RAZA BULAND SUGAR CO.LTD. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD, RAMPUR
Citation: [1965] 1 S.C.R. 970; 1964 INSC 238
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR , K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1964 INSC 238. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1964-10-30. RAZA BULAND SUGAR CO.LTD. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD, RAMPUR. Read the judgment and case details on...
Judgment text
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~ ·~ RAZA BULAND SUGAR CO. LTD. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD, RAMPUR ~- October 30, 1964 ocn published in a Hindi paper. The High Court dismissed the petition hut granted a Cc'1ificatc under Art. ! 33 ( 1 )( c). The q ucstions for consideration were whelher the whole of s. 131 ( 3) y:;v; mandatory, or the part of it requiring publication in the manner Ia. id down in s. 94( 3) i. e. , in a Hindi nev. ·spapcr ~·as merely directory; and whether the publication in the Government Gazette of the notification impo5ing the tax wns not conclusive proof, as provided in s. 135(3), of • the prescribed procedure having beea observed. HElJ) : (Per GA. JE:-ODRAGADKAR C. J. , WANCHOO and RAGtlliHAR OA YAt. J J. ) ·-( i) Section 131 ( 3) can he divided into two parts-the first oac providing that the proposal and draft rules for a tax intended to be 1 imposed shutild be pllhlishc s orders thereon by special resolution and if it thinks necessary it can modify the proposals.
If the proposals and the rules (if any) are modified, the modified proposals and rules are again published. It is open to any inhabitant of the municipality again to object to the modified proposals, and if any such objection is made, it • BULAND SUGAR v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Wanchoo /,) 973 is dealt with in the same manner as objections to the original proposals. When the proposals have been finally settled, the Board has to submit them along with the objections to the prescribed authority or the State Government, as the case may be, under s. 133 l of the Act. The prescribed authority or the State Government has the power thereunder to sanction the proposals or to return them to the Board for further consideration or sanction them without modification or with such modificatjon not involving an increase of the amount to be imposed as io deems fit.
Section 134 provides that when the proposals have been sanctioned, the State Government has to take into consideration the draft rules submitted by the Board and make such rules under s. 296 of the Act as it thinks fit. When the rules have been made the order of sanction and a copy of the rules has to be sent to the Board which thereupon by special resolution has to direct the imposition of the tax with effect from the date to be specified in the resolu· tion. Section 13 5· then provides that a copy of the above resolution has to be submitted to the State Government or the prescribed authority, as the case may be. Upon receipt of such copy, the State Government or the prescribed authority, as :the case may ; be, has to notify in the official gazette the imposition of the tax from the . appointed day and the imposition of the tax is in all cases subject to the condition that it has been so notified under E s. 135 (2). Then comes s.
135 (3), which reads as follows:- "A notification of the imposition of a tax under sub-section (2) shall be conch,1sive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. " F Section 94 (3) which provides for the manner of publication readi thus :- "Every resolution passed by a Board at a meeting shall, as soon thereafter as may be, be published in a local paper published in Hindi and where there is no such local paper, in such manner as the State Gov- G ernment may, by general or special order, direct. " According to the respondent, it followed the procedure provided under the Act for the imposi\ion of the tax and after following the procedure the tax came to be imposed from April 1, 1957 at the rate of 10 per centum of the annual value of lands H and buildings. After the tax was thus imposed, the respondent sent notices of demand to the appellant requiring it to pay water tax for the years 1957-58 and 1958-59. This was dono on • [1965] l S. CR.
October 7, 1958. It may be added that under s. 129 of the A Act there are certain restrictions subject to which water tax can be imposed and one of the restrictions is that the tax shall not· be imposed, where the unit of assessment is a plot of land or a building, on any such plot or building of which no part is within a radius to be fixed by rule in this behalf for each municipality B from the nearest standpipe or other waterwork whereat water is made avai'able to the public by the Board. In the present case this limit has been fixed by the rules at 600 feet. The appellant objected to the payment of water tax demanded from it, and one of its objections was that it was exempt under s. 129 (a), as there was no standpipe or other waterwork whereat c water was made available to the public by the respondent within • 600 feet of the buildings of the factory, the Central Oflice or the Govan Colony, except that some buildings outside the main Raza Sugar Factory were within 600 feet.
The respondent however rejected the objections, and threatened D to recover the amount by coercive process. The appellant then filed a writ petition before the High Court in December 1958 and a large number of grounds were taken in the writ petition ' in ~upport of its case that it was not liable to pay· water tax, including certain constitutional objections to the vires of the Act itself. The appellant failed in tht High Court- on all points and E has come up in appeal before us on a certificate granted by the High Court. In the present appeal however only two points have been urged before us on behalf of the appellant.. We arc therefore not concerned with the other points raised in the High Court and F shall confine ourselves to the two points urged before us, • namely- ( 1) There was no publication as provided by s. I 31 ( 3) read withs. 94(3) of the Act, and as the provision of s. 131 (3) is mandatory and was not complied with.
all subsequent action G taken for the imposition of the tax was bad for non·compliance with a mandatory provision and therefore the tax itself was not levied according to law and could not be realised; and ( 2) the tax could not be levied on most of the premises belonging to the appellant as there was no standpipe or other waterwork whereat water was made available to the public by H the respondent within 600 feet of all of the buildings of the appellant. BULAND SUGAR v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Wanchoo /. ) 975, A. We shall first consider the ground as to publication and three questions fall to be decided in that behalf : (first), is publication as provided in s. 131 (3) mandatory or directory, for it is con- ', tended on behalf of the respondent that publication under s. 131(3) is merely directory; (secondly), was the publication in this case strictly in accordance with the manner provided in B s.
94 ( 3) ; and (thirdly), if the publication was not strictly in accordance with the manner provided in s. 94 ( 3), is the defect curable under s. 13 5 ( 3) ? The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory, inasmuch as it uses the word C "shall"-as in the present case---is merely directory- cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. .
The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general D iltconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the parti-f cular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to E be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. The respondent strongly relies on the State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava('), where Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution was held to be directory and not mandatory, and contends that the principle of that case applies with full force to the facts F • of the present case.
It-- is therefore necessary to consider that case before we consider the facts of the present case in the light of the circumstances to which we have referred above and which are helpful in determining whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. Article 320(3)(c) provides for consulta- G tion with the Public Service Commission on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil capacity, and the language of the Article is mandatory in form, as it provides that the Public Service Commission shall _be consulted. This Court relied on the following observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy H Council in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin(') in that connection:- (I) [1958] S. C. R. 533. (2) (1917) LR. A. C. 170. (1965] I S. C. 111..
"The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in tltis country, but it has been said that no general rule I• can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. . . . 'Nhen the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done. " niat wa' a case wheie the jury lists had not been revised as required by law. Following the principle laid down in that case, this Court held that Art. 320(3 )( c) itself contemplates three grounds: (i) that the proviso to Art.
320 itself contemplates that regulations may be made specifying matters in which either • generally, or in any particular class of cases or in particular circumstances it shall not be necessary for a Public Service tomrnis-sion to be consulted; (ii) that the advice of the Public Service Commission was not binding on the Government, and in the absence of such binding character it was difficult to sec how non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) could have the effect of nullifying the final order pas1ed by the Government; and (iii) that Art. 311 wa' not in any way controlled by Art. 320 and there was no provision in the Constitution expressly or otherwise providing that the result of non-compliance with Art. 320(3)(c) • would be to invalidate the proceedings ending with the finnl order of the Government. It was also pointed out in tlrnt case that an examination of the terms of Art.
320 showed that the word "shall'" appeared in almost every parag,aph and every clause or sub-clause of that Article. If it were held that the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) were mandalorv in terms, the other clauses or sub-clauses of that Article would have to be equally held to be mandatory. If they \¥ere so held, any appointments made to the public services without observing strictly the terms of these sub-clauses in cl. (3) of Art. 320 would adversely affect the person ~o a ppointcd to a public service, without :my fault on his part and without his having any say in the matter. and this could not have been intended hy the makers of the Constitution. Tims this Court approximated Art. 320(3)(c) to a statutory BULAND SUGAR v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Wanchoo J.
) 977 provision like the one which came up for consideration in Montreal Street Railway Company"s case(') and held that if the Article were construed as mandatory, it wonld canse serio~ general inconvenience, and injnstice to persons who had no control over those entrusted with the duty. That decision was clearly based on the special facts in that case dealing with appointments and dismissals of public servants and the duty of the Government to consult the Public Service Commission in that behalf and cannot and should not be extended to case! based on a different set of facts. As the Judicial Committee itself pointed out the question whether provisions in a statute are directory or mandatory cannot be decided by laying down a general rule and in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. That case therefore in the circumstances is of little assistance· to the respondent, except insofar as it lays down the principle that no general rule.
can be laid down for determining the question whether a provision in a statute is directory or mandatory, and that every tase will have to be judged on the basis of the object of the statute concerned. This brings us to the examination of the facts and circumstance! ; of the present statute in the light of what we have said above as to the criteria for determining whether a provision in a statute is mandatory or directory. The provision with which we are concerned, namely, s. J. 31(3), can be divided into two parts. The first pan lays down that the Board shall publish proposals and draft rules along- with a notice inviting objections to the proposals or the draft rules so published within a fortnight from the publication of the notice (see Sch. Ill). The second part provides for the manner of publication and that manner is according to s. 94 ( 3). We shall first deal with what we have called the first part of s. 131 ( 3). This provision deals with taxation.
The object of providing for publication of proposals and draft rules . is to invite objections from the inhabitants of the municipality, who have to pay the tax. The purpose of such publication obviously is to further the democratic process and to provide a reasonable opportunity of peing heard to those who are likely to be affected by the tax before imposing it on them. I It is true that finally it is the Board itself which settles the proposals with respect to taxation and submits them to Government or the prescn"bed authority, as the case may be, for approval. Even so we have no doubt that the object behind this puhlirntion is to find out the reaction of tax payers generally to the tairntion (! ) [1917] L. R. A. C. 170. [1965] I S. C. R. proposals, and it may very well be in a particular case that the Board may drop the proposals altogether and may not proceed further with them. if the reaction of the tax-payers in general i> of disapprobation.
Further the purpose served by the publi-l' cation of the proposals being to invite objections, in particular from the tax-payers, to the tax proposed to be levied on them, the legislature in its wisdom thought that compliance with this part of s. 131 ( 3) would essentially carry out that purpose. In the circumstances if we are to hold that this part of s. 131 ( 3) was merely directory, the whole purpose of the v~ry elaborate procedure provided in ss. 131 to 135 for the impo- 'ition of tax would become meaningless, for the main basis of that procedure is the consideration of objections of tax-payers '"1 the proposals of the Board. If such publication is merely directory, the Board can proceed to levy the tax without complying with them and that would make the entire elaborate procedure provided ir. the Act before a tax is imposed nugatory. We are thereforo o: opinion that this part of s. 131 (3) is mandatory '"d it is nocessary to comply with it strictly before any tax can be imposed.
We shall consider the interpretation of s. 135(3) later. but we have no doubt that in the present. case, in spite of s. 135 (3), the legislature intended that there must be publication as provided in what we have called the first part of s. 131 n l. We therefore bold that this part of s. 131 ( 3) is mandatory considering its language. the purpose for which it ha~ been enacted, the setting in which it appears and the intention of the legislature which obviously is that no tax should be imposed without hearing tax-payers. Lastly we sec no serious general inconvenience or injustice to anyone if this part of the provision is held to be mandatory: on the other hand it will be unjust to tax-payers if • this part of the provision is held to be directory, inasmuch as the disregard of it would deprive them of the opportunity to make objections to the proposals, and the draft rules. We therefore hold that this part of s. 131 (3) is mandatory.
Turning now to the second part, which provides for tho manner of publication, that manner is provided in s. 94(3) already set out above. It seems to us that when the legislature rrovided for the manner of publication it did not intend that that manner should be mandatory. So long as publication is made in substantial compliance with the manner provided in been· imposed in accordance with the provisions of that Act, and it could not be challenged on the ground that all the necessary steps had not been taken. Now what happened in that case was that the necessary publication was made as reauired by law and objections were invited to the proposed tax. Only one objection was filed in that case and that objection was· considered by the Board and rejected. The other procedural provisions were complied with and tax was imposed and a final notification made (I) [1962] I S. C. R. 596. under s. 67 (7) of that Act.
Imposition of the tax was challenged on the ground that the Board did not take into consideration the objections filed. The evidence in that case wa' that the Board had taken into consideration the objections filed and had rejected thcin on grounds which the appellant \in that case) thought were not proper. It was in those circumstances that this Court held that sub-s. ( 8) of s. 67 was conclusive. The present case is in our opinion similar to that case. Here also the publication was made, as we have already pointed out in compliance with what we have called the first part of s. 131 ( 3). Further the manner of publication was in substantial compliance with s. 94 ( 3). Therefore, a' there was substantial compliance with the provisions of s. 94(3), s. 135(3) would in our opinion oomc to the help of the respondent and it must be held that all necessary steps had been taken. It is however contended on behalf of the respondent that s.
135 ( 3) goes further and means that where it applies, the tax must be held to be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, even though none of the procedural provisions may have been complied with at all. lt is enough to say that the questinn in this form does not arise before us directly for we have h -dural provisions including s. 131 (3) by a Board before imposing a tax and the evidence consisted only of a notification under s. 135 ( 2). It has been held by the Allahabad High Court in a number of cases that if there is no compliance with the procedural provisions in s. 131 to s. 134, the mere notification under ' s. 135 ( 2) would not be sufficient to impose a tax and s. 135 (3) would not save such tax: (see Azimu/la v. Sura; Kumar Sin[lh(') 2 and Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raghuvendra Kripa/( ). These arc cases in which certain procedural provisions were not complied with at all and the High Court held that s. 135 (3) would not save the tax in such cases.
We do not think it necessary to express any opinion on this question for it does not arise in the present case. We may however point out that the decision 3 in the Berar Swadeshi Vana ve the ground f! om which the pubiic can draw water. Rut even so, the question is one of fact and the High Court has pointed out that there was dispute on this quesion of fact and there was no sufficient material before it to enable it to come to a definite finding whether all the buildings of the appellant were beyond the radius of 600 feet from the nearest standpipe. In this state of the evidence the question must be left open and the appellant can pursue such remedies as he may be advised to take. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed witb costs. Hida)atnllah J. I agree th~t this app~:il should be dismissed but would like to say a few words about the failure to publish the notice in strict compliance with the provisions of s. 94 ( 3) of the U. P. Municipalities Act.
The procedure for the imposition of a tax by the Municipality has been analysed by my learned brother Wanchoo very succinctly. I agree generally with all he has said but as I view the matter differently on the construction of ss. 131 ( 3), 94 ( 3) and 135 ( 3) of the Act, I shall briefly give the reasons • for my decision on that part of the case. ' The general scheme of taxation in the Act is this: After the Municipal Committee or Board decides to impose a tax it ~ required to frame proposals by. a special resolution fs. 131 ( 1 )] and to frame rules which it desires the State Government to make rdativ~ to the assessment, collection etc. , of the tax [s. 131 (2i]. Section 13 l ( 3) then provides : "The Board shall, thereupon, publish in the manner prescribed in section 94 the proposal framed under sub-section (I ) and the draft rules framed under sub-section ( 2) along with a notice in the form setforth in Sc he du le 111.
" This enables any inhabitant affected by the proposal to object. The Municipal Committee or the Board then considers the objections and passes orders on the objections but if it modifies the proposals or the rules it publishes them a second time and the whole procedure has to be gone through again. When there is no modification or the prooosals or rules are finally settled, the original proposals and rules, if any, have to be forwarded to Government. Government may accept the proposals and the rules II or may send them back for further consideration. The proposals and the rules when finally sanctioned by Government are return-ed to the Municipality which imposes the tax with effect from a BULAND SUGAR v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Hidayatul/ah J. ) 985 A specified date by passing a fresh resolution. This does no; impose __, the tax proprio vigore. The resolution has to be submitted to Government and when it is notified in the official Gazette, the tax is imposed from the appointed date.
Section 153(•3) then provides : "A notification of the imposition of a tax under sub- B section ( 2) shall be conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.. " The tax herewas imposed by Rampur Municipality and the notices were published in an Urdu newspaper called "Aghaz" c though the notices were in Hindi. Section 94(3) of the U. l> Act provides: - "Every resolution passed by a Board at a meeting shall, as soon thereafter as may be, be published in a local paper published in Hindi and where there is no D such local paper in such manner as the State Government may, by general or special order, direct. " There was in Rampur another newspaper which was published in Hindi but its circulation was admittedly very_poor. The news, paper selected for publication, though in Urdu, was widely read, E and the notice itself was in Hindi. Thus there was a local paper with a wide circulation and there was a notice in Hindi.
The only breach was that the paper was not 'published in Hindi'. There was clearly no literal compliance with s. 94 ( 3). Two questions, therefore, arise : (a) Is section 94(3) mandatory? and F (b) If section 94(3) is not strictly complied with whether section 135(3) makes the notification conclusive :igainst the defect ? In my judgment the answers to these questions depend upon the G nature of the functions of a Municipal Committee and its powers of imposing a tax. A Municipal Committee enjoys powers of taxation not as a legislature but as a delegate of the legislature. Taxes levied by it are in effect levied by Government. They are allowed to be imposed and retained by the Municipality to perform its functions H and to pay for its expenses. The whole procedure is shortened in this way, otherwise Government would be required to levy taxes and to give the proceeds to the Municipality.
However, the final - word lies with Government and the legislature makes this the vital condition in the imposition of the tax. What the Muiiicipality does in consequence of the power so conferred, it can only effe<:tivcly do if the conditions laid down with the grant of power arc followed and Governmc~t finally approves of the tax, the manner of its imposition and manner of its collection. Once Government has approved of the Resolution and published it in the Gazette the tax is deemed to be conclusively imposed in accordance with the procedure laid down. The legislation on the subject is then complete and the tax derives its legislative validity from the legislature's will. Now ss. 131-135 lay down the procedure. All the conditions apparently seem equally obligatory because every condition is couched in mandatory language.
The crnx of the problem before us is whether all the conditions are to be treated as mandatory or all of them as directory or some of them as of one kind and some of the other kind ? What is the test to apply and if a distinction is to be made, on what principle? In my opinion, the way to look at the matter is this. A tax to be valid must be imposed in accordance with the Municipalities Act. The Act lays down conditions some of which arc devised for the protection of the tax-payers and some others for ministerial operations connected with the method or system of imposing the tax or for promoting despatch, efficiency and publicity etc. All conditions of the first kind must, of course, be regarded as mandatory, because they lie at the very root of the exercise of the power. Thus preparation of assessment rolls, hearing of objection, framing of assessment rules are all mandatory.
Similarly, conditions involving the passing of resolutions by the necessary majority at special meetings after • proper notice to members are fundamental and cannot be overlooked. If a defect of a fundamental kind occurs it would (in the absence of curative provision) remain even if Government gave its 1 sanction -Sec Scadding v. Lorant( ) (affirming S11b-Nom) (2) and Joshi Ka/idas v. Dakar Town Municipality('). Conditions which promote despatch or provide for ministerial operations are usually direct~ry and although compliance with them i• also necessary it is sufficient if the compliance is substantial. It may be accepted that a provision for a notice to the tax-payers informing them about the proposal to impose a particular tax and the rules made for the imposition, is fundamental. Such 1-1 (I) 3 H. L. C. 418·10 E. R. H. L. 164. (2) 13 Q. B. 7C6. (3) I. LR. 7 Born. 399. BULAND SUGAR v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Hidayatullah J.
) 987 A a provision, if ignored, would frustrate the very policy of the Jaw that there should be no tax without an opportllnity to object, and to ign0re it would ordinarily be fatal. ~imilarly, the direetion that • the notice should be published in a 10cal newspaper is also an \ integral part of the Scheme. The same purpose cannot be achiev- ' ed by proclaiming by beat of drum or distributing hand-bills or Jl publishing a notice in a newspaper not circulating locally. There ' is no option there because if the notice cannot be published in a local newspaper the sec~ion goes on to provide for alternative modes of. publicati~ to be determined by Government. The sub-section, how~er, goes further and says that the newspaper C must be one. that is published in lμmli. ·I would be disposed to eonsider this further 'direl9-tion as not funilamental.
If a newsp~per • is selected which is very widely read in the locality but is not in Hindi and the notice is published in Hindi, I imagirie the intention of the law is better promoted than if another newspaper published in Hindi with next to no circulation is selected. There is no doubt D a departute ·from the letter of the law·but the departure promotes the very object and purpose of it. -' lwould regard such a provision as directory. · It is a provision for the guidance of the Municipality and not something wmch can be said to be essential to the validity ' ' of ·the imposition . .. E It seems to me that it is not necessary at all to go into· the niceties of the distinction between mandatory and directory provisions in general or in relation . to the provisions of the U . P. Municipalities Act in particular, ··The legislatt. ire )las itself furnish-ed the solution by enacting s. 135(3) which indicates the conse-quences of an omission.
It lays down empbatically a rule of F evidence which precludes courts from miling inquiries into the minutiae of the procedure ·with a view to declaring the imposition ' invalid. The· legislature is quite content to enact th~t Government should review the proposals, the rules and the· procedure before accepting the resolution imw. sing the tax and that after this i' done and a notification issues :an questions about the procedural G part of the imposition must cPiise. The legisiative will takes over from that stage and the tax is imposed arisalidly as if the legislature itself imposed it. Whether one reads 's. ' 135 ( 3) as enacting ·an. absolute rule of . evidence (and I am in favour of reading it as such-See: The Berar Swildeshi Vanaspati v. Municipal Com- 1 mittee, Shegaon )( ) or as ·merely. related to venilil defects, errors H or omissions, it is plain that it mui;t at least protect the imposition of wa~-tax in Rampur against a flaw in procedure of the (l). 11962) I S. C. R. 596.
:a kind we are dealing with or it would serve no purpose at aII. This A provi;ion, therefore, 'serves to cure the breach of the direction which was intended to serve merely a~ a guide to the municipalities, and it precludes courts from inquiring into such a breach. That was a matter for Government to take into con,ideration before according its approval and Government must be deemed B to have approved this other mode of publication which, it i~ .. clear enough it could have perrr. ittcd to be followed in the first instance under the latter part of s. 94 ( 3) itself. Subject to these reasons for holding the tax to be valid I agree that the appeal be dismissed with costs. c Mudholkar J. I agree that the appeal be dismissed but • on the point of Jaw urged before us I would like to state my reasons separately. I iind it difficult to construe sub-s. (3) of s.
131 as partly directory and partly mandatory; that is to say, that the require- D ment of p;iblication is mandatory but the requirement ot the manner of publication is not mandatory but only directory. To construe the section that way would be giving two different meanings to the verb "shall" occurring in the provision which governs both rubiicat1on as well as the manner of publication. "Shall" can, according to the authorities, no doubt be construed literally and, E therefore, as being mandatory or, liberally and thus being only dir~ctory depending upon the object of the provision in which it occurs, the connected provisions and other similar matters. But it seems to me on principle that when a verb used in a provisron governs two different matters it cannot he given one mc&nmg in so for as it relates to one matter and ;mother mcanin~ insofar as F it relates to another matter. ~ • The provisions of s.
94(3) are clearly directory inasmuch as a dcvi~tion from the mode of publication prescribed thcrei11- :ha1 is public,nion in a local newspaper in the Hindi language--is rnntemnlated by it. T! 1e requirement of s. 131 ( 3) is μublica- G tion in the manner provided for in s. 94-which is actually prcwid-ed in sub·s. ( 3) of s. 94. Since the latter provision is directory it is immaterial to consider whether s. 131 (3) is directory or man- ' datory or to read ir ''' par:ly one and partly the other and depart from the normal rule of construction which discountenances read-rng a word in a provision m two J;ffercnt ::enses. H While a mandatory pccwision must be strictly complied with, substantial compliance is sufficient with respect to a directory J. ~ BULAND SUGAR v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Mudho/kar J. ) 989 A provision. There has been substantial compliance 'with the provisions of s. 94 ( 3) since the proposals were in fact published in the Hindi language in a local newspaper.
The only departure from the letter of the law was not obtaining the permission of the State Government for publishing the proposals in an Urdu newspaper. In my view the essential requirement of s. 94(3) is pub-ll lication in a local newspaper. Where this requirement is satisfied, ! he omission to obtain a direction from the. State Government permitting publication in a newspaper other than one in the Hindi. language is not of much consequence. Upon this view the question whether s. 131 ( 3) is mandatory C or whether s. 135(3) has become void by reason of Art. 13(1) • of the Constitution or whether it can cure a defect resulting from non-compliance with a mandatory provision do nae at all arise· for consideration. Appeal dismissed .. • •
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