SAT NARAIN v. STATE OF HARYANA TH. MINISTRY OF HOME

Citation: [2008] 1 S.C.R. 243

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: C.K. THAKKER, DALVEER BHANDARI

Case summary

SAT NARAIN v. STATE OF HARYANA TH. MINISTRY OF HOME.pdf

Judgment text

[2008) 1 S. C. R. 243 SAT NARAIN ·~ v: STATE OF HARYANA TH. MINISTRY OF HOME (Crl. A. No. 38 of 2008) JANUARY 8, 2008 [C. K. THAKKER AND DALVEER BHANDARI, JJ. ] Penal Code, 1860: ss. 302 and 307 - Conviction under - Dispute between complainant party and accused leading to fatal shot to one and injuries to others - Conviction by courts below-Accused --f intention to kill CR and attempt to kill other members of the. con:iplainant party. [Para 14) [253-E, F, G; 254-A] 1. 2 A right of private defence cannot be weighed in a 'golden scale' and even in absence of physical injury, in a 8' given case," such right may be upheld by the Court provided there is reasonable apprehension to life or grievous hurt to such person. The onus of proof on the . ~ accused as to exercise of right of private defence is not as heavy as on the prosecution to prove guilt of the accused and it is sufficient for him to prove the defence on the touchstone of preponderance pf probability.

The prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. But it is sufficient if the accused, when he is called upon to take a defence, proves it on the basis of reasonable probability. He need not prove it beyond reasonable doubt. [Paras 17 and 25) [256-E, F, G; 259-F) · 1. 3 In the instant case, regarding right of self defence, both the Courts rightly held that the complainant party was not the aggressor and the appellant could not have claimed right of private defence. It is also clear from intrinsic evidence and circumstances, viz. (i) presence of wife of CR at the time of occurrence at 3. 30 a. m. ; (ii) complainant side was unarmed and empty handed; (iii) all the injured persons were from complainant's family, etc. It has also come in evidence that it was the accused -+ side who abused the complainant party.. Deceased CR tried. to pacify the accused stating that they would discuss the matter in the morning.

How~ver, accused party did not oblige the deceased· and the complainant party and did not allow them to leave. When tbe complainant party left the place for going to their village in a jeep, they found Maruti car of the accused in the way which prevented them from proceeding towards their village and at that · stage, the accusedattacked them. [Para 15) [254-B, C; D, E] 1. 4 High Court was wholly right in holding that when *' , accused-appellant had admitted his presence at the scene of offence as also use of fire-arm and pleaded the right of self defence, there was no question of his alibi. Therefore, it was for the appellant to place before the Court the circumstances in which he exercised the said right. But in the instant case, from the facts and evidence on record, the right of self defence was not at all available to the appellant. The complainant party was unarmed and also i.

, not an aggressor and hence the appellant could not have committed death of CR nor could have caused injuries to wife of CR. It was the appellant, who came with a loaded gun and fired shots one after th~ other which resulted in death of CR, injury to wife of CR, though complainant could avoid the shot and remained unhurt. The gun was re-loaded b~r the appellant which goes a long way to 0 exhibit his intention to finish the complainant side. In the light of the evidence, the trial court did not grant benefit of private defence to the appellant. The High Court again considered the plea of the accused and negatived it. [Paras 17, 18 and 25] [256-D-E; 259-F, G; 256-G; 257-A, BJ 1. 5 Trial Court convicted accused nos. 1 and 3 also but High Court allowed the appeals of the other two accused, extending benefit of doubt to them observing that they might have been roped in belatedly and acquitted them.

But that does not mean that the appellant who had used his gun, killed deceased and also attempted to kill ~ PW-14 and 15 is entitled to acquittal or that his conviction and sentence was not in consonance with law. [Parar. 17 and 21) [256·. C, D; 258-F, G] 1. 6 Since both the Courts were right in believing prosecution witnesses who were injured at the time of incident and since the appellant had used fire arm which -,,,, caused death of deceased and injuries to PW15- without there being aggression by them, the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court against the appellant cannot be said to , -t be illegal or contrary to law. It cannot be said that no case for an offence punishable under Section 302 or 307, IPC was made out against the appellant and at the most he could be convicted for an offence punishable under Section 304 (Part II) or (Part I) IPC. [Paras 22 and 27] [260-A, B; 258-G; 259-A] Chanan Singh v.

State of Punjab, 1979 (4) SCC 399 - ~ ~ distinguished. Partap v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1976 (2) SCC 798; State of U. P. v. Ram Swarup and Anr. 1974 (4) SCC 764 - relied on. CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal No. 38 of 2008. From the final Judgment/Order dated 17. 8. 2006 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. A. No. 533- DB/2004. ~ Puneet Bali, Satinder S. Gulati, Hiten Nehra and Kamaldeep Narang for the Appellant. Rajeev Gaur 'Naseem', Rajesh Ranjan and T. V. George for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C. K. THAKKER, J. 1. Leave granted. + 2. The present appeal is filed against the judgment and order passed by the Addi. Sessions Judge, Sirsa on May 5, 2004 in Sessiohs Case No. 140 of 1999/2003 and partly confirmed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana on August 17, 2006 in Criminal Appeal No. 533-DB of 2004. 3. The case of the prosecution was that the occurrence took place on June 17, 1999 at about 3. 30 a. m.

In the said """' incident, one Chhotu Ram@ Lal Bahadurwas killed and PW14- Ravinder Kumar-real brother of deceased Chhotu Ram, as - ' not proved beyond reasonable doubt that they had committed the offences with which they were charged. Hence, by giving benefit of doubt, the High Court acquitted them. 9. So far as the appellant is concerned, the High Court, in the light of acquittal recorded in favour of accused Nos. 1 and 3, acquitted him for the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34, IPC. But the High Court held that .. the appellant was rightly convicted by the trial Court for offences punishable under Section 302, IPC substantively as also under Section 307, IPC substantively. Accordingly, the order of con\Yiction and sentence recorded by the trial Court against the appellant in respect of those offences was confirmed. \. J 10. Against the order passed .

bY the High Court acquitting Bablu and Avtar Singh, complainant Ravinder Kumar had ~ approached this Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 1274 of 2006 which was dismissed on January 15, 2007. In the present matter by accused No. 2-Sat Narain, notice was issued on March 7, 2007. Records and proceedings t • were thereafter called for and the matter was ordered to be placed for hearing on a non-miscellaneous day. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that both the Courts were wrong in convicting the appellant. It was submitted that when the other two accused were aC'luitted· by the High Court, the appellant could not have been convicted on ,_ the basis of the same evidence. Acquittal of other accused goes to show that the case of the prosecution was not reliable and it was not proved that the incident took place in the manner as described by the prosecution.

The appellant, in the circumstances, ought to have been granted benefit of doubt. It was urged that the case of the appellant was that the complainant party was the aggressor and in exercise of right of private 0 defence, the appellant was compelled to use licensed fire arm. Only one shot was fired which resulted into unfortunate death of Chhotu Ram and injuries to Sakeela. The fire arm, however, ~ was used because there was reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant that if he would not use it, he would either be killed or seriously injured. Both the'"Courts were, therefore, wrong in not giving benefit of right of self defence. Finally, it was urged that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case,- at the most, it was a case of exceeding of right of self defence. The Courts ought to have considered the facts of the case and ought not to have convicted the appellant for an offence . _ .

punishable under Section 302, IPC for causing death of deceased Chhotu Ram and ought not to have awarde. d imprisonment for life. The Courts were also in error in convicting the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 307, IPC for attempt to commit murder of PW15-Sakeela, wife of deceased Chhotu Ram and in awarding imprisonment for life which is the maximum penalty. It was, therefore, submitted that 'II' in any case, the conviction of the appellant should be converted for an offence punishable under Section 304, Part II or under Section 304, Part I and to that extent, the appeal deserves to ~ -. i be allowed. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that murder of deceased Chhotu Ram was committed by the appellant-accused N-o. 2 when the members of the complainant party, who were unarmed, were going to their village in a jeep. According to the counsel, they were prevented from proceeding towards the village by putting Maruti car in the way which caused .

-1 obstruction and the complainant party was attacked by the accused party. The counsel submitted that the appellant herein had fired three shots, out of them one injured deceased Chhotu Ram who succumbed to the injuries, the second shot was aimed at complainant Ravinder Kumar but he escaped it by taking shelter behind the jeep and the third shot injured Sakeela, wife of the deceased. The trial Court, after appreciating the evidence, believed the story of the prosecution witnesses so far as the role of the appellant is concerned and convicted him. The High Court confirmed the view taken by the trial Court. In the ~ circumstances, acquittal of other two accused by the High Court would not make conviction and finding recorded against the appellant vulnerable. It was also submitted that in the totality of facts, both the Courts were right in convicting the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 as also under Section.

307, IPC and in imposing imprisonment for life and the order does not suffer from any infirmity. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, no case has been m~de out for interference by this Court against the order passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court so far as the present appellant is concerned. As already noted by us, both the Courts believed the story of the prosecution, particularly evidence of PW14-complainant Ravinder Kumar, real brother of the deceased and injured as also PW15-Sakeela, wife of deceased Chhotu Ram, another injured eye-witness. The Courts rightly held that the appellant fired three times. The resultant effect was loss of life by Chhotu Ram and injuries to Sakeela, wife of Chhqtu Ram. The appellant also tried to hit the complainant Ravinder Kumar but he could escape himself by taking shelter of his vehicle Ueep) and thus could avoid injury by a fire arm.

From the evidence, it is also clearly established and believed by the Courts that the appellant had re-loaded his gun which proves his intention to kill Chhotu Ram and attempt to kill other members of the complainant party. 15. So far as right of self defence is concerned, in our opinion, both the Courts were right in holding that the complainant party was not the aggressor. It is also clear from intrinsic evidence and circumstances, viz. (i) presence of Sakeela at the time of occurrence at 3. 30 a. m. ; (ii) complainant side was unarmed and empty handed; (iii) all the injured persons were from complainant's family, etc. It has also come in evidence that it was the accused side who abused the complainant party. Deceased Chhotu Ram tried to pacify the accused stating that they would discuss the matter in the morning. Accused party, however, did not oblige the deceased and the complainant party and did not allow them to leave.

When the complainant party left the place for going to their village in a jeep, they found Maruti car of the accused in the way which prevented them from proceeding towards their village and at that stage, the accused attacked them. In the circumstances, in our opinion, it cannot be said that either the trial Court or the High Court had committed any error of fact or of law in convicting the appellant. 16. The trial Court considered the defence of the appellant and his right of self defence. Dealing with the evidence on record and negating the defence theory, it observed; "There is no reason to disbelieve the oral assertions of the prosecution witnesses which has been well corroborated from the medial evidence. Even the occurrence has been admitted by the accused. Even the accused Sat Narain has taken the plea of self defence.

The accused have also admitted the presence of the witnesses Ravinder Kumar Sakila, Vikram Singh, Darshan Lal and deceased Chhotu Ram at the place of occurrence. The defence version of the accused is that the complainant ~· -i party was the aggressor. They attacked accused Sat Narain and the accused Sat Narain in his self defence opened fire but except the suggestion put to the prosecution witnesses there is no evidence on behalf of the accused to proye that the complainant party ever chased accused Sat Narain armed with deadly weapons with intention to harm his person and property. So, the plea of self defence set up by the accused fails. There is ~ specific evidence against the accused that accused Sat Narain was armed with the double barrel licensed gun, accused Bablu was armed with a gandasi, accused Avtar Singh was armed with a Lathi and accused Savitri (since declared proclaimed offender) was armed with a kasuli. They all came to the Dhani of Darshan Lal at 3. 30 a. m. at night.

So, their common intention can be inferred. Had they no common intention to cause the death of Chhotu Ram, they might not have come to the Dhani of Darshan Lal (PW12) at odd hours armed with deadly weapons. '. >- Specific injury and role has been attributed to each of the accused. The testimony of the witness namely Darshan Lal (PW12), Vikram Singh (PW13), Ravinder Kumar, complainant/injured (PW14) and Sakeela, injured (PW15) is well corroborated by Dr. R. C. Ola (PW7) and medico legal reports Ex. PE, Ex. PG and Ex. PH and post mortem report Ex. PM. Hence, it is proved that the accused on 17. 6.

1999 in the area of village Choutala accused Sat ~ Narain in furtherance of common intention of his coaccused Bablu, Avtar Singh and Savitri (proclaimed offender) caused the death of Chhotu Ram alias Lal Bahadur by firing shot at him and he also fired at Sakeela in furtherance of common intention of his remaining accused with the intention to cause her death and accused Avtar Singh and Bablu in furtherance of common intention of his co-accused Sat Narain, and Savitri (since declared proclaimed offender) caused simple hurt with sharp and blunt weapon to Ravinder Kumar. Therefore, the accused committed offences punishable under Section 302, 307, 323 and 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal t- ~ · Code. So, accused Sat Narain is held guilty for the commission of offences punishable under Section 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code whereas accused Bablu and Avtar Singh are held guilty for the commission of .

offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and accused Bablu and Avtar Singh are further held guilty for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 /and 324 of the Indian Penal Cod~ and accused Sat Narain is held guilty for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and are convicted thereunder accordingly". 17. It is no doubt true that the High Court allowed the appeals of the other two accused, i. e. accused Nos. 1 and 3 extending benefit of doubt to them observing that they might have been roped belatedly. But to us, the High Court was wholly right in holding that when accused No. 2 (appellant) had admitted his presence at the scene of offence as also use of fire-arm and pleaded the right of self defence, there was no question of his alibi. It was, therefore, for him to place before the Court the circumstances in which he exercised the said right.

We are conscious and mindful that a right of private defence cannot be weighed in a 'golden scale' and even in. absence of physical injury, in a given case, such right may be upheld by the Court +provided there is reasonable apprehension to life or grievous hurt to such person. We are equally aware of settled legal position that the onus of proof on the accused as to exercise of right of private defence is not as heavy as on the prosecution to prove guilt of the accused and it is sufficient for him to prove the defence on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. But in the instant case, from the facts and evidence on record, the right of self defence was not at all available to the appellant. The complainant party was unarmed and also not an aggressor. It was the appellant, who came with a loaded gun and fired shots ~ .. , one after the other which resulted in death of Chhotu Ram, injury to Sakeela, though Ravinder Kumar could avoid the shot and remained unhurt.

The gun was re"loaded by the appellant which goes a long way to exhibit his intention to finish the complainant side. 18. The trial Court, in the light of the evidence, did not grant benefit of private defence to the appellant. The High Court again considered the plea ofthe accused and negatived it by observing "1· as under; "lfwe take the plea as set up by Sat Narain to be true then in that eventuality some one else along with Chhotu Ram, Sakeela and Ravinder would have certainly received some injuries. It is not so. The hired person~ do not come without any weapon. Sat Narain does not say a word about any weapon being carried by the complainant side. He simply states that he was attacked by them. This goes to show that at the time of occurrence there was no one else except Chhotu Ram, his wife and Ravinder who were going to village Babrian from Dhani of Darshan Lal.

If the entire scene is visualized in the present set of circumstances, it can be said that the plea raised by Sat Narain to the effect that he was called in the Dhani and threatened by Chhotu Ram and others goes against him for the reason that in any case he had the grudge in his bosom against Chhotu Ram (since deceased)'an outsider for extending help to -t Darshan Lal. Chhotu Ram in any case would not be the. aggressor" 19. The High Court rightly concluded; ''Therefore, in our considered view, it is a clear case of murder for which he deserves to be punished under Section 302, IPC". --.. 20. Regarding an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, the High Court stated; "We have also appreciated the case of the prosecution t • with regard tp charge of Section 307 IPC qua Sat Narain appellant. We do find some discrepancies in the eyeversion account vis-a-vis the investigation conducted but the same is of no help to him.

The case set up by the prosecution is that Sat Narain had fired three shots; one at Chhotu Ram hitting on his right side; second at Ravinder, who incidentally escaped unhurt and the third at Sakeela causing her injuries, who was sitting behind Chhotu Ram ~ on the back seat of the jeep. The substantive evidence before us is that the gun was reloaded by Sat Narain. The argument advanced by Mr. Ghai is that only one shot was fired by Sat-Narain and a crude padding has been done by the investigating agency in connivance with the complainant side in order to project it as a case of repeated firing of shots is of no consequence as we have already held him guilty for the charge under Section 302 IPC substantively for causing murder of Chhotu Ram. Still after rescanning the entire case in its right perspective, 1 we are of the firm view that it is a case of more than one shots, causing pellet injuries to Sakeela PW also.

Therefore, the conviction of Sat Narain appellant under Section 307 IPC also deserves to be re-affirmed. Resultantly his conviction under Sections 302 IPC and 307 IPC is upheld". 21. It may be mentioned here that the trial Court had convicted acc}Jsed Nos. 1 and 3 also but the High Court felt that +they were entitled to benefit of doubt and hence they were ordered to be acquitted. But that does not mean that the appellant who had used his gun, killed deceased Chhotu Ram and also attempted to kill Sakeela and Ravinder Kumar is entitled to acquittal or that his conviction and sentence was not in consonance with law. .. -- 22. We are also not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that no case for an offence punishable under Section 302 or 307, IPOwas made out against the appellant and at the most he could be convicted for an offence • • punishable under Section 304 Part II or Part I, IPC. 23. The counsel drew our attention toa decision in Chanan Singh v.

State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 399. In that case, reversing the order passed by the High Court and extending . the benefit of right of self defence, ~his Court set aside the 8 conviction of the appellant-accused. In our opinion, however, the facts of Chanan Singh were totally different. As observed in the decision, even the High Cot. irt had observed in the order that it was difficult to hold that the eye-witnesses in the case had given true version of the fight. The presence of injuries on the persons of the accused went to show that there was a quarrel between them on one side and the complainant party on the other and the prosecution did not put forward the genesis and the origin of fight correctly. Obviously, therefore, this Court held that the High Court was wrong in convicting the accused. 24.

In the instant case, both the Courts believed the prosecution version and we are satisfied that the Courts were right in relying on the evidence of prosecution and in holding that they were not aggressors and the appellant could not ~ave claimed right of private defence. 25. Partap v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1976) 2 SCC 798 also does not take the case of the appellant anywhere. There it . was held that burden to prove plea of self defence on the accused is not as onerous as that which lies on the prosecution. We are in respectful agreement with the said proposition of law. It is settled law that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. But it is sufficient if the accused, when he is called upon to take a defence, proves it on the basis of reasonable probability. He need not prove it beyond reasonable doubt.

But in the instant case, complainant party was not the aggressor and the right of self defence was not available to the appellant and h£mce he could not have committed death of Chhotu Ram nor could have caused injuries to Sakeela. 26. State of UP v. Ram Swarup & Anr, (1974) 4 SCC 764 is again on a question of law and as stated by us, law is well settled on the point and even the State counsel has not ' ~ disputed the availability of right of private defence to accused under the IPC. 27. Since both the Courts were right in believing prosecution witnesses who were injured at the time of incident and since the appellant had used fire arm which caused death of deceased Chhotu Ram and injuries to PW15-Sakeela without there being aggression by them, the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court against the appellant cannot be said illegal or contrary to law. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 28.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court against the appellant is legal, valid and in consonance with. law and calls for no interference. The appeal is, therefore, 0 dismissed. N. J. Appeal dismissed.