SETH NAND LAL & ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS

Citation: [1980] 3 S.C.R. 1181

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, P.N. BHAGWATI, V.R. KRISHNA IYER, V.D. TULZAPURKAR, A.P. SEN

Case summary

;;cision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jaswant Kaur's(') dse, seek to challenge the vires of some of the pro- ' visions of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1972 (26 of before the authorities nnder the Act, the Court dismissed all the writ petitions.

Judgment text

SETH NANO LAL & ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. May 9, 1980 1(Y.. V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J. , P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA hER, V. D. TuLZAPURKAR & A. P. SEN, JJ. ] • • Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Haryana Act 26 of 1972)- . c~nstitutional validity of-Artificial definition of family unit-Sections 4(1), 4(3), 7, 8, 9, 11(1) and (2), whetill? r violate Article 14 of the Consti111tion. The Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Act 26 of 1972) received the assent of the President on 22-12·1972 and was publish\xl in the Oflicial Gazette on 23-12-72. Section 2 contained and even now contains the requisite deda. ation that it was enacfed for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution. The' Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7·9-1974 a. nd, thereby, it came under the protective um1'rella of Art. 31B of the c·onstitution. In Saroj Kuniari's case A. LR.

1975 Punjab & Haryana 353 relying on an ·earlier decision of that Court in Sucha Singh's case A. LR. 1974 P & H 162, the Punjab & Haryana High Court, being ·unaware of the inclusion of Act 26 of 1972 in the Ninth Schedule struck down certadn provisions of th:e Act on the ground that these provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. •The Full Bench decision in Sucha Singh's case A. I. R. 1974 Punjab & Hary~na 162 was reversed by the Supreme Court in Sucha Singh's case A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 915, taking the view that the provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act . are saved by both Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution. However, after the decision in Saroj Kumari's case, Act 26 of 1972 and--the Rules framed under ~. 31, thereof were amended extensively; the Act was first amended by Haryana Act 17 of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the Ninth Schedule; the Act was further a. nended by Harya. na Acts Nos.

40 and 47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18' of 1978, but the last four Amending Acts were not put in the Ninth S meagre rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision, even in the absence . of a provision_ conferring discretion • OQ the appellate/revisional authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. [1207 G-H, 1208 A-DJ Anant Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat A. LR. 1975 S. C. 1234 applied. • • 12. Section 8 (3) of the Act does not violate the second proviso of s. 31A. The Act including - the said provision having been included in the Ninth Schedule will receive the protection of Art. 3JB. [1208 D-E] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1361 Of 1977 Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 17-3-1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Writ Petition No. 4766of1976 AND CIVIL APPEALS NOS.

2785-86, 2935-38, 2893, 2823-25, 2235, 1348, 1362~74, 1525-27, 2022-23, 2144, 22:t4, 2707, 2710, 2831, 2723-24, 2423-26, 2805--09/77,976, 843-44, 1263, 56--67, 1010-1014, 1076, 1898-1901, 1902-16,2043-47, 2064, 1674-76, 120-27, 1079, 291, 318-19, 132, 546, 547, 671, 941-45, 946, 949, 1650, 1876, 1878- 1895, 1813, 1829, 176-77, 139, 276, 576, 581-83, 1645-48, 1554, 992-998, 1789-1803, 1831-33, 2071-74, 2162, 2216, 2233, 2234, 2294, 2436-39 of 1978 & 2725 of 1977. WITH S. L. P. (Civil) Nos. 3498-99, 4270, 4419, 4420, 4455, 4735, 5205, 5238/77, 63, 64, 65, 99, 352-353, 442, 443, 454, 455, 608, 635, 622, 623, 778-79, 1819, 1303, 1312, 1414, 1404, 1573, 1576-79, 1715, 1842, 1849-50, 1959, 2370, 2013-14, 2414, 2462, 2491-92, 3102·03, 3225-26, 3569, 3413, 3476, 1423, 4072, 3519, 3521, .

3541-44, 3715, 3746, 3819, 3857-58, 3891-96, 4052, 4539, 4500-11, *4655-67, 4617, 4815-17, 4818, 4830, 4831-34, 4836-37, 4849, 4864-76, 4966, 4972, *4973-81, 4983A-5002, 5004-7, 5030, 4850-51, 4863, 5008-22, 5024, 5025, 5049, 512£-29, '5174-84, 5272, 5211, 5250-57, 5271, 5290-93, 53~46, 5385, 5402-08, 541;l-15, 5454, 5460-72, 5516-19, 5628, 5625, 5634-36, 5637-44, 5646-47, 5786'87, 5788-90, 5869-72, 5873, 5907-24, 5939-40, '597C-74,*5975-84, 6C02, 6120, 6126-33, 6158-62, 6208, 6209, 6240, 621£-18, 6246-47, 6361-62, 6395, 6421, 6449-53, 6582, 6645-49, 6677-78, 6654, 6656, 6669/78 and 200-214 & 215/80 ( *4662/78, 4974/98 and 5975-5977/78 Withdrawn) WITH WRIT PETITION NOS. 4306, 4312, 43. 77 & 4507 of 78. M. N. Phadke, Nisha! Singh, B. P. Maheshwari, Sureslz Sethi, V. M. Tarkunde, Naunit Lal and Naurang Singh, for the appellant/ petitioners in Civil Appeals 2785-86, 2935-38, 2234-35, 2707-10, 2831 • 2805-9/77, 120-22, 318-19, 671, 176, 276, 2071-84/78, 177, 2216/78, SLPS.

91-93/78 3541--44, 5126-29, 6216-18, 6421, 5308/78 and WP 4377, tA 2893/77. , • R. K Mohan and Mrs. Geetanja/i Mohan for th~ appellants/peti- • tioners in CAs. 2823-25, 1525-27, 2022-23/77, 2069-70/78, 1813/78, 2144, 2423-26/77, 1263, 56-67, 1010-14, 1898-1901, 1902--16, 2064--68, 1392, 291, 546-47, 941--45, 946-49, 139, 576, 1789-1803 1828, 2436-39/78, SLPs. 442, 443, 454, 608, 635, 778, 779, 1819, 1401, 1414, 1573, 1576-79, 1849-50, 2013-14, 2414, 2462, 3102-3,! 3225-26, 3369, 3746, 5272, 3819, 3857-58, 3891-96, 4052, 4500-11, 4655--67 4983A-5002, 5174--84, 5460-72, 5907-24, 5970-74, 6126-33, 6645--49, 6677-78/78 4270, 4455, 4735, 5205 & 5238/77 & 5030/78. V. M. Tarkunde, O. P. Malhotra, P. R. Mridul, H. K. Puri, for the appellant in CAs. 1348, 1362-74/77 & petitioners in SLPs. 4539 and 562/78. NC. Sikri for the appellants in CAs. 2723-24/77 & 2725/77. Lakshmi Arvind for the appellants in CAs. 976, 1076/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 622, 623, 1715/78 and WP No. 4312. S. K.

Mehta for the appellants in CAs. 843-44, 546/78& petitioners in SLPs. 4815-17, 5008-22, 5024, 5025, 5290-93, 5340-46, 5869-72 ! of 1978, 4419-20/77. S. M. Ashri S. S. Sharma for the appellants in CAs. 2043--47, 1831-34/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 4617, 4830, 5454, 5628, 6246-47/78 & 4863/78. R. S. Mittal and A. Minocha for the appellants in CAs. 1674-76, 1554/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 5873/78, 5646-47/78. M. B. Lal for the appellants in CA. 1079/78. B. P. Maheshwari and S. Grewal for the appellants in CA. 132/78 & petitioners. in SLPs. 63-65, 99, 352, 353, 455/78, 208-14/80, 209-245/80. Sarva Mitter. for the appellants in CAs. 1650, 1878-89/78, 1890-95/78, and petitioners in SLPs. 4831-34,. 4836, 4837, 4864, 76, 4966, 5250-57, 5402-8, 5634-44, 5646-47, 5975-5984, 6158--62, 6449-6453, 6654/78, 5271/78. NAND LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, !. ) 1189 S. K. Sabharwal for the appellants in CAs. 1876, 1645-48/78 and petitioners in SLPs. 3519, 4972, 5004-5007, 6120/78 and WP. 4507/78. ) S. C.

Patel for the appellants in~CAs. 581-83/78, and petitioners in SLPs. (C). 1842/78, 3521, 4849, 4850-51/78. Manoj Kumar for the appellants in CAs. 992-98/78, S. K. Dhingra for the appellants in CAs. 2162/78 and . petitioners m SLPs. 4973-81, 6361-62, 6395, 5413-5415/78. D. Goburdhan for the appellants in CAs. 02233, 2234/78 and petitioners in SLPs. 5309-10/78. Ramesh Chand for the appellants in CA. 2294/78. C- /. S. Ratta, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the petitioners in · WP. 4306/77 and SLPs. 3498-99/77. R. Bana for the petitioners in SLPs. 1303/78, 2370, 3413, 3476, 6002, 1423, 4072/78 & 1312/78. Harbans Singh for the petitioners in SLPs. 1959/78, 5939-40/78. Rameshwar Nath for the petitioners in SLP. '. 3715f78. R. C. Kohli for the petitioners in SLP. 5049/78. S. R. Srivastava for the petitioners in SLP. 5211/78. ' · S. K. Bagga for the petitioners in SLP. 5385/78. J. D. Jain for the petitioners in SLPs. 5516-19, 5786-90, 6208, 6656, 6669/78, 4818, 6239-40/78.. K. K Vem'!

_opal, B. Datta, M. N. Shroff, Hemantika Wahi, Anup Sachthey, Miss A. Subhashini, for appearing respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by TuLZAPURKAR, J. These appeals, by special leave, directed against the Full Bench d. ;;cision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jaswant Kaur's(') dse, seek to challenge the vires of some of the pro- ' visions of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1972 (26 of 1972) and accor~ing to the appellants some of the provisions are pivotal and run through the whole Act and. therefore. the entire Act ~ is liable lo be Strl/Ck down. The Act (26 of 1972) received the assent of the President on 22-12-1972 and ~as published in the Official Gazette on 23-12-1972. Section 2 contained and even now contains the requisite declaration (! ) A. l. R. 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221. that it was enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in els. (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution.

The Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7-9-1974 (vide: Item 72), and, thereby. it came under the protective umbrella of Art. -31-B of the Constitution; , however, on 9-9-1974 in Saroj Kumari's(') case a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, being apparently unaware of such inclusion, struck down certain provisions of the Act on the ground that those provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part • • III of the Constitution. The Division Bench also held that the provisions were not saved by Art. 31-A of the Constitution as those provision which mainly related to 'Family Unit', could not be said to be in furtherance of Art. 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. In so holding, the Division . Bench relied on a Full Bench decision of 2 that Court in Sucha Singh's( ) case where similar provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1973) had been struck down.

The Full Bench decision in Sucha Singh's case (supra) has since been reversed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1040 of 1976 (reported in AIR 1977 SC 915). This Court has taken the view that the provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act are saved by both Aris· 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution. The foundation on which the decision in Saroj Kumari's case (supra) striking down certain provisions of the Haryana Act (26 of 1972) rested has thus disappeared. However, after the decision in Saroj Kumari's case (supra) the Act (26 of 1972) and the Rules framed under s. 31 thereof were amended extensively; the Act was first amended by Haryana Act 17 of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the Ninth Schedule (vide : Item No. 137); the Act was further amended by Haryana Acts Nos. 40 and 47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978, but the last four Amending Acts have not been put in the Ninth Schedule.

It is, therefore, clear that the amendments effected in the Principal Act by Amending Act 17 of 1976 will receive the protective umbrella of Art. 31-B but not the amendments effected by the last four Acts. Moreover, though the Principal Act as amended by Act 17 of 1976 will be under the protective umbrella of Art. 31-B, the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973 as originally framed or even after amendments, being subordinate legislation and not specified in the Ninth Schednle may not receive such protection 8 (Vide : Prag lee & Oil Mills( ) case) . . H (1) A. I. R. 1975 Punjab & Haryana 353. (2) AIR 1974 P & H. 162, (3) [1978] 3 SCR 293. -~ Ill NANb LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, J. ) 1191 ' ', After the Pi! incipal Act (26 of 1972) was amended as above, several writ petifions were filed in the High Court. ~ Punjab & Har· · yana challenging the 'vires of some of the prov1Sions of the Act. Since the Princit.

al Act as well as the Amending Act 17 of 1976 had been put i Ninth Schedule, the challenge was based on the • ground that tho e . provisions were vague, uncertain, ambiguous and . mutually incons~tent and, therefore, should be struck down ~nd neither Art. 31-{\ nor Art. 31-B of the Constitution co~d save s~ch provisions- The! , High Court rejected the plea, and m our view . rightly, on the g/-ound that a statute enacted by a Legislature fallin! l within its compeience which did not offend any Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Pint ill of the Constitution arid which did not contravene any othe~ provision of the Constitution could not be declared . ultra vires eithe~r'. on the ground tha~ its ~rovisions were vague'. or uncertain or am guous or mutually mcons1stent. The Court pointed out that unlike e American Constitution,. there was no 'due process' -clause in our Cqnstitution and, therefore.

Indian Courts could not declare a statute 1invalid on the ground that it contained vague, un- ·certain, ambigum\s or muluany inconsistent pmvisions, and that it was the duty an4 function of the Indian Court in relation to each forensic situationj to examine the language of the law, the context in which it was inade, to discover the intenticn of 1]ie Legislature ·and to the interprpt the law to make effective and not to frustrate the legislative intent 'nd in that behalf it could always call in aid well- 1 known canons of interpretation and even where the provisions of a statute appeared ~ be mutually inconsistent there were several wellknown rules of itj. terpretation to guide the Court in giving a proper meaning to the provisions of a statute, such a1;, the rule of harmonious constructio~j _the rule th~t special shall pn~vail over the general etc.

After negatrying the mam plea, the Court went on to examine the concerned pr9visions which were said to be vague or uncertain \ and mutually incqnsistent and came to the conclusion that certain expressions which i were said to be vague were not so vague but had d~ite import a~4 conn? tation and that apparently inconsistent pro- VIs1ons were not ujrcconc1lable and all of them fitted well into the general scheme of Ithe Act. The only provision in respect of which relief was granted ~y the_ ~ourt was s. 20A which barred the appearance of any legal I practitioner before any officer of authority other than the Financial' C~mmissioner in proceedings under the Act, and the Court took th~ VIew that such a provision was repugnant to s. 1_4 of the lhdian ~ar Councils Act (which had mntinued in force in view ef s. 30 ~f t~~ Advo~ates Act not havin1~ come into force) and, ~erefore, mvahd. Sub1ect to holding s.

20A of the Act to be ultra vires and, ther~fore, issuing a direction to the State not to enforce the said provision and subject to giving some further directions in the matter of filing declarations etc. before the authorities nnder the Act, the Court dismissed all the writ petitions. In these appeals the appellants have challenged some of the provisions of the Act on gronnds substantially different from those that were urged before the High Court. ,.. Besides these Civil Appeals, a large number of writ petitions as • also petitions for special leave have been filed listed before us • where in almost identical points have been raised challenging the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to time and those also will sta'nd disposed of by this judgment. lti is true that since the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as also the first Amending Act 17 of 1976 have been put in the Ninth Schedule, connsel for the appellants !

)ave challenged the constitutional validity of Art. 31-B as also of the' Constitution (34th Amendment) Act 1974 and the Constitution (40th Amendment) Act 1976 whereby the Principal Act as well as the first Amending Act were put in t!! e Ninth Schedule on the ground that Art. 31-B and these Constitutional. Amendments violated the basic structure or features of the Constitution. Sinn1arly since the Principal Act contains the requisite declaration nnder s. 2 thereof th~t the enactment is for the purpose of giving effect to the directive principles enshrined in Art. 39 (b) and (c), counsel for the appellants have also challenged the constitutional validity of Art. 31-C as being violative of the basic features of the Constitution. However, apart from these aspects, it cam1ot be gainsaid that the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to time, if it falls within Art.

31-A of the Constitution, would be immune Jl from the attack on the ground of inconsistency with or abridgement of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31. The constitutional validity of Art. 31-A has all along been upheld by this Court since Sankar Prasad's(') case and its validity was not put 2 in issue in Keshavananda Bharati's( ) case but the constitutional validity of Art. 31C was sought to be canvassed by reference to Art. 31A. Moreover, consequent upon the introduction of Art. 3lA in the Consel' -s. {8) it was provided that if the appellant or the petitioner coming against the order declaring the land surplus failed in his appeal or revision, he shall be liable to pay for the period he has at any time been in possession of the land declared surplus to which he was not entitled under the law, a licence fee equal to • 30 times the land holdin~ tax recoverable in respect of this area.

On 6th June, 1978, the Act was further amended by Amending Act 18 of 1978 whereby the rigour of the condition imposed under sul>-s. (7) was reduced by permitting the appellant or the petitioner to furnish a bank guarantee for the requisite amount as an alternative to making cash deposit and while retaining sub-s. (8) in its original form, a new sul>-s. (9) inserted under which it has been provided that if the · . f. appeal or revision succeeds, the amount deposited or the bank guarantee furnished shall be refunded or released, as the case may be but if the appeal or revision fails th;: deposit or the guarantee shall be adjusted against the licence ree recoverable under sub-s. (8). In the High Court, two contentions were urged: first, thats. 18(1) and (2), as originally enacted in 1972, gave an unrestricted and unconditional right of appeal and revision against the orders of the prescribed authority or the appellate authority but by inserting sub-ss.

(7) and (8) by Act 40 of 1976, a fetter was put on this unrestricted right which was unconstitutional; secondly, even the mellowing down of the condition by Act 18 of 1978 did not have the effect of removing the vice of unconstitutionality, inasmuch as even the conditlons imposed under the amended sul>-s. (7) were so onerous in nature that they either virtually took away the vested right of appeal or in any event rendered it illusory. Both these contentions were rejected by the High Court and in our view rightly. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the right of appeal is a creature of a statute and there i,s no reason why the legislature while granting the right cannot impose conditlons for the exercise of such right so long as the conditlons are not so onerous as to amount. to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory (vide the latest decision in Anant Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat -ss.

(8) and (9) it is clear that the cash deposit or bank guarantee is not by way of any exaction but in the nature of securing mesne profits from the person who is ultimately found to be in unlawful possession of the land; thirdly, the deposit or the guarantee .. is co-related to the land holdings tax (30 times the tax) which, we • are informed, varies in the State of Haryana around a paltry amount of Rs. 8/- per acre annually; fourthly, the deposit to be made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confined to the land holdings tax payable •in respect of the disputed area i. e. the area or part thereof which is declared surplus after leaving the permissible area to the appellant or petitioner.

Having regard to these aspects, particularly the meagre rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision, even in' the absence of a provision conferring discretion on the appellate/revisional authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. The challenge to s. 18(7) must, therefore, fail. It may be stated that relying on Kunjukutty Sahib's(') case coun- . sel for the appellants also challenged s. 8(3) of the Act on the ground that it violates the second proviso to Art. 31-A. The Act including • said provision having been included in the Ninth Schedule will receive the protection of Art. 31-B and since the challenge to the constitutional validity of Art. 31-B is being separately dealt with it is unnecessary to deal with the contention here. In the result all the Civil Appeals, Writ Petitions and Petitions for Special Leave are dimissed. There will be no order as to costs. I I.. I S. R.

Appeals and Petitions dismissed. . ( • -~ ,, \ (1) [197311 S. C. R.! 326.