SAURABH CHAUDRI AND ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 152

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: V.N. KHARE, R.C. LAHOTI, B.N. AGRAWAL, S.B. SINHA, AR. LAKSHMANAN

Judgment text

SAURABH CHAUDRI AND ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. NOVEMBER 4, 2003 [V. N. KHARE, CJ. , R. C. LAHOTI, B. N. AGRAWAL, S. B. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ. ] Constitution of India-Articles 14 and 15 (1)-Reservation- Reservation-based on domicile residence or institutional preference in technical and medical courses-Reasonableness-Held, such reservations not discriminatory or arbitrary given the imbalances and disparities in country- Reservation restricted to 50% ofthe seats-Directions issued-Constitution of India-Articles 41 and 47. Constitution ofIndia-Articles 14 and 15 (/)-Reservation-Reservation based on domicile/residence or institutional preference in technical and medical courses-Reasonableness-Super-speciality courses-Held, such reservations impermissible in super-speciality courses.

Constitution ofIndia-Article 15(/)-'Place ofbirth'--Dijference between 'Place ofbirth' and 'domicile'l'residence'-Held, the expressions reflect different concepts and are not the same-Constitution ofIndia-Article 16(2). Constitution of India-Seventh Schedule-Entry 66, List II and Entry 25, List I/I-Education-Reservation in-Legislation regarding-Competence ofStates-Held, in absence ofany Parliamentary legislation, State is competent to enact statute providing for reservation. Interpretation ofStatutes-Strict Scrutiny Test and Intermediate &rutiny Test-Applicability of-Held, can only be applied where legislation is ex facie unreasonable or puts the life and liberty of a citizen in jeopardy-There is presumption ofconstitutionality ofa statute-Constitution ofIndia-Articles 14 and 21. Considering the question of reservation to technical and medical courses on the basis of domicile/residence or institutional preference as S. CHAUDRI v. U. 0. 1.

153 provided for by various states, the Court, in its judgment in Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , 11984) 3 SCC 654, held that wholesale reservation on the basis of domicile or institutional preference, regardless of merit, is unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution ol India. However, recognising the factual position as to inequalities existing in the society aml need for affirmative action and following earlier judgments of the Court, the court allowed reservation based on domicile/residence and institutional preference up to a certain percentage in MBBS courses.

In case of post-graduate courses, the Court held that though it was not desirable to provide reservation based on residence requirement or institutional preference, having regard to the broader considerations of equality of opportunity and institutional continuity, the States could provide for reservation on the basis of institutional preference up to 50% of the total number of open seats. The Court further directed that there should be no reservation on the basis of institutional preference in respect of the super-speciality courses and admission should be granted purely on merit on all-India basis. The percentage of seats to be allotted on all-India basis was modified by the subsequent judgment of the Court. In Dr. Parag Gupta v. University ofDelhi and Ors. , (2000) 5 SCC 684), the Court upheld even residential preference in post-graduate course in the facts and circumstances of the case. In Magan Mehrotra and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors.

, (2003) 3 SCALE 101, the Court noted the divergence between the judgment of the Court in Dr. Pradeep jain and Dr. Parag Gupta and held that apart from institutional preference, no other preference, including reservation on the basis of residence was envisaged by the Constitution of India. Pursuant to the judgment of the Court in Magan Mehrotra, the Delhi university issued a notification that only Delhi University medical graduates would be eligible against the 75% reserved seats for the students from Delhi and the students who had taken admission in the University/ States under the 15% all-India quota would not be eligible to seek admission in the P. G. Degree/Diploma Courses of Delhi University against the 75% reserved seats. The petitioners, though original residents of Delhi, had obtained their MBBS degrees from medical colleges outside Delhi in 15% all-India quota. they had applied for admission to Post graduate Medical Courses in Delhi.

Being aggrieved by the aforesaid notification, they filed writ petitions 154 SUPREME COURT REPOR·; S (2003] SUPP. 5 S. C. R. before the Court. The issue, which arose for determination before the Court was whether any reservation, made on residence or institutional preference, is violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner challenged reservations contending, inter alia, that reservations, whether based on domicile or institutional preference, would ( be unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution of India. The term 'place of birth' was synonymous with the term \domicile' and therefore, any reservation on the basis of 'domicile' would be violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India.

Reservations, whether on the basis of domicile or on the basis of institutional preference, would be impermissible having regard to the constitutional scheme and therefore, they would fall within the purview of 'suspected classification'. Therefore, they must pass the 'strict scrutiny test' or 'intermediate scrutiny test'. Disposing of the writ petitions with directions, the Court HELD: Per V. N. Khare, C. J. (for himself and R. C. Lahoti and B. N. Agrawal, JJ. ) Validity ofreservation on the basis ofdomicile 1. Reservation on the basis of domicile is not impermissible in terms of clause (I) of Article IS of the Constitution of India. The term 'place of birth' occurs in clause (1) of Article 15 but not' domicile'. It may be true that 'place of birth' appeared to be synonymous with 'domicile' to some of the members of the Constituent Assembly but the same cannot be a guiding factor.

Ifa comparison is made between Article 15(1) and Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India, it would appear that whereas the former refers to 'place of birth' alone, the latter refers to both 'domicile' and 'residence' apart from 'place of birth'. A distinction, therefore, has been made by the makers of the Constitution themselves to the effect that the expression 'place of birth' is not synonymous to the expression 'domicile' and they reflect to different concepts. (171-H; 172-A-BI D. P. Joshi v. The State ofMadhya Bharat andAnr. , (19551 1 SCR 1215 and State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Pradip Tandon and Ors. , (19751 1 sec 267, referred to. S. CHAUDRI v. U. 0. 1. 155 Applicability ofstrict scrutiny test. 2. 1. Article 14 of the Constitution of India forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification subject to conditions that it is based on an intelligible differentia and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.

[173-A, BJ Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar and Ors. , (1959) SCR 279, referred to. 2. 2. The strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the United States of America cannot be applied as such a test is not applied in India courts. In any event, such a test may be applied in the case where the legislation exfacie is found to be unreasonable. Such a test may also be applied in the case where by reason of a statute the life and liberty of a citizen is put in jeopardy. This Court since its inception apart from a few cases where the legislation was found to be exfacie wholly unreasonable proceeded on the doctrine that constitutionality of a statute is to be presumed and the burden to prove contra is on him who asserts the same. The courts always lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility.

A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim: ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Applying the test of presumption ofconstitutionality no case has been made out for invoking the doctrine of strict construction or intermediate construction. (174-F-H; 175-A-B) C! Tv. Teja Singh, AIR (1959) SC 352 and Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd v. State ofAssam, AIR (1990) SC 123, referred to. Validity ofreservation by institutional preference 3. 1. Reservation by way of institutional preference must be held to be not offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [190-E) 3. 2. It is true that the country should strive to achieve a goal of excellence which In turn would mean that meritorious students should not be denied pursuit of higher studies.

Ideal situation may have been to see that meritorious students irrespective of cast, creed, sex, place of birth, domicile/residence are treated equally but history is replete with situations to show that India is not ready therefor. Sociological condition prevailing in India compelled the makers of the Constitution to bring in Articles 15 and 16 in the Constitution. The said Articles for all intent and purport are species of Article 14 which is the genus in a sense that they would provide for exception to the equality clause also. Preference to a class of persons whether based on caste, creed, religion, place of birth, domicile or residence is embedded in our constitutional scheme. (175-C, E, Fl 3. 3. Whereas larger interest of the country must be perceived, the law makers cannot shut their eyes to the local needs also. Such local needs must receive due consideration keeping in view the duties of the State contained in Articles 41 and 47 of the Constitution of India.

The test to uphold the validity of a statute on equality must be judged on the touchstone ofreasonableness. (175-Fl 3. 4. Constitutional interpretation is a difficult task. Its concept varies from statute to statute, fact to fact, situation to situation and subject matter to subject matter. Perceptions are yet to be perceived by the Court which would meet all situations while laying down emphasis for achieving excellence in all spheres of life keeping in view Chapter IV-A of the Constitution of India which provide for fundamental duties. Circumstances and compulsions faced by the State in this behalf led the courts to uphold a statute providing for reservation for a special class of people. Mostly they suffer from disability either being belonging to an oppressed community or by way of economical, cultural or social imbalances. The courts should all along strive bard for maintaining a balance. [176-A-C) Missouri v. Holland, 252 US 416; Jagadish Saran and Ors. v.

Union of India, [198012 SCC 768; D. P. Joshi v. The State ofMadhya Bharat andAnr. , (19551 1 SCR 1215; Km Chitra Ghosh and Anr. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [196912 SCC 228; D. N. Chancha/a v. The State ofMysore and Ors. [1971) 2 SCC 293 and MR. Mini (Minor) represented by her Guardian and Father MP. Rajappan v. State ofKera/a and Anr. (1980) 2 SCC 216, referred. 3. 5. A scheme has been framed by the Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain, which is a law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and is binding on all States in terms ofArticle 144 ofthe Constitution of India. In the said judgment, a distinction was made between the Undergraduate Course, i. e, MBBS Course and Post Graduate Medical Course as also super speciality courses. The Court in the said judgment, therefore, sought to strike a balance of rights and interests ofall concerned. Institutional preference has been preferred in earlier judgments too.

There is no reason to depart from the ratio laid down by the Court in Dr. Pradeep S. CHAUDRI v. U. 0. 1. 157 Jain. (183-A, G, HJ Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , (1984) 3 SCC 654; Jagadish Saran and Ors. v. Union ofIndia, (19801 2 SCC 768; Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. v. Moti/al Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , [1985) 3 SCC 22; Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (II) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , (1986) 3 SCC 727; Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (III) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , (1987) 4 SCC 122; Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (IV) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad andOrs. , (1987) 4 SCC459; Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (V) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 428; Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (VJ) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , (1987) l SCALE 1232; Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (VII) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , (1987) 2 SCALE 222; Dr.

Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (VIII) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , (1988) l SCALE 428; Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (IX) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , (1990) 4 SCC 627; Dr. Parag Gupta v. University ofDelhi Ors. , (2000) 5 SSC 684; Magan, Methrotra and Ors. v•. Union ofIndia and Ors. (2003) 3 SCALE 101; State of U. P. and Ors. v. Vineet Singh and Ors. , (2000) 7 SCC 262; Abhinava Aggarwal and Anr. v. Union ofIndia Ors. , (2001) 3 SCC ~25; Dr. Prachi Almeida v. Dean, Medical Co//eg'l and Ors. , (2001) 7 SCC 640; K. Duraisamy andAnr. v. State ofTamil Nadu and Ors. , (2001) 2 SCC 538; AllIndia Institute ofMedical Sciences Students Union v. All India Institue ofMedical Sciences and Ors. (2002) 1 SCC 428; MR. Mini (Minor) representd by her Guardian and Father MP. Rajappan v. State ofKera/a and Anr. , (1980) 2 SCC 216 and Km. N. Vasundhara v. State ofMysore and Anr. , (1971) 1 Supp. S~ 381, referred to.

Relevance ofan entry in the State List or Concurrent List 4. Education appears both in Union List as also the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Argument that different interpretation is needed having regard to the shift of constitutional entry from St. ate List to the Concurrent List is not correct. Shifting of the entry from the State List to the concurrent list is not relevant inasmuch as the State, in absence of any Parliamentary Act, has the legislative competence to enact a statute laying down reservation for entry in any course of studies including the medical courses. (187-E, H; 188-E) - T. MA. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State ofKarnataka and Ors. , [20021 8 sec 481, referred to. Directions issued by the Court 5. 1. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, reservation by way of institutional preference should be confined to 50% of the seats since it is in public interest. [190-H; 191-AJ Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v.

Union ofIndian and Ors. , [1984] 3 SCC 654, referred to. Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors.. (1985] 3 SCC 22, over-ruled on this aspect. MR. Balaji and Ors. v. State ofMysore, [1963] Supp. I SCR439, cited. 5. 2. For the purpose of selecting the candidates, it is necessary to hold an All India Entrance Examination by an impartial and reputed body. One test should be held for all the students taking admission throughout the country. The disparity arising from one common entrance test for admission against 25°/e of the All-India quota and other tests being held be respective Universities, should be done away with and merit of the students should be judged on the basis of one test held therefor. [191-B-D] 5. 3. In the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and the medical colleges of the Central University, merit should have primacy subject of course to institutional preference to the extent of 50% of the seats in the MBBS course.

In all other respects the decision of the Court p in All India Institute ofMedical &iences Student Union shall operate. [191-EJ All India Institute ofMedical Sciences Students' Union v. All India Institute ofMedical &iences and Ors. (2002] I SCC 428, referred to. 5. 4. The directions being issued are interim in nature. The Parliament having regard to Entry 66, List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India has the legislative competence which would take care of the country as a whole. While making such a legislation, the Parliament undoubtedly would take into consideration the special needs of some small States, having regard to their backwardness-economic, social and educational as also geographical conditions. The Parliaments has also the • S. CHAUDRI v. U. 0. 1. 159 legislative competency in terms of Entry 25, List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.

It, while enacting law for education and particularly higher education where excellence is required, must also foresee that in the era of liberalisation and globalisation, Indian citizens must compete with their counterparts of the developed countries. Merit, thus, must be allowed to explore to the fullest extent. (191-F-H) 5. 5. The courts are normally reluctant to issue any direction to the Central Government for making law. Following the practice, no direction is being issued in this regard. There is hope and trust that the Central Government expeditiously considers making legislation or taking such steps as are necessary in this behalf keeping in view the requirement of coordination in higher education in terms of Entry 66, List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. [192-B, CJ Per S. B. Sinha, J. (concurring) 6. 1. Article 14 of the Constitution of India prohibits discrimination in any form.

Discrimination at its worst form would be violative of the basic and essential feature of the Constitution. It is trite that even the fundamental rights of a citizen must conform to the basic feature of the Constitution. Preamble of the Constitution in no uncertain terms lays emphasis on equality. (192-F) Kesavanada Bharti v. State ofKera/a, [1973) 4 SCC 225; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union ofIndian and Ors. , [1997) 3 SCC 261 and Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , (1981) 1 SCC 166, referred to. The validity of institutional reservation must be judged on the touchstone of equality clause of the Constitution of India. While considering the reasonableness of the institutional reservation the effect of equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India has to be taken into consideration. Even applying the strict scrutiny test, having regard to the present day scenario, institutional reservation should be done away with.

[195-A, B; 196-8) Islamic Academy ofEducation andAnr. v. State ofKarnataka arid Ors. , JT [2003) 7 SC I; Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1984) 3 SCC 654 and Bairam Kumawat v. Union ofIndia, [2003) 7 SCC 628, referred to. Per A. R. Lakshmanan, J. (concurring) 7. 1. In the case ofCentral educational institutions and other institutions of excelleace in the country the scope for reservations is minimal. At the level of super specialities the rule of "equal chance for equal marks" dominates. The higher the level of speciality the lesser the role of reservation. This view equally applies to all super speciality institutions. (200-B, CJ . ... Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v. Union ofIndian and Ors. , (1984) 3 SCC 654 and Jagadish Saran and Ors. v. Union ofIndia, (1980) 2 SCC 768, referred to. 7. 2.

As regards the scope of reservation of seats in educational institutions affiliated and recognised by State Universities, the constitutional prescription of reservation of 50% of the available seats has to be respected and enforced. The institutional preference should be limited to 50% and the rest beiAg left for open competition based purely on merits on an ail-India basis. (200-C, DJ Indra Sawheny v. Union ofIndia, [1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217; Preeti Srivastava v. State ofMP. Air. , (1999) SC 2894 and All India Institute of Medical Sciences Student's Union v. All India Institute ofMedical &iences and Ors. , [2002) I sec 428, referred to. 7. 3. In case of aided institutions government/State can prescribe guidelines as to the process of selection and admission of students.

The Government/State, while issuing guidelines, has to take into consideration the constitutional mandate of the requirement of protective discrimination in matters of reservation of seats as ordained by the decisional law in the country. Accordingly, the extent of reservation in no case can exceed so•;. of the seats. The inter-se merit may be assessed on the bas. is of a common all-India Entrance Test or on the basis of marks as the level of qualifying examination. [200-E, F) 7. 4. In case of un-aided institutions, they have large measure of autonomy even in matters of admission ofstudents as they are not bound by the constraints of the demands of Article 29 (2) of the Constitution of India. Nor are they bound by the constraints of obligatory requirements of Constitutional reservation. [201-A) S. CHAUDRI v. U. 0. 1. 161 7. 5.

The position with respect to minority aided institutions is that they are bound by requirement of constitutional reservation along with other regulatory controls. However, the right to admit students of the Choice being part of the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, the management of these educational institutions can reserve seats to a reasonable extent not necessarily 50%. Out of the Seats left after the deduction of management quota, the State can require the observance of the requirement of Constitutional reservation. (200-G, HJ [Ed. -A. R. Lakshmanan, J. also suggested following options for streamlining the policies andprocessesfor admission to Medical Courses and other Professional Courses] Entry Qualification 8.

For admission to undergraduate programmes, there are several different eligibility norms among the different categories of institutions and among the various States thereby confusing the students from different parts of the country. The preferred option should be for a designated agency or the University concerns to conduct the entrance examination for professional as well as non-professional institutions in the specified subjects. The marks awarded in those subjects should be the basis for determining the merit of the students for admission to the institutions to which they apply. [196-H; 197-A-C) Unplanned growth of institutions 9. 1. The country needs to evolve urgently a predictable pattern of growth for the Higher Education system in Technical, Managerial and other Professional disciplines as well as in Science and Humanities at least for the next five years. The present level ofad-hoc approach and stampede should be eliminated. (197-G] 9. 2.

The national blueprint and the road map for the development of professional education should be based on maintaining credible level of quality standards and anticipated demand structure in economic and social sectors. (197-H; 198-A) Fee Structure t0. One possible remedy is to make a rule under the Prevention of the Capitation Fee Act that collecting any fee that was not previously aanounced in the college publications and any fee collected without a formal receipt should be punishable offences. This rule should be strictly enforced. [198-C-D] Certificate Hassles 11. Every student should be provided with the basic indentity certificate while he/she is in the higher secondary stage. This should provide all essential information such as date of birth, community, domicile, photo identity etc. , authenticated by the designated official. This should be acceptable for admission requirements in any institution and in any State in India.

(198-F, G) CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 29 of 2003. (Under Article 32 to the Constitution of India). WITH W. P. (C) Nos. 54, 57, 68, 69, 84, 85, 89, 91, 95, 98, 99, 1001. ,:003 and C. A. No. 8581 of 2003 Kailash Vasdev, Shanti Bhushan, M. C. Dhingra, Ms. Gulnar Khan, S. Sadashiva Reddy, Ms. Sudha Gupta, Syed Ali Ahmad, Syed Tanweer Ahmad, Mohan Pandey, A. S. Bhasme, Sanjay Visen, Manoj K. Mishra, S. K. Bhattacharya, M. N. Shroff, A. D. N. Rao, Rajiv K. Garg, Abhijeet Chatterjee, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Ms. Sunita Sharma, D. S. Mabra, Maninder Singh, Ms. Pratibha, M. Singh, Ankur Talwar, Kriti Maan Singh, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Aruna Mathur, Anurag D. Mathur, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Ms. Shyonmila Bakshi, Ashok K. Srivastava, Ashok K. Mahajan, K. R. Sasiprabhu, (NP) Ms. Krishna Sharma, Ms. Asha G. Nair, V. K. Sidharthan, Anil Srivastav, B. B. Singh, (NP), Ms. H. Wahi, Ms. Aruna Gupta, Ms. A. Subhashini Satinder S. Gulati, Neeraj Kumar Jain, Ms.

Kavita Waida, (NP), J. S. Attri, Sanjay R. Hegde, Satya Mitra, Anil K. Mihra, KH. Nobin Singh, U. U. Lalit, S. S. Shinde, Mukesh K. Giri, Ranjan Mukherjee, Ms. Kamakshi S. Mehlwal, (NP) Nillay Dutta General for State of Nagaland, Ms. V. D. Khanna, S. K. Nandy, R. S. Jena, (NP), Rs. Suri, Ranji Thomas, Ms. Bharati Upadhyaya, V. N. Rghupathy, Ms. Sandhya Goswami, (NP), A. T. M. Sampath, V. Balaji, P. N. Ramalingam, Gopal Singh, Navin Prakash, A. S. Pundir, (NP), Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, T. C. Sharma, Ms. Neelam Sharma, Ms. Sunita Sharma, D. S. Mehra, Anis Suhrawardy, Ms. Shamama Anis, V. G. Pragasam, Prakash Srivastava, Ashok Mathur, Nikhil Nayyar, Gautam Narayan, Mukul Gupta, . Ankur Jain and T. A. Khan for the appearing parties. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by: V. N. KHARE, CJ. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petition.

The core questions involved in these writ petitions and appeal centres round the constitutional validity of reservation whether based on domicile or institution in the matter ofadmission into Post Graduate Course in government run medical colleges. For determination of the said question factual matrix of the matter, is being noticed from Writ Petition (Civil) No. 29 of 2003. The petitioners who are 52 in number are original residents of Delhi. They joined various medical colleges out ofDelhi for undertaking their MBBS Courses ofstudies against the 15% all-India quota on being qualified therefor in the All India Medical Entrance Exam. ination. The appellants intended to join the medical colleges of Delhi for their Post Graduate Medical Courses. They applied for and were granted admission forms having regard to the decision of this Court in Dr. Parag Gupta v. University ofDelhi and Ors.. [2000) 5 SCC 684.

In the Bulletin ofInformation issued by the University of Delhi, it was stated, that candidates like the appellants would be entitled for admission in Post Graduate Courses subject to the decision of a matter pending in this Court, i. e. Magan Mehrotra and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. Since reported in (2003) 3 SCALE 101. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Magan Mehrotra (supra) inter alia, therein held that from institutional preference, no other preference including reservation on the basis ofresidence is envisaged in the Constitution, in view of the decision of this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1984) 3 SCC 654. The Delhi University or About 31. 12. 2002 relying on or on the basis of the decision ofthis Court in Magan Mehrotra (supra) issued the following notification. "In view of the judgment ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 17. 12. 2002 in Writ Petition (C) No. 417 of 2002. It is hereby notified that for admission of P. G.

Courses during the Academic Session 2003, only Delhi University Medical Graduates would be eligible against the 75% reserved seats of the students from Delhi who have taken admission in the University/States under the 15% All-India quota will not be eligible to seek admission in the P. G. , Degree/Diploma Courses ofDelhi University against the 75% Reserve Seats. All concern may please be note. Accordingly the students who have done MBBS under 15% All- India quota from the University/States other than Delhi University and have applied for admission to the P. G. Degree/Diploma Courses are not eligible to appear in P. G. Medical Entrance Test 2003 to be held on 9. 2. 2003. They are advised to apply for the return of the Bank Draft/Cheque. " The appellants claiming themselves to be "the residents of Delhi" and "sons of the soil" filed the writ petition in the court questioning the aforementioned notification dated 31. 12.

2002 as also reservation made by way of institutional preference for admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses. A Division Bench of this Court having regard to the decision in Magan Mehrotra's case (supra) which was rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court, referred the matter to a Bench ofthree Judges by order dated 3. 2. 2003. However, when the matter was placed before a three-Judge Bench, it by an order dated 7. 2. 2003 directed the matter to be placed before a Bench of five judges considering the importance ofthe matter; but no reason was assigned therefor. The question which was initially raised in the writ petition was as to whether reservation made by way of institutional preference is ultra vires Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India; but during hearing a larger issue viz. as to whether any reservation, be on residence or institutional preference is constitutionally permissible, was raised at the Bar. ..

_ In view of the importance ofthe question involved, this Bench in tenns oforder dated 1. 4. 2003 directed issuance ofnotice to all the States and Union Territories. Pursuant whereto, except State of A. P. and State of Jammu and Kashmir all the States filed their returns and were heard. Shri Harish Salve, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe appellants raised two contentions in support of the writ petition. He submitted that in view of the equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 15 (I) of the Constitution of India, reservation whether based on domicile or institutional preference would be unconstitutional. The learned council took us through the decisions of this Court operating in the filed and urged that in view of the passage of time no reservation should be pennitted either on the basis of residence or on institutional preference. Reservation on residential criteria, the learned counsel contended, is squarely hit by clause (1) of Auricle 15 of the Constitution of India.

Placing reliance on the debates on the subjects at the time of framing of the Constitution, Shri Salve urged that the 'place of birth' being synonymous with 'domicile' the observations made contrary thereto is D. P. Joshi v. The State ofMadhya Bharat and Anr. , [1955] l SCR 1215 are not correct. Shri Salve further contended that in tenns of the constitutional scheme, reservation is pennissible only when there exist compelling Government objectives therefor and that too on nominal basis if it can be demonstrated that 'rule of merit' should not be allowed to be sustained and when the class in whose favour a departure is sought to be made constitutes a homogeneous group and such departure satisfies the tests of social justice for securing equality upon comparison of such disability suffered by such class or group of persons.

The learned counsel submitted that in the matter of reservation the State must scrupulously follow the requirements of clause (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution of India, namely, that the same is needed for the section of society or a homogeneous class and identified by a presidential order issued in that behalf. In a case involving higher education even, Shri Salve argued, such provision must be handled with care and keeping in view a large number of decision ofthis Court including MR. Ba/aji and Ors. v. State ofMysore, AIR [1963] SC 649 = [1963] Supp. I SCR 439 not more than 50% of the total seats can be reserved. The learned counsel would contend that if such reservation is prima facie impennissible having regard to the constitutional scheme the same would fall within the purview of 'suspected classification' ·and thus, must pass the 'strict scruiting test' or 'intermediate scrutiny test'.

Any executive order providing for such reservation, the learned counsel urged, must be construed having regard to the preamble, the fundamental rights of the citizens and in particular Article 19 (I) (d), as also that Directive Principles of the State Policy as contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India and in particular Articles 41 and 47 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that meritorious students suffer from lack of mobility as contra distinguished from the mobility of the employees, and are required to be protected so as to suffer any discrimination only on a specious plea of the State "our money, our people". Domicile of all the citizens of India, Shri Salve urged, should be one; as the concept ofState domicile has no role to play in our constitutional scheme.

He emphasized that keeping the same in view, a profile check is required to be made so far as meritorious students are c:oncerned, as those who are born and brought up in small town also would like to have higher education in the metropolitan towns where having regard to the better infrastructures and higher resources, the institution therein would provide a better academic pursuit for them. In terms of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, Shri Salve argued, students cannot form different class nor any such classification made amongst them wouid be in public interest. Relying heavily upon the observations made in paragraph I0 of the judgement of this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra), the learned counsel submitted that as all students are entitled to equal opportunities all sorts of reservations must be given a go bye.

The learned counsel next contended that in any event, the students, like the appellants should not be held to have lost their residential status only because they had gone out of the their State of origin for pursuing their MBBS Course for a period of five years. According to Shri Salve, Magan Mehrotra (supra). , does not lay down the correct law and it is required to be overruled. Assailing reservation by way of institutional preference, Shri Salve, further submitted that the very premise upon which it is based is fallacious inasmuch as the majority of students, in view of the decision of this Court in Dr.

Pradeep Jain's case (supra) having taken admission on the criteria of domicile alone, would again be considered for pursuing their Post Graduate Stutlies only on that basis and, thus, reservation by way of institutional preference would amount to indirect way of doing things as the same would for all intent and purport would be based on domicile and tlius, is liable to be struck down. Shri Salve further contended that Delhi University or the States were required to place before this Court sufficient materials to prove that such classification on institutional preference is based on an intelligible differentia Drawing our attention to the statements made in the counter affidavit, the learned counsel urged. that no such material has been placed except that the said practice is in vogue for a long time. Shri R. F.

Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of some ofthe students of All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in All India Institute of Medical Sciences Students' Union v. All India Institute ofMedical Sciences and Ors. , (2002] I SCC 428, out of 40 students only 6 were offered admission in nonclinical subjects which the most of the students would not like to pursue Shri Nariman urged that plight of the students of AIIMS should be considered having regard to the stand taken by or the practice prevalent in other Universities, namely, institutional preference and in the view of the matter the students ofthe institution are also entitled to equal opportunity to compete with students of other Universities. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the students of Delhi University, on the other hand, submitted that Magan Mehrotra's case (supra) has correctly been decided.

The learned counsel contended that keeping in view the decisions of this Court e. g. D. P. Joshi (supra), Dr. Jagadish Saran and Others v, Union ofIndia [1980] 2 SCC 768 and Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra), it must be held that reservation by way institutional preference has held the field for a long time. The impugned notification, Shri Shanti Bhushan urged, having been issuing pursuant of this p Court, it is futile to urge that the action on the part of Delhi University in following the 'same has resulted in arbitrarirtess. According to the learned counsel reservation by way of institutional preference is not only a matter of convenience but also forms part of the educational policy. If such a policy is not allowed to have a little play, a student while undergoing different courses of studies may have to take admissions in different parts of the country wherefor he would face problems involving different languages, different cultures and different environments.

It may not be feasible even for the parents of middle class family to send their children out of the State. Furthermore, the learned counsel contended that the chances that the local students would serve the local people cannot be completely ruled out and, thus, such a criteria cannot be said t. i be illogical or bad in law. As regard application of strict scrutiny test, Shri Shanti Bhushan relying on or on the basis of the decision in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar and Ors. , [1959] SCR 279 submitted that this Court has laid down the law that the constitutionality of a statute must be presumed and onus to prove that the statute is unconstitutional is upon the person who asserts the same. Only two . tests, namely, as to whether the classification is reasonable and based on an intelligible differentia stood the test of time and there is no reason to deviate therefrom.

Shri Shanti Bhushan argued that reservation by way of institutional preference had been holding the field since this Court decided Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) and nothing has been pointed out by the petitioners to show that the said principle should be departed from. Shri A Mariarputham, learned conusel appearing on behalf of Delhi University, supplementing the arguments of Shri Shanti Bhushan, submitted that reservation by way of institutional preference is a definite and identifiable criteria and in the view ofthe matter it satisfies the test of valid classification as contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The reason assigned in support of the institutional preference in various decisions ofthis Court arc still relevant and such there being no change in the situation, any fresh look or reconsideration thereof is not warranted. This Court, the learned counsel urged that having framed a scheme in Dr.

Pradeep Jain's case (supra) which is binding on all concerned in view of the provisions contained in Articles 141, 142, 143 and 144 ofthe Constitution of India may not depart therefrom in view of the fact that this Court in Magan Mehrotra's case (supra) upon issuance of notice to all States had clearly directed that the law relating in institutional preference laid down in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) should be followed and in particular directed that the States of Assam, Kamataka, Tamil Nadu and Goa to follow reservation by way of institutional preference alone. The learned counsel contended that all the States have since amended their rules so as to consider the candidature of those students who hand studied in any of the institutions situated in the State on 15% all India quota and in that view of the matter the said students do not require a further indulgence.

According to the learned counsel apart from the fact that the students who had gone to purse their MBBS courses outside the State are entitled to take part in all India open competition, they having regard to the amendments made in the rules framed by the States of Karnataka, Assam and others being entitled to institutional preference in the State where they had studied, may not be held to be entitled to a further indulgence of competing with the students of Delhi University in 75% quota on the ground that they ·are residents af Delhi and thereby bringing back the concept of reservation on domicile indirectly again. Shri Sanjay Hegde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Karnataka, Shri A. Phukan, learned counsel appearing for the State of Assam and Shri R. S. Suri, learned counsel appearing for the State ofPunjab, however, submitted that the States should be allowed to set apart some seats for the local candidates.

It was pointed out that unlike other studies Post Graduate Medical Courses involve practical training and the students are required to work in the hospitals wherein they are paid stipends by the States. It was urged that the States have been finding it extremely difficult to get good number of local doctors to serve the rural population and thus, such a criteria, according to the learned counsel, cannot be said to be unconstitutional. Before we embark upon the questions raised at the Bar, we may notice that the States before the decision of this Court in Dr. Parag Gupta's Case (supra) had been following different criteria as regard grant of preference i. e. either on institution basis or on residence basis or both. The positions prevailing in different States before and after Dr. Parag Gupta's case (supra) and at present are given as under: POSITION BEFORE PARAG GUPTA SI. State Nature of Preference I. U. P. Institutional 2. Delhi Institutional 3. Maharashtra Institutional 4.

Gujarat Institutional 5. West Bengal Institutional 6. Assam Residence 7. Tamil Nadu Residence 8. Goa Residence 9. Karnataka Residence 10. Madhya Pradesh Institutional OR Residence 11. Haryana Institutional OR Residence 170 SUPREME COURT REPO;zrs [2003] SUPP. 5 S. C. R. 12. Punjab Institutional OR Residence 13. Rajasthan Institutional OR Residence 14. Kerala Institutional OR Residence 15. Orissa Institutional OR Residence 16. Himachal Pradesh Institutional OR Residence 17. Bihar Institutional OR Residence 18. Pondicherry 25% all India quota + 37. 5% Institutional of available seats + 37. 5% of available open for all seats POSITION AFrER PARAG GUPTA SI. State Nature of Preference I. U. P. Institutional Residence (15%) 2. Delhi Institutional Residence (15%) 3. Maharashtra Institutional 4. Gujarat Institutional 5. West Bengal Institutional 6. Assam Residence 7. Tamil Nadu Residence 8. Goa Residence (IOYears) 9. Kamataka Residence 10. Madhya Pradesh Institutional OR Residence 11.

Haryana Institutional OR Residence 12. Punjab Institutional OR Residence 13. Rajasthan Institutional OR Residence 14. Kerala Institutional OR Residence 15. Orissa Institutional OR Residence 16. Himachal Pradesh Institutional OR Residence 17. Bihar Institutional OR Residence 18. Pondicherry 25% all India quota + 37. 5% Institutional of available seats + 37. 5% of available seats open for all PRESENT POSITION SI. State Nature of Preference I. U. P. Institutional 2. Delhi Institutional \ 3. Maharashtra Institutional 4. Gujarat Institutional 5. West Bengal Institutional 6. Assam Residence 7. Tamil Nadu Residence 8. Goa Residence (10 Years) 9. Kamataka Residence (I0 years) 10. Madhya Pradesh Institutional OR Residence 11. Haryana Institutional OR Residence 12. Punjab Residence 13. Rajasthan Institutional OR Residence 14. Kerala Institutional OR Residence 15. Orissa Institutional OR Residence 16. Himachal Pradesh Institutional OR Residence 17. Bihar Institutional OR Residence 18.

Pondicherry 25% all India quota + 37. 5% Institutional of available seats + 37. 5% of available seats open for all It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that before the scheme was evolved in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra), notices had been issued to all the States all of them were fully heard. But despite the same, the orders, passed by this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) had been flouted with impunity, inter a/ia, by the States of Assam, Kamataka Goa and Tamil Nadu. Now it transpires that even State of Punjab has also not been following the said decision. The. necessity of issuing notices by this Court ag! jin in Magan Mehrotra's case (supra) must be considered from that angle. In Magan Mehrota's case (supra), this Court not only reiterated that the reservation by way of institutional preference be maintained but also directed the aforementioned States to follow the same. The questions must, therefore, be considered in the aforementioned factual backdrop.

The first question that arises for consideration is, whether the reservation on the basis ofdomicile is impermissible in terms ofclause (I) ofArticle 15 of the Constitution of/ndia? The term 'place of birth' occurs in clause (I) of Article 15 nut not 'domicile'. If a compassion is made between Article ' 15(1) and Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India, it would appear that whereas the former refers to 'place of birth' alone, the latter refers to both 'domicile' and 'residence' apart from place of birth. A distinction, therefore, has been made by the makers ofthe Constitution themselves to the effect that the expression 'place ofbirth' is not synonymous to the expression 'domicile' and they reflect two different concepts. It may be true, as has been pointed out by Shri Salve and pursued by Mr. Nariman, that both the expressions appeared to be synonymous to some of the members of the Constituent Assembly but the same, in our opinion, cannot be a guiding factor. In D. P.

Joshi 's case (supra), a Constitution Bench held so in no uncertain terms. This Bench is bound by the said decision. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Pradip Tandon and Ors. , [1975] 1 SCC 267 this Court observed: "The reservation for rural areas cannot be sustained on the ground that the rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes ofcitizens. This reservation appears to be made for the majority population of the State. Eighty per cent of the population of the State cannot be a homogenous class. Poverty in rural areas cannot be the basis of classification to support reservation for rural areas. Poverty is found in all parts of India.

In the instructions for reservation of seats it is provided that in the application form a c~didate for reserved seats form rural areas must submit a certificate of the District Magistrate of the District to which he belonged that he was bom in rural areas and had a permanent home there, and is residing there or that he was born in India and his parents and guardians are still living there and earn their livelihood there. The incident of birth in rural areas is made the basic qualification. No reservation can be made on the basis of place of birth, as this would offend Article 15. " Answer to the said question must, therefore, be rendered in the negative. The second question that arises for our consideration is, whether reservation by way of institutional preference comes within suspected classification warranting strict scrutiny test?

Once it is held that clause (I) of Article 15 of the Constitution of India is not attracted, the only question which survives is as to whether the same attracts the wrath of Article 14 ofthe Constitution oflndia. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification subject to the conditions that it is based on an intelligible differentia and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. In Shri Ram Krishna Da/mia's case (supra), this Court categorically held: " ... It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation.

In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and, (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical or according to objeets or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions ofthis Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. " The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequents cases.

The decisions of this Court further establish (a) that a law may be constitutional even thought it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons .

applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour ofthe constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression ofthe constitutional principles; (c) that is must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of problems made manifest by experience and that its discrimination are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the count may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing c:onditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face ofthe law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations of hostile or discrimination legislation.

The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws. " The strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test applicable in the United States of America as argued by Shri Salve cannot be applied in this case. Such a test in not applied in Indian Courts. In any event, such a test may be applied in a case where a legislation ex facie is found to be unreasonable. Such at test may also be applied in a case where by reason of a stature the life and liberty of a citizen is put in jeopardy. This Court since its inception apart from a few cases where the legislation was found to be ex facie wholly unreasonable proceeded on the doctrine that constitutionality of a statute is to be presumed and the burden to prove contra is on him who asserts the same.

The counts always lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative "on the principle expressed in the maxim: ut res magis valeat quam pereat. ''[See Cit v. Teja Singh, AIR S. CHAUDRI v. U. 0. 1. [KHARE, CJ. ] (1959) SC 3520 and Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State ofAssam, AIR (1990) SC 123. Applying the test of presumption of constitutionality no case has been made out for invoking the doctrine of strict construction or intermediate construction. The third question that arises for our consideration is, whether the reservation by institutional preference is valid! India is one country and all its citizens should equally be treated. The essence of equality is enshrined in Article I4 of the Constitution of India. But does it mean that equality clause must be applied to all citizens to all situations?

It is true that the country should strive to achieve a goal of excellence which in tum would mean that meritorious students should not be denied pursuit of higher studies. This itself brings us the question, who is to judge the merit and what are the standards therefor? It is extremely difficulty. to lay down a fool-proof criteria . success or failure of a candidate in one examination or the other may not lead to infallible conclusion as regard the merit of a candidate so as to achieve excellence. The larger question, therefore, would be how to and what extent balance should be struck.. Ideal situation, although it might have been to see that only meritorious students irrespective of caste, creed, sex, place of birth, domicile/residence are treated equally but history is replete with situations to show that India is not ready therefor. Sociological condition prevailing in India compelled the makers of the Constitution to bring in Articles 15 and 16 in the Constitution.

The said Articles for all intent and purport are species of Article 14 which is the genies in a sense that they provide for exception to the equality clause also. Preference to a class of persons whether based on caste, creed, religion, p place ofbirth, domicile or residence in embedded in our constitutional scheme. Whereas larger interest of the country must be perceived, the law makers cannot shut their eyes to the local needs also. Such local needs must receive due consideration keeping in view the duties ofthe State contained in Articles 41 and 47 ofthe Constitution ofIndia. (Emphasis mine) For the last five decades this Court times without number had adopted the efficacy of one criteria or the other for giving preference to a section of students. Constitutional interpretation is a difficult task. Its concept varies from statute to statute, fact to fact, situation to situation and subject matter to subject matter.

Perceptions are yet to be perceived by the court which would meet all situations while laying down emphasis for achieving excellence in all spheres of life keeping in view Chapter IV-A of the Constitution of India which provide for fundamental duties, circumstances and compulsions faced by the State in this behalf led the courts to uphold a statute providing for reservation for a special class of people. Mostly they suffer from disability either being belonging to an oppressed community or by way 1Jf economical, cultural or social imbalances. The courts shall all along strive hard for maintaining a balance. While interpreting the Constitution, we must notice the following view of Justice Homes expressed in Missouri v..

Holland, 252 us 416 (433): "When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realise that they have called into life a being the development ofwhich could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realise or to hope that they had created an organism, it has taken a century and has cost their successors must sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light ofour whole experience and not merely in that of what said a hundred years ago. '' [Emphasis supplied] Equally important is an elucidation ofJustice Frankfurther contained in an article "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes. " This Court also in Jagadish Saran and Ors. v.

Union ofIndian, [1980) 2 sec 768, a decision which is applicable in the fact situation of this case, stated the law thus: "Law, constitutional law, is not an omnipotent abstraction or distant idealization but a principled, yet pragmatic, value-laden and resultedoriented, set ofpropositions applicable to and conditioned by a concrete stage ofsocial development ofthe nation and aspirational imperatives of the people. India Today-that is inarticulate major premise of our constitutional law and life. " In D. P. Joshi's case (supra) advantage give to local residents as regard payment of capitation fee was upheld. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Km. Chitra Ghosh and Anr. Union of India and Ors. , [1969] 2 SCC 228 stated the law thus: "It is the Central Government which bears the financial burden of running the medical college. It is for it to lay down the criteria for eligibility.

From the very ,J\'ature of things it is not possible to throw the admission open 1\0 students from all over the country. The Government cannot be·denied the right to decide from which sources the admission will be made. That essentially is a question ofpolicy and depends inter alia on an overall assessment and survey of the requirements ofresidents ofparticular territories andother categories ofpersons for whom it is necessary to provide facilities for medical education. Ifthe sources are properly classified whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis it is not for the courts to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification. " [Emphasis supplied] The matter came up for consideration again is D. N. Chanchala v. The State of Mysore and Ors. , [1971) 2 SCC 293 and M. R. Mini (Minor) represented by her Guardian and Father M. P. Rajappan v. State ofKera/a and Anrs. , [1980) 2 SCC 216, Wherein a similar note was struck. In Dr.

Jagadish Saran's case (supra) this Court had an occasion to consider the question as to whether grant of institutional preference was a valid basis for admission. This case dealt with admission in Post Graduate Courses of the Delhi University. Krishna Iyer, J. with whom Pathak, J. concurred in no uncertain terms upheld such preference. A large number of decisions on the point were taken into consideration by this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra). Upon a detailed analysis of the constitutional provisions, case laws as also the practical difficulties faced by the States, students as also the institutions, it was held: " .... What is, therefore, necessary is to set up proper and adequate structures in rural areas where competent medical services can be provided by doctors and some motivation must be provided to the doctors servicing those areas.

But, as the position stands today, there is considerable paucity of seats in medical colleges to satisfy the increasing demand of students for admission and some principle has, therefore, to be evolved for making' selection ofstudents for admission to the medical colleges and such principle has to be in conformity with the requirement of Article 14. Now, the primary imperative of Article 14 is equal opportunity for all across the nation for education and advancement, and as pointed out by Krishna lyre, J. in Jagdish Saran v. Union ofIndia "this has during relevance to our times when the country is gradually being 'broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls' by surrender to narrow parochial loyalties". What is fundamental, as an enduring value of our polity, is guarantee to each of equal opportunity to unfold the full potential of his personality.

Anyone anywhere, humble or high agrestic or urban, man or women, whatever be his language or religion, place of birth or residence, is entitled to be afforded eq. ial change for admission to any secular educational course for cultural growth, training facility, speciality or employment. It would run counter to the basic principle of equality before the law and equal protection of the Jaw if a citizen by reason of his residence in State A, which ordinarily in the communality of cases, would be the result of his birth in a place situate within that State, should have opportunity for education or advancement which is denied to another citizen because he happens to be resident in State B. It is axiomatic that talent is not the monopoly of the residents of any particular State; it is more or less evenly distributed and given proper opportunity and environment, everyone has a prospect of rising to the peak.

What is necessary is equality of opportunity and that cannot be made dependent upon where a citizen resides. If every citizen is afforded equal opportunity, genetically and environmentally, to develop his potential, he will be able in his own way to manifest his faculties fully leading to all round improvement in excellence. The philosophy and pragmatism of universal excellence through . equality of opportunity for education and advancement across the nation is part of our founding faith and constitutional creed. The effort must, therefore, always be to select the best and most meritorious students for admission to technical institutions and medical colleges by providing equal opportunity to all citizens in the country and no citizen can legitimately, without serious detriment to the unity and integrity ofthe nation, be regarded as an outsider in our constitutional set-up.

Moreover, it would be against national interest to admit in medical colleges or other institutions giving instruction in specialities, less meritorious students when more menitorious students are available, simply because the former are permanent residents or residents for a certain number of years in the State while the latter are not, though both categories are citizens of India. Exclusion of more meritorious students on the ground that they are not resident within the State would be likely to promote substandard candidates and bring about fall in medical competence, injurious in the long run to the very region. "It is no blessing to inflict quacks and medical midgets on people by wholesale sacrifice of talent at the threshold. Nor can the very best be rejected from admission because that will be a national loss and the interests of no region can be higher than those of the nation".

The primary consideration in selection of candidates for admission to the medical colleges must, therefore, be merit. The object of any rules which may be made for regulating admissions to the medical colleges must be to secure the best and most meritorious students. " But it was observed: " ... Whether consistently with the constitutional values, admissions to a medical college or any other institution of higher learning situate in a State can be confined to those who have their 'domicile' within the State or who are residents within the State for a specified number of years or can any reservation in admission be made for them so as to given them precedence over those who do not possess 'domicile' or residential qualification within the State, irrespective of merit... " The right of development in a developing country in acknowledged in International Treaties, Charters and Conventions.

Referring to the State mentality and pointing out of the law that there does not exist any separate State domicile in India, this Court specifically banished the residential requirement for the purpose of admission into Post Graduate Medical Courses for all times. It directed: "So much for admission to the MBBS course, but different consideration must prevail when we come to consider the question of reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on institutional preference for admission to the post-graduate courses, such as, MD, MS and the like. There we cannot allow excellence to be compromised by any other considerations because that would be . I ,, detrimental to the interest of the nation. It was rightly pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J.

in Jagadish Saran case, and we wholly endorse what he has said: The basic medical needs of a region or the preferential push justified for a handicapped group cannot prevail in the same measure at the highest scales of speciality where the best skill or talent, must be handpicked by selecting according to capability. At the level of Ph. D. MD, or levels ofhigher proficiency, where intentional measure of talent is made, where losing one great scientist or technologist inthe-making is a national loss, the considerations we have expanded upon as important lose their potency. Here equality measured by matching excellence, has more meaning and cannot be diluted much without grave risk. sec pp. 778-79' para 23. * * * If equality of opportunity for every person in the country is the constitutional guarantee, a candidate who gets more marks than another is entitled to preference for admission.

Merit must be the test when choosing the best, according to this rule of equal chance for equal marks. This proposition has greater importance when we reach the higher levels of education like post-graduate courses. After all, top technological expertise in any vital field like medicine is a nation's human asset without which its advance and development will be stunted. The role of high grade skill or special talent may be less at the lesser levels of education, jobs and disciplines of social inconsequence, but more at the higher levels of sophisticated skills and strategic employment. To devalue merit at the summit is to temporise with the country's development in the vital areas of professional expertise.

In science and technology and other specialised I fields ofdevelopmental significance, to relax lazily or easily in regard to exacting standards ofperformance may be running a grave national risk because in advanced medicine and other critical departments of higher knowledge, crucial to material progress, the people of India should not be denied the best the nation's talent lying latent can produce. If the best potential in these fields in cold-shouldered for populist considerations garbed as reservations, the victims, in the long run, may be the people themselves. Of course, this unrelenting strictness in selecting the best may not be so imperative at other levels where a broad measure of efficiency may be good enough and what is needed is merely to weed out the worthless. SCC p. 785, para 39. * * * Secondly, and more importantly, it is difficult to denounce or renounce the merit criterion when the selection is for postgraduate of post-doctoral courses in specialised subjects.

There is no substitute for sheer flair, for creative talent, for fine-tuned performance at the difficult heights of some disciplines where the best alone is likely to blossom as the best. To sympathise mawkishly with the weaker sections by selecting sub-standard candidates, is to punish society as a whole by denying the prospect ofexcellence say in hospital service. Even the poorest, when stricken by critical illness, needs the attention of super-skilled specialists, not humdrum second-rates. So it is that relaxation on merit, by overruling equality and quality altogether, is a social risk where the stage is post-graduate or postdoctoral. sec p. 786, para 44. These passages from the judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. clearly and forcibly express the same view which we have independently reached on our own and indeed that view has been so ably expressed in these passages that we do not think we can usefully add anything to what has already been said there.

We may point out that the Indian Medical Council has also emphasized that playing with merit, so far as admissions to post-graduate courses are concerned, for pampering local feeling, will boomerang. We may with advantage reproduce the recommendation of the Indian medical Council on this point which may not be the last word in social wisdom but is certainly worthy of consideration: Students for post-graduate training should be selected strictly on merit judged on the basis of academic record in the under graduate course. All selection for post-graduate studies should be conducted by the Universities. The Medical Education Review Committee has al§o expressed the opinion that. "all admissions to the post-graduate courses in any institution should be open to candidates on an all-India basis and there should be no restriction regarding domicile in the State/Union Territory in which the institution is located".

So also in the policy statement filed by the learned Attorney-General, the Government of India his categorically expressed the view that: So far as admission to the institutions of post-graduate colleges and special professional colleges is concerned, it should be entirely on the basis of all-India merit subject to constitutional reservations in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. We are therefore of the view that so far as admissions to postgraduate courses, such as MS, MD and the like are concerned, it would be eminently desirable not to provide for any reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on institutional preference.

But, having regard to broader considerations ofequality of opportunity and institutional continuity in education which has its own importance and value, we would direct that though residence requirement within the State shall not be a ground for reservation in admissions to postgraduate courses, a certain percentage of seats may in the present circumstances, be reserved on the basis of circumstances, be reserved on the basis of institutional preference in the sense that a student who has passed MBBS course from a medical college or university, may be given preference for admission to the post-graduate course in the same medical college or university but such reservation on the basis of institutional preference should not in any event exceed 50 per cent of the total number of open seats available for admission to the postgraduate course.

This outer limit which we are fixing will also be subject to revision on the lower side by the Indian Medical Council in the same manner as directed by us in the case of admission to the MBBS t:ourse. But, even in regard to admissions to the post-graduate course, we would direct that so far as super specialities such as neurosurgery and cardiology are concerned, there should be no reservation at all even on the basis of institutional preference and admissions should be granted purely on merit on all-India basis. " It in no uncertain terms directed: "The decisions reached by us in these writ petitions will bind the Union of Indian, the State Governments and Administrations of Union Territories because it lays down the law for the entire country and moreover we have reached this decision after giving notice to the Union oflndia and all the State Governments and Union Territories...

" A scheme, thus, came to be framed by this Court which is a law a within the meaning ofArticle 141 ofthe Constitution oflndian and is binding on all the States in terms of Article 144 of the Constitution of India. The principal considerations which weighed with the court for arriving at the aforementioned conclusion were: "'... There can be no doubt that the policy of ensuring ·admission to the MBBS Course on all-India basis is a highly desirable policy, based as it is on the postulate that India is one nation and every citizen of India is entitled to have equal opportunity for education and advancement, but it is an ideal to be aimed at and it may not be realistically possible, in the present circumstances, to adopt it, for it cannot produce real equality of opportunity unless there is complete absence of disparities and inequalities-a situation which simply does not exist in The country today.

There are massive social and economic disparities and inequalities not only between State and State but also between region and region within a State and even between citizens and citizens within the same region. There is a yawning gap between the rich and the poor and there are so many disabilities and injustices from which the poor suffer as a class that they cannot avail themselves of any opportunities which may in law be open to them. They do not have the social and material resources to take advantage of these opportunities which remain merely on paper recognized by law but non-existent in fact. Students from backward States or regions will hardly be able to compete with those from advanced States or regions because, though processing an intelligent mind, they would have had no adequate opportunities for development so as to be in a position to compete with others.

So also students belonging to the weaker sections who have not, be reason of their socially or economically disadvantaged position, been able to secure education in good schools would be at a disadvantage compared to students belonging to . the effluent or well-to-do families who have had the best of school education and in open all-India competition, they would be likely to be worsted... " A distinction was made therefor between the Undergraduate Course i. e. , MBBS course and Post Graduate Medical Course as also super speciality courses. The Court, therefore, sought to strike a balance ofrights and interests of all concerned. However, the percentage of seats to be allotted on all-Indian basis however, came to be modified in Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. v. Motial Nehru Medical College, Allahabadand Ors.

, [1985] 3 SCC 22 in the following terms: "We would also like to clear up one misunderstanding which seems to prevail with some State Governments and universities in regard to the true import of our Judgment dated June 22, 1984. They have misinterpreted our Judgment to mean that 30% of the total number of seats available of admission MBBS course in a medical college should be kept free from reservation on the basis ofresidence requjrement or institutional preference. That is a total misreading of our Judgement. What we have said in our Judgement is that after providing for reservation validly made, whatever seats remain available for non-reserved categories, 30% of such seats at the least, should be left free for open competition and admission to such 30% open seats should not be based on residence requirement or institutional preference but. students from all over the country should be able to compete for admissions to such 30% open seats.

To take an example, suppose there are I00 seats in a medical college or university and 30% of the seats are validly reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. That would leave 70 seats available for others belonging to non-reserved categories. According to our Judgment, 30% of 70 seats, that is, 21 seats out or 70 and not 30% ofthe total number of 100 seats, namely, 30 seats, must be filled up by open competition regardless of residence requirement or institutional preference. " Changes were made in the formula in Dr. Dinesh Kumar and Ors. (II) v. Motial Nehru Medical College, Allahabad and Ors. , (1986] 3 SCC 727 at page 733. This Court thereafter times without number issued directions from time to time regulating admissions in different courses of studies, meticulous supervision and conduct of examinations by the Universities as also all- Indian tests in the following: I. Dr. Dinesh Kumar (III) [1987] 4 sec 122 2. Dr.

Dinesh Kumar (IV) [1987] 4 sec 459 3. Dr. Dinesh Kumar (V) [1989) Supp. 2 sec 428 4. Dr. Dinesh Kumar (VI) [1987] 1 SCALE 1232 5. Dr. Dinesh Kumar (VII) [1987] 2 SCALE 222 6. Dr. Dinesh Kumar (VIII) [I 988] I SCALE 428 7. Dr. Dinesh Kumar (IX) [I990J 4 sec 627 The State of Assam, it appears, was specifically directed to follow institutional preference by this Court. by an order dated 2. 2. 1996 in Write Petition (Civil) No. 625 of 1995. A deviation to the said dicta, however, was sought to be made by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Dr. Parag Gupta's case (supra).

In the said decision some of the students complained that whereas the students who had } undergone studies in other Universities were entitled to reservation by way domicile or institutional preference, but they, although had successfully competed in All India Entrance Test in MBBS Course, are not being permitted to compete with their fellow students of Delhi University on the ground of institutional preference, although they belong to the same class of students. This Court in Dr. Parag Gupta (supra) did not lay down any law. It dealt with the situation on equitable and humanitarian grounds but while doing so it indisputable deviated from the law laid down in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case supra only by way of an interim arrangement. It inadvertently created reservation on domicile which was forbidden in Dr. Pradeep Jain's case supra. The said provisional directions being binding on Delhi University came to be following subsequent years.

The sympathetic consideration shown by this Court in Dr. Parage Gupta's case (supra) came to be misapplied by the Allahabad High Court in Vineet Singh 's case wherein the High Court directed consideration of cases of the students who belonged to the State of U. P. irrespective of the fact that whether they had gone out of their home State on 15% all-India quota or not. This Court in State of UP. and Ors. v. Vineet Singh and Ors. , [2000] 7 SCC 262 clarified the position holding that the High Court war wrong in extending the benefit in Dr. Parag Gupta's case supra to other students and reiterated that Dr. Parag Gupta's decision was confined to the students who had gone to other States under 15% all-India quota. The ratio of the judgment iii Dr. Parag Gupta's case (supra) came to be reiterated in Abhinav Aggarwal and Anr. v. Union of Indian and Ors. , [20011 3 sec 425. In Dr. Prachi Almeida v. Dean, Gna Medical Collage and Ors.

, [2001] 7 SCC 640, a problem was faced by a :;tudent from Delhi who was admitted into Goa Medical College under the 15% all-India quota. She was denied admission in Goa on the ground that she was not resident of the said State. She, however, was married in Goa. This Court followed Dr. Pradeep Jain's case (supra) and directed that the student cannot be denied admission on the basis of residence requirement holding that if the candidate has done MBBS Course in that State such a candidate would be eligible for admission in Post Graduate Medical Course therein. Some students of the Delhi University, thereafter filed a writ petition questioning the residential reservation in Magan Mehrotra and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , since reported in (2003) 3 SCALE IOI. A Bench of this Court therein by an order dated 11. 09. 2002 noticing the conflict between the decisions in Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra) on the one hand and Dr.

Parag Gupta < (supra) on the other, issued notices to all the States excepting the States of Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh and referred the matter to a three- Judge Bench. In Magan Mehrotra (supra) this Court held that the decision in Dr. Parag Gupta (supra) is contrary to the decision in Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra) stating: " ...... A bare look at the judgement of the 3-Judge Bench in Pradeep Jain's case and two-Judge Bench in Parag Gupta's case in relation to the question of preference in the post graduate course it cannot but be held that the Parag Gupta's case took a different view by upholding the residential preference, in essence, which was contrary to the judgement of the three-Judge Bench in Pradeep Jain's case.

Independently on examining the 7 issue of preference, we are also of the considered opinion that the decision rendered by this Court in Pradeep Jain's case had taken a correct criteria into consideration and we therefore, agree with the principles evolved and the ratio given in Pradeep Jain's case so far as it relates to admission into the post graduate courses and the question of institutional preference to be given to those who had studied their under graduate courses in the very institutions against the 15% quota on the All India basis. In this view of the matter, the impugned Bulletin of Information issued by the Delhi University in relation to the Post-doctoral (D. M. /M. Ch. ) Post Graduate Degree must be held to be contrary to the direction of this Court in Pradeep Jain's case and the same is accordingly quashed. However, this order shall be made effective form the next academic session.

We, however, direct the States of Assam, Tamil Nadu, Goa and Kamataka to follow the pattern of institutional preference as has been indicated by this Court in Pradeep Jain's case and reiterated by us today... ". We may, however, notice that this Court in K Duraisa