S. SUBRAMANIAM BALAJI v. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU & ORS

Citation: [2013] 13 S.C.R. 668

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM, RANJAN GOGOI

Case summary

S. SUBRAMANIAM BALAJI v. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

(2013) 13 S. C. R. 668 -r S. SUBRAMANIAM BALAJI v. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 5130 of 2013) JULY 5, 2013 [P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ. ] Representation of the People Act, 1951 - s. 123 - J. t Elections - Promises made by political parties in their election ... _ manifesto - If amounts to 'corrupt practices' as per s. 123 - Held: Promises in the election manifesto cannot be read into s.

123 for declaring it to be a corrupt practice - Promises in the election manifesto do not constitute as a corrupt practice under the prevailing law - However, reality cannot be ruled out that distribution of freebies of any kind, undoubtedly, --f influences all people - It shakes the root of free and fair elections to a large degree - Considering that there is no enactment that directly governs the contents of the election manifesto, the Election Commission is directed to frame guidelines for the same in consultation with all the recognized political parties - Generally political parties release their election manifesto before the announcement of election date, in that scenario, strictly speaking, the Election Commission will not have the authority to regulate any act done before announcement of the date - Nevertheless, an exception can be made in this regard as the purpose of election manifesto is directly associated with the election process - Election Commission directed to take up this task as early as possible owing to its utmost importance - Also, there is need for a ,.

_~ separate legislation to be passed by the legislature in this regard for governing the political parties - Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 324. Policy - Government policy - State Largesse - Scheme framed by State for free distribution of Colour Television Sets • TAMIL NADU (CCTVs) to eligible families in the State - Scheme challenged in writ petition - Whether the scheme was within the ambit ofpublic purpose and if yes, was it violative of Art.

14 of the Constitution - Held: The mandate of the Constitution provides various checks and balances before a Scheme can be implemented - Therefore, as long as a scheme comes 8 within the realm of public purpose and monies withdrawn for implementation of the scheme by passing suitable Appropriation Bill, the Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere ~in such scheme - Judicial interference is permissible only when action of the government is unconstitutional or contrary to a statutory provision and not when such action is not wise or that the extent of expenditure is not for the good of the State - The scheme in question fell within the realm of fulfilling the Directive Principles of State Policy thereby falling within the scope of public purpose and was a/so in consonance with j. Art. 14 of the Constitution - Scope for application of the principle laid down in Vishaka case did not arise as there was no legislative vacuum in the case on hand -Constitution of India, 1950 - Art.

14 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - s. 123. Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 148 - Comptroller and Auditor General of India (GAG) - Role and duties of - Held: ,.. CA G is a constitutional functionary appointed ulArt. 148 of the Constitution - His main role is to audit the income and expenditure of the Governments, Government bodies and State-run corporations - GAG examines the propriety, legality and validity of all expenses incurred by the Government - Comptroller and Auditor General's (Duties, Powers etc. ) Act, 1971. Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 148 - Comptroller and Auditor General of India (GAG) - Whether GAG has a duty to examine expenditures even before they are deployed - Held: The office of GAG exercises effective control over the government accounts and expenditure incurred on schemes •. only after implementation of the same - Duty of the CAG arises only after the expenditure is incurred. Respondent No.

8-Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), while releasing the election manifesto for the 2006 Assembly Elections, announced a Scheme of free 8 distribution of Colour Television Sets (CTVs) to each and every household which did not possess the same, if the said party/its alliance were elected to power. This Scheme was challenged by the appellant, by filing writ petition before the High Court on the ground that the expenditure to be incurred by the State Government for its implementation out of the State Exchequer was unauthorized, impermissible and ultra vires the Constitutional mandate. The appellant filed complaint to the Election Commission of India seeking initiation of action in respect of the said promise under Section 123 of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The appellant also forwarded the complaint to the Chief Election Officer, Tamil Nadu. The DMK and its political allies emerged victorious in the State Assembly Election held in the month of May, 2006.

In pursuit of fulfilling the promise made in the election manifesto, a policy decision was taken by the then government to provide one 14" CTV to all eligible families in the State. It was further decided by the Government to implement the Scheme in a phased manner and a provision of Rs. 750 crores was made in the budget for implementing the same. Being aggrieved by the implementation of the Scheme, the appellant filed another complaint to the Chief Secretary and the Revenue Secretary pointing out the unconstitutionality of the Scheme. He also preferred Writ Petition before the High Court alleging the Scheme a corrupt practice to woo the gullible electorates with an eye on the vote bank. The High Court dismissed both the writ petitions filed by the TAMIL NADU appellant holding that the action of the Government in distributing free CTVs cannot be branded as a waste of exchequer. In the instant appeal, the following questions arose for consideration in the present appeal.

(i) Whether the promises made by the political parties in the election manifesto would amount to 'corrupt practices' as per Section 123 of the Representation of People Act, 1951? (ii) Whether the schemes under challenge are within the ambit of public purpose and if yes, is it violative of Article 14? (iii) Whether the Supreme Court has inherent power to issue guidelines by application of the principle laid +-down in Vishaka case? (iv) Whether the Comptroller and Auditor General of India has a duty to examine expenditures even before they are deployed? (v) Whether the writ jurisdiction will lie against political party? ,,. _ Dismissing the appeal and the transferred cases, the ' Court Issue No. 1 Whether the promises made by the political parties in their election manifestos would amount to 'corrupt practices' as per Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951? 1.

The purpose of incorporating Section 123 of the RP Act is to ensure that elections are held in a free and fair manner. A perusal of sub-sections 1-8 of Section 123 of the Act makes it clear that it speaks only about a candidate or his agent or any other person. There is no word about political parties. [Paras 47, 49 and 50) [709- D; 715-G; 716-B] 2. 1. If every kind of promise made in the election 8 manifesto is declared as a corrupt practice, this will be flawed, since all promises made in the election manifesto are not necessarily promising freebies per se, for instance, the election manifesto of a political party promising to develop a particular locality if they come into power, or promising cent percent employment for all young graduates, or such other acts. Therefore, it will be misleading to construe that all promises in the election manifesto would amount to corrupt practice.

Likewise, it is not within the domain of this Court to legislate what kind of promises can or cannot be made in the election manifesto. [Para 53) [716-H; 717-A-C] 2. 2. Secondly, the manifesto of a political party is a statement of its policy. The question of implementing the manifesto arises only if the political party forms a Government. It is the promise of a future Government. It is not a promise of an individual candidate. Section 123 and other relevant provisions, upon their true construction, contemplate corrupt practice by individual candidate or his agent. Moreover, such corrupt practice is directly linked to his own election irrespective of the question whether his party forms a Government or not. The provisions of the RP Act clearly draw a distinction between an individual candidate put up by a political party and the political party as such.

The provisions of the said Act prohibit an individual candidate from resorting to promises, which constitute a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 of the RP Act. The provisions of the said Act place no fetter on the power of the political parties to make promises in the election manifesto. [Para 54) [717-C-F] • TAMIL NADU 2. 3. Thirdly, the provisions relating to corrupt practice are penal in nature and, therefore, the rule of strict interpretation must apply and hence, promises by political party cannot constitute a corrupt practice on the part of the political party as the political party is not within the sweep of the provisions relating to corrupt practices. As the rule of strict interpretation applies, there is no scope for applying provisions relating to corrupt practice. contained in the said Act to the manifesto of a political "! -. party. [Para 55) [717-G-H; 718-A] 2. 4.

Lastly, it is settled law that the courts cannot issue a direction for the purpose of laying down a new norm for characterizing any practice as corrupt practice. Such directions would amount to amending provisions of the said Act. The power to make law exclusively vests in the Union Parliament and as long as the field is covered by parliamentary enactments, no directions can be issued as sought by the appellant. As an outcome, it cannot be held that the promises made by the political parties in their election manifesto as corrupt practice under Section 123 of the RP Act. [Para 56) [718-B-C] Patangrao Kadam vs. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav Deshmukh and Ors. (2001) 3 SCC 594: 2001 (2) SCR 118 - relied on. -+' Union of India &Anr. vs. International Trading Co. &Anr. 2003 (5) SCC 437: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 55; K. T. Moopil Nair VS. State of Kera/a AIR 1961 SC 552: 1961 SCR 77; Bhim Singh vs. Union of India and Ors. (2010) 5 SCC 538: 2010 (6) SCR 218; Federal Bank Ltd. vs.

Sagar Thomas and Others (2003) 10 SCC 733: 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 121; Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug vs. Union of India and Others (2011) 4 SCC 454: 2011 (4) SCR 1057; Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms and Another (2002) 5 SCC 294: 2002 (3) SCR 696; People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Anr. vs. Union of India and Anr. (2003) - I + l 4 sec 399: 2003 (2) SCR 1136; M. J. Jacob vs. A. -r Narayanan and Others (2009) 14 SCC 318: 2009 (4) SCR 305; Ba/dev Singh Mann vs. Surjit Singh Dhiman (2009) 1 SCC 633: 2008 (16 ) SCR 540; Samatha vs. State of A. P. and Others (1997) 8 SCC 191: 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305; Keshavanand Bharati vs. State of Kera/a (1973) 4 SCC 1461 and Deepak Theatre, Dhuri vs. State of Punjab and Others 1992 Supp (1) sec 684: 1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 242 referred to. )(. Coates vs. Campbell and Others 37 Minn. 498 ((USA); Roberts vs. Hopwood & Ors. 1925 AC 578; Bromley London Borough Council, London vs. Greater Council & Anr. 1982 (2) WLR 62; R vs.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1995) 1 All ER 611; Richardson-Garnder vs. Ekykn (1869) 19 LT 613 and Kingston Cotton Mills Co. Re [1896) 2 Ch 279 - referred to. -+ Issue No. 2 Whether the schemes under challenge are within the ambit of public purpose and if yes, is it violative of Article 14? 3. 1. The concept of State largesse is essentially linked to Directive Principles of State Policy. Whether the ~ State should frame a scheme, which directly gives benefits to improve the living standards or indirectly by -i increasing the means of livelihood, is for the State to decide and the role of the court is very limited in this regard. [Para 57) [718-D, E] 3. 2. The concepts of livelihood and standard of living ~are bound to change in their content from time to time. It is factual that what was once considered to be a luxury has become a necessity in the present day.

It is well settled that the concept of livelihood is no longer confined to bare physical survival in terms of food, TAMIL NADU clothing and shelter but also now necessarily includes basic medicines, preliminary education, transport, etc. Hence, the State distrusting largesse in the form of distribution of colour TVs, laptops, etc. to eligible and deserving persons is directly related to the directive principles of. the State policy. [Para 61) [743-B-C] 3. 3. It cannot be said that giving. of colour TVs, laptops, mixer-grinders etc. by the' Government after adhering to due process is not an expense for public )'. purpose. Judicial interference is permissible when the ... action of the government is unconstitutional and not when such action is not wise or that the extent of expenditure is not for the good of the State. All such questions must be debated and decided in the legislature and not in court. [Para 62) [743-D-E] 3. 4.

More so, the functioning of the Government is +-controlled by the Constitution, the laws of the land, the legislature and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. [Para 63] [743-F] 3. 5. There are various checks and balances within the mandate of the Constitution before a scheme can be implemented. As long as the schemes come within the realm of public purpose and monies for the schemes is )rwithdrawn with appropriate Appropriation bill, the court ... has limited power to interfere in such schemes. [Para 68) [745-E-F] 3. 6. The purpose of the schemes is to enforce the Directive principles of State Policy. In what way the State chooses to implement the Directive principles of State -~ policy is a policy decision of the State and this Court cannot interfere with such decisions. Ordinarily, this Court cannot interfere with policy decisions of the government unless they are clearly in violation of some statutory or ·constitutional provision or is shockingly - A arbitrary in nature.

In the given case no such circumstances prevail as envisaged for judicial enquiry; this Court is not persuaded to interfere with the policy decision. [Para 69] [745-G-H; 746-A, F] 3. 7. The principle of not to treat unequals as equal 8 has no applicability as far as State largesse is concerned. This principle applies only where the law or the State action imposes some burden on the citizen either financial or otherwise. Besides, while implementing the directive principles, it is for the Government concerned to take into account its financial resources and the need of the people. There cannot be a straight jacket formula. If certain benefits are restricted to a particular class that can obviously be on account of the limited resources of the State. All welfare measures cannot at one go be made available to all the citizens. The State can gradually extend the benefit and this principle has been recognized by this Court in several judgments.

[Para 70] [746-H; 747- A-C] Ekta Shakti Foundation vs. Government of NCT of Delhi 1 (2006) 1o scc 337: 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 631 - relied on. Issue No. 3 Whether this Court has inherent power to issue guidelines by application of Vishaka principle? ..... 4. It is the stand of the appellant that there is legislative vacuum in the given case, hence, the judiciary is warranted to legislate in this regard to fill the gap by application of the principle in Vishaka case. In Vishaka, '! -- -. there was no legislation to punish the act of sexual harassment at work place, therefore, the judiciary noting the legislative vacuum framed temporary guidelines until the legislatures passed a bill in that regard. However, in ' the case at hand, there is a special legislation,- namely, TAMIL NADU the Representation of People Act wherein Section 123 enumerates exhaustively a series of acts as "corrupt practice". Therefore, this is not a case of legislative vacuum where the judiciary can.

apply its inherent power to frame guidelines. [Para 71] [747-D-G] Vishaka and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241: 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 404 - referred to. Issue No. 4: Whether Comptroller and Auditor General of India has a duty to examine expenditures even before they are deployed? 5. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India is constitutional functionary appointed Linder Article 148 of the Constitution. His main role is to audit the income and expenditure of the Governments, Government bodies and state-run corporations. The extent of his duties is listed out in the Comptroller and Auditor General's (Duties, Powers etc. ) Act, 1971. The functioning of the Government is controlled by the Constitution, the laws of the land, the legislature and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. CAG examines the propriety, legality and validity of all expenses incurred by the Government.

The office of CAG exercises effective control over the government accounts and expenditure incurred on these schemes only after implementation of the same. As result, the duty of the CAG will arise only after the expenditure has incurred. [Para 72] [747-H; 748-A-D] Issue No. 5 Whether the writ jurisdiction will lie against a political party? 6. The respondents never raised any objection relating to the jurisdiction in the High Court or even in the pleadings before this Court. It is only in the oral -< submissions that this issue has been raised. In the matters relating to pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction, the objection as to jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. But, this case relates to the jurisdiction over the subject matter. This is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. As such, th~ question of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised even in the appeal stage.

However, as this petition is fit for dismissal de hors the jurisdiction issue, the ~ jurisdiction issue is left open. [Paras 74, 75) [748-E, G-H; 749-A-B] 7. Summary: (i) After examining and considering the parameters laid in Section 123 of RP Act, it is clear that the -t promises in the election manifesto cannot be read into Section 123 for declaring it to be a corrupt practice. Thus, promises in the election manifesto do not constitute as a corrupt practice under the prevailing law. Prof. Ramchandra G. Kapse vs. Haribansh Ramakbal Singh (1996) 1 sec 206: 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 471 referred to. (ii) Further, it has been decided that the schemes challenged in this writ petition falls within the realm of fulfilling the Directive Principles of State Policy thereby falling within the scope of public purpose. (iii) The mandate of the Constitution provides various ';-checks and balances before a Scheme can be implemented.

Therefore, as long as the schemes come within the realm of public purpose and monies withdrawn for the implementation of schemes by passing suitable Appropriation Bill, the court has TAMIL NADU limited jurisdiction to interfere in such schemes. (iv) Judicial interference is permissible only when the action of the government is unconstitutional or contrary to a statutory provision and not when such action is not wise or that the extent of expenditure is not for the good of the State. (v) It is also asserted that the schemes challenged )'- under this petition are in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. (vi) As there is no legislative vacuum in the case on hand, the scope for application of Vishaka principle does not arise. (vii) The duty of the CAG will arise only after the expenditure has incurred. (viii) Since this petition is fit for dismissal dehors the jurisdiCtion issue, the issue of jurisdiction is left open. [Para 76] [749-C-H; 750-A-C] 8. Directions: 8. 1.

Although, the law is that the promises in the } election manifesto cannot be construed as 'corrupt practice' under Section 123 of RP Act, the reality cannot be ruled out that distribution of freebies of any kind, undoubtedly, influences all people. It shakes the root of free and fair elections to a large degree. The Election Commission through its counsel also conveyed the same ... ~ feeling both in the affidavit and in the argument that the promise of such freebies at government cost disturbs the level playing field and vitiates the electoral process and thereby expressed willingness to implement any directions or decision of this Court in this regard. [Para 77] [750-D-E] 8. 2. This Court has limited power to issue directions to the legislature to legislate on a particular issue.

However, the Election Commission, in order to ensure level playing field between the contesting parties and candidates in elections and also in order to see that the purity of the election process does not get viti<\ted, as in past been issuing instructions under the Model Code of Conduct. The fountainhead of the powers under which the commission issues these orders is Article 324 of the Constitution, which mandates the commission to hold free and fair elections. It is equally imperative to acknowledge that the Election Commission cannot issue such orders if the subject matter of the order of commission is covered by a legislative measure. [Para 78] [750-F-H; 751-A] 8. 3.

Considering that there is no enactment that directly governs the contents of the election manifesto, the Election Commission is hereby directed to frame guidelines for the same in consultation with all the recognized political parties as when it had acted while framing guidelines for general conduct of the candidates, meetings, processions, polling day, party in power etc. In the similar way, a separate head for guidelines for election manifesto released by a political party can also be included in the Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of Political Parties & Candidates. Generally political parties release their election manifesto before the announcement of election date, in that scenario, strictly speaking, the Election Commission will not have the authority to regulate any act which is done before the announcement of the date. Nevertheless, an exception can be made in this regard as the purpose of election manifesto is directly associated with the election process.

[Para 79] [751-8-D] 8. 4. The Election Commission is directed to take up TAMIL NADU )'- this task as early as possible owing to its utmost . ' importance. Also, there is the need for a separate legislation to be passed by the legislature in this regard for governing the political parties. [Para 80] [751-E] Case Law Reference: 37 Minn. 498 (USA) referred to Para 10 1925 AC 578 referred to Para 10 ~ 1982 (2) WLR 62 referred to Para 10 (1995) 1 All ER 611 referred to Para 10 2003 (~) Suppl. SCR 55 referred to Para 17 1961 SCR 77 referred to Para 18 (1'869) 19 LT 613 referred to Para 20 [1896] 2 Ch 279 . referred to Para 27 2010 (6) SCR 218 referred to Para 28 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 121 referred to Para 32 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 404 referred to Paras 34, 71 2011 (4) SCR 1057 referred to Para 34 2002 (3) SCR 696 referred to Para 35 2003 (2) SCR 1136 referred to Para 35 2009 (4) SCR 305 referred to Para 36 2008 (16 ) SCR 540 referred to Para 37 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 referred to Para 39 -I;.

, -"'. (1973) 4 sec 1461 referred to Para 41 1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 242 referred to Para 42 2001 (2) SCR 118 relied on Para 51 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 631 relied on Para 69 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 471 referred to Para 76 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5130 of 2013. From the Judgment & Order dated 25. 06. 2007 of the Court of Madras, Madurai Bench in W. P. No. 9013 of 2006. WITH T. C. No. 112 of 2011. ~ P. P. Malhotra, ASG, Arvind P. Datar, Shekhar Naphade, Abhay Kumar, Rupesh Kumar Pandey, Upendra Pratap Singh, Neetu Jain, Vineet Kumar Singh, Shubhangi Tuli, R. Rakesh Sharma, P. Krishnamoorthy, B. Balaji, Rachana Joshi lssar, D. K. Thakur, Sushma Suri, D. S. Mahra, Meenakshi Arora for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. SATHASIVAM, J. SLP CC) No. 21455 of 2008 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and i order dated 25. 06. 2007 passed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition lC) Nos.

9013 of 2006 and 1071 of 2007 whereby the High Court dismissed the petitions filed by the appellant herein. 3. Brief Facts: >-- "'. (a) The case relates to distribution of free gifts by the political parties (popularly known as 'freebies'). The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)- Respondent No. 8 herein, while releasing the election manifesto for the Assembly Elections 2006, announced a Scheme of free distribution of Colour 'H Television Sets (CTVs) to each and every household which did not possess the same, if the said party/its alliance were elected to power. The Party justified the decision of distribution of free CTVs for the purpose of providing recreation and general knowledge to the household women, more particularly, those living in the rural areas. In pursuance of the same, follow up actions by way of enlisting the households which did not have a CTV set and door to door identification and distribution of ,. application forms were initiated.

(b) This Scheme was challenged by one S. Subramaniam Balaji-the appellant herein, by way of filing writ petition before the High Court on the ground that the expenditure to be incurred by the State Government for its implementation out of the State Exchequer is unauthorized, impermissible and ultra vires the Constitutional mandates. The appellant herein filed a complaint dated 24. 04. 2006 to the Election Commission of India seeking initiation of action in respect of the said promise under Section 123 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (in short 'the RP Act'). The appellant herein also forwarded the complaint to the Chief Election Officer, Tamil Nadu. (c) The DMK and its political allies emerged victorious in the State Assembly Election held in the month of May, 2006. In pursuit of fulfilling the promise made in the election manifesto, } a policy decision was taken by the then government to provide one 14" CTV to all eligible families in the State.

It was further decided by the Government to implement the Scheme in phased manner and a provision of Rs. 750 crores was made in the budget for implementing the same. A Committee was constituted, headed by the then Chief Minister and eight other .. ~ legislative members of various political parties, in order to ensure transparency in the matter of implementation of the Scheme. (d) For implementing the first phase of the Scheme, the work of procurement of around 30,000 CTVs was entrusted to Electronic Corporation of Tamil Nadu Ltd. (ELCOT), a State owned Corporation. The first phase of the Scheme was implemented on 15/17th September, 2006 by distributing around 30,000 CTVs to the identified families in all the districts of the State of Tamil Nadu. (e) Being aggrieved by the implementation of the Scheme, the appellant herein filed another complaint to the Chief Secretary and the Revenue Secretary pointing out the unconstitutionality of the Scheme.

He also preferred Writ Petition being Nos. 9013 of 2006 and 1071 of 2007 before the ~ Madurai Bench of the High Court of Madras alleging the Scheme a corrupt practice to woo the gullible electorates with an eye on the vote bank. By order dated 25. 06. 2007, the High Court dismissed both the writ petitions filed by the appellant herein holding that the action of the Government in distributing free CTVs cannot be branded as a waste of exchequer. Being aggrieved, the appellant herein has preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this Court. Transferred Case (Cl No. 112 of 2011 (f) In the month of February 2011, pursuant to the elections to the Tamil Nadu State Assembly, the ruling party (DMK) announced its manifesto with a volley of free gifts. In the same manner, the.

opposite party-All India Anna Dravidn Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and its alliance also announced its election manifesto with free gifts to equalize the gifts offered by the DMK Party and promised to distribute free of cost the following items, viz. , grinders, mixies, electric fans, laptop computers, 4 gms gold thalis, Rs. 50,000/- cash for women's marriage, green houses, 20 kgs. rice to all ration card holders even to those above the poverty line and free cattle and sheep, >- if the said party/its alliance were elected to power during the Tamil Nadu Assembly Elections 2011. (g) The very same Scheme was also challenged by the appellant herein on the ground that such promises by the parties are unauthorized, impermissible and ultra vires the Constitutional mandates. The appellant herein also filed a complaint dated 29. 03. 2011 to the Election Commission of India seeking initiation of action in respect of the said Scheme under Section 123 of the RP Act.

(h) The AIADMK and its political allies won the State 8 Assembly Elections held in 2011. In order to fulfill the promise made in the election manifesto, a policy decision was taken by the then government to distribute the gifts and, pursuant to the same, tenders were floated by the Civil Supplies Department for mixies, grinders, fans etc. , as well as by ELCOT for lap top computers. (i) On 06. 06. 2011, the appellant herein filed another complaint to the Comptroller and Auditor General of India and the Accountant General of Tamil Nadu (Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 therein respectively) pointing out the unconstitutionality of tjle Scheme and transfer of consolidated funds of the State for the same. In the meanwhile, the appellant herein preferred a Writ Petition being No.

17122 of 2011 before the High Court of Madras alleging the Scheme a corrupt practice and to restrain the government from in any way proceeding with the procurement, placement of tenders or making free distributions under various Schemes introduced to woo the voters. In view of the pendency of SLP (C) No. 21455 of 2008 in this Court relating to the similar issue, the appellant preferred a Transfer Petition (C) No. 947 of 2011 before this Court praying for the transfer of the said writ petition. By order dated 16. 09. 2011, this Court allowed the said petition and the same has been numbered as T. C No. 112 of 2011 and tagged with the abovesaid appeal. 4. Heard Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned senior counsel for the appellant/petitioner, Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu, Mr. P. P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General for the Union of India and Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel for the Election Commission of India. 5.

Prayer/Relief Sought For: (a) When DMK started distribution of CTVs, the appellant/ petitioner herein approached the High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai, by way of filing Writ Petition (C) No. 9013 of 2006 with a prayer to issue a writ of mandamus to · 8 forbear the respondents therein from incurring any expenditure out of the public exchequer for the purchase and distribution of colour Televisions within the State of Tamil Nadu. (b) After 5 years, when AIADMK elected to power, pursuant to their election manifesto, they started distributing various freebies, which was also challenged by the very same person - the appellant/petitioner herein by filing a writ petition being No. 17122 of 2011 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying for issuance of a writ to declare the free distribution of (i) grinders (ii) mixies (iii) electric fans (iv) laptop computers (v) 4 gm. gold thalis (vi) free green houses (vii) free 20 kgs.

rice to all ration card holders even to those above the poverty line and (viii) free cattle and sheep ultra vires the provisions of Articles 14, 41, 162, 266(3) and 282 of the Constitution of India and Section 123(1) of the RP Act. Contentions by the Appellant: 6. Mr. Datar, learned senior counsel for the appellant i submitted that a "gift", "offer~ or "promise" by a candidate or his agent, to induce an elector to vote in his favour would amount to "bribery" under Section 123 of the RP Act. He further pointed out that to couch this offer/promise to give away a gift whose Wbrth is estimable in money and that too from the consolidated fund of the State under the head "promise of publication" or >- , "public policy" or "public good" is to defeat the purposes of the above Section viz. , Section 123(1) of the RP Act. While elaborating his submissions, Mr.

Datar raised his objections under the following heads: (I) Article 282 of the Constitution of India only permits defraying of funds from the Consolidated Fund of the State for "public purpose"; (II) The distributions made by the respondent-State is violative. of Article 14 since there is no reasonable classification; (Ill) Promises of free distribution of non-essential commodities in an election manifesto amounts to electoral bribe under Section 123 of the RP Act; (IV) The Comptroller and Auditor General of India has a duty to examine expenditures even before they are deployed; and (V) Safeguards must be built into schemes to ensure that the distribution is made for a public purpose and is not misused. (I) Article 282 of the Constitution of India only permits defraying of funds from the Consolidated Fund of the State for "public purpose". 7.

Regarding the first contention relating to Article 282 of the Constitution of India which only permits use of monies out of the Consolidated Fund of the State for public purpose, it is useful to refer the said Article which reads as under: "282. Expenditure defrayable by the Union or a State out of its revenue - The Union or a State may make any grants for any public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is not one with respect to which Parliament or the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, may make laws. " ' -_... _ 8. It is pointed out by Mr. Datar that under Article 266(3) of the Constitution, the monies out of the Consolidated Fund of India or the Consolidated Fund of the State can only be appropriated in accordance with law and for the purposes and in the manner provided by the Constitution. Under Article 162, the extent of the executive power of the State is limited to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has the power to make laws.

Likewise, under Article 282, the Union or the States may make grants for "any public purpose", even if such public purpose is not one with respect to which1he State s or the Union may make laws. By referring these Articles, Mr. Datar submitted that monies out of the Consolidated Fund of the State can only be appropriated for the execution of laws made by the State, or for any other "public purpose". 9. It is further pointed out that the State raises funds through taxation which can be used by the State only to discharge its constitutional functions. Taxpayers' contribution cannot be used to fund State largesse. While the taxpayer has no right to demand a quid pro quo benefit for the taxes paid, he has a right to expect that the taxes paid will not be gifted to other persons without general public benefit.

The main intention of an act done for a public purpose must be the public, and that the act would remotely, or in a collateral manner, benefit the local public is not relevant at all. 10. According to Mr. Datar, the most important constitutional mandate is that a "public purpose" cannot be the one that results in the creation of private assets. The exceptions that can be made to this overarching principle are the distributions that fulfill an essential need such as food, clothing, shelter, health or education. Even if certain distributions, such as the distribution of televisions might have some public benefit, it would not amount to public purpose since the dominant purpose of such a distribution is only the creation of private assets. Where the purposes of the expenditure are partly public and partly private, the Courts in the US have held that the entire act must fail. (vide Coates vs. Campbell and Others, 37 Minn. 498). 11.

While statutory authorities can confer social or economic benefits on particular sections of the community, their power is limited by the principle that such benefits must not be S. SUBRAMANIAM BA~JI v GOVERNMENT OF 689 ,.. excessive or unreasonable. As Lord Atkinson stated in Roberts vs. Hopwood & Ors. 1925 AC 578, the State cannot act in furtherance of "eccentric principles of socialistic philanthropy". In view of the above, a reference was also made to Bromley London Borough Council, London vs. Greater Council & Anr. 1982 (2) WLR 62 and R vs. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1995) 1 All ER 611. 12. In this context, it is pointed out that Article 41 of the Constitution of India states that the State, "within its economic >capacity and development" can make effective provision for r securing "public assistance" in certain special cases.

Article 39(b) states that the State shall endeavour to ensure that the "material resources" of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the "common good". Both these articles imply that the goal of the Constitution, as evidenced by these Directive Principles, is to ensure that the State distributes its resources to secure "public assistance" and "common good", and must not create private assets. 13. It is also pointed out that the Constitutions of 17 States of the US explicitly prohibit the making of private gifts by the Government, and it is recognized even elsewhere in the US that the public funds cannot be used to make gifts to private persons. 14. It is further stated that the spending on free distribution must be weighed against the public benefits that ensue from it and only if the public benefits outweigh the same, can the spending be classified as being for a public purpose. Mr.

Datar asserted that when the literacy rate in the State of Tamil Nadu is around 73% and there are 234 habitations across the State with no school access whatsoever, distribution of free consumer -~ goods to the people having ration cards cannot be justified as "public purpose". 15. In addition to CTVs by the previous Government, the following free distributions have been promised by the Government of Tamil Nadu in the Budget Speech for the year 690 SUPREME COURT REP9RTS [2013] 13 S. C. R. 2011-2012: "1. 60,000 green houses, at a cost of Rs. 1. 8 lakhs per house, totally amounting to Rs. 1080 crores. The green houses are being supplied to persons below the poverty line residing in rural areas. However, they are being supplied to persons who already own 300 sq. ft. of land. Comment by the appellant: ~ The State is creating private assets through this distribution, when it can, instead build houses owned by the State which can be occupied by eligible persons. 2.

4 gms of gold for poor girls for thali, plus Rs. 50000 cash for wedding purposes, totally amounting to Rs. 514 crores. Comment by the appellant: . The State can achieve the same end of subsidizing marriages by providing institutions such as mandaps and temples that can be used for marriage. There are no safeguards in any scheme proposed by the State to ensure that Rs. 50,000 given in cash to the eligible beneficiaries will be used for the marriage, and not diverted for other purposes. 3. Free mixies, grinders and fans for 25 lakh families, totally amounting to Rs. 1250 crores. Comment by the appellant: ).. _ _,... The reasons given by the State, of alleviating women of "domestic drudgery" are frivolous and do not amount to a "public purpose". Mixies, grinders and fans are luxuries and cannot be freely distributed by the Government. The distribution is being made to a large section of persons without even ascertaining whether the persons already own ,. ,.

these goods and whether they require state assistance to acquire these goods. 4. 9. 12 lakh laptops to all class XII students in Tamil Nadu amounting to Rs. 912 crores. Comment by the appellant: No "public purpose" is served by such distribution. The State is duty bourid to create computer labs in schools and }colleges and not distribute such expensive articles as gifts. Classification of students eligible for the laptops suffers " from overclassification, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The classification is also violative of Article 14 as it omitted certain categories of students. 5. Free cattle to poor families in certain rural areas, Rs. 56 crores. Distribution of milch cows is being done, according to the State's Government Order, to "boost the productivity of milk in the State.

" Comment by the appellant: It is stated that the State does run a diary, and the constitutionally valid method to boost milk production is to spend on these institutions and not to create private assets under these Government Orders. ' 6. Free ri. ce to 1. 83 crore families under the PDS system, amounting to Rs. 4500 crores. Comment by the appellant: Rice is already being distributed in the State at Rs. 2 per ~ kilo. Under this scheme, rice is being distributed free of cost, as a pure populist measure. As per the State's own submissions, rice is priced at Rs. 2 under the Anthyodaya Anna Yojana, which is being followed throughout the country. 16. Mr. Datar, learned senior counsel for the appellant pointed out that the Constitution of India does not permit free distribution of goods such as colour televisions, mixies, grinders, laptops since these are consumer goods and only benefit the persons to whom they are distributed and not the public at large.

Public spending on these goods to the tune of 8 Rs. 9000 crores far outweighs any public benefit that might arise from such distributions. When the same ends can be efficiently -achieved without the creation of private assets, such as the creation of Community Computer Centers instead of distributing laptops, or setting up of Community Televisions at the Panchayat level resorting to make large scale free distribution, it clearly violate Articles 162, 266(3) and 282 of the Constitution. It is further pointed out that the fact that CTVs and other schemes of previous Government were cancelled by the present Government shows that these were not for "public purpose" but only to serve the political objectives of a particular party. II. The distributions made by the respondent fall foul of Article 14 since there is no reasonable classification 17.

The right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution requires that the State must make a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia, and such classification must have a nexus with the object of the law. In making free distributions, the State, therefore, must show that it has identified the class of persons to whom such distributions are sought to be made using intelligible differentia, and that such differentia has a rational nexus with the object of the distribution. As held in Union of India & Anr. vs. International Trading Co. & Anr. 2003 (5) sec 437, Article 14 applies to matters of government policy and such policy or action would be unconstitutional if it fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness. )- 18. This Court, in K. T. Moopil Nair vs. State of Kera/a AIR 1961 SC 552, held that a statute can offend Article 14 if it groups together persons who are dissimilar. In that case, a flat tax of Rs.

2 per acre was levied on land without ascertaining the income earning potential of such land, which was struck down as unconstitutional. 19. In the case on hand, the colour televisions, mixies and grinders were being distributed to all persons having ration card. While the distribution of these goods is supposedly being made to help people who cannot afford these items, the State has not made any attempt to find out if such persons already >-own a colour television, a mixie or a grinder. Further, the differentia of a ration card has no rational nexus with the object of free distribution of the items since a ration card does not indicate the income of the family or whether they already own these goods. 20. Similarly, in another Scheme, the State has promised to distribute free laptops to all the students studying in the State Board. Again, this classification is arbitrary since there are numerous similarly placed students in Central Board schools who were being excluded by this Scheme.

The Scheme also excludes commerce, law and medical college students and violates Article 14 by not providing intelligible differentia having a nexus with such distribution. Ill. Promises of free distribution of non-essential -r commodities in election manifesto amounts to an electoral bribe under Section 123 of the RP Act. 21. Under Section 123(1 )(A) of the RP Act, any "gift, offer or promise" by a candidate or his agent or by any other person, with the object of inducing a person to vote at an election amounts to "bribery", which is a "corrupt practice" under the - "'"" said section. The key element in this section is that the voter must be influenced to vote in a particular manner. It has been held in Richardson-Garnder vs. Ekykn, (1869) 19 LT 613 that the making of charitable gifts on an extensive scale would lead to an inference that this was made to influenCti. voters. H-· 694 SUPREME CO~RT REPORTS [2013] 13 S. C. R. ' 22. Mr.

Datar pointed out that the plea that promises in the · manifesto do not amount to bribery is completely baseless and finds no support in the plain words of the statute or in decided case laws. The statute very clearly includes a "promise" within its ambit, and an unconstitutional promise clearly falls foul of the language of Section 123 of the RP Act. Such 'freebies' are in form part of an election manifesto but in substance is a bribe or inducement under section 123. If such practices are permitted, then the manifesto does indirectly what a candidate· cannot do directly. ~ 23. It is further pointed ·out that the promise of distribution was made at the time of. elections and not after, and instead o_f focusing ori basic necessities, it was on free distributions which indicates that the promise of free colour televisions, grinders, mixies, laptops, gold etc. , was only made as an electoral bribe to induce voters. 24. Mr.

Datar further pointed out that the intent of Section 123 of the RP ACt is to ensure that no candidate violates the level playing field between the candidates. Therefore, whether such promises are made by the political party or by the candidate himself is irrelevant. The manifesto, where such illegal promises are made, implore the voters to vote for that particular party. i- IV. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India has a duty to examine expenditures even before they are deployed. ' 25. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India is a constitutional functionary appointed under Article 148 of the Constitution. His main role is to audit the income and expenditure of the Government, Government bodies and staterun corporations. The extent of his duties is listed out in the . Comptroller and Auditor General's (Duties, Powers etc. ) Act, 1971.

Section 13 of this Act states that the CAG shall audit all the expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India, and of )' each State, and ascertain whether the moneys so spent were "legally available for and applicable to the seNice of purpose .. to which they have been applied or charged. " 26. Section 15 of the Act states that where grants _and, loans have been given for any specific purpose to any authority s· or body other than a foreign state or an international organization, the CAG has the duty to scrutinize the procedure by which the loan or grant has been made. 27. The language of the provision suggests that the role of CAG is limited to review. However, this would rob the CAG of the power to ensure that large-scale unauthorized spending of public funds, such as these free distributions, does not take place. The Section must be given purposive interpretation that would f1..

1rther its intent to ensure that the government's spending is only on purposes that are legally allowable. The Chancery Division has held in Kingston Cotton Mills Co. Re [1896] 2 Ch 279 that an auditor is a "watchdog". To perform his· role as a watchdog, the CAG must be vigilant, watch for any large-scale ·illegal expenditures, and act upon them immediately. V.. Safeguards must be built into schemes t. o ensure that the distribution is made for a public purpose, and is not misused. ~~ 28. The Member5 of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS) was challenged before this Court in Bhim Singh vs. Union of India and Ors. , (2010) 5 SCC 538 wherein the Constitution Bench of this Court upheld the scheme . on the grounds that there were three levels of safeguards built into the scheme to ensure that the funds given to the Members of . '""" Parliament would not be misused.

This Court held as under: "8) The court can strike down a law or scheme only on the basis of its vires or unconstitutionality but not on the basis . of its viability. When a regime of accountability is availabfe H· ' --( within the Scheme, it is not proper for the Court to strike it down, unless it violates any constitutional principle. "' 9) In the present Scheme, an accountability regime has been provided. Efforts must be made to make the regime more robust, but in its current form, cannot be struck down as unconstitutional. " 29. The MPLAD Scheme clearly had prohibitions against spending on the creation of private assets and to make loans. ~ It is pointed out that there is no scheme of accountability in the above mentioned promises for free distributions, hence, learned senior counsel prayed for necessary guidelines for proper utilization of public funds. Contentions by the Respondents: Contentions of the State of Tamil Nadu: 30. On the other hand, Mr.

Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu while disputing the above claim submitted that the freebies, as promised in the election manifesto, would not come under the head "corrupt practices" and "electoral offences" in terms of the RP Act. He further submitted that in view of the mandates in the Directives Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution, it is iincumbent on the State Government to promote the welfare of the people, who are below the poverty line or unable to come up without their support. In any event, according to learned senior counsel, for every promise formulated in the form of election manifesto, after coming to power, the same were being implemented by framing various schemes/guidelines/eligibility criteria etc. as well as with the approval of legislature. Thus, it >- cannot be construed as a waste of public money or prohibited by any Statute or Scheme. 31. While elaborating his submissions, Mr.

Shekhar Naphade replied for the contentions made by the appellant under the following heads: ~ (I) Political Parties are not State, therefore, not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or ' writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution ·of India or any other provisions of the Constitution. For corrupt practices, tne remedy is Election Petition. (II) Non-application of Vishaka principle and the difficulties in implementing the directions, if any, that may be issued ~ by this Court. --·-~. ·!... -- (Ill) Promises of political parties do not constitute a corrupt practice. (IV) The Schemes under challenge operate within the parameters of public purpose and Article 14 of the Constitution has no role to play.

(I) Political Parties are not State, therefore, not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or the writ jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India or any other provisions of the Constitution. For corrupt practices, the remedy is an Election Petition. 32. Learned senior counsel submitted that a political party is not a statutory Corporation. Similarly, a political party is also not a Government. It is also not an instrumentality or agency of the State. None of the parameters laid down by several judgments of this court for identifying an agency or instrumentality of the State apply to a political party and, therefore, no political party can be considered as a State or any agency or instrumentality of the State, hence, no writ can lie against a political party. [vide Federal Bank Ltd. vs. Sagar Thomas and Others, (2003) 10 SCC 733. ~. ! --- I 33. Further, learned senior counsel put forth that it ~ the .

claim of the appellant that the promises like giving colour TVs, mixer-grinders, laptops etc. constitute a corrupt practice and, therefore, must vitiate an election. If the promise of the above nature is a corrupt practice, then the only remedy for the appellanf is to file an Election Petition under Section 80, BOA s read with other provisions of the RP Act. Under Section 81, such an Election Petition must be filed within 45 days from the date of the election.. In the petition, the appellant must set out clearly and specifically the· corrupt practice that he complains -i. of and also set out as to how. ,the returned candidate or his agent has committed the same or has connived at the same. An election Petition is to be. tried on evidence and therefore, the writ petition is not a remedy. (II) Non-application of Vishaka principle and the difficulties in implementing the directions; if any, that may be issued by this Court. 34.

It was submitted that Entry 72 of List-I of the Vllth Schedule to the Constilution of India deals with election to Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies. In exercise of this power, the Parliament has enacted the RP Act. The Act, as originally enacted, did not contain any provision relating to corrupt practice as contained in Section 123. Se9tion 123 . defines and enumerates "corrupt practices" exhaustively. Section 123 came as a result of recommendations of the Select Committee of the Parliament on the basis of whiGh the . said Act was amended by substituting Chapter 1 in Part Vil of the Act by Act No. 27 of 1956. The Legislature has dealt with the subject of corrupt practice and it is not a case of legislative vacuum. The field of corrupt practice Is covered by the provisions of the said Act. Once the Legislature has dealt with ~a particular topic, then the Vishakha principle (Vishaka and Others vs State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241) has no applicability.

This Court, in Vishaka (supra) and Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug vs. Union of India and Others, (2011) 4 sec 454 and other cases has dearly held that if on --( are possible then the benefit of doubt. should go to the elected candidate vide Manmohan Kalia v. Yash, vide sec p. 502, para 7 in which it is stated: ·- "7.... It is now well settled by several authorities of this Court that an allegation of corrupt practice must be proved as strictly as a criminal charge and the principle of preponderance of probabilities would not apply to corrupt practices envisaged by the Act because if this test is not applied a very serious --4. ,. prejudice would be caused to the elected candidate who may be disqualified for a period of six years from fighting any election, which will adversely affect the electoral process. " 15. In Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, vide SCC p. 104, para 23 it was observed: -. \ "23. ...

It is thus clear beyond any doubt that for over 20 years the position has been uniformly accepted that charges of corrupt practice are to be equated with criminal charges and proof thereof would be not preponderance of probabilities as in civil action but proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal trials. " 37. In Baldev Singh Mann vs. Surjit Singh Dhiman, ~- (2009) 1 SCC 633, this Court observed as under: "19.......... The law is now well settled that the charge of 1c a corrupt practice in an election petition should be proved almost like the criminal charge. The standard of proof is high and the burden of. proof is on the election petitioner. Mere preponderance. of probabilities is not enough, as may ,L ... be the case in a civil dispute. Allegations of corrupt practices should be clear and precise and the charge should be proved to the hilt as in a criminal trial by clear, cogent and credible evidence. 21.

The Court in a number of cases has held that the charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal in character and it has to be proved as a criminal charge and proved in the court. In Jeet Mohinder Singh case the Court observed as under: "(ii) Charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal in character. If substantiated it leads not only to the setting aside of the election of the successful candidate, but also of his being disqualified to contest an election for a certain period. It may entail extinction of a person's public life and political career. A trial of an election petition though within the realm of civil law is akin to trial on a criminal charge. Two consequences follow. Firstly, the allegations relating to commission of a corrupt practice should be sufficiently clear and stated precisely so as to afford the person charged a full opportunity of meeting the same. Secondly, the charges when put to· issue should be proved by clear, ).. cogent and credible evidence.

To prove charge of corrupt practice a mere preponderance of probabilities would not be enough. There would be a presumption of innocence available to the person charged. The charge shall have to be proved to the hilt, the standard of proof being the same as in a criminal trial. " 38. It is further submitted that the manifesto of the political ... >- party in question promises to achieve a social order removing economic inequalities, attain a social plane and attempts to reduce the degradations existing in our society where only a certain class of people are elevated and entitled to economic upliftment. The mandate for social and economic transformation requires that material resources or their ownership and control be so distributed as to subserve the common good. ~ 39. In Samatha vs. State of A. P. and Others, (1997) 8 sec 191, in paras 76 and 79, it has been held as under: "76.

Social and economic democracy is the foundation on which political democracy would be a way of life in the Indian polity. Law as a social engineering is to create just social order removing inequalities in social and economic life, socio-economic disabilities with which poor people are languishing by providing positive opportunities and facilities to individuals and groups of people. Dr B. R. Ambedkar, in his closing speech in the. Constituent Assembly on 25-11-1949, had lucidly elucidated thus: ".. :What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. These principles ofliberty, equality and fraternity are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form a 1. mion of trinity in the sense that to divorce one ·from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Liberty cannot be divorced from equality, equality cannot ·o be divorced from liberty.

Nor can liberty and equality be divorced from fraternity. Without equality, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many. Equality without Hberty would kill individual initiative. Without fraternity; liberty and equality could not become. a natural course of things. It Would require a constable to enforce· them. We must begin by acknowledging the fact that there . is complete absence of two things in Indian society. One of these is equality. On the social plane, we have in India . ·~·~ .. a society based on the principle of graded inequality which means elevation forsome and degradation for others. On the econom~ plane~ we have a society in which there are . some who have immensewealth as against many who live in abject poverty. On the 26th January, 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we wiU have· equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality.

In politics we will be recognizing the princfple of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, coritinue to deny the principle of one S. SL! BRAMANIAM BALAJI v GOVERNMENT OF 703 TAMIL NAOU [P. SATHASIVAM, J. }. ·· )man one value. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradir:tions? How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this Assembly has so laboriously built up. " '· ·~ (Vide B. Shiva Rae's The Framing of /ncJia's Constitution: Select DOcuments, Vol. IV, pp. 944-45. ) 79. ltis necessary to consider at this juncture the meaning of the word "socialism" envisaged in the Preamble ofthe . Con.

stitution. Establishment of the egalitarian social order through rule of law is the basic structure of the Constitution. · The Fundamental Rights and the Directive· Principles are the means, as two wheels of the chariot, to achieve the above object of democratic socialism. The word "socialist" used in the Preamble must be read from the goals Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 38, 39, 46 and all other cognate articles seek to establish, i. e. , to reduce inequalities in inco~e and status and to provide equality of opportunity and facilities. Social justice enjoins the Court to uphold the· Government's endeavour to remove economic .. ~ inequalities, to provide decent standard of living to the poor. and to protect the interests of the weaker sections of the society so as to assimilate all the sections of the society in a secular integrated socialist Bharat with dignity of person and equality of status to all. " 40. In Bhim Singh (su.

pra), a Constitution Bench of this Court observed ·as under: · """' "58. The above analysis shows that Article 282 can be the source of power for emergent transfer of funds, like the MPLAD Scheme. Even otherwise, the MPLAD Scheme is voted upon and sanctioned by Parliament every year as a scheme for community development. We have already held that the scheme of the Constitution of India is that the power of the Union or State Legislature is not limited to the legislative powers to incur expenditure only in respect of powers conferred upon it under the Seventh Schedule, but it can incur expenditure on any purpose not included within its legislative powers. However, the said purpose must be "public purpose". Judicial interference is -'-,. permissible when the action of the Government is unconstitutional and not when such action is not wise or that the extent of expenditure is not for the good of the State.

We are of the view that all such questions must be debated and decided in the legislature and not in court. 95. This argument is liable to be rejected as it is not based on any scientific analysis or empirical data. We also find · this argument a half-hearted attempt to contest the constitutionality of the Scheme. MPLADS makes funds available to the sitting MPs for developmental work. If the MP utilises the funds properly, it would result in his better performance. If that leads to people voting for the incumbent candidate, it certainly does not violate any principle of free and fair elections. 96. As we have already noted, MPs are permitted to recommend specific kinds of works for the welfare of the ~people i. e. which relate to development and building of durable community assets (as provided by Clause 1. 3 of the Guidelines). These works are to be conducted after approval of relevant authorities.

In such circumstances, it cannot be claimed that these works amount to an unfair advantage or corrupt practices within the meaning of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Of course such spending is subject to the above Act and the regulations of the Election Commission. " ·H )-- (IV) The Schemes under challenge operate within the parameters of public purpose and Article 14 of the Constitution has no role to play. 41. The argument of the appellant that giving of colour TVs, laptops, mixer-grinders etc. on the basis of the manifesto of the party that forms the Government is not an expense for a public purpose. This argument is devoid of any merit according to learned senior counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu. It was -~ submitted that the concept of State Largesse is essentially linked to Directive Principles of State Policy.

Whether the State should frame a scheme, which directly gives benefits to improve the living standards or indirectly by increasing the means of livelihood, is for the State to decide. The preamble to the Constitution recognizes Socialism as one of the pillars of Indian Democracy. The preamble has been held to be a part of the Constitution by a catena of judgments including >- Keshavanand Bharati vs. State of Kera/a (1973) 4 SCC 1461. The State largesse is directly linked to the principle of Socialism and, therefore, it is too late in the day for anybody to contend that the Government giving colour TVs, laptops, mixer-grinders,· etc. that too to the eligible persons as prescribed by way of Government Order is not a public purpose. For the same reasons, it must be held that it is a part of Government function to take measures in connection with '> ~ Government largesse. 42.

It is further submitted that the political parties in their election manifesto promised to raise the standard of living of the people and to formulate a scheme/policy for the upliftment of the poor. The distribution of basic necessities in today's time - --\. , like TVs, mixers, fans and laptops to eligible persons fixing parameters, can by no stretch of imagination be said to be State largesse. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Deepak Theatre, Dhuri vs. State of Punjab and Others, 1992 Supp (1) sec 684, held as under: --( , "5. Witnessing a motion picture has become an amusement to every person; a reliever to the weary and . fatigued; a reveller to the pleasure seeker; an ·imparter of education and enlightenment enlivening to news and current events; disseminator of scientific knowledge; perpetuator of cultural and spiritual heritage, to the teeming illiterate majority of population.

Thus, cinemas have become tools to promote welfare of the people to secure and protect as effectively as it may a social order as per ~directives of the State policy enjoined under Article 38 of the Constitution. Mass media, through motion picture has thus become the vehicle of coverage to disseminate cultural heritage, knowledge, etc. The passage of time made manifest this growing imperative and the consequential need to provide easy access to all sections of the society to seek admission into theatre as per his .. paying capacity. " ~ 43. The grievance of the appellant is that the public resources are being used for the benefit of individuals. According to learned senior counsel for the respondent, this a·rgument is completely misconceived. It was submitted th. at in catena of cases, this Court has held that while judging the constitutional validity of any law or any State action, the Directive Pr~nciples of the State -Policy can be taken into ~; account.

Article 38 contemplates that the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people. Article 39 contemplates that the State shall take actions to provide adequate means of livelihood and for distribution of material resources of the communjty on an egalitarian principle. Article 41 contemplates that the State shall rencar assistance to citizens in certain )... circumstances and also in cases of undeserved want. Article 43 directs that the State shall "endeavour to secure to all workers, by suitable legislation or economic organisation or any other way to ensure decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities to the workers". Similarly, Article 45 contemplatesthatthe State shall endeavour ·H t to provide early childhood care and education to all children be. low the age of 6 years and Article 46 says that the State shall promote educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. Article 47 contemplates that the.

State shall take steps to raise the level of nutrition and the standard • { of living. The concept of livelihood and standard of living are bound to change in their content from time to time. This Court has dealt with the concept of minimum wage, the fair wage and the living wage while dealing with industrial disputes and has ) .. . noted that these concepts are bound to change from time to time. What was once considered to l:le a luxury can become a " necessity. The concept of livelihood is no longer confined to a bare physical survival in terms of food, clothing and shelter, but also now must necessarily include some provision for medicine, transport, education, recreation etc. How to implement the directive principles of State Policy is a matter within the domain .. . ).. of the Government, ~ence, the State distributing largesse in the form of distribution of colour TVs, laptops,· mixer-grinders etc.

to eligible and deserving persons is directly related to the directive principles of the State Policy. 44. The other facet of the argument is that this largesse is distributed irrespective of the income level and, therefore, violative of Article 14 as unequals are treated equally. Learned senior counsel submitted that this principle of not to treat > ~ unequals as equals has no applicability as far as State largesse • is concerned. This principle applies only where the law or the State· action imposes some burden on the citizen. either financial or otherwise. 45. Article 14 essentially contemplates equality in its absolute sense and classification can be taken recourse to if _.. I,,. the State is unable or the State policy does not contemplate the same benefit or treatment to people who are not similarly situated. It is the philosophical sense decoded by this Court in the first part of Article 14 which is equal treatment for all without any distinction.

This-is the concept of formal equality which is. ·708 SUPREME COURif REPORTS [2013) 13 S. C. R. not necessarily an antithesis to Article 14. The concept of equality based on classification is proportional equality. The formal equality applies when the State is in a position to frame a scheme or law which gives the same benefit to all without any distinction and the proportional equality applies when the State frames a law or a Scheme which gives benefit only to people · who form a distinct class. It is in the case of proportional equality that the principles of intelligible differentia having reasonable nexus to the object of legislation gets attracted. Article 14 does not prohibit formal equality. The Directive Principles of State Policy save proportional equality from falling in foul with formal equality contemplated by Article 14. Contentions of the Union of India, CAG and Election Commission: 46. Mr. P. P.

Malhotra, learned ASG also reiterated the stand taken by learned senior counsel for the State. It is the stand of the CAG that they have no role. at this juncture, particularly, with reference to the prayer sought for. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel for the Election Commission of India submitted that with the existing provisions in the RP Act, Election Commission is performing its duties, however, if this Court frames any further guidelines, they are ready to implement the same. 47. We have carefully considered the rival contentions, perused the relevant provisions, various Government orders, guidelines and details furnished in the counter affidavit. Theo following points arise for consideration: Points for Consideration: (i) Whether the promises made by the political parties in the election manifesto would amount to 'corrupt practices' as per Section 123 of the RP Act?

(ii) Whether the schemes under challenge are within the ')-ambit of public purpose and if yes, is it violative of Article 14? (iii) Whether this Court has inherent power to issue guidelines by application of Vishaka principle? (iv) Whether the Comptroller and Auditor General of India has a duty to examine expenditures even before they are deployed? _). _ (v) Whether the writ jurisdiction will lie against a political party? .. ,. ' Discussion: Issue No. 1 Whether the promises made by the political parties in their election manifestos would amount to 'corrupt >practices' as per Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951? --! 48. Before going into the acceptability or merits of the claim of the appellant and the stand of the respondents, it is desirable to reproduce certain provisions of the RP Act. Part VII of the RP Act deals with "corrupt practices" and "electoral offences" which was brought into force with effect from I>'~ 28. 08. 1956.

Chapter I of Part VII deals with "corrupt practices". Section 123 is the only Section relevant for our purpose which reads thus:- . , "123. Corrupt practices. -. The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act: = ~ (1) "Bribery'', that is to say- ' (A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsoever, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing- (a) a person to stand or not to stand as, or [to withdraw or not to withdraw] from being a candidate at an election, or (b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to- (i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for [having withdrawn or not having withdrawn] his candidature; or (ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting; ..

1, _ (B) the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any "';--gratification, whether as a motive or a reward- (a) by a person for standing or not standing as, or for [withdrawing or not withdrawing] from being, a candidate; or (b) by any person whomsoever for himself or any other person for voting or refraining from voting, or inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any candidate [to withdraw or not to withdraw] his candidature. Explanation. - For the purposes of this clause the term" gratification" is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or gratifications estimable in money and it includes all forms 1 _, of entertainment and all forms of employment for reward but it does not include the payment of any expenses bona fide incurred at, or for the purpose of, any elec- tion and duly entered in the account of election expenses referred to in Section 78. .

>- (2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the. candidate or his agent, or of any other person [with the consent of the candidate or his election agent], with the free exercise of any electoral right: Provided that- ~ (a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of 4 this clause any such person as is referred to therein Who- (i) threatens any candidate or any elector, or any person in whom a candidate or an elector is interested, with injury of any kind including social ostracism and excommunication or expulsion from any caste or community; or _).

(ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or elector within the ,, ' meaning of this clause; >- (b) a declaration of public policy, or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this clause. (3) The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground .

,, t of his religion, race, caste, community or language or the use of, or appeal to religious symbols or the use of, or appeal to, national symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem, for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate: ..... - Provided that no symbol allotted under this Act to a candidate shall be deemed to be a religious symbol or a national symbol for the purposes of this clause. (3A) The promotion of, or attempt to promote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or language, by a candidate or his agent or any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate.

(38) The propagation of the practice or the commission of sati or its glorification by a candidate or his agent or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his ~election agent for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate. Explanation. - For the purposes of this clause," sati" and" glorification" in relation to sati shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 . (4) The publication by a candidate or his agent or by any other Person, [with the consent of a candidate or his election agent], of any statement of fact which is false, and which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate, or in relation to the candidature, or withdrawal [of any candidate, being a statement 1 ...

reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate' s election. (5) The hiring or procuring, whether on payment or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent], [or the use of such vehicles or vessel for the free conveyance] of any elector (other than the candidate himself, the members of his family or his agent) to or from any polling station provided under Section 25 or a place fixed under sub- section (1) of ,. Section 29 for the poll: .. Provided that the hiring of a vehicle or vessel by an elector or by several electors at their joint costs for the purpose of conveying him or them to and from any such polling station or place fixed for the poll shall not be deemed to be a corrupt practice under this clause if the vehicle or vessel so hired is a vehicle or vessel not propelled by mechanical power: ~)..

Provided further that the use of any public transport vehicle or vessel or any tramcar or railway carriage by any elector -at his own cost for the purpose of going to or coming from any such polling station or place fixed for the poll shall not be deemed to be a corrupt, practice under this clause. Explanation. - In this clause, the expression" vehicle" means any vehicle used or capable of being used for the purpose of road transport, whether propelled by mechanical power or otherwise and whether used for drawing other vehicles or otherwise. (6) The incurring or authorizing of expenditure in contravention of Section 77. (7) The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to .. ~ obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any other person [with the consent of a candidate or his election agent], any assistance (other than the giving of vote) for the furtherance of the