SARWAN SINGH ETC. ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. ETC.
Citation: [1975] 2 S.C.R. 1007; 1974 INSC 268
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: A.N. RAY , P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, HANS RAJ KHANNA, P.K. GOSWAMI
Judgment date:
Case summary
1974 INSC 268. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1974-12-12. SARWAN SINGH ETC. ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. ETC. Read the judgment and case...
Judgment text
1007 . A SARWAN SINGH ETC. ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. ETC. December 12, 1974 [A. N. RAY, c. J. , P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, H" R. KHANNA B AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ. J c D E F G H · P1111jab Town lmprovemellf Act, 1922-S. 59(a)-Constitutional validity of- lf ultra vires Art. 14-Whether the Trib1111al has adopted any unrcaso11able principle ill determi11i11g the compe11satio11. The appellants' land within the municipality was acquired for a development scheme of the Improvement Trust. A notification was issued llnder s. 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. Aggrieved by the award of the Land Acquisition Collector of the Improvement Trust and the decision of the Tribun&l constituted under the Improvement Act the appellants challenged the order of the Tribunal in a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court. On appeal to this Court it was c9~tended 0) that s. 59(a) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 was ultra vires Art.
14 of the Constitution and (ii) that the Tribunal took an absolutely wrong prin:iple into consideration in determining the ·:ompen! ation of the lands acqufred. Dismissing the appeals, Hf·LD : (I) (a) Acquisition of land under the Improvement Act admits · of a reasonable basis of clas~ification and s. 59(a) is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. There can be no complaint that there is no guideline in the Improvement Act in determining the comJiensation since referentially. the principles under the Acquisition Act had been adopted and such other principles are also added as may be appropriate in the nature of things. The object of the Improvement Act being improvement of the towns c'Overs a specific, though wide, field. Under the Improvement Act there is a statutory obligation upon the Trnsts to frame appropriate schemes in Which case, the matter . is likely to take air and the public as well as the land owners may bmefit materia!
ly from knowledge of acquisition prior to the actual notification under S; 36 as against a preliminary notification u. nder s. 4 of the Land Acquisition A:t which appears in . the gazette all of a sudden. Although acquisition under the Acquisition Act is also generally for public purpose the chara-cter of the acquisition under the Improvement Act is different arid the difference· has ·a definite and intimate nexus with the- principal object ot the Act, namely. improvement of towns. No valid exception can be taken to the adoption of the Acquisition Act with modifications to suit the requirements of the Improve- ment Act, and in particular, to the deletion of the provisions of appeal under s. 54 of the Acquisition Act. [IOI! C; 1010 E'H] (b) Denial of the right of appeal available u,nder the Acquisition Act docs not make s. 59(a) ultra vires Art. 14 of ·the Constitution. Th~· le1? i•la1L1re, by making the order of the Tribunal final under s.
59 ( d) sects to avoid delay in the course of litigation to defeat the purpose of the schemes framed under the Act. Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and me. re denial or taking away of such a ri1? ht under the law c11nnot be consi. dered as an infringement of a person's fundamental right. [IOI! DJ (2) Tribunal has not adopted anv unreasonable prin:iples in i~noring the sales 1Jutt have taken place after the date of notification under s. 36. The notification under s. 36 being of September 16, 1960. that is the material date which should be reckoned for purposes of determining compensation. The sale that takes place after the date of notification under s. 36, as distinct from one under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, cannot be taken as a reasonable guide for determination of compensation under s. 23 of the Acquisition A. ct as amended by the Improvement Act, f 1012 B-Cl toos SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 2 s. c. R. C1v1L APPELLATE JuRtSU! CTION : Civil Appeals Nos.
345 & 347 A to 349 of 1971. Appeals from the judgment and decree dated the February 5, 1970 of· the Punjab & Haryana High Court in C. W. Nos. 3627 /68, 273, 274 and 1380 of 1969. B. Sen, and R. L. Kohli, for the appellants. B. P. Singh for respondents No. 3 (In C. A. No. 347 /71) and respc1n- dertt No. 2 On CA No. 345-348-349 /71). V . C. Mahajan (In C. A. No. 245/7 ll Harba11s Singh (In C. A. No. 347/71) 0. P. Sharma and N .. T said Act shall be subject to the further modifica- tions indicated in the Schedule to this Act; (c) x x x x ( d) the: ward of a Tribunal shal[ be deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (1 of 1894), and shall be final". , Under section 60 the Tribunal shall consist of a President and two assessors and the President shall be a person qualified for appoint- ment as a Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
In the Schedule attached to the Improvement Act, further modifications i:ii the Acquisition Act have been introduced as provided for in section 59. Para 10 of the Schedule provides for amendment of section 23 of the Acauisition Act and prescribes, inter alia, some supplemental principles for determining the market value of the land according to use to which the land was put at the material date. It is clear there can be no complaint that there is no guideline in the Improvement Act for determining compensation since referentially the pr. inciples under the Acquisition Act 11'ave been adopted and such other principles are also added as may be appropriate in the naturi~ of things. Land acquired for the Trusts under the Improvement Act, as will be shown below, can be reasonably placed under a well-defined category in view of the scheme underlying the detailed provisions in the said Act.
It is well settled drat article 14 does not abhor a reason- able classification provided the basis of the classification has a rational relation to the object to be achieved by the Act. Here the object of the Improvement Act being improvement of the towns covers a specific, though a wide, field as may be evidenced by the elaborat the actual notification under section 36 as against a preliminary notifica- tion under section 4 of the Acquisition Act which appears in th R!! Mll COlJP. T REPORTS [1975] t s. c. a. sent case being of September 16, 1960, that is the. material date . which should be reckoned for purposes of determining . compensation. It is well-known that once a notification for acquisition is publish1~ people start.
upon various speculatiohs and the future potentiality 1 of the land becomes very important and that affects the price of the land sold in the area sought to be acquired or in close proximity to it and this rise in potential value has a definite connection with the issuan1~ of the notific11tion for acquisition of the land. The sale. that tak 1 es place after th1: date of a notification under section 36, a8 distinct from A one under section 4 of the.. Acquisition Act, cannot be taken as a rea- sonable guide ·for determination of compensation under section · 23 of the Acquiilition Act oas amended by the Improvement Act. T)1e Tribunal has, therefore, not adopted any unreasonable trinciples in ignoring the sales that have taken place after the date o notification · under section 36. The second submission of the learned counsel afao C · fails. .
With regard to the third and last submission of the appelants we are unable to interfere with the quantum of compensation · when no case of gross injustice and discrimmation has been made out . on tbe facts and circumstances taken into account by the Tribunal. .. In ~he result all the appeals are dismissed but we. make no ord1er" as to costs; · . . P. B. R. A. ppeall di. Jmlned. L346&1Pct/,74 D.
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