RAMPRASAD BALMIKI v. ANIL KUMAR JAIN & ORS

Citation: [2008] 13 S.C.R. 1232

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, CYRIAC JOSEPH

Case summary

RAMPRASAD BALMIKI v. ANIL KUMAR JAIN & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 13 S. C. R. 1232 RAMPRASAD BALMIKI v. ANIL KUMAR JAIN & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 5949 of 2008) OCTOBER 1, 2008 [S. B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ. ] Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Motor Vehicle accident - Permanent disability - Claim - Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 85, 000/- to the victim - Enhanced to Rs.

3, 75, 0001- by High Court observing that extent of injuries suffered was 40% - Correctness of - Held: Amount of compensation should be determined having regard to state of affairs as existing on the date of occurrence - In the instant case, claimant suppressed facts before the Tribunal about his · premature retirement on account of permanent disability - A claim for obtaining 100% compensation in lieu of permanent disability must be supported by reasons - But no such material has been furnished by the claimant - Doctor, who treated the claimant did not state that he had sustained any permanent disability - Moreover, shortening of leg does not come within the purview ofpermanent total disablement even under 1923 Act - Under the circumstances, no interference with the impugned judgment called for ~ Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 'Total disablement' and 'total permanent disablement' - Distinction between. Appellant was working as a driver with the Cantonment Board.

While he was riding on a two-wheeler, a Tempo allegedly driven rashly and negligently by respondent No. 1 collided with his two-wheeler. Appellant sustained injuries, he was hospitalized and allegedly, underwent three operations and his right leg got shortened. He JAIN & ORS. filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming a sum of Rs. 17. 94 lakhs for sustaining permanent disability in his right leg and expenses in treatment, etc. Long after the said accident, he was referred to the Civil Surgeon, who declared him unfit to drive a vehicle pursuant whereto an order of premature retirement from service on medical ground was passed by the authorities. In the meantime, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 85,000/- as compensation. On appeal, the High Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.

3,75,000/- opining that even as per the certificate issued by the Medical Board, the extent of permanent disability suffered by him was 40%. Hence the present appeal. Appellant contended that the Tribunal as also the High Court have committed a serious error insofar as they failed to take into consideration that 'total disablement' would mean 'disablement from doing his job in which he was engaged'. Respondents submitted that in absence of any statute or statutory rule or any other material, the functional disability would be the same as loss of earning capacity, and in that view of the matter, once the structured formula is applied for the purposes of computing the amount of compensation, what is relevant is not only the income earned by the appellant but also the extent of purported disability suffered by him; and that since the correct multiplier has been applied, the impugned judgment warrants no interference. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.

1 Appellant filed an application in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and not in terms of Section 163A thereof. It is not a case where even the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was applicable. (Para - 5) (1239,C] [2008] 13 S. C. R. 1. 2 The jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal in terms of Section 163A and Section 166 of the Act is different. · (Para -- 5) [1239,D] Rajesh Kumar@ Raju v. Yudhvir Singh & Anr. (2008) 8 SCALE 497 - relied on. · · · · 1. 3 Ordinarily, the amount of compensation should be dete·rmined having regard to the state of affairs as was existing on the date on which the cause of action arose. This Court, however, does not mean to lay down a law that the subsequent event(s) can never be taken into consideration but it must be placed on record that for the said purpose another application would not be maintainable subsequently. (Para - 5) [1240,F-G] 1. 4 Appellant in this case is guilty of suppression of facts.

With a view to obtain ajust compensation, he should t have placed all relevant materials on record. The benefits to which he was found to be entitled to pursuant to the order of retirement on medical invalidation were required to be disclosed before the Tribunal so as to enable it to arrive at a conclusion as regards the quantum of 'just compensation'. (Para - 6) [1240,H; 1241,A] 2. 1 There exists a distinction between a 'total disablement' and 'total permanent disablement' as contained in Schedule I Part I of the 1923 Act. Sufferance of fracture by itself resulting in shortening of leg to some extent does not come within the purview of the 'permanent total disablement' even under the 1923 Act. (Para - 9) [1242,D-E] 2. 2 PW-3, who had treated the appellant, did not say that the appellant had sustained any permanent disability. (Para - 9) [1243,B] 2.

3 The High Court correctly proceeded on the as- • sumption that the extent of permanent disability suffered by the appellant is only 40% and not 100%. In that view of the matter alone he was found to have lost earning ca- > JAIN & ORS. pacity to the tune of Rs. 2000/- per month having regard to the fact that he had been getting a salary of Rs. 4,847/per month. Even otherwise, the amount of pension which he had been receiving and other benefits at the time of his retirement, which if invested, would have mitigated the quantum of damages and the same was required to be taken into . consideration. The High Court, therefore, Was more than lib- . eral in awarding the said amount of compensation in favour of the appellant. (Para -10) [1243,G-H; 1244,A-B] Grifan v. Sarbjeet Singh & Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 338 - held inapplicable. ~ 2. 4 A claim for obtaining 100% compensation for his permanent disability must be supported by reason.

How- -j ever, no material has been brought on record by the appellant in this regard. (Para - 10) [1244,D-E] ... National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed and Anr. (2007) 2 sec 349 - relied on. 2. 5 In the facts and circumstances of the case, no infirmity is found in the impugned judgment. (Para-11) [1244,E] Case Law Reference (2008) 8 SCALE 497 relied on Para - 5 'l (2000) 9 sec 338 held inapplicable Para - 10 _.. (2001) 2 sec 349 relied on Para - 10 CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5949 ~ of 2008 From the final Judgment and Order dated 27. 4. 2006 of · the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Misc. Appeal No. 67 of 2003 ·;, Ankur Mody, Shashi M. Kapila, Kush Chaturbedi and '{ikas Mehta for the Appellant. Dr. Meera Agarwal and R. S. Mishra for the Respondents. a cJaim petition either under the Act or under the 1923 Act. . ·. In Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra),, whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr.

Mody, this Court was dealing with a case under the 1923 Act. Respondent therein suffered injuries resulting in amputation of his left arm from the elbow. In that view of the matter, the Commissioner of Workmen adjudged him to have lost "100 per cent of his earning capacity" as by loss of his left hand he was evidently rendered unfit for the work of carpenter as the same was not possible to be done by one hand only. This Court, however, although took notice of the definition of the term 'total disablement' as contained in Section 2(1)(I) of the 1923 Act but had no occasion to consider the proviso appended thereto, which reads as under: "PROVIDED that permanent total disablement shall be deemed to result from every injury specified in Part I of Schedule I or from any combination of injuries specified in Part II thereof where the aggregate percentage of the loss of earning capacity, as specified in the said Part II against those injuries, amount to one hundred per cent or more;" ! 3.

There exists a distinction between a 'total disablement' and 'total permanent disablement' as contained in Schedule I Part I of the 1923 Act. Sufferance of fracture by itself resulting in shortening of leg to some extent does not come within the purview of the 'permanent total disablement' even under the 1923 Act. It is in that view of the matter, the Tribunal opined: "For sustaining permanent disability, the identity card issued to disabled person by Board is produced by the Applicant as Ex. P- 8. On perusal of the said identity card it is found that in column No. 11 the nature and extent of disability it is not made clear that what kind of disability was found. On the contrary below the next column 40% is written. But for that it is not clearly mentioned that what is 40% and if it is for disability, the kind of disability is not mentioned. In such situation on the basis of Ex. P-8 Identity Card it cannot be held that Identity Card is issued to the applicant for permanent disability.

Although original identity card in evidence is acceptable but when regarding permanent disability the position is not clear, in such a ~ ·1 \ .. , case the doctor who have issued the identity card should be produced in evidence. But the applicant has not .. ' produce the doctor who have issued the identity card in 1 evidence. ~ PW-3 Dr. B. P. Purohit, who had treated the appellant, did not say that the appellant had sustained any permanent disability. With regard to the evidence of PW-6 Dr. R. P. Sharma, Civil Surgeon, the Tribunal opined: "Although AW-6 R. P. Sharma has stated that on request of the Cantonment Board Officers he has examined the applicant and have not found him fit for driving. This witness has stated that after looking to the photo copy of Certificate he has given the statement. This witness has not made it •J ,; clear that because of injuries to the appli<:;ant, permanent disability was found in the applicant.

The opinion for not finding him fit for driver, was given by him because bones could not have joint but he has not made it clear whether · joint of bones was possible or not. Keeping in view the statement of this witness it can be held that due to nonjoint of bones the applicant was not able to work on the post of driver but it cannot be held that for the work of driver he has become unfit for the work of driver for ever. As such on the basis of the aforesaid discussion on the basis of evidence produced by the applicant it is not i " -) proved that because of sustaining injuries by the applicant in accident the same has caused him permanent . , disability. " 10. Be that as it may, the High Court, in our opinion, cor- · rectly proceeded on the assumption that the extent of permanent disability suffered by the appellant is only 40% and not \' I 100%. In that view of the matter alone he was found to have lost ~ earning capacity to the tune of Rs. 2000/- per month having re- ·~.

gard to the fact that he had been getting a salary of Rs. 4,847/- ~ . per month. Even otherwise, the amount of pension which he " .. ' had been receiving and other benefits at the time of his retirement, which if invested, would have mitigated the quantum of ,. damages and the same was required to be taken into consid- " eration. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was more than liberal in awarding the said amount of compensation in favour of the appellant. ' The decision in Grifan v. Sarbjeet Singh & ors. [(2000) 9 SCC 338], relied upon by Mr. Mody does not lay down any legal principle. Although therein medical evidence showed that the claimant had suffered 80% disability, the overall disability was taken at 50% only; of course, the future prospects have been taken into consideration, as in that case also the right leg of the claimant had to be amputated. Some shortening of the legs can be made up with specially manufactured shoes.

A person can even drive a vehicle even with artificial limbs. claim for obtaining 100% compensation for his perma- ~ nent disability must be supported by reason as has been held by this Cou1i in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed and Anr. [(2007) 2 SCC 349]. No material has been brought on record by the appellant in this regard. 11. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. ... S. K. S. Appeal dismissed. ~ ~ ( ; -