RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ORS. v. U.O.I. AND ORS.
Citation: [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 426; 1992 INSC 308
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: M.H. KANIA , N.M. KASLIWAL, N.P. SINGH
Judgment date:
Case summary
1992 INSC 308. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1992-11-13. RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ORS. v. U.O.I. AND ORS. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S. C. R. RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ORS. v. U. 0. 1. AND ORS. NOVEMBER 13, 1992 [M. H. KANIA, CJ. , N. M. KASLIWAL AND N. P. SINGH, JJ. ] Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : Sections 4,6,9 and JIJ-Notifications-Chal/enge ta-Delay-Not properly explainetJ-Effect of Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in respect of certain lands including the lands belonging to the appellant-foundation situated at two different places. The appellant-Foundation filed objections. Subsequently notifications under Sections 6 and Notices under Sections 9 and 10 were also issued. The appellant-Foundation challenged the notifications in respect of the land situated at one of the two places, by way of a Writ Petition before the High Court and the same was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to agitate the matter in a suit.
Thereupon, the appellant-Foundation filed a suit and the same was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court. The Letters Patent Appeal filed against that decision is pending. In respect of the land situated at the other place, a Writ Petition was filed by the appellant before the High Court, which came to be dismissed as withdrawn. Thereafter, another Writ Petition was filed by the appellant· Foundation before the High Court challenging the notifications. The High Court having dismissed the Writ Petition, the appellant- Foundation preferred the present appeal. On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that they filed their objections under Section SA of the Act, but the same were rejected ,. ;thou! alTording any opportunity of personal hearing, and the denial of such opportunity invalidated the notifications; and that the land of the appellants being wakf property it ought to have been excluded on the basis of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.
Alternatively it was contended RAMJAS FOUNDATION v. U. 0. 1. 427 that the appellant has been running several educational institutions on the very land and that if the exemption for wakf property is not applicable to such educational and charitable institutions run by Hindus or non- Muslims, then such a notification would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Respondents contested the appeal on grounds of delay, ! aches and acquiescence in filing the Writ Petition c~all. enging the acquisition proceedings. It was also stated that the appellaif~'were given opportunity of personal hearing. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The conduct of the appellants in raising the plea that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellants in respect of the objections filed under Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was totally baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct is reprehensible.
It is well-settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226 of the Co"stitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal the material facts. (431-F, GI Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad & Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Anr. , [1977] 1 SCR 71, referred to. 2. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings was mainly based on the ground that in the notification dated 13. 11. 1959 issued under Section 4 of the Act the lands of wakf property were excluded and the lands of the appellants being also used for educational and charitable purposes the same were also liable to be excluded. At a later stage a ground was also taken that if wakf property in the aforesaid notification under Section 4 of the Act meant only wakf properties of the Mohammedans, then such notification was discriminatory and violative under Art.
14 of the Constitution as there was no reasonable ground to discriminate such properties of Hindus or non-Muslims meant for charitable purposes. Thus the challenge was in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act alone and though in the prayer ciaos sought or given for filing a fresh writ petition. In any case there were r. o fresh ground or circumstances available to the appellants to file a fresh writ petition No. 106 of 1978 on 7. 1. 1978 on identical grounds when the earlier writ petition No. 213 of 1973 had been dismissed as withtlrawn on 30. 3. 1977. Nothing had happened between 30. 3. 1977 and 7. 1. 1978 for giving a fresh cause of action to the appellants to file the writ petition No. 106 of 1978. Awadh Behari, J. bad dismissed the suit No. 451 of 1971 by order dated 21. 3. 1977 in regard to the lands in Mubarikabad and be was also one of the Jud!!
;es of the Division Bench who passed the impugned order dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the writ petition in limine as he was fully aware of the entire background of this litigation. The appellants are themselves responsible for creating confusion RAMJAS FOUNDATION v. U. O. L [KASL! WAL J. ] 435 in initiating separate proceedings at different periods of time in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad and Sadhurakhurd though challenge to the acquisition proceedings was on common grounds. Learned counsel for the appellants was unable to satisfy in respect of such conduct of hide and seek on the part of the appellants. In case, as sought to be explained by Mr. Tarkunde, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, the appellants were depending on the result of the civil suit filed in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad there was no justification for filing the writ petition No.
213 of 1973 in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd as the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in fact dismissed on 21. 3. 1977. We find no justification for filing the writ petition in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ petition on 30th March, 1977 reserving the liberty to file a fresh suit but thereafter again filing the writ petition on 7. 1. 1978 instead of suit. Independently, of all the circumstances mentioned above, we shall now consider the question of delay and ! aches in filing the writ petition No. 106 of 1978 and the earlier writ petition No. 213 of 1973 relating to lands in Sadhurakhurd. Mr. Tarkunde, Learned Senior Counsel vehemently contended that there is no limitation prescribed for filing the writ petition and the question of delay and ! aches has to be examined independently in the facts and circumstances of each case.
He has argued that the appellants are continuing in possession uptil date and though challenge has been made to the validity of notifications issued under Section 4 in 1959, Section 6 in 1968 and 1%9 and Section 9 and 10 in 1972, there is no delay, since no award has been passed so far and no loss has occasioned to the respondents due to lapse of time. It has been submitted that there was no change of circumstances during the intervening period and the delay had been fully explained on the aforesaid grounds. It has also been argued that notifications under Sections 9 and 10 were issued in 1972 and soon thereafter the appellants came forward with a writ petition No. 213 of 1973 challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4, 6, 9 and 10 of the Act. We find no force at all in the above contentions.
It is an admitted fact that notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued as early as 1959 and all the notifications under Section 6 of the Act in relation to the land of the appellants in Sadhurakhurd were issued in 1968 and 1969. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings was mainly based on the ground that in the notification dated 13. 11. 1959 issued under Section 4 of the Act the lands of wakf property were excluded and the lands of the appellants being also used for educational and charitable purposes the same were also liable to be excluded. At a later stage a ground was also taken that if wakf property in the aforesaid notification under Section 4 of the Act meant only wakf properties of the Mohammedans, then such notification was discriminatory and violative under Art. 14 of the Constitution as there was no reasonable ground to discriminate such properties of Hindus or non-Muslims also meant for charitable purposes.
So far as the notifications under Section 6 of the Act are concerned the same were attacked on the ground that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to hear the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act. Thus it is abundantly clear that the challenge was in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act alone and though in the prayer clause relief had been sought to quash the notification under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act also which were issued in 1972 but no ground whatsoever has been pleaded in the writ petition nor raised before us as to how the notifications under Sections 9 and 10 had any concern for explaining the delay in respect of the challenge to notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. It is worthwhile to note that according to the appellants own showing the notices under Sections 9 and 10 issued to the appellants in 1972 were in respect of the land being Khasra No. 1040/353 which related to 12 bighas· and 8 biswas only.
The challenge on the other hand in the writ petition is in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 covering the entire land measuring about 730 bighas situate in village Sadhurakhurd. We find no justification at all in explaining the delay on the ground that no award has been passed nor the appellants have been dispossessed so far. This cannot be an explanation for not challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and in the present case the appellants had themselves sought stay from this Court as early as 15. 11. 1978 for not making and declaring the award and not to dispossess the appellants. Thus we find no justification at all for the delay in not challenging the notification issued under Section 4 on 13. 11. 1959 till 1973. Even notifications under Section 6 of the Act were issued in 1968 and 1969 but not challenged till 1973.
·As already mentioned above inAflatoon's case (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that even after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act published in 1966, the appellants had approached with their writ petitions in 1970 when the notices under Section 9 were issued to them the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the grounds of , RAMJAS FOUNDATION v. U. 0. 1. [KASLIWAL J. J 437 ! aches and delay. Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior counsel made strenuous effort to distinguish the aforesaid case on the ground that in the aforesaid case the Court was influenced with the fact that the petitioners had sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete (emphasis added) the acquisition proceedings. Much emphasis has heen laid on the word 'to complete' the acquisition proceedings.
We find no force in this submission as the facts narrated in the above case clearly shows that the petitioners in those cases had filed writ petitions in the High Court in 1970 and in the Supreme Court in 1972 after the issuance of notices under Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Act. The use of the word 'complete' was not of much significance and the main reasoning of the case was that grounds to attack the notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were available at the time of publication of such notifications. In the facts and circumstances of the case before us the appellants were also sitting on the fence and did not take any steps of challenging the notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act till 1973 though the grounds now sought lo be urged were available to the appellants as soon as such notifications were issued. Thus viewing the matter from any angle we are clearly of the view that the writ petition was also liable to be dismissed on the ground of !
aches and delay on the part of the appellants apart from other grounds already dealt by us. In the face of the aforesaid view taken by us, it is not necessary at all to go on other questions raised in the case. ·we decline to express any opinion on any questions of law raised in the appeal. In the result we dismiss this appeal with costs. In view of the dismissal of the appeal itself all interim orders stand vacated automatically. G. N. Appeal dismissed.
Source: Supreme Court eSCR. Dataset: Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0. Text extracted automatically; compare with the source PDF for layout and accuracy.