SAKAL PAPERS (P) LTD., AND OTHERS v. THE UNION OF INDIA
Citation: [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842; 1961 INSC 277
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA , A.K. SARKAR, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1961 INSC 277. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1961-09-25. SAKAL PAPERS (P) LTD., AND OTHERS v. THE UNION OF INDIA. Read the judgment and case details...
Judgment text
3 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 843 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] Criminal Appoals No. 33 of 1959, No. 126 of 1959, No. 123 of 1959, Civil Appeal No. 5ll of 1960 and Writ Petition No. ll8 of 1958 were not Sampalhu heard on the merits and wo havo not oxamined the_f~cta of any of those cases. Those appeals and petitions should, therofore, be posted for hearing in the usual oourse. .. Appeals ooa. 408 ond 40~ alloww. Appeal 110. 410 dism1'. ssed. RAKAL PAPERS (P) LTD. , AND OTHERS v. THE UNIOX OF INDIA (B. P. SINHA, c. J. , A. K. SARKAR, K. C. DASGUPTA, N. RA. JAGOPAJ,A AYYA: upplements that could be issued. The petitioner challenged the Act and the order as contravening Art. 1q (1) (a) of the Constitution. 1/i/4, that the Act and the Order were void as they violated Art I 9(1) (a) of the Constitution and v. ere not saved by Art. 19(2). The freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) included the freedom of the prm. For • .....
,_ propagating his ideas a citiz~n had the right to publish them, to di. 5$emlnate them and to circulate them, either by word of mouth or by writing. The right extended not merely to the matter which he was entitled to circulate but also to the volume of circulation. The impugned Act and Order placed 1961 restraints on the latter aspect of the right. But its very object Sakal Papm (P} the Act was directed against circulation and thus interfered Ltd. , with the freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) did v. not permit the State to abridge this right in the interests of Thi Unfon 6/ India tho general public. Brij Bhushan v. The Siate of Delhi, [! 950] S. C. R. 605 Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India, (! 959j S. C. R. 12, Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras [1950] S. C. R. 594, State of Madras v. V. G. Row, [1952] S. C. R. 597, Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur & Weaving Co. ,Ltcl. [1954] S. C. R. 674, Virendra v. The State of Punjab, cl958J S. C. R.
308 and IIamdard Dawakhana (wakf) v. Union of India, [19601 2 S. C. R. 671, referred to. - Held, further, that the State could not make a law which directly restricted one guaranteed freedom for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. Freedom of speech could not be restricted for the purpose of regulating the com· mercial aspect of the activities of newspapers. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 331 of 1960 and 67-68 of 1961. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement c. f Fundamental Rights. G. S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy Iyer, S. S. Shukla , and G. Gopalakrishnan for tbe petitioners. M. G, Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. H. P. Nathwani, J. B. Jadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent No. 1. J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath andP. L. Vohra, for the interveners Nos. 2 and 6. K. R. Ghoudhri, for intervener No. 3. S. T. Desai, TE.
Udayarathnam andS. S. Shukla, for intervener No. 4. W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for intervener No. 5. S. T. Desai, E. Udayarathnam and S. S. Shukla, for the petitioners (In petitions N cs. 67 and 68 of 1961). S·U SUPREME G'OC. :RT REPORTS [I Uu2) 1961. September 25. The Jmlgmcut of the Comt was delivered Ly . 'lkDHOLKAR, . J. -A matter of far-reaching impo! lancc affecting the freedom of the pre8s is raisl'd i11 these three petiti011s when·in the eonstitu· tionulity of the Ne\\'spaper (Price and Page) Act, 19iiu, and the Daily ~cwspapcr (Price and Page) Order, I UuO, is questioned. The first petition is Ly 1~ prirnte limit(• th<> Central GO\'t! l'ilment the power to permit i~su rluction.
Placing reli1mcc upon the statemrnt containt:d in the Ropurt of the Press CummiHsion it is cuntcwled Pll behalf of the re~pondent that news-f'"lpern of long Htallding which ha\·e built up a large and stable ad n·rt iscment rev(·nue being in a more 1i(lva11tagPous position than newcomers in the fi a rraHonalile flexil1ility with r1·:;pN:t to the fall of news and flow of a1lvertis1·m! 'J1ts and other mattBrs eonnect• d with the normal working of newspapers. Sub-section i4) makes it obligutory upon thn C1:ntral Goverment to consult asHoc:iations of pul. iJi,,Ju·rs and su .. h pu bli•hcrs as am likely to be affected by the Onkr as it may think fit with respect to the action proposed to Im tak1•n. Section 4 prohibit~ publication or sale of newspapers in tbu territmie8 to whiPh the Act t'xtends in contravention of gal nspect. The correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in su bstanco is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method ha.
s bccu adopted by the State in placing the restriction. In Virendm v. 'l'he State of Punjab (') this Court has observed at p. 319 as follows : "It is certainly a serious ciate how it could be sustained. The right to freedom of speech and oxpression is an individual right guaranteed to cvory citizen by Art. HI( I )(a) of the Constitution. There is nothing in cl. (2) of Art. 19 which permits the State to abridge this right on the ground of confer-ring benefits upon tho public in general or upon a section of tho public. It is not open to tho State to curtail or infringe the freedom of spocch of one for promoting the goncrnl wolfare of a section or a group of people unless its action could bo justified under a law competent under cl. (2) of Art.. l! l. It is admitted that the impugned provisions cannot be justified on the grounds reforred to in the afore. said rlause.
It was, however, contended on behalf of the State that there are two aspects of the ncth'ities of newspapers-the dissemination of news and views and the commercial aspect. Thcso two aspects, it is mi. id,, •··are different from ono another and under cl. (6) of Art. 19 restrictions can be placed on the Jattor right in the interest of the general public. So far as it is rcJc,·ant for the purpose of the argument cl. (6) read~ thus: "Nothing in ;;nb-elause (g) of tho said clause shall affect tho operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevent the State from making ar. y law imposing in tho interests of tho general public, reasonabfo restric~ions on the cxereiso of th~ right conferred by the said sub-clause ............. , ... , 1961 It m11y well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public, Sakal P>Pm (P} Ltd. restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on v.
business but it is not open to the State to achieve The Union of India this object by directly and immediately curtailing M udlwlkar ]. any other free:lom of that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not susceptible of abridgement on the same grounds as are set out in cl. (o) of Art. 19. Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken a"·ay with the object of placing restrictions on the business aoti vi ties of a citizen. Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be cu~tailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under els. (;3) to (6). For, the scheme of Art. l! J is to enumerate different ;: freer!
oms ~eparatcly and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and cl. (I) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that tho State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore for holding that the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another freedom. Viewing the question from this angle it would be _seen that the reference to the Press being a busmess and to the restriction imposed by the impugned Act being referable or justified as a proper restriction on the right to carry on the blJsinese of publishing a newspaper wo]lld be • who!
Jy irrelevant for considering whether the impngncd Act infringes or docs not infringe the fr. Jcdom guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(a). Tho only gncstion that would t. hon remain would be whether the impugned rnactmcnt dirertly impinges on tho guarantee of freedom of speech and expression. It would directly impinge on this freedom either by placing restraint upon it or by placing restraint upon something which is an essential part of that frcodo'll. The freedom of a newspaper to publish any number of p rights of an individual under Art. l! l( l)(a) are those which cl. (2) of Art. 19 permits and no other. Coming to Writ Petitions 67 and 68 of l! l61, considering that tho rcliof granted by us in the main petition will redress the grievance of the petitioners in these two petitions it will be only of academic interest to decide whether they, as readers of newspapers, ca. n complain of an interference with their right under Art. (19)(1) (a).
We, therefore, refrain from making any Order on their petitions. Upon the view we take it would follow that s. 3(1) of the Act, which is its pivotal provision, is unconstitutional and, therefore, the Daily newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960 made thereunder is also unconstitutional. If s. 3(1) is struck down as bad, nothing remains in tho Act itself. Accordingly we allow this petition with costs. The petitionern in \V. Ps. 67 and 68 of 1961 as well as the intorvoners will bear their respective costs. Petition allowed.
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