S. PL. NARAYANAN CHETTIAR v. M. AR. ANNAMALAI CHETTIAR

Citation: [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 237; 1958 INSC 90

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: SYED JAFFER IMAM, S.K. DAS, J.L. KAPUR

Judgment date: 1958-10-31

Case summary

1958 INSC 90. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1958-10-31. S. PL. NARAYANAN CHETTIAR v. M. AR. ANNAMALAI CHETTIAR. Read the judgment and case details...

Judgment text

(1) S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 237 the strikers had ta. ken up a belligerent attitude and the lock out was fully justified. The Labour Appellate Tribunal a. warded to the 24 workmen reinstated by its amended order dated September 28~ 1956, back wages from April 1, 1956, to the date of reinstatement as was done by the Industrial Tribunal in the case of workmen Nos. 2 to 24, whom the Tribunal had ordered to be reinstated. As we have come to the conclusion that the order of reinstatement by the Industrial Tribunal of workmen Nos. 2 to 24 and by the Appellate Tribunal of workmen Nos. 25 to 48 was erroneous, neither of the two sets of workmen is entitled to back wages by way of compensation. The appeal is therefore allowed and the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal as to all the workmen n. nd the award of the Industrial Tribunal as to workmen Nos. 2 to 24 are set aside and the claim for compensation which was argued before us is disallowed.

As the workmen have been dismissed and no compen-sat. ion has been allowed tho proper order as to costs is that both parties do pay their costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed. S. PL. NARAYANAN CHETTIAR v. M. AR. ANNAMALAI CHETTIAR (JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and J. L. KAPUR, JJ. ) Debt Relief-Agriculturist-Scaling down of decree debt-Enabl-ing statute coming into force pending appeal-Application made after appellate decree-Whether barred by res judicata-Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, z938 (IV of z938), as amended, s. z9(2)-Madras Agriculturists Relief (Amendment) Act (XXIII of z948), s. z6, els. (ii), (iii). In 1944 the respondent instituted a suit for the reco~ery of money due under an award dated July 31, 1935, whereby the appellant and his brother were directed to pay a certain amount to the respondent. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court but on appeal the High Court passed a decree on March 9, 1951.

During the pendency of the appeal in the High Conrt the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938, was amended by Act XXIH of 1948, which inter aliaby adding sub-section (2) to s. 19 of the main Act enabled decrees passed after the commencement of the Act Ch•tti•• to be scaled down under the provisions of the Act. By cl. (ii) to s. 16 of the amending Act, which came into force on January 25, 1949, it was provided that "that the amendments made by this Act shall apply to ......... all suits and proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Act, in which no decree or order has been passed before such commencement ". On October 5, 1951, the appellant made an application to the trial court for scaling down the decretal debt under s.

19(2) of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938, as amended, but the application was dismissed on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to act under that sub-section as the decree sought to be scaled down had been passed by the High Court. The appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court and also made a separate application for scaling down the decretal debt under s. 19(2) of the Act. The High Court took the view that s. 19(2) was controlled by s. 16 of the amending Act and that cl. (ii) of s. 16 was applicable to the case, but that as the appellant whose appeal was pending at the commencement of the amending Act did not apply for scaling down before the decree was passed although he had the opportunity to do so, his application subsequent to the decree was barred by the principle of res judicata. Held, tha,t the High Court erred in its view that in order to get relief under s. 19(2) of the Act, read with cl. (ii) of s.

16 of the amending Act, the appellant must have made the application when the appeal was pending and before a decree had been passed. For the application of cl. (ii) of s. 16 of the amending Act, the true test is whether the suit or proceeding was instituted before January 25, 1949, and whether no decree or order for repayment of a debt had been passed before that date, and it is not necessary that the suit or proceeding should be pending on the date of the application under s. 19(2) of the Act. In cases covered by tha. t clause a party can ask for relief under the Act at two stages, before a decree for repayment of the debt had been passed, and also after such a decree had been passed, and since s. 19(2) of the Act in express terms enables a debtor to claim a relief under the provisions of the Act after a decree had been passed, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of s. 19(2) of the Act read with s. 16, cl. (ii), of the amending Act. While cl. (ii) of s.

r6 applies to suits and proceedings which wer~ instituted before January 25, 1949· but in which no decree or order had been passed, or the decree or final order passed had not become final, before that date, cl. (iii) applies to decrees or orders, which, though they had become final before January 25, • 1949, were still in the state of unfinished execution and at the stage at which satisfaction had not been fully received. Narayanan Venkataratnam v. Seshamma, I. L. R. [1952] Mad. 492, Chettiar approved. v. The question whether cl. (ii) refers to decrees and onlers of Annanznlai Chettitir a declaratory nature, which are not executable but which haYe become final before January 25, 1949, left open. The opinion expressed in Jagannatham Chetty v. Parthasarathy Iyengar, A. LR. 1953 Mad. 777, that the word 'proceedings' iu s.

16 of the amending Act must relate to proceedings instituted for repayment of a debt and not to execution proceedings which are for enforcement of a decree or order, doubted and the question left open. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 117 of 1955. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 25th l\'farch, 1953, of the Madrns High Court, in Civil Misc. Petition No. 6577 of 1952. R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellant. Sardar Bahadu. r, for the respondent. 1958. October 31. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. K. DAs, J. -In this appeal, pursuant to special s. r s to be referred to in this connection. On behalf of the respondent-creditor it has been pointed out to us that on the date the application for relief under s. 19(2) was made in the High Court, nu suit or pruoeeding · was actually pending, the High Court having passed a decree llluch eal"lier, na. lllely, on March 9, 1951. As a matter of fact, the application for relief under s. l!

l(2) for scaling down the decree was ma. de in the High Court sometime in 1952. We are of the view that cl. (Ii) of s. 16 describes the nature of suits or . proceedings in which the amen 1. Act has perhaps led to some of the difficulties of inter- i958 prntation referred to therein. The earliest decision brought to our notice is the decision in Velagala N ~~;,,~;:n Sriramareddi and others v. Karri Sriramareddi (1). v. This is a full bench decision of the Madras High Court Annmnalai Chettiar to which we have already referred in an earlier part of this judgment. The next decision is that of Venkata- s. K. D. is J. ratnam v. Seshamma (2), which; is also a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court. It deals with the construction of clauses (ii) and (iii) of s. 16 of the amending Act with particular reference to the view expressed in certain earlier cases of the same High Court with regard to cl. (iii) of s. 16.

The view expressed in the earlier cases, to which the learned Judges who decided the case out of which the present appeal has arisen were parties, was that cl. (iii) of s. 16 had no application to proceedings in which the decrees and orders had become final before J anua. ry 25, 1949. The Fnll . Bench did not accept that view as correct. Satyanarayana. Rao, J. , who delivered the judgment of the Court said: "It cannot be doubted that the two clauses (ii) a. nd (iii) are entirely independent and a. re intended to provide for different situations ........ . " The view ta. ken by the learned Judges in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals, already referred to, was that, while the two clauses a. re independent, . clause (iii) has no application to proceedings in which the decrees and orders have become final before the commencement of the Act. It is this view which is also pressed now before us by the learned Ad voca. te for the respondent. While we agree with the lea.

rued Judges in holding that the two . clauses a. re independent, we a. re unable, with great respect, to accept the view that clause (iii) applied only to cases in which the decrees and orders have not become final. If the decree or order has not become final before the commencement of this Act, clause (iii), in our opinion, seems to be unnecessary a. nd as such the case would be covered by cla. use (ii). ~'urther, it would be difficult to imagine (1) LL R. (1942] Mad. 346. (2) I. L. R. [1952) Mad. 492, 498, 499. that a decree or order which has not become final can be finally executed or can be finally satisfied. No doubt it is true that, even when an appeal is pending, a decree may be executed and satisfaction may be Chettiar entered. But all that is only subject to the result of the appeal.

If the appeal succeeds or the amount due by the defendant to the plaintiff is increased by the Appellate Court, fresh execution has to be started, the satisfaction must be re/opened and the execution must proceed. The Legislature, in our opinion, when it enacted these two provisions, must have intended that, even in the case of decrees or orders which have . become final, having regard to the provisions of the new Act, relief should be had by the judgment-debtor so long as the decree or order was not executed or was not satisfied in full before the commencement of the Act. If, however, a decree was executed in part and, before it was fully satisfied, the debt was scaled down under the provisions of the Act, as a result of which the creditor was found to have received more than what he was entitled to, the proviso enacts that, in such a situt\tion, the creditor should not be required to refund any sum which has been paid to or realised by him before the commencement of this Act.

The qnes. tion is asked, and legitimately, as to which are the kinds of decrees or orders which have become final and which are sought to be excluded by implication in clause (ii) of section 16. It is of course not easy to give an exhaustive list of such decrees and orders. It may be that the legislature contemplated that decrees and orders of a declaratory nature, and which are not executable and which have become final before the commencement of the Act, need not be re-opened. A reading of the two clauses together would suggest that clause (iii) would apply exclusively to executable decrees or orders which, though they have become final hefore the commencement of the Act, are still in the stage of unfinished execution and at the stage at which satisfaction was not fully received. The view which we take, in our opinion, reconciles both the clauses and does not make any of the clauses unnecessary. " We concur in the view expressed above that cl. (iii) of (1) S. C. R.

SUPREME ~OURT REPORTS 251 s. 16 applies to decrees or orders which, though they had become final before January 25, 1949, are still in the stage of unfinished execution and at the stage at which satisfaction has not been fully received, and cl. (ii) applies to suits and proceedings which were Annamolai instituted before January 25, 1949, but in which no decree or order had been passed or the decree or order passed had not become final before that date. We consider it unnecessary in the present case to go into the further question whether cl. (ii) refers to decrees and orders of a declaratory nature, which are not executable but which have become final before January 25, 1949. That is a question which does not fall for decision in the present case and we express uo opinion thereon. In Kanakammal v. Muhammad Kathija Beevi (1) it was observed: " The mere fa.

ct that the judgment-debtor raised an objection to the executability of ~he whole decree on the ground that it has to be scaled down is no ground for sea. ling down the decree and the court will not be justified in so scaling down without a separate application. This is also another ground for holding that the judgment-debtor is not barred from filing the application to scale down the decree even though he had not raised the question at an earlier stage of the execution proceedings. \Ve are therefore definitely of opinion that an application under s. 19 of the Act is not one which comes under s. 47, Civil Procedure Code, and therefore the principle of res judicata in execution cannot apply to the facts of the present case. " The decision in Narayanan Chettiar v. Rathinasami Padayachi (2), related to a different point altogether, namely, sticccssive applications under s. I! ) or s. 20 of the Act.

In that case the question was whether the judgment-debtor not having filed an application under s. 19 within the prescribed time from the date of the stay order under s. 20 passed on his prior application was precluded from again filing auother application under s. 20 followed by a. n application under s. 19. It was held that he was not so entitled. In Jagamtatham Chetty v. Parthasarathy {I) A. I. R. 1953 l\Iad. 188, l8g. (2) A. I. R. 1953 Mad. 421. 252 SUPREME COURT REPOltTS (1059] Supp. Iyengar (1) the question as to the meaning of the word 'proceedings ' in s. 16 was considered and it was observed that the word 'proceedings' ins. 16 must relate to proceectings instituted for repayment of a AnnamalaiCh"tiordebt and not f. o execution proceedings which are for enforcement of a decree or order.

We greatly doubt whether that is the correct view to take, particularly when the expression 'debt' includes a decretal debt; but as the question does not arise in the present case we refrain from making any final pronouncement. In H emavathi v. Padmavathi (') it was held that the amending Act was retrospective so as even to apply to a debt which had already been scaled down once by the application of the Act and even where the rights of the parties had been finally adjudicated by de. cree or order of a court, provided that the decree or order ha. <l not been executed or fully satisfied. That was held to be the effect of cl. (iii) of s. 16 of the a. mending Act. 3 In Lingappa Chettiai· v. Chinnaswami Naidu ( ), the view taken by Subba ·Rao and Somasuuda. ram, JJ.

(the same Judges who decided the present case) in au earlier decision that a party who had au opportunity of getting the beneficent prodsions of the Act applied to him before the amendment, but did not avail himself of the same, is disentitled to invoke the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 19, was dissented from and Govinda Menon, J. , who gave the judgment of the Court, said: " \:Ve do not find any difficulty in holding that sub-s. (2) of section 19 is applicable to cases like the present, and the retrospective nature of that sub-section a. s contemplated by clause (iii) of section 16 of Act XXIII of 1948 cannot be restricted or circumscribed by any other clause in that section. " In T. N. Krishna Iyer v. Nallathambi Mudaliar and others (') Krishna. swami N ayudu, J. , said that the object of s. 16 of the amending Act was to render the application of the amendments to a. wide range of suits, both to suits instituted before and after the commencement of the a.

mending Act and to such suits in which the decrees have not only become final but have (1) A. I. R. 1953 Mad. 777· (2) I. L. R. [1954] Mad. 8g1. (3) (1955) I M. L. J. '· 5. (4) (1955) I M. L. J. 215- (1) S. C. R. SUPREME COUHT REPORTS 253 not been executed or satisfied and so long as something remains to be <lone out of the decree, the Act could be made . applicable. It seems to us that both on authority and principle, the correct view'is that the appel- ! ant was entitled to the benefit of s. 19(2) of the Act, Annamalai read with s. 16, cl. (ii) of the a. mending Act. These are our reasons for holding that the view taken by the High Court is not correct and the appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the case sent back to the High Court for consideration on merits in accordance with law. The appellant will get his costs of this Court; costs incurred in the High Court before and hereafter will be dealt with by the High Court at the time of the final decision.

There were two applications filed by the appellant-debtor for the relief which he claimed. One was filed . in the trial court and the other in the High Court. The trial court dismissed the application on the ground that the High Court a. lone had jurisdiction to give such relief. The appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court and also filed an application there. The question. which is the proper court to give relief to the appellant is a matter on which we a. re making no pronouncement. That is a. matter which will be dealt with by the High Court. Appe,al allowed. Case remanded.

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