SHRI SANTOSHKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. v. SHRI BALASAHEB TUKARAM SHEVALE & ORS

Citation: [2009] 13 S.C.R. 1173

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: TARUN CHATTERJEE, RAJENDRA MAL LODHA

Case summary

SHRI SANTOSHKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. v. SHRI BALASAHEB TUKARAM SHEVALE & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2009] 13 (ADDL. ) S. C. R. 1173 SHRI SANTOSHKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. -+· v. SHRI BALASAHEB TUKARAM SHEVALE & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 6017 of 2009) SEPTEMBER 2, 2009 l( [TARUN CHATTERJEE AND R. M. LODHA, JJ. ] + Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 - s. 257 - Power "ti of revision under -Whether can be exercised at anytime, although no time has been prescribed for exercise of such power - Held: If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for --- _, urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional 1. (1969) 2 sec 1s1. SANTQ$HKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. v. 1179 aAl.. A$AH~B TUKARAM SHEVALE [R. M. LODHA, J. ] powers within a few months of the order of the Collector.

This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case th~ Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on Oetober 12, 1961 i. e. more than a year after the order and it aeems to us that this order was passed too late. n ~ 14. While dealing with the suo-motu revisional power under Section 64.. C of the Bombay Tenency and Agricultural L~nde Act, 1976, this Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad 2 Amin v. Fatmabai lbrahim held that generally where no timelimit Is prescribed for exercise of power under statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. This is what this Court s. aid: * "Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe any time for Initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power it Vt!

sted in a statutory authority without p~aeribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973. ~· If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on b~half of the appellant reliance was placed on a jyggment of Justice S. B. Majmudar (as he then was ifl the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah (Spe. WA No. 2770of1979) disposed Qf cm 1.. 3. ,. 1~90, where in connection with Section 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court ln connection with other statutory provisions, in the case 2. (1997) s sec 11. -,, of State of Gujarat v.

Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC + 187) and in the case of Ram _Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 sec 44) has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such ~ power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under Sec~ion 84-C of ~ the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time:" , 15. Recently, in the case of State of Punjab and Others 3 v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. while dealing with the power of revision under Section 21 of ·the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held: - ·\. -. "17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed ·therefore, the same would not _mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. 18.

It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the + statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In· any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made >hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation 3. (2001) 11 sec 363. -+ provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years. " 16.

It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather 8 it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled +- after a long lapse of time. Where· the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, ~ 0 but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time.

Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the 1 order of Tehsildar, Shirol although it was passed on March 30, 1976 and he was alive uptoi1990. It is not even in the case of Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated March 30, 1976. There is no finding by the Sub- Divisional Officer either that order dated March 30, 1976 was obtained fraudulently. 17. In what we have discussed above, the appeals deserve to be allowed against respondent Nos. 1· to 5 and are allowed -~ and impugned orders are quashed and set aside as against them. Parties will bear their own costs. 8. 8. B. Appeals allowed.