SAMIR MUKHERJEE v. DAVINDER K. BAJAJ AND ORS

Citation: [2001] 3 S.C.R. 88

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.S.M. QUADRI, S.N. PHUKAN

Judgment text

SAMIR MUKHERJEE v. DAVINDER K. BAJAJ AND ORS. ,. APRIL 18, 2001 [SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND S. N. PHUKAN, JJ. ] Tena11cy Laws:· Transfer ofProperty Act, 1882-Sections 106, 107-Lease-Categories of-Execution-Procedure for-Duration. of a lease-Non-indication of- ~ Held, in such cases Section 106 lays down a rule ofconstruction prescribing the duration ofdifferent kinds of/eases by legalfiction-'-Lai1dlord terminating the tenancy by 15 days' notice-Plea by tenant that such notice is bad in law as lease granted in his favour for manufacturing purpose would be deemed to be from year to year requiring·6 months' notice-Tenability·of- Tenancy created by an oral agreement-Statut01y requiremeht of Section 107 ofa registered instrument for creation ofa valid lease ji·om year to ye01; not satisfied-Held, there being no registered written lease, rule of construction envisaged in Section 106 deeming a lease for manufacturing l' purpose to be lease .

from year to year, would not be applicab/e-15 days' notice to quit issued to tenant, upheld. Respondents created tenancy in favour of a11pellant in respect of suit llroperty by way of an oral agreement. Subsequently, re~]JOndents filed a suit for eviction of appellant and also for recovery of arrears of rent and damages/ mesne profits. According to respondents, a1Jpellant was a monthly tenant and therefore 15 days' notice terminating the tenancy, as required under Section ' - rescribe the duration of the period of different kinds of leases by legal fiction-leases for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be lease from year to year and all other leases shall be deemed to be from month to month. Existence of a valid lease is a 1>re-requisite to invoke th~ rule of construction embodied in Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. Section 107 of Transfer of Prope11y Act 11rescribes the 11rocedure for execution of a lease between the parties.

Under the said section, a lease of immovabfo property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving 'i yearly rent can be made only by rcgi~1ered instrument. All other leases of .. ,. immovable pro11erty can be made either by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. In the 1irescnt case though the appellant has claimed that it was a lease for manufacturing 1mrpose, admittedly there was no registered written lease. Therefore, rule of construction as envisaged in Section 106 would not be applicable as the statutory requirement· of Section·107 of the Transfer of Property Act has not been satisfied. Hence the plea of appellant that 15 days' notice terminatin~ • his tenancy is bad in law would not be sustainable. (92-D-G; 93-G] Jagat Taran Beery v. Sardar Sant Singh, AIR (1980) Delhi 7, relied on~ Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, Dhaba/ Dev and Am:, Am. (1952) SC 23 = (1952) 3 SCR 269, distinguished. Krishna Das v.

Bidhan Chandra, AIR (1959) Calcutta 181 and Ba/want Singh v. L. Murari Lal, AIR (1965) Allahabad 187, impliedly overruled. Shri Janki Devi Bhagat Triist, Agra v. Ram Swarup Jain (Dead) By ' Lrs. , [1995) 5 SCC 314; Sati Prasanna Mukherjee v. Md. Fazel, AIR (1952) .. _ .. + Calcutta 320 and Kishan Lal v. Lal Ram Chander, AIR (1952) Allahabad 634, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIL Appeal No. 1906 of 1998. From the Judgment and Order dated 23. 1. 98 of the Delhi High Court in RF. A. No. 325 of 1997. Jaideep Gupta, Sanjay Sen, R. S. Biswas, Suchit Mohanty, Satish Mukherjee, Sarla Chandra and Ms. Indra Sawhney for the Appellant. · r M. L. Verma, Navin Chawla, Puneet Arora and Ashok K. Mahajan (NP) ~ for the Respondents. The Judgment of the ·Court was delivered by .... PHUKAN, J. In this appeal by special leave the appellant has impugned the judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court passed in R. FA No.

325 of 1997 by which the High Court upheld the judgment of the Additional r District Judge, Delhi. ·~ The respondents filed a suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit ,. ' different views are projetted·in·these decisions. One view is that fiction i~. section 106 was not intended to override Section I07. In Krishna Das. v. Bidhan Chandra, AIR (1959) Calcutta 181 and Ba/want Singh v. L. Murari Lai, AIR (1965) Allahabad 187 the courts have taken the view that Section 106 was not intended to be controlled by Section 107. Similar view has been expressed by the High Courts of As~aim and Nagaland. The contrary view has been expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Sati Prasanna Mukherjee v. Md. Faze/, AIR (1952) Calcutta 320 andAllahqbad High Court in Kishan Lal v. Lal Ram Chander, AIR (1952) Allahabad 634. It is not necessary to refer to all the decisions of other High Courts.

On perusal of these decisions we find the view that fiction in Section 106 was not intended to be controlled by Section 107 was due to misunderstanding ofthe decision of this court in Ra1f1 Kumar Das (supra) as we have already indicated that in Ram Kumar Das (supra), this court did not apply rule ofconstruction ofSection l06 as there was rio reg~stered instrument. The High Courts taking that view have not laid down the 1;,iw correctly. In Jagat Taran Beeryv. Sardar Sant Singh, AIR (1980) Delhi 7, Delhi High Court considered the views. expressed by different High Courts and correctly took the view that there is no conflict between Sections 106 and 107 of the Act and for application of Section 106 a valid year to year lease shall be deemed to exist when it is created by a registered instrument; the nonexistence ofa registered instrumeqt to create such a lease will by itself exclude Section 106. '· For the reasons stated above, we fin.

d no merit in the present appeal and accordingly it is dismissed. Costs on the parties. MP. Appeal dismissed.