with ' unnatural death ofhis wife Sushma Rani. 2. They were married on 11. 03. 1986.

An engagement ceremony took place twenty days prior thereto. A demand for dowry was made. It was met in part. A sum of Rs. 25,000/- by way of a demand draft was handed over to the husband's family at Mansa when shagun ceremony was performed. Allegedly another sum of Rs. 11,000/-was paid in cash, as further demand was made by the family of the appellant. However, allegedly at the time ofmarriage the parents ofthe appellant demanded a further sum ofRs. 40,000/- in cash which could not be fulfilled. For nonfulfillment ofthe said demand, the deceased was allegedly tortured. 3. Appellant had sent a telegram on 16. 04. 1988 to Des Raj stating: "MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING REACH IMMEDIATELY - RAMESHWAR" On or about 4. 06. 1986, Sat Paul, brother of the deceased (PW- 1), visited the house ofhis brother-in-law Raj Kumar (PW-2), which is situate in the village, where the incident took place and stayed there for the night. On the morning ofthe next day, both ofthem visited the house ofthe appellant.

Appellant and the deceased were found quarreling with each other on account of demand of dowry ofRs. 40,0001-. He tried to pacify _them. Appellant left his house at about 9 a. m. Sat Paul and Raj Kumar also went to the town. However, when they returned after three or four hours, the house was found to be locked. On an enquiry having been made from the neighbours, they were informed that the deceased had been taken to hospital as she had consumed something. At about -\. 1. 30 p. m. , they reached the hospital at Bhatinda and came to know that Sushrna Rani had expired. She admittedly was pregnant at that time. 4. On receipt ofa report in this behalf, ASI Mal Singh visited the hospital at about 1. 20 p. m. It was at a distance ofabout 1km. from the police post. Statement was made before him by Sat Paul at about 2. 45 p. m. The said statement was sent to the police station and the same was recorded at 4 p. m. on the same day on the basis whereofthe F. 1. R. was recorded.

The statement ofPW-2 Raj Kumar was also recorded on the . ·· _;;. same day. Appellant was arrested on 12. 06. 1988. 5. The learned Sessions Judge, Bhatinda convicted the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. An appeal filed thereagainst by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court by reason ofthe impugnedjudgment. 6. Mr. Rajiv K. Garg, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in support ofthis appeal inter alia would submit: (i) The relation between the parties being cordial, the prosecution cannot be said to have proved its case ofcausing harassment by the appellant to his wife. (ii) The prosecution has not been able to prove demand ofdowry of Rs. 40,000/-. (Iii) Des Raj in his previous statement did not state about the demand of dowry ofRs. 40,000/-.

A complaint petition was later on filed under Section5 405 and 406 ofthe Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act which ended in acquittal by ajudgment dated 5. 11. 1992 and arevision petition filed thereagainst by Des Raj was withdrawn on 2. 03. 1995 which clearly establishes innocence on the part ofthe Appellant. (iv) The family ofthe deceased having suffered several deaths, the deceased started suffering from severe depression wherefor she was given a 'taveej' which also goes to show that she had committed suicide. (v) Even after the conviction, a settlement had been arrived at by and between the parties and in fact the cousin ofthe deceased was married to the appellant whereafter an application for compromise had also been filed. 7. The learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, supported the impugnt>,d judgment. 8. The fact that the deceased committed suicide is not in dispute.

The only question is whether the appellant is guilty ofcommission ofan offence under Section 304B ofthe Indian Penal Code. Before the learned Sessions Judge, the prosecution inter alia examined PW-1 Sat Paul, PW- 2 Raj Kumar, PW-3 Dr. Balbir Singh, PW-4 Dr. S. K. Gupta, PW-5 Gurjant Singh Record Keeper), PW-6 Anup Krishan (Branch Manager State Bank of Patiala, Chandigarh), PW-7 G. S. Mann, (Manager, State Bank ofPatiala, Bhatinda), PW-8 Guiab Chand (Supervisor Telegraph Office), Bhatinda, PW-11 Des Raj and PW-12 ASI Mal Singh. 9. The defence ofthe appellant was that she had been suffering from several diseases like depression, leucorrhea, abdominal trouble and was on medicine. He also denied that Sat Paul came to Bhatinda on 4. 06. 1988.

According to him, Shri Joginder Singh Bedi was requested to inform his in-laws on telephone about the death of Sushma, whereupon his father- ~ >" in-law and other relations came in the night and demanded valuables including the ornaments and on his refusal to give the same, they had filed a false case. He also alleged that he was detained by the police in the hospital. 10. To prove mal-treatment of the deceased on the part of the appellant, three witnesses were examined, viz. , PW-1 Sat Paul, PW-2 .. J Raj Kumar and PW-11 Des Raj. PW-3 Dr. Balbir Singh examined the deceased when she was brought to the Civil Hospital. PW-4 Dr. S. K. Gupta conducted the post mortem examination at 9 a. m. on 6. 06. 1988. The report reads as under: "Post-mortem staining was present on the dependant part ofthe body. Rigor mortis was present. Eyes were congested enclosed. Fluid was coming out from nostrils and mouth. Level ofthe uterus was 3" above the umbilicus. Ants were creeping on the body.

Multiple abrasions were seen on the waist line, neck, arm with ~ clotted blood. These abrasions and clotted blood was post-mortem and is caused by ants. Lungs were congested. Stomach contained about l/4th ounce ofsemi - 11. The Branch Manager of the State Bank of India Shri Anup Krishan PW-6 proved preparation ofthe demand draft ofRs. 25,000/from Sector 22-D Branch of Chandigarh on 1. 02. 1986 as also draft dated 19. 03. 1986 for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- which was issued from -L Chandigarh in favour ofRameshwar Dass (appellant) payable at Mansa. PW-7 G. S. Mann, Manager, State Bank of Patiala, Bhatihda proved payment ofthe said drafts to the appellant. 12. Apart from the said draft ofRs. 25,000/- dated 1. 02. 1986 which was encashed on 3. 02. 1986 at Mansa, the prosecution, thus, had also been able to prove payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to the appellant by demand draft dated 19. 03. 1986. 13. The learned Sessions Judge relied upon the testimonies of Sat Paul and Des Raj.

The court found corroboration in their testimonies from the fact of payment of money by way of demand drafts. The learned Sessions Judge also took into consideration the fact that some quarrel must have taken place between the spouses wherefor the telegram dated 16. 04. 1988 was sent to Des Raj by the appellant himself. 14. The fact that the death took place within seven years from the date ofmarriage is not in dispute. Commission ofsuicide by Sushma Rani is also not in dispute. 15. The only question which is required to be taken into consideration is as to whether the deceased soon before her death was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband for or in connection with the demand ofdowry. 16. The defence ofthe appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, was that the relationship between the par:ties was cordial. An attempt was made l( -- ' to prove a few letters allegedly written by the deceased to the accused. The said letters were sought to be proved by one Joginder Singh Bedi.

He was cited as a witness on behalfofthe prosecution. He had made his statement before the police under Section 161 ofthe Indian Penal Code. Evidently, he was given up. The learned Sessions Judge disbelieved his testimony opining that it is wholly unnatural that he would see the deceased writing a letter. He made a statement that the deceased was writing letters to him as also his wife. The said letters were not produced. The learned Sessions Judge also took into consideration the fact that there was nothing to show as was contended by the appellant that the investigating officer RAMESHWARDASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB [SINHA, J. ] 537 took possession of the said letters wherefor no seizure memo was ~) prepared and handed over the same to the accused. Such a statement made by Joginder was held to be wholly unnatural. The High Court in its impugned judgment endorsed the said view. 17.

A document in terms of Section 65 ofthe Evidence Act is to be proved by a person who is acquainted with the handwriting ofthe author thereof. DW-1 Joginder Singh Bedi claimed his acquaintance with ,. J the handwriting ofthe deceased on the basis ofthe letters written to him and his wife. He claimed that the deceased had written a large number of letters. It was, therefore, expected that some ofthem would be preserved. He did not produce any letter. 18. DW-1, as noticed hereinbefore, was a prosecution witness. He evidently was won over and, thus, prosecution did not examine him as its witness. Submission ofMr. Garg that he was the only independent witness who was available and was not examined must be considered from that angle. In response to the questions posed by the learned Sessions Judge, he even denied making any statement before the police. We wish that the learned Magistrate had recalled the investigating officer to bring the earlier statements ofDW-1 to his notice.

Unfortunately, no such step was taken. Furthermore, we fail to comprehend as to why the father and brother of the deceased in the course oftheir depositions were not confronted with the said letters. In ordinary course, it should have been done. Why such a course of action was not taken recourse to is anybody's guess. The purported explanation ofthe appellant that the said letters were taken into -- 'j custody ofthe investigating officer and later on returned to him is wholly unbelievable. An investigating officer would not seize letters without preparing any seizure list. When the investigating officer visited the place ofoccurrence, the appellant was not present. Even a copy ofthe telegram which was found in the house had been seized. Other articles had also been seized. Ifseizure list had been prepared, there does not appear to be any reason whatsoever as to why the letters purported to have been > written by the deceased would not be mentioned in the seizure list.

We, therefore, do not find any reason to differ with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court in this behalf. 19. So far as the submission of Mr. Garg that the subsequent complaint made by father ofthe deceased as against the appellant for i. commission ofan offence under Sections 405 and 406 ofthe Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3 and 4 ofthe Dowry Prohibition Act ended in acquittal, is concerned, in our opinion, the same is not very relevant. The said complaint was in relation to a demand made before the marriage took place. Allegations made therein were confined to non-return ofthe articles which was allegedly given to the bride for her own use. Mis-appropriation ofthe said articles was alleged on the part ofthe appellant therein. The learned Magistrate while passing the saidjudgment ofacquittal inter alia opined that whereas the letter containing the draft of Rs. 5,000/- was addressed to Rameshwar Dass, it was encashed by Rameshwar Garg.

Even in the purported letters written by the deceased to the appellant, the name ofthe appellant was stated to be Rameshwar Dass Garg. The learned Magistrate, therefore, in our opinion, misdirected himselfin making such observations but it is not necessary for us to express any opinion thereupon. 20. The said judgment of acquittal was passed on 5. 11. 1992, whereas the learned Sessions Judge passed his judgment on 18. 10. 1989 in the instant case. The charges in both the cases were not same. They were based on different transactions. Surprisingly, for reasons best known to the appellant, no attempt was made even to bring the said judgment dated 5. 11. 1992 to the notice before the High Court. Had an application for adducing additional evidence been filed, the High Court not only could have considered the same, it could have also called for the record ofthe said case to examine the matter at some length.

We, however, gave an opportunity to the appellant, in our anxiety to dojustice to him, to file an application for bringing the same on records. Such an application has been filed and we have taken into consideration the effect of the said subsequent judgment. As two cases, it will bear repetition to state, are on in respect oftwo different transactions, we are ofthe opinion that the same does not have any relevance in the present case. For the self-same reasons, the purported withdrawal ofthe criminal revision application filed by Des Raj thereagainst is also not Ofmuch ,j relevance. Both PWs 1 and 2 in no uncertain terms stated about the demand of dowry of Rs. 40,000/-. 21. Apart therefrom, we have noticed hereinbefore that the fardbayan was recorded in the hospital. When the investigating officer on receipt of the report went to the hospital, there was none. In normal course, the appellant should have been in the hospital.

The first informant arrived at the hospital within a few minutes. He upon receipt ofthe news ofhis sister's death made a statement at the hospital at about 2. 30 p. m. In a situation of this nature, he would not make a statement which is imaginary so as to implicate the appellant falsely. Apart from the oral testimony ofthe prosecution witnesses, the very fact that the appellant himselfhad sent the telegram asking Des Raj to come immediately is also a pointer to the fact that the spouses were not on good terms. 22. There appears to be a ring oftruth in the statement ofthe first informant that a telegram was sent. He came to see his sister. His brother- "-\ in-law was the resident ofthe same village. After he spent his night at his brother-in law's place, he had visited the appellant's house together with him. He tried to pacify them. Only when the appellant went out, they also went out and came back after a few hours to find the door closed.

Appellant evidently tried to show that he had gone to office. It was Sunday and as such the question ofhis going to office did not arise. 23. Another factor which is of some significance cannot also be lost sight of. The deceased was in the family way. She was carrying for 5-6 .... 'I months. Apart from the statement ofher father and brother to that effect, even the post mortem report clearly proved the said fact. Des Raj in his testimony denied and disputed that a 'taveej" was given to her because she was suffering from depression. According to him, it was given for the birth ofa child. A pregnant woman ordinarily would not commit suicide unless relationship with her husband comes to such a pass that she would be compelled to do so. .. > 24. An attempt had also been made to show that there was death of two children in the family as also a brother of the deceased.

It was stated that one of sisters committed suicide and the 'taveej' was given >-- ' ~ for her warding offthe evil spirits ofher deceased sister. No such evidence -\_, -,_ has been brought on record. 25. We must also notice the conduct ofthe appellant. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant accepted that at the time of his marriage, a demand for Rs. 40,000/- was made from the parents of the deceased and they showed their inability to pay the same. ASI Mal Singh, investigating officer stated that when he had visited the Hospital, nobody was present. Ifthe statement ofthe appellant is to be believed that he immediately rushed to the hospital, there was no reason ofhis not being there. According to him, he was detained in the hospital but the same has not been proved. It was only on 12. 06. 1988 that Sub- Inspector Sukhdev Ram had arrested him. Why he was not available for six days has not been explained by the appellant.

Even there was nothing on record to show that it was either DW-1 or the appellant, who got the deceased admitted in the hospital. The prosecution has discharged its primary onus, as envisaged under Section 304B ofthe Indian Penal Code. In terms ofSection l 13B ofthe Indian Evidence Act, onus ofproofwas upon the appellant. [See State ofKarnataka v. MV Manjunathegowda and Anr. , [2003] 2 SCC 188] As the defence taken by the appellant has not been established, he cannot be held to have discharged the said onus. ~ 'L 26. We, therefore, are of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. 27. Before parting, however, we must notice the submissions made by Mr. Garg that 21 years have passed, the appellant has married a cousin of the deceased and an application has been filed by Des Raj for condoning the offence. 28. An offence under Section 304B ofthe Indian Penal Code is not ...... compoundable.

Why and under what circumstances the cousin of the deceased, ifany, has been married to the appellant is not known. Only "' because such a marriage has allegedly taken place, the same by itself , . - ; cannot be said to be a ground for rejecting the prosecution story. These A contentions cannot also persuade us to impose a lesser punishment upon the appellant as in tenns of Section 304B ofthe Indian Penal Code the minimum sentence is seven years rigorous imprisonment. Appellant has been awarded only the minimum sentence. We, therefore, cannot even interfere with the quantum ofthe sentence. B 29. The appeal, for the reasons stated above, is dismissed. S. K. S. Appeal dismissed. "-4 '1 . '