S.A. KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.
Citation: [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 749; 1992 INSC 358
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN , K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY
Judgment date:
Case summary
1992 INSC 358. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1992-12-18. S.A. KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
S. A. KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. DECEMBER 18, 1992 [S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN AND K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ. ] Civil Service: All India Services (Discipline and Appeals) Rules, 1969- Rules 3, 4 and 16--Suspension order-- n 22. 7. 1991 and that, therefore, the order of this Court made in the Civil Appeal was neither nullified nor any attempt has been made to stultify the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordmg to the State, the suspension order was D passed so that free and fair investigations could be carried on in the cases registered against the petitioner in FIR Nos. 147/89 and 492/89. The suspension order has no connection with the Contempt Petition filed before this Court against Ch. Bhajan Lal.
It is further stated that the suspension order is neither violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitu- tion nor not opposed to any valid law or rules; that the investigation in the E main corruption case was completed even before the suspension of the petitioner; that the petitioner as D. I. G. (CID) from 23. 7. 1990 to. 2. 4. 1991 was not the investigating officer of the case and that the said order of suspension was not passed with · a view to buy over the complainant (Dharam Pal), Ch. Bhajan Lal was elected as Chief Minister on 23. 6. 1991 only after the completion of the investigation on 18. 6. 1991 during the President's Rule.
The first respondent has enumerated the following in- stances in which the petitioner has been involved: (1) During the elections to the Bhiwani Parliamentary Constituency held in November 1989 and again during the elections to the Darba Kalan Assembly Constituency, the petitioner was restrained from visiting both the constituen- cies under the directions of the Elections Commissioner, as the Commissioner had reasons to believe that this Police Officer would interfere in free and fair elections. vide letter F G H 756 A B c D SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l992) SUPP. 3 S. C. R. No. 90/3AE-5418 dated 12th July, 1990 written by the Chief Electoral Officer, to Director General of Police, Haryana. (2) The Ministry of Home Affairs had recently sought the consent of the State Government under Section 6 of the Delhi Police Special Establishment Act, 1946 to conduct a detailed inquiry to unearth the benami nature of two com- mercial ventures allegedly owned by the petitioner.
(3) In March 1990, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Shri S. A. Khan under Rule 8 of the Rules for certain acts of omission and commissioin during the gene;-al elec- tions to the 9th Lok Sabha. (4) Ari inquiry under Rule 8 of the Rules is directed to inquire into the alleged drawal of false TNDA. (5) The ministry of Home Affairs had brought to the notice of the first respondent in December, 1989 that the petitioner is liable to pay Rs. 68,900/- on account of excess telephone calls made by him. The petitioner has filed an affidavit in reply to the counter of the first E respondent (State) and of Ch. Bhajan Lal denying all the allegations levelled agianst him. According to him, the variolis allegations levelled by the fmt respondent are totally untenable and irrelevant. He states that Ch. Bhajan Lal and his Government are unjustily harassing him by passing the illegal order of suspension for the f~llowing reasons: F G 1.
The petitioner had furnished incontrovertible evidence to the Commission of Inquiry headed by Raja Jaswant Singh (ex-Judge of the Supreme Court) appointed by the then Prime Minister against Ch. Bhajan Lal to find out as to whether he could be continued as Chief Minister. 2. Ch. Bhajan Lal in order to c0ntinue as Chief Minister without facing the criminal prosecution for corruption has placed the petitioner under suspension by misusing his power. H 3. To paralyse the investigation of the corruption case - S. A. KHAN v. STATE OF HARYAt'\IA [PANDIAN, J. ) under the petitioner's supervision and to nullify the order of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5412/90 for escaping froni the criminal liability, he has rewarded the, complainant, Dharam Pal, by appointing him as the Chair- man of the Khadi Board as a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of the compalaint.
757 Shri Khan has refuted the allegations of his involvement in the two FIRs stating that he is neither an accused in the respective complaints nor is he involved in them in any other manner. He has further stated that even A B in the statements recorded !.! nder Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the witnesses in connection with those two FIRs, there is C no mention of his involvement in either of the criminal cases. Explaining the other allegations, the petitioner states that he has sent a detailed letter to the Chief Election Commissioner, Haryana thrn 1 1gh the Director General of Police in June, 1990 stating that he couk '1. 0t be stopped to perform his lawful duties in his jurisdiction in exercise of his D official work as the range Deputy Inspector General of Police.
The petitioner challenged his transfer on the basis of the letter written by the Chief Election Commissioner of India during November 1989 and June 1990 and the matter came up before this Court in SLP (C) No. 6996 of 1991. This Court while dismissing the SLP observed: E "We would like to make it clear that the allegations made therein will not be linked with the impugned transfer and they will further not be considered against the petitioner service career. " F He has denied the allegations of benami commercial ventures as well as the alleged false claim of 'f. A. and D. A. It is stated by the petitioner that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has directed the Union of India to make the payment of T. A. Bills in civil revision petition filed by him. Regarding the telephone bill, he states that he was not provided with STD facilities and that he has moved the District Forum under the Consumer G Protection Act against excessive billing by the Telephone Department.
Finally he states that he has sent a number of representations to the Home Secretary, Haryana; Director General of Police, Haryana; Home Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi on various dates followed by his reminders. Along with the reply affidavit the petitioner has annexed some H 758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S. C. R. A copies of statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as his correspondences with his higher ups and copies of the 'order of this Court in SLP (C) No. 6996/91 and the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana made in Civil Miscellaneous No. 8455-CII of 1991 in Civil Revision No. 2025/91. To the reply affidavit, a B c rejoinder affidavit is filed by respondents 1 and 2 sworn by the Under Secretary to the Government of Haryana on 7. 2. 1992.
In this rejoinder, it is stated that the two FIRs lodged against the petitioner have been referred to the Government of India for entrusting the investigation to the CBI; that in the meanwhile a special team under the supervision of Deputy Superin- tendent of Police, Headquarters Bhiwani has been constituted by the S. P. for further investigation of those two FIRs; that the Ministry of Home Affairs had sought consent of the State Government under Section 6 of the Delhi Police Establishment Act, 1946 to conduct a detailed inquiry to unearth the benami nature of the two commercial ventures; that there is an inquiry being conducted by the C. BJ. in this matter and the same is in D progress; that in spite of the alleged false T. A.
Bills by the petitioner, the petitioner has been chargesheeted under rule 8 of the Rules by the Govern- ment 'of India and that with r~gard to the non-payment of telephone bills - the Government of India has brought to the notice of the State Government in December 1989 that the petitioner is not ready i:o pay Rs. 68,900, which E F amount he has not deposited so far and that the statements of Sarvashri Azad Singh, Bir Singh, Dharma Chand, Balwan Singh and Om Prakash which are. annexed to the reply affidavit are not on the police files and that in fact the statements were not recorded under Section 164 Cr. P. C. through the investigating officer, who is entrusted with the investigation of the case. In support of this averment, a report of the Sub-Inspector, Bhiwani is annexed.
A close scrutiny of the serious averments made in the Writ Petition, the affidavits of counter, reply and rejoinder as well as in the documents annexed thereto irrefragably and demonstratively shows that for a consid- erable length of time, in fact over a decade, there was bad blood between G Ch. Bhajan Lal and the writ petitioner, which, it appears, has been gaining momentum day by day and has ultimately culminated in these proceedings indusive of the filing of the Writ Petition. The writ petitioner has given various instances in Annexure 'B' to this Writ Petition which according to him, have provoked Ch. Bhajan Lal to entertain a feeling of vengeance H against the wTit petitioner. Those are: S. A. KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA [PANDIAN, J. ] (1) While the writ petitioner was Assistant Inspector General of Police, Haryana, he was deputed to arrest Shri Bhindrawala at Chandokalan.
But, as the news of his "im- pending arrest" ·was disclosed to Shri Bhindranwala, he with the assistance of the official machinery escaped the arrest. In spite of this incident, a one man commission of inquiry headed by Justice Gurnam Singh was appointed to inquire into the allegations involving the petitioner and his staff at Chandigarh. The petitioner was constrained to fde a Writ Petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging the appointment of the one man com- mission which was not liked by Ch. Bhajan Lal. A silimar Writ Peition was also filed by a member of the police force before the Supreme Court which is still pending. The Enquiry Commission was stayed and has remained stayed since then. (2) Ch. Bhajan Lal secured the transfer of the petitioner outside the State of Haryana and assigned no duty for a long time in order to punish him for approaching the High Court.
(3) As a result of a wide public reaction against the then corruptive practices prevailing in the administration of the Government of Haryana and the serious allegations levelled against the then Chief Minister, namely, Ch. Bhajan Lal in that connection, the Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi appointed an Enquiry Commission, headed by a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, Justice Jaswant Singh to hold an inquiry into the allegations against Cb. Bhajan Lal. Before the Enquiry Commission, the petitioner placed materials relating to incontrovertible proof of cor- ruption of Ch. Bhajan Lal. On account of this Ch. Bhajan Lal became inimical towards the petitioner. ( 4) A series of criminal cases numbering to 21 listed in the Writ Petition were registered against the partners, close associates and relations of Ch. Bhajan Lal in Hissar range even before the petitioner was transferred to Hissar range 759 A B D E F G H A B c D E 760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S. C. R. as D. I. G.
(5) When Ch. Devi Lal became the Chief Minister of Haryana, the FIR No. 372/87 was lodged with the allega- tions of corruption of high magnitude against Ch. Bhajan Lal which led to the Civil Appeal No. 5412/90, which was disposed of by this Court on 21. 11. 1990. In that case, the petitioner was assisting and instructing the Advocate General appearing for the State of Haryana before the Supreme Court. Hence Ch. Bhajan Lal apprehending that his political career was in jeopardy by that judicial proceed- ing has misused his power malicfously and suspended the petitioner w. e. f. 5th July 1991 after he assumed. the office , of the. Chief Minister of Haryana State. (Vide paragraph 13 (A to F) of the aforementioned An- nexure 'B'. ) In fact the petitioner himself has stated in one of his letters dated 13. 8.
1991 enclosed with the Writ Petition addressed to the Director General of Police, Haryana admitting his strained relationship as follows: "I have strained relations with the present Chief Minister as Shii J. P. Atray in September, 1981 for reasons best. known to him had misrepresented certain facts in Chan- dokalan/Gurnam Singh Commission episode. " Further in yet another letter dated 13. 8. 1991 addressed to the Direc- F tor General of Police, Haryana he has mentioned some unpalatable, un- savoury and vitriolic remarks couched in unrestrained language, allegedly on the strength of a confidential police report which reads: G H "The confidential record of P. S. Adampur and District Crime Record Hissar, clearly shows that Shii Bhajan Lal started his carrer as a petty Food grain smuggler. In the village Crime book there is mentioned of his Anti Social activities.
He is notorious for his corruption and now he is making every effort to stop this process of law to avoid the Supreme Court direction to inves,tigate ........................... Pressure is being put on the Judiciary to approve this S. A. KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA [PANDIAN, J. ] 761 cancellation report within 3 weeks. " A We have given the above facts, extracting the same from various documents annexed to the Writ Petition for demonstrating the high mag- nitude of their hostile relationship existing well-nigh for a decade, that is from 1981 onwards. It appears that the petitioner is having a long-standing . deep rooted hostility and strained relationship with Ch. Bhajan Lal which B is reflected from the averments made in the letter written by him to the Director General of Police notwithstanding the fact that Ch. Bhajan Lal is the Chief Minister of the State whereas the petitioner is bureaucrat.
It is manifestly clear that the petitioner in utter desperation has made such an unpalatable remark evidently crossing his bounds. Needless to emphasise, C a bureaucrat working under the Government . is not expected to disclose any confidential report that comes to his knowledge in his official capacity to satisfy his personal grievance. The petitioner is holding a high position in the Governmental machinery that too in the disciplinary police force though now under suspension. We do not like to elaborate this aspect of D the matter any further except expressing our strong disapproval. In the above back-drop, we may now turn to the submissions made by Mr. R. K. Garg for setting aside the order of suspension. The order of suspension under challenge which is annexed as 'An- E nexure-A' reads as follows: "HARYANA GOVERNMENT HOME DEPARTMENT ORDER Whereas the Governor of Haryana is satisfied that it is necessary to place Shri S. A.
Khan lPS (HAR-1970), DIG, under suspension so that free and fair investigations in cases FIR No. 147/89 u/s 307-IPC and FIR No. 492, u/s 302/34-IPC registered at police station, City Bhiwani could be conducted in public interest. Now, therefore, the Governor of Haryana hereby places Shri S. A. Khan, IPS, DIG, under suspension with Em. ediate effect. F G H A B c 762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S. C. R. During the period of suspension, Shri S. A. Khan, IPS will be paid subsistence allowance and other allowances as are admissible in terms of rule-4 of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeals) Rules, 1969. His headquarters during the period of suspension will be at Ambala. Tirlochan Singh Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Govt. Haryana, Home Department. No. 18/76/91-2HG-1 Dated Chandigarh the 5th July, 1991.
" A reading of the above order of suspension does not either expressly or impliedly or even remotely spell out that the petitioner was suspended for having been incharge of the investigation of t. he corruption case D registered in FIR No. 372/87 or for having taken active role in the proceed- ings of the said case. This suspension order has been confirmed by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under rule 3(1)(b) of the Rules. It cannot be disputed that the Rules provide a remedy to the officer concerned by preferring a statutory appeal under rule 16 of the Rules. E Mr. R. K. Garg states that Ch. Bhajan Lal after having been elected as Chief Minister . of Haryana State on 23. 6. 1991 on being actuated by malice has ordered the suspension of the petitioner misusing his authority and deceptively passed this order as if this suspension order has nothing to do with the corruption case registered against him so as to give a F misleading impression. What Mr.
Garg wants this Court is to draw an inference which could be the only inference according to him from the surrounding circumstances of the case that this suspension order was passed because of the active interest taken by the petitioner in the criminal proceedings of the case of corruption registered against Ch. Bhajan Lal and as such this order is vitiated by ma/a fide. According to Mr. Garg, the G submission made by Mr~ Kapil Sibal, the senior counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent (the State of Haryana) that there is no fundamental right of the petitioner to approach this Court with this Writ Petition and that the remedy available to him at this stage is only for a statutory appeal under Rule 16 of the Rules, is totally inconceivable. He H further contends that this petition under Article 32 is maintainable since S. A. KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA [PANDIAN, J. ] 763 there is gross violation of Article 14 of the Constitution committed by Ch.
A Bhajan Lal by misusing his power in an arbitrary manner and that ma/a fide permeates through the order of suspension. The other facet of bis argument is that since the suspension order is connected with the final order passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 5412/90, the petitioner was constrained to file the Writ ff<tition under Article 32 instead of approach- ing the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or preferring an B . appeal to the authorities concerned under the rules. In continuation of bis submission, the learned counsel vehemently urged that this suspension is nothing but a fraud on power and if it is allowed to stand, there will be negation of justice and that the Chief Minister has by this order destroyed the petitioner's equal protection of law as enshrined under Article 14 of C the Constitution.
In support of his contention be has relied upon a passage of De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Fourth Edition at page 325) under the caption 'Exercise of a Discretionary power for an Improper Purpose'. The relevant passage referred to reads as thus: "If a power granted for one purpose is exercised for a different purpose, that power has not been validly exer- cised ........................... nowadays the courts will not readily be deterred by subjectively worded statutory formulae from determining whether acts done avowedly in pursuance of statutory powers bore an adequate relationship to the purposes prescribed by statute .......................................... . An exercise of discretionary power, ex- facie valid, is likely to be held invalid if it can be shown to have been directed ad hominem - e. g. where a by-law or order has been made especially to thwart an individual application for a per- mit. .......................... .
If a prim a f acie case of abuse of power by a public authority has been established, the failure of that authority to adduce· any evidence in reply from which it can reasonably be inferred that the avowed purpose had in fact been pursued may lead a court to the conclusion that they have not been genuinely pursued. " Mr. Garg forcibly articulated that the absence of arbitrary power is D E F G the first essential of th Rule of Law upon which. our whole constitutional system is based and that in a system governed by Rule of Law, discretion when conferred upon executive authorities, must be continued within clear- H 764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S. C. R. A ly defined limits and if a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the Rule of Law. For the above proposi- tion; he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in S. G. Jaisinghani v.
Union of India and others, AIR 1967 S. C. 1427 = [1967] 2 SCR 703. B c Reliance was also placed in S. Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1964) 4 SCR 733. According to him, Ch. Bhajan Lal for pursuing his illegitimate aim and wreakin vengeance against the writ petitioner who having been incharge of the investigation of the corruption case took active role in unmasking him and thereby exposing him to the public what Ch. Bhajan Lal is, after having become the Chief Minister of Haryana State has passed this suspension order which is tainted with mala fide. Therefore, this order is liable to be. struck down. In this connection, he drew the attention of this Court to an observation at page 741 made _in Pratap Singh's case (supra) reading "the use of that power - for achieving an alien purpose - wreaking the minister's vengeance on the officer wollld be ma/a fide and a colourable D exercise of that power, and would therefore, be struck down by the Courts.
" E F The further submission of Mr. Garg is in addition to the manifesta- tion of ma/a fide, personal bias on the part of the Chief Minister, Ch. Bhajan Lal is writ large on the face of the order of suspension and therefore on that ~ound also the suspension has to be quashed. In support of_ this plea, he placed reliance in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Satyanarayana Transporters, AIR 1965 S. C. 1303. Saying that the suspension order was pass. ed in exercise of fraud besides with mala fide and personal bias, he drew our attention to the observation of Lord Denning in Lazams Estates, Ltd. v. Beasley, {1956) 1 All. E. R. 341, 345, which reads thus: "No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud.
" Relying on the view expressed by this Court in Pratap Singh 's case G {supra) it has been strenuously urged that if the dominant purpose of making an order is unlawful, then the act itself is unlawful and it is not cured by saying that the maker had another purpose which was lawful. Lastly, drawing strength on the decisions of this, Court in Bashes/Jar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan & Another, H (1959] 1 Suppl. SCR 528 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S. A. KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA (PANDIAN, J. ] 765 SCR 621, it has been contended by Mr. Garg that si. 1ce the order of A _ suspension under challenge is one passed by the Government in arbitrari-. ness violating the equal protection as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court being the guardian of the liberty and protector of the fun~amental rights of the citizens of this country has to step into this matter and set at naught the gross injustice done to the petitioner.
Even if the power is discretionary, it is not necessarily discriminatory and the B discretion vested in such high officials should not be assumed by abuse of power, vide Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, [1957] SCR 233. According to him as pointed out in G. Sandandan v. State of Kera/a, AIR 1966 S. C. 1925, at page 1930 para 21, the tendency to pass· orders in a very casual and cavalier manner by using the unfettered powers will ultimately pose a c serious threat to the basic values on which the democratic way of life in this country is founded and this case is one such example. According to Mr. Kapil Sibal, all the decisions relied upon by Mr.
Garg are not under Article 32 of the Constitution except (1) Pannalal D Binjraj's case (supra) in which the question was whether Section 5(7A) of the Income Tax Act is ultra vires of the Constitution as infringing the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g); and (2) Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) in which the main thrust of contention was whether Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1957 is violative of Article 14, 19(1)(a) and (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India and hence all those E decisions except the two mentioned above cannot be availed of by the writ petitioner. Be that as it may, as we have indicated above the suspension of the Writ petitioner Mr. Khan is based on a separate cause of action and there F is no reference of any part of the corruption case either directly or indirectly in the suspension order. Further the said suspension order has been confirmed by the Central Government. Along with the reply affidavit Mr.
Khan has annexed several letters. In one of the letters dated 19. 7. 1991 addressed to the Home Secretary, Haryana by Shri Khan the following averments are made: G "Within 24 hours of his taking over as Chief Minister, I was transferred and till 5th July I was not given any posting orders. I have waited till today i. e. 19. 7. 1991 but I have not been served the suspension order for the reasons best H 766 A B SUPREM:LO COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S. C. R. known to you. I feel that it is desired that I should not be ·in a position to agitate in the Administrative Tribunal for redressal andjustice .............. , .................. . I suppose on fancy as well as caprice, on 20. 8. 1991 your suspension order is likely to become invalid and faulty as no charge sheet can possibly be served on these grounds without investigation. I request you to re-consider the matter dispassionately, revoke my suspension order and save me unnecessary expense aD;d mental torture.
" In another letter dated 7. 10. 1991 addressed to the DGP he has C requested "that the suspension order may please be revoked" after pointing out that though more than 90 days have elapsed, he has not been served with any chargesheet. In yet another letter dated 9. 1. 1992 addressed to the DGP, h·e, after stating that more than 6 months pe;riod has elapsed since his suspension, has requested the DGP that his representation be sent to D the Government of India for revocation of the suspension order. Along with the letter it appears that he has attached copies of those earlier represe~tations addressed to the Government of . l:ndia. E F From the above correspondence, it is gathered that the petitioner Mr.
Khan has not only approached the Home Secretary of the State Government, 'the DGP of the State of Haryana, but also has sent his representations to the Government of India presumably through the DGP requesting for revocation of the suspension for the various reasons men- tioned therein, one of which being that more than 6 mor.. ths had elapsed since the suspension. In one of the letters he has also expressed his awareness of approaching the Administrative Tribunal for any relief to which he would be entitled to. Till date admittedly no formal charge has been framed following the suspension. It is also admitted that the petitioner has got a statutory appeal under rule 16 of the Rules. G At the risk of repetition, it may be recalled in this connection that Ch. Bhajan Lal became the Chief Minister on 23. 6. 1991 and that on the very next day, that is on 24. 6. 1991 the petitioner Mr. Khan was transferred ~thout being given any place of posting and on 5. 7. 1991 he was suspended.
Earlier to the election of the Chief Minister, the investigation of the H corruption case was completed on 18. 6. 1991 and the cancellation report S. A KHAN v. STATE OF HARYANA [PANDIAN, J. ] 767 . dated 18. 6. 1991 was forwarded to the Ilaqa Magistrate who accepted the · A caneellation report on 22. 7. 1991 and discharged the accused. From the above quick succession of events, it has been forcibly urged that though the investigation of the corruption case does not writ large on the face of the suspension order, in fact this order is very much connected with the investigation of the corruption case which was under the super- B vision and incharge of the writ petitioner, Shri Khan and therefore this Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in revoking this suspen- sion. We are unable to accept the above argument.
As we feel that any observation of ours, if made, on the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner as regards the alleged mala fide, exercise of fraud, arbitrariness, C malice etc. will prejudice or be detrimental to either of the parties in any future adjudication relating to the suspension order, we refrain from expressing our views on this aspect. Further we see no force in the argument that there is a gross violation of Article 14 of the Constitution giving rise to the filing of the writ Petition under Article 32 of the Con- D stitution. Above all, we are inclined to dismiss this writ petition since it is only a suspension order and there is a statutory remedy available to the petitioner. In the result, for all the aforementioned reasons the Writ Petition is dimissed. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the Writ Petition, we hope and E trust that the State Government will expedite the proceedings one way or the other without keeping the petitioner Mr.
Khan on tenterhook for any further period. We would like to point out that any observation made in justification of this judgment shall not have any bearing on any proceedings that may arise on this issue. No. costs. F N. P. V. Petition dismissed.
Source: Supreme Court eSCR. Dataset: Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0. Text extracted automatically; compare with the source PDF for layout and accuracy.