S. B. NORONAH v. PREM KUMAR! KHANNA (2)

Citation: [1980] 1 S.C.R. 281

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER, P.N. SHINGAL

Case summary

If he makes a mindless order, the Court, when challenged at the time of execution \Vill go into the question as to whether the twin conditions for saaiction hav11 really been fulfilled....

Judgment text

S. B. NORONAH .... v. • PREM KUMAR! KHANNA August 16, 1979 [V. R. KRISHNA lYER AND P. N. SmNGHAL, JJ. ] Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Section 21 scope of-Duty oj the Court in dealing witli applications 1111der Section 21, expfai11ed. • Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court HELD: Section 21 of the: Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 carves out category for special treatment. While no landlord can evict without compliance \vith sections 14, 19 and 20 of the Act, a. liberal eviction policy cannot be said to under-lie in section 21. Parliament was presumably keen on maximising accommodation available for letting, realising the scarcity crisis. One source of such spare accommodation which is usually shy is potentially vacant building or part thereof which the landlord is able to let out for a strictly limited period provided he has some credible assurance that when he needs he \vill get it back.

n The law seeks to persuade the o\vner of the premises available for letting for particular period by giving him a special assurance that at the expiry of that period the appointed agency wil1 place the landlord in vacaint possession. And·,.. Section 21 confines the special remedy to letting for residential uses only. Parlian1cnt had the wholesome fear that if the section were not controlled by 1nany conditions it n1ight open the floodgates for wholesale circun1vention of the rent control legislations by ingenious landlords exploiting the agonising ne'ed of houseless denirens. [285B-D, G-H, 286A] 2.. Section 21 over-rides se~ion 14 precisely because it is otherwise hedged in with dra-stic lin1itations and safeguards itself against landlords' abuses. The first condition is that the landlord docs not require the demised pren1ises "for a particular period" only.

This means that he n1ust indicate to the authority before \\'hich sanction is sought for letting what is the particular prriod for \vhich he can spare the accommodation. The Controller exercises an important regtrla·tory function on behalf of the community. The fact that a landlord and a potential tenant together apply, setting out the formal ingrcdi~nts of Section 21, does not relie,·e the Controller from being vigilant to inquire and --io satisfy himscJf about the requisites of the landlord's non-requirement "for particular period" and the letting itself being "as a resident". A fraud on the statute cr111not he permitted especin·lly hecause of the grave niischief that n1ay be perpt:trated in such event, [286E, H, 287A-DJ ' • ~ 3. There would be a terrible blow to the rent control law if section 21 \\'ere freely permitted to subvert the scheme of Section 14. Every 13. ndlord will insist on a tenant going through the formal exercise of Section 21, making • ·~ ideal averments in ferm.

s of that Set'. tion. The con~quence will be that both , the Civil Procedure Code \Vhich prescribes suits for recovery of possession and the Delhi Rent ·control Act 'vhich prescribes grounds for eviction will be eclipsed by the pervasive operation of Section 21. Neither grounds for eviction nor suits for eviction wilt thereafter be needed, and if the la-ndlord moves the Court for a mere warrant to place the landlord, through the Court process, in vacant possession of the premises, he gets it. No courtwfee, no decree, no execution ... petition, no termination of tenancy-wish for possession and the court is at your command. Such a horrendous situation will be the negation of the ruie of Jaw in this area. [287 D-F] 4. When an application under Section 21 is filed by the landlord and/or tenant the Controller must satisfy himself by such inquiry as he may inake, about the compulsive requirements of that provision.

If he makes a mindless order, the Court, when challenged at the time of execution \Vill go into the question as to whether the twin conditions for saaiction hav11 really been fulfilled. Of course, there will be a presumption in favour of the sanction being regular, but it \vill still be open to a pa. rty to make out his ca rted in 1976 R. C. J. p. 582. It is true as Misra, J. in that C'ase, following earlier decisions has observed that the provisions of Section 21 are designed to meet the problem of shortage of housing in Delhi. If the landlord does not need the premises for a, limited period, section 21 permits him to lease it out during that period. Without the facility of section 21 the landlord might have preferred to keep the premises vacant, but that does not mean that the law surrenders itself to this landlord and releases him from all conditions. That is why the need for sanction and the mandatory conditions for such sanction are specified in the section.

It is altngether wrong to import the idea that the tenant h·aving taken advantage of induction into the premises pursuant to the permission, he cannot challenge the legality of the perm1ss1on. As between unequals the law steps in and as against statutes there is no estoppel, especially where collusion and fraud are made out and high purpose is involved. The doctrine. of estoppel cannot be invoked t'o render 'alid a proceeding which the legislature has, on grounds of public policy, subjected to mandatory conditions which are shown to be absent : "Where a statnte. enacted for the benefit of a section of the public, imposes a duty of a positive kind the person charged with the performance of the duty cannot by estoppel be prevented from exercising his statutory powers. A petitioner in a divorce suit cannot obtain relief simply because the respondent is estopped from denying the charges, as the court has a statutory duty to inquire into the truth of a petition".

(') It is an old maxim that estoppels are odious, although considerable inroad into this maxim has been made by modern law. Even so, "a judgment obtained by fmud or collusion, even it seems a judgment of the House of Lords, may be treated as a nullity. "' (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 16-fourth edition para 1553). The point is that the sanction granted under section 21, if it has been procured by fraud or collusion, cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high public policy will be given as hostage to successful collusion. (I) Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition p. 1019 Vol. 16. s. B. NORONAH V, PREM KUMARI (Krishna Iyer, J. ) 2 8 9 Law that non·pcr(orms stultifies the rule of law and so it is that • we stress the need for strict compliance. Or else, the sanction is 11011 est. Collusion between the strong and the weak cannot confer validity where the nrnndatory prescriptions of the law are breached or betrayed.

We have said enough to make the point that it is open to the tenant in the present case to plead and prove that the s•anction under Section 21 is invalid, and if it is void the executing court is not debarred from holding so. - We, therefore, hold on the first point that no question of amendment arises in the present case and the application before the Controller did not suficr from any deficiency. On the second point we hold that it is perfectly open to the Controller to examine whether the sanction under Section 21 is a make-believe, vitiated by fraud and collusion. We make it clear that the Controller is concerned with delivery of posession at the expiry of the lease of 1975 and he will, therefore, examine the position with reference to that lease only. The appellant-tenant urged a further contention that because there was fraud the court could not assist the party in fraud even if both sides were involved in the fraud.

He invoked the doctrine of inpari delicto potior est conditio dejendantis. We are not inclined to examine these contentions but leave it open to the executing court to go into such pleas as are permissible at the execution stage. Beyond that he has no jurisdiction but within that he has a duty to decide. On these findings we dismiss the appeal but direct the Controller to go into the question of the validity of the sanction and such otl1er objections •as may be awilable in the light of our observations recorded above. The first point raised is untenable and we should have directed costs while dismissing the appeal. The second point raised is of great public moment and the appellant has broadly succeeded on that question. The result is that the community has benefited by our declaration of the law and the parties must, therefore bear their respective costs throughout'. S. R. Appeal dismiised.