S.N. DUBE ETC. v. N.B. BHOIR

Citation: [2000] 1 S.C.R. 200

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: G.T. NANAVATI, S.P. KURDUKAR

Judgment text

S. N. DUBE ETC. v. N. B. BHOIR JANUARY 12, 2000 [G. T. NANAVATI AND S. P. KURDCKAR, JJ. j Terrorist and Disrnptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987, s. 15. Tmorist and Disrnptive Activities (Prevention) Rules, Rule 15(2) and (3) and Code of Criminal Procedure 1974, s. 164-Confessions ofaccused recorded by same police officer who was supervising investigations and without infarming accused that the statements were being recorded under TADA-Whether malafide--Held, on facts, no; moreover, accused made no such grievance in their statement under s. 313 Cr. P. C. Mandatory requirement that police officer must explain and give statutory warning to accused so that confession is voluntary-Whether while confession is recorded in two parts warnings given while recording first part will hold good for recording the second part which is the real confession--Held, yes; the second part being in continuation of the first part both parts have to be treated as one confe.

1sional statement-Further held, the requirement oflaw was that police officer should ascertain voluntariness and explain to accused that confession could be used against him in evidence--On facts, there was no breach of rnle 15(2) of TADA Rules. Police officer mixing up the certificate and memorandum required to be made under the mies-Statement regarding voluntariness appearing in the body of the confession and not at the end of it-Whether the certificates and memorandum should be in the exact words of Rule 15(3)(bj--Held, no mandatory-Though giving of statutory warning ascertaining voluntariness alld preparation of contemporaneous r. :cord is mandatory, the words of the certificate and memorandum are not-There was no violation of rnle 15(3/(b). Whether guidelines issued by High Court for recording confessions u/s. 164 Cr. P. C. apply to those recorded u/s. 15 TADA-Held, no-Merely because some guidelines were not followed Rule does not deprive con/essions of their evidentiary value.

S. N. DUB! : t:s was also lt:d. 7. The Trial Court found many faults with the confessions and also held tht. :m inadmissible in evidence. It also held that they were not voluntarily made. The trial Court disbelievt:d the witnesses examined to prove the terrorist acts on the ground that their evidence was too general and vagut: and they were not independent and responsible members of the locality. The evid1. :nce of two eye witnesses was dis-bdieved on the ground that there were material improvements and contradictions in their evidence and their version was also not believable. Identification of the accused in the court by these two eye witnesses was not believed because it was after a long time and no previous test identification parade was held. For all these reasons it further held that the prosecution case against A-1 to A-13 was not proved.

As regards A-14 to A-17 the Trial Court held that the sanction given for their prosecution undt:r Section 3(1) of the TADA Act was vitiated on account of non-application of mind. It also held that the reinwstigation was done with an oblique motive as most of the terrorist activities fell outside the jurisdiction of the railway police and yet they were investigated by them and the regular police having jurisdiction over the areas was not associated with it. Thus the case against A-14 to A-17 was also held not proved. 8. Whether tht: earlier investigation was dishonest or the subsequent re-investigation by Deshmukh and his officers was done with some oblique motiw will have to be considt:red first as acceptability of the evidence of tht witnesses and the confessions would depend upon the answer to that question.

If the tarfo::r investigation was honest as held by the learned trial Judgc, tht:n the contradictions and improvements found in the evidence of tht two eyt: witnesscs will assume importance. But if the earlitr investigation is found to be not honest, then the major ground on which the evidence of tht eye witntsses has bt:en disbt:lieved will disappt:ar. If we confirm the finding of the learned trial Judge that the rt-investigation was madt: with some obliqut motiw then that would certainly affect evidentiary value of tht: confessions. Tht: Trial Court hdd tht: investigation by Mr. Deshmukh and his otlicers motivakd for the following reasons : (1) in the application 214 SL:PREME COURT REPORTS (20COJ l. S. C. R. (Ext. 237) made for re-investigation it was not stated that the earlier investigation was faulty and that A-4 and A-11 were wrongly shown as murderers of Suresh Dube.

(2) There was no material before Deshmukh on the basis of which he could have stakd that the earlier invt:stigation was faulty and for that reason no good ground was mentiom:d in the application for re-investigation. (3) there was no reason for Debhmukh to take possession of the Mudemmal articles on the wry day on which application for re-investigation was made as there was no material before him to show that an unconnected weapon was seized by the earlier investigating officer. (4) After obtaining the sealed packet of Muddamal empties and bullets from the court for getting them examined by a ballistic expert he first opened it and then again r~sealed it for no reaMJD except for tampering with the Mudammal articles, particularly the thrt;i;; bullets recovered from the body of Suresh Dube. (5) even though there was no material before Deshmukh on the basis of which he could have lawfully invoked the provisions of TADA on 28. 9.

1992 very probably he did so with a view to defoat the anticipatory bail application filed by some of the accused. (6) Even though in the first FIR Shyam Sunder Dube [P. W. 2) had stated that he was suspecting none for the murdt:r of his brother, the entirt; theory got changed during the subst:quent re-inwstigation. 9. Suradakar (P. W. 75) who took ever as DIG, Railways, Bombay in August 1991 had been to Palghar Railway Police Station in February 1992. While examining case papers rdating to the murder of Suresh Dube he felt some doubt about the investigation. Therefore, he had dirc::cted his subordinate officers to send a message to Shyam Sunder Dube to meet him. Pursuant thereto Bhagwati (P. W. 5) and Dr. Rijuta Dube (P. W. 37) had met him within about 8 to 10 days. Suradkar has deposed that they had orally complained to him about the honesty of the police officers who had investigated the case. On his assurance t'.

1at he would look into the matter and take appropriate action they again 'Ile! him after .. bout 15 days and gave further details regarding the murdt:r of Suresh. He had, therefore, advist:d them to give a complaint in writing and pursuant thereto a complaint (Ext. 237) dakd 185. 1992 was given to him This part of his evidence has ahnost rt:mained unchallenged . in cross-examination. Only suggestion made to the witntcss was that afkr Dub1:• had met him he got the investigation of the ca;e re-opened in order to help Dube brothers. No material has been brought on n;cord tu inler that Suradakar was in any manner interested in Dubes or had any other n::asun to help Dubes by falsely SX Dt:BE v. N. B. BHOIR [G. T. NANAVATI, J. j 215 i. nvolving Bhai Thakur or Manik Patil or their men. The doubt felt by him regarding honesty of the inwstigation was justified because even though five empties wen; recovered from the place of offoncc a revolver was seized as the weapon of offence.

A police officer ewn with littie 1;;xperience would have rt:alised that the murder was committt:d not by using a rt:volvi. :r but with a pistol. The ! t:arned trial Judge was, therefore, wrong in holding that 8 there was no material bdore Suradakar for entertaining any doubt and re-opening the investigation and that he had done so with some oblique motive. lO. The Trial Court was also not right in holding that Suradakar got re-investigation done with some oblique motive because in the complaint (Ext. 237) it was not specifically statt:d that the investigation made by the police officers ti!! then was not honest. The complaint does indicate that the investigation made till then was not honest. It should have been appreciated that Dube brothers, in the position in which they were placed at that time, could nut have specifically alleged that the previous investiga· tion was dis-honest.

So also from the fact that in the application made to , the Court for permission to re-investigate it was not stated that the previous investigation was not honest, no inference of oblique motive could have been ! egitimately inferred. The application did refer to the complaint made by Dube brothers. Without further investigation no charge of dis-honesty could have been levelled against the police officers associated with earlier inwstigation at that stage. Therefore, Deshmukh could not have mentioned in the application that permission to re-investigate was sought as the previous investigation was not honest. 11. The adverse inference drawn by the learned Trial Judge from the p circumstance that Deshmukh had taken back Mudemmal articles from the Court on the sami. : day on which permission to reinvestigate was granted and that hi. : had opened the sealed packet containing bullets and empties and again si. :alcd them, is wholly unjustified.

For ascertaining from which type of weapon · pistol or n:vulver - the bullets which were found from the body of Sun:sh Dube were fired, it was really necessary for Deshmukh to obtain pm,session of those bullt:ts and also the empties and get an opinion of a ballistk expert, particularly when no clear opinion on that point was given by him in his t:arlier report. As tht: said Mudemmal articles were lying in the: Court in a sealt:d packet ht: had to obtain them from the Court and without opening the packet he could nut have givi. :n a receipt as to 216 SUPRFMF. C:OVRT REPORTS (2000) l S. C. R. which article, were taken possession of by him. It was m:cessary for him to open that packd and verify tht: contents. All those steps wern regular and necessary and it is difficult to appreciate how the learnt:d trial Judge could infor from them that all that was done by Dt:shmukh with a view to tamper with those Muddamal articles and particularly the three bullets found from the body of Suresh.

12. The trial Court also grievously em:d in holding that the TADA Act was v. rnngly invoked. The complaint made by Dube brothers and inquiries made by Deshmukh and his officers disclosed some of the illegal activities committed by the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil and the terror created by them in Nalasopara and surrounding areas. Deshmukh was handed over the complaint of Dube brothers for further enquiry on 18. 5. 1992. On 31. 7. 1992 he had interrogatt:d Mukesh Shah and on 18. 8. 1992 he had interrogated Amarnath Tripathi. He had also made some discreet enquiries through his subordinates and gathered some information regarding involvement of accused other than A4 and Al1. On 22. 9. 1992 he had interrogated accused Dnyaneshwar Patil (A-3). It was thereafh:r that ht: had submittt:d a report to the St:ssions Court, Thane under Section 173(8) of the Code of c;;riminal Procedure tor further investigation.

After obtaining that permission he was able to obtain custody of Dilip Waghchoure (A-7) and inti. :rrogate . :1im. On 25. 9 l992 ht: had rt:corded statements of Mira Dube, Bhagwati Dube and Jayprakash Dube. It was on the basis of this material that he was satisfied that the accused had committed offences punishable under the TADA Act. Dbclosing all this material he had made a report to the Superintendent of Police, Railways on 28. 9. 1992 for invoking the provisions of the TADA Act. It is, therefore, not correct to say that without any justifiable reason provisions of TADA were invoked by Deshmukh and that he had done so for frustrating the bail applications which were to come up for ht;aring on 13. 9. :992. 13. Tht: last reason given by the Trial Court is also not sound. It wrongly assumed that the fust complaint was correct and the FIR was recorded at the time stated therein. If the eVIdence of Shridhar Thakur (P. W. 80), Rajendra Panjwam (P. W 7Y) and Gosaikar (P. W.

66) had been analysed morL carefully it would have become apparent that the FIR could not haw been recorded at Palghar railway station at 12. 30 p. m. as mentioned in the FIR. Tht: learned triai Judge also failed to apprt:ciate that some days pnor to 9. 10. 1989 Sun:sh was called by Bhat Thakur and was S '. 'i. lJlJllF ·. -. N. B. HHOlR [lf. L NA. "IAVAl'LJ. ] 217 threatened that if he did not part with the lands wanted by Bai Thakur, then his family members shall havi. : to ptrform Aarti of his photograph and on 8. to. 1989 one Srikant Pandt:y, who wa> a man of Bhai Thakur, had met Suresh and advu. t:d him to leave ~alawpara if he wanted to n:main alive. Becau;c Df this threat a decision was taken hy Dube brothers that Suri;;sh -;hould go to his nativl: plact: and n;main th. :rt: till the danger tu his life continues. Pursuant tu that dt:cision Sun:sh had left his huusl: v. 1th Amarnath Tripathi on 9. lC. 1989 for going to \1umbai for punhasing a railway tickt:t for Oorakhpur.

This conduct of Suresh corroborated the evidence of the prnsecution v. ltnesses on that puinL It is, thcrdare, difficult to appreciate how in view nf this evidence the ! earned Judge could persuade himself to hold that the first complaint was correct and during the re investigation the whok version was changtd deliberately. The statement in the complaint that the complainant did not suspt:ct anyom; as the murdt:rer of Sun:sh should have made the learned Trial Judge more careful while appreciating the relevant evidence. 14. As regards the earlier investigation hy PSI Padckar and Pl Berge, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that it was not honest. It was submitted that Pl Kukdofkar, PI Nimbalkar and the police officers attached to the Vasai and Virar police station~ and t. :ven higher officers wcr~ supporting and prntc,cting: Bhc1i ThakIT, ~Lmik Pafl and their ffi~ll hyh~ip1ng thLffi in tatnp(. "fiflg_ \\lih ~b. _: v:. 0. 1. ". ~·rH.

, utfa:ient c:viut:ncc un rccnrJ to b. o! d that the. gang> of Bhai Thakur and l\fanik Patil Wl:Ore opGrating in Vasai and "''tla,opara areas since 1980 and 1984 respectively. Then: is also evidence to show that in order to achieve their objects of extorting money and grabbing land they used to indulge in violence and other criminal activities. Whether those two gangs were committing terrorist act> or not is a separate point and we shall deal v. lth it later. For the present we are examining the t:vidtmce tu find out whether investigation in respect of murder of Suresh Dube was honestly done. The evidence of the family members of Suresh Dube is consistent on the point that PI Kukdolar and PI Nimbalkar had pressurised them not to mention the name of Bhai Thakur or his men as the murderers of Suresh and had even threatened them that if they did so they would have to suffer serious consequences. P. W. 1, Dr. Om Prakash ha~ deposed that v.

lthin about 10- L5 minutes after Suresh wa~ brought home and dt:kar at ' upon his earlier version :. o as tu make hi~ evidence against A-1 tu A-4 ccrtain and acc.. :ptabk. It was also urged that this witness in his statement dated 18. 8. J992 had stated that 'I had given my statement before the police during my stay of 20-25 days with Dubes' family after the incid. ;nt of murder". It was urged that this witness has falsely stated while giving evidt:nce that hc had not given any statt:ment to the police either on 12. 10. 1989 or 20. 10. 1989. It was further urged that this witness had denied to Jt;ve made any statement on 12. 10. 1989 and 20. 10. 1989 as he knew that it contained a different and an uncertain version not only as regards the manner in which the incident had happened but also with regard to his seeing the assailants.

The Trial Court was also much impressed by these omissions and contradictions and taking into consideration the circumstance that the incident had happened suddenly and large number of persons whu were standing on the platform had started running helter skelter after hearing the sound of firing of a shot, held that this S. N. DUBE v. N. B. BHOIR [G. T. NANAVATI,J. ] 225 witness could not have sufficiently seen the assailants so as to correctly A . identify them in the court after many y. ::ars. In arriving at this conclusion the Trial Court also relied upon the statement in his cross-examination that he did not know from which direction the sound of the first shot had come and from what distance it was fired. We have earlier hdd that the previous investigation was not honest and, therefore, no importance could have been given to these omissions and contradictions proved from the statement dated 12. 10. 1989.

Even if we proceed on the assumption that a statement of this witness was recorded by the police on 12. 10. 1989 it is not possible to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the respondents that the earlier version of this witness was totally different from his version in the Court. The discrepancies were with respect to number of assailants and number of shots fired by the assailants and also on the point of his seeing the assailant firing one mon: shot after he had received a push and fallen down on the railway track. Even the omissions and contradictions with respect to the statement dated 18. 8. 1992 are also not such as would lead to an inference that this witness was deliberately making improvements before the court in order to falsely say something that he had not seen. What appears from the statement is that this witness had stated in his statement dated 18. 8. 1992 that he had seen the last shot fired on Suresh after he had fallen down from the platform.

What he had not stated was that he had seen the assailant firing the last shot after he had got up from the railway track. The fact that this witness had gone to Nalasopara· to meet his sister and had some work has remained unchallenged. The fact that on 9. 10. 1989 he had left the house of Dubes with Suresh at 10. 15 A. M. has also remained unchallenged. The presence of this witness on the platform at the time of incident has not been questioned. His version that he was getting his shoes polished at the time of the incident has also not been disputed. What was urged before the Trial Court and what has been believed by it is that as the incident had happened suddenly and the peoplt: standing on the platform had started running helter skelter immediately after the first iliot was fired this witness could not have seen the assailants clearly for a sufficiently long time so as to correctly recognise them after a lapse of few years.

It was also urged that as this witness was not able to make out from which direction the sound of firing a shot had come and was not ablt: to state the distance from which it was fired would also support the finding that this witness really did not know the manna and circumstanct:s in which the assault on Surt:sh had taken place. This witness 226 SUPREME COl:RT Rf. PORTS (200CJ 1 S. C. R. has said that he was at a distance of about 3 ft. from Sun:sh when the incident had happened. That appears to be more probab! t: and natural also. Both of them had lt:ft the house togcthtr and were to go together in the train. Except the circumstance that pcoplt: on the platform had started running helter skelter after hearing tht: sound of firing of shots, there was nothing before the court on the basis of which it could have hdd that Amarnath could not have seen the assailants fuing shots at Surt:sh and surrounding him.

Though the incident had happened suddenly, fuing of five shots from a pistol must have taki,:n some time. The witm:ss in our opinion had sufficient time to see and register in his mind what was then happening to Suresh, his brother-in-law. In our opinion the :earned trial Judge was not right in holding that this witness very probably did not havt sufficient opportunity to see the manner in which the whole incident had happened and who were the assailants. 21. The next point to be considered is whether identification of the accused by this witm;ss in the Court can be believed when no attempt was made earlier by holding a test identification parade for identification of the real culprits. The trial Court h. as found it unsafe and it was contended by the learned counsel for the accused that such identification has no value: as held by this Court in State ofMaharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, AIR (1992) SC 210 and State v. V. C. Shukla, AIR (1980) SC 1382.

A-1 to A-4 who were identified by this witness were arrested bt:tween September 1992 and February 1993. Thret years had passed by then. Perhaps that was the reason why test identification parade was not held. Anyway this infirmity of not holding a test identification parade does diminish the evidentiary value of identification of these accused by this witness. in the Court. lf this was the only evidence regarding identification of those accused we would have held that it was not sufficient for convicting any of thost four accused. But it stands corroborated by the evidence of i1IlOther eyt:-witness and also. by the confessions of A·1 to A-4, if they are held admissible and voluntary. 22.

It was contended by the learm:d counsel for the respondentsaccused that the version of this witness that he had become unconscious on hearing that Suresh had ciit:d and had remained unconscious for three days was not believable and the Trial Court was right in rejecting the evidence of this witm:ss on that ground. It is difficult to appreciate what this witness would hav.. : gained by falsely saying so. He had seen his SXDCBEv. N. B. BHOIR[G. T. NANAVATI,J. j 227 brother-in-law bt:ing shot dead. Therefore it was not unlikdy that he got a ' shock and became unconscious. If what he has stated was not correct then the police would have recorded his statement before 12. 10. 1989. The fact that his statement could nut be recorded bdore 12. 10. 1989 lends support to his evidt:nce that ht had remained unconscious, though nut continuously, for thret: days. 23. Om Prakash Brahmania (P. W.

49), another eye-witness, was earning his livelihood in Bombay by working as a boot-polisher on the platforms of Nalasopara railway station. He had bei:n doing so since about 10 years before the date of the incident. He used to sit on the platform from 6. 30 in the morning till 6. CO o'clock in the evening. He knew Suresh and some accused as they often used to come to the railway platform to get their shoes polished. He also knew some of the accused as he was thri:;atened by them on some occasions as a part of their activity of terrorising people of the locality. He has deposed that on the date of incident he had seen Suresh Dube and one person accompanying him on the railway platform at about 10. 30 A. M. The person who had accompanied Suresh came to him for getting his shoes polished. While he was polishing his shoes Suresh was reading a newspaper near the book-stall at a distance of about 2 ft. from him.

He then saw Narendra (A-1) nephew of Manik Patil, coming there and firing shots at Suresh. He also saw that 3 or 4 persons were with A-1. Narain was one of them and he had a chopper with him. As a result of that firing people started running. He also gut frightened and ran away and took shelter behind a nearby building. After waiting there for some time he went home. He identified ! 'ifarendra (A-1), Dayaneshwar Patil (A-3) and Patric (A- 4) in the Court. He identified Narendra (A-1) as the person who had p fired shots at Suresh and Dayaneshwar (A-3) as the person who was standing with a chopper by the side of Suresh Dube. He has further depos. :d that because of this incident and fear of Manik Patil's gang he left Bombay within about 2 to 3 days and went to his native place in Haryana. He stayed there for three years. When he returned to Bombay he came to know that the police was searching for him. Therefore, he met the police and his statement was recorded on 5. 10J992.

In his cross-examination ht: stated that it was aftt:r about 8 to 10 days from his return from Haryana that his statement was recorded by the police. He also stated that his father had all the time n:maincd in Bombay. The learm:d trial Judge has hdd this part of the evidence of this witness unbelievable. Tht: Trial Court hdd that 228 SVPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 1 S. C. R. there was no reason for this witnes~ to remain away from Mumbai for a period of 3 years, particularly when his father had stayed back. tb. e lt:arned trial Judge also held that this witness had shifted to Bombay as he did not have enough work in Haryana and, tht:n:fon:, it was not likely that he would have remained in Haryana for 3 years before returning to Bombay. The learned Judge also relied upon the circumstance that in Ins statement before the police he had given his Bombay address and stated that he was staying at that place since about 10 years.

The reasoning of the Trial Court was that if he was absent for 3 years from Bombay then he would not have stated to the police that he was staying at that address since about 10 years. In our opinion, the reasons given by the trial Court for disbelieving this part of the evid1:nce of this witness art not at all sound. The fact that this witness belongs to a small town in Sonepat District of Haryana State is not disputed. It is also proved that summons were served upon this witness while· he Wds in Haryana. It was also suggested by the defonce in his cross-examination that the police had arrested him from Haryana and brought him back to Bombay. The version of this witness was that he had come to Bombay on his own and he was not arrested or brought by the police. But the fact that he had gone back to Harydna and returned in 1992 has remained almost unchallenged.

It is true that according to the previous investigation made by PI Padekar and PSI Berge statements of this witness were recorded on ll. 10. 1989, 13. 10. 1989 and 20. 10. 1989. This witness had denied to have given those statements and we are inclined to believe this witness on this point in view of the fmding recorded by us earlkr that the previous investigation was not honest. This witness had been staying in Bombay and earning his livelihood. He had come to Bombay as he did not have any source of livelihood in Haryana. It was, then:fore, not likely that without any compelling reason he would have left Bombay and gone to Haryana. Therefore, his evidence that he had ldt Bombay and gone back to Haryana because of fear of Manik Patil's gang deserved to be accepted. ... - , He was an eye-witness to the incidenL The investigation had disclost:d that i he was an eye- witness and that was the reason why a stakment alleged to L have been made by him was recorded by the police on 11. 10.

1989. The conduct of this witness was quite natural and then: was hardly any justification for discarding his evidence on the ground that his version was not believable. This witness knew Suresh and also the accust:d. He stated so in his examination··in-chief. We find hardly anything in the cross-examination of this witness which would create any duubt regarding his knowing Sun:sh S. N. DUBE v. N. H. BHOIR [G. T. NANAVATI, J. j 229 and some of the accused since before the date of the incident. He had been - working at Nalasopara railway station for about 10 years. He has given the reason why he km:w Suresh and some of the accused. It was, therefore, more probable that he knew Suresh and also some of the accused including A-1. This witness had no reason to falsely involve any of the accused. Moreover, being aware of the existence of Manik Patil's gang and the terror which they had created he would not have dared to falsely depose against them.

His presence on tht: railway platform on the date and time of the incident cannot be seriously disputed as that was the usual thing for him to do. There i~ nothing on record to show that he was close to Dube or was under any influence of the police and for that reason would depose falsely against A-1, A-3 and A-4. 24. The Trial Court also has recorded a finding that possibly he knew the accused belonging to the gang of Manik Patil. His evidence by the Trial Court has been disbelievt:d mainly on the ground that the description of the assailants given by him in the earlier statements did not tally with A-1 and that on 20. 10. 1989 he had identified A-4 and A-11 as the assailants of Suresh, while in the Court he had identified A-1, A-3, A-4 and Narain (A-10) as the real assailants of Suresh. We have already pointed out that the earlier investigation was not honest. This witness has denied to have made any statement on 11. 10. 1989 or 13. 10. 1989.

We will later on point out that naming of A-4 and A-11 as the murderers of Suresh was a manipulation done by the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil with the help of A-14 to A-17. It is also not factually correct to say that the witness had on 20. 10. 1989 identified A-4 and A-11 as the assailants of Suresh. According to the police statement this witness had only confirmed that the persons A-4 and A-11 who were in the police custody were the persons who had p attacked Suresh. Therefore, the learned Trial Judge was not right in r~ecting his 'evidence on these two grounds. The Trial Court also disbelieved his evidence on the ground that if ht: really knew the names of the accused then he should have disclosed the same not only to the police but to other persons with whom he had a talk. He had neither disclosed tht: names to the police nor to his father with whom he had a talk about the incident. The evidence on this point is also not correctly read by the Trial Court.

What this witness had stated in his evidence is that he knew A-1 by name and others by their faces. According to this witness he did not havt: any talk with anyone with respect to the incident except with his father. It 230 SL'PREME COl RT REPORTS [2000] 1S. C. R. may be that he was afraid of naming dny person belonging to the gang of - Manik Patil a\ the murderer and therefore had not disclosed the name of A-1 as the murderer of Suresh. A-1, A-3 and A-4 were all known to him and, therefore. there was no point in holding a test identification parade after this witness had rtturned from Haryana. Thercfort:, the learned Trial Judge was not right in rejecting his t:Vldence on the ground that he had not disclosed namts of the ;iccused to anyone and that no test identification parade was hdd to test the identity of the real culprits. Wc are of the opinion that the Trial Court was nut justifit:d in discarding the evidence of this witness on the ground that it was not believable.

His evidence deserved to be accepted without any independent corroboration. 25. The prosecution has also relied upon the circumstance of discovery of a pistol by A-1 as an independent circumstance corroborating the evidence of eye··witncsses. The Panch witm. :ss did not wpport the prosecution and it is also difficult to hold that it was really a case of discovery of pistol by A- l as contemplated by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Trial JudgL has nut relied upon the evidence relating to this circumstance and we are also of the opinion that the evidence relating to discovery of pistol s nut worthy of acceptance. 26. The next important piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution is the confessions made by some of the accused. It was urged by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the learned Trial Judge has committed a grave error in holding them inadmissible and nut voluntary.

During the course of reinvestigation confessions of A-1 to A-8 and A-11 were recorded by Shinde (P. W. 76), who was then working as Superintendent of Police (Railway), Mumbai. The said confessions were recorded between 29. 9. 1992 and 1. 3. 1993. A-9 and A-10 had also shown their willingness to make confessions to PI Deshmukh (P. W. 71), but after they were taken to Shinde they dt:clined tu make any confession. The confessions were recorded by Shindc under Section 15 of the TADA Act. All those accused were forwarded by Pl Deshmukh with hi5 rt:ports tu Shinde as they had expresst:d willingness to make confessions before him. All those forwarding reports have been brought on record and have bcen proved by these two witnesst:s. The fact that these witnesses were taken to Shinde for recording their confessions was not disputed. What Wds stated by these accused while retracting thcir confessions was that they were obtained by giving threats or under undue influence. It was generally S. N.

DUBE v. N. B. BHOIR [G. T. NANAVATI, J. ) 231 suggested to Shinde in his cross-examination that he had obtained signatures of the accused on those confessions under undue influence, coercion, fraud and mental and physical torture. It was not stated by the accused nor even >uggested in the cross-examination of Shinde that particular type of physical or mental torture or coercion was caused to the accused or in which manner they were defrauded or what undm:: influence was exercised upon thtm. Only suggestion that was made to the witnesses was that while recording that confessions he told them that he was Superintendent of Police and he had stated so in order to impn:ss the accused. In our opinion Shinde had done nothing wrong in disclosing his identity as he was really required to do so before recording the confessions. At this stage we will refer to some of the admissions and statements made by Shinde in his cross- examination.

He admitted that he had felt that it was unfair on his part to record the confossions as he was supervising the investigation. He also admitted that he was not aware of the statutory requin:ments of Section 15 of the TADA Act and Rule 15 of the TADA Rules till he recorded the first confession. He also admitted that he had inadvt:rtently committed a breach of the TADA Rules while recording those confessions. He also admitted that while recording the confessions he was not aware of the procedure prescribed under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code for recording confessions and also the provisions made by the Bombay High Court in its Criminal Manual. He also admitted that he had put some more questions to the accused before recording their confessions in order to find out that they were willingly making those confessions, but all those questions have not been recorded by him in the confessions.

lt was really on the basis of these admissions and some other reasons to be dealt with hereinafter that the Trial Court held the confessions not admissible, not voluntary and not reliable. 27. Section 15 of the TADA Act makes certain confessions made to police officers admissible in the trial of such person or co- accused, abettor or conspirator for an offence under the Act or Rules made thereunder. This Court considering its constitutionality in Kartar Singh v.

State of - Punjab, [1994] 3 sec 569, observed that "'having regard to the legal competence of the legislature to make the law prescribing a differc:nt mode of proof, the meaningful purpose and object of the legislation, the gravity of terrorism unleashed by the terrorists and disruptionists endangering not only the sovereignty and integrity of the country but also the normal life of the citizens, and the reluctance of even the victims as well as the public in coming forward, at the risk of their life, to give evidence" - held that the impugned section cannot be said to be suffering from any vice of unconstitutionality. Section l5 is thus an important departure from the ordinary law and must receive that interpretation which would achieve the object of that provision and not frustrate o~ truncate it. Interpreting the said provision this Court in State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT Etc. v. Nalini and Ors.

, (popularly known as Rajiv Cfandhi \'1urder case), this Court has held that a confession recorded under Section 15 of tht: TADA Act is to be considi;;red as a substantive pit:ce of evidence not only against the maker of it but also against its co-accused. There was differcnct: of opinion amongst the three learned Judg~s who decided that case regarding the evidentiary value of such a confession against the co-accused is tried in the same case. Wadhwa, J. observed that what weight should be attached to such a confession is a matter of discretion of the Court and as a matter of prudence the Court may look for some corroboration before relying upon such confession against the co-accust:d. Quadri, J. held that the rule of prudence would require that the Court should examine the same with great care and should not be rdied upon unkss It is corroborated generally by other evidence on record. Thomas, J.

held that "Thus the established position which gained ground for a very long time is that while a confession is substantive evidence against its maker it cannot be used as substantive evidence against another person even if tht latter is a co-accused, but it can be used as a piece of corroborative material to support other substantive evidence. " Relying upon the decision of this Court in Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997] 8 SCC 732, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that even a confession made admissible under Section 15 of --the TADA Act can be used as against the co-accused only in the same p manner and subject to the same conditions as stipulated under Section 30 of the Evidence Act. An observation to the same effect is to be found in paragraph 75 of the judgment. In fact no such point fell for decision in that case and it appears to be a passing observation only.

In view of the decision of this Court in Nalini's case the said observation can now be regarded as correct position of law. The correct legal position is that the confession recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act is a substantive piece of evidence and can be used against a co- accusc:d also otherwise held to be admissible, voluntary and believable. 28. The confessions have been hdd inadmissible mainly on two grounds. The first ground giv. :n by the learned trial Judge is that the S. N. DUBEv. N. B. BHOIR [Cif. NANAVATI,J. ] 233 powers under Section 15 of the TADA Act was exercised either malafide or without proper application of mind. The second ground on which they are ht:ld inadmissibfo is that they were n:corded in breach of Rules 15(2) and 15(3) of the TADA Rules and also in breach of the requirements of Section 164 and the High Court Criminal Manual. The learned trial Judge held that the TADA Act was applied in this case without any justification.

The permission was granted in that behalf without any application of mind. According to the Trial Court there was material on the basis of which TADA Act could have been invoked of that stage and that most probably the said Act was invoked in order to defeat the bail application filed by two accused in the High Court. ln our opinion the Trail Court was wrong in taking this view. We have already pointed out earlier that Deshmukh had collected enough material on the basis of which reasonable satisfaction could have been arrived at that the acts committed by the two gangs were terrorist acts. It is no doubt true that it was wrongly reported by Deshmukh that Section 5 was also applicable in this case and that without proper verification sanction was granted to proceed under that section also. The applicability of section 5 depended upon existence of a requisite notification by the State Government.

It was wrongly reported by Pl Deshmukh in hi, report that such a notification was issued and relying upon his statement the higher officer had given the sanction. Merely on this ground it cannot be ,aid that Shinde has exercised the power under Section 15 of the TADA Act ma/a fide. The learned trial Judge has al. so hdd that it was not fair on the part of Shinde to record the confessions as he was also supervising the investigation. Shinde has clearly stated in his evidence that he had made attempts to find out if any other Superintendent of Police was available for recording the confessions and as others had declined to oblige him he had no other option but to record them. We see no illegality or impropriety in Sbinde recording the confessions even though he was supervising the investigation.

One more flimsy reason given by the Trial Court for holding that the power under Section 15 was exercised ma/a fide is that the accused making the confessions wen: not told that they have bet::n recorded under the TADA Act. No such grievdnce was made by tht:: accused in their statement under Section 313. On the other hand, it appears from the confessions themselves that the accused were made aware of the fact that those confessions were recorded under the TADA Act. 29 The learned trial Judge has held the confessions inadmissible on the ground that they have been recorded in breach of Rules 15(2) and 15(3) of the TADA Rules. The rules read as under: 'S. 15(2). The police officer shall, before recording any confession under sub-section (1), explain.

to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him and such police officer shall not record any such confession unless upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to beliew that it is being made voluntarily. " "R. 15(3). The confession shall, if it is in writing, be - (a) signed by the person who makes the confession; and (b) by the police officer who shall also certify under his own hand that such confession was taken in his presence and recorded by him and that the record contains a full and true account of the confession made by the person and such police officer shall make a memorandum at the end of the confession to the following effect : ''I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made.

It was taken in my presence and hearing and recorded by me and was read over to the person making ! t and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and trut: account of the statement made by him. Sd/- Police Officer. " Relying on sub-rule 2 of Rule 1. 5 it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the polici. : officer is n:quired to explain to the person making confession that he is not bound to make it and that if he makes it, it can be used against him as evidence. The said provision also requires that he should question the: person making it in order to assure him that he is making it voluntarily. It was submitkd by Mr. Kotwal, learned counsel appearing for some of thi. : respondents that both these things are required to be done 'before recording' any confession.

When a confession is recorded in two parts - the preliminary part containing record of how and for what the person was forwarded and the questions and answers put to him for ascertaining his voluntary willingness to make a confession even S. N. DUBh v. N. B. BHOIR [G. T. NANAVATI, J. ] 235 after being told that th. : confession may be used against his as evidence and the second part which contains the actual confessional statement - it is the ~econd part which has to be regarded the confessional statement and not the preliminary part. Therefore, the obligation to explain and ascertain is to be performed whili: recording the real confessional part and doing so earlier when the preliminary part is recorded cannot be regarded proper compliance of the requirement of Rule 15(2).

The police officer must explain and give the statutory warning before recording the actual confessional part and it is at that point of time that he has to ascertain by questioning the person making it that he is making the confession voluntarily. He submitted that the confessional statements were recorded in this case in two parts and while recording the second part no questions were asked from the accused to ascertain whether he was making the confession voluntarily. He also submitkd that while recording the second part no warning was given to the accused that he was not bound to make the conkssion and that if he made it, then it can be used against him. 30. Neither Section 15 nor Rule 15 contemplates recording of confessional statement in two parts or giving time to the person making a confossion to think over and reconsider whether he still wants to make it in spite of being told that he is not bound to make it and that it can be used against him.

If in order to be assured that the person concerned makes the confossion willing and voluntarily the recording officer gives him some turn: to think over and for t4at reason records the confessional statement in two parts, then they cannot be regarded as two independent and separate statements. The second part being in continuation of the first part both the part~ have to be treated as one confessional statement. If the recording police officer feels assured after giving the statutory warning that the person who wants to make a confession is doing so voluntarily he may not give any time for reconsideration and in that case there would be only one continuous statement. Therefore, the contention that when the confession is recorded in two parts, only the second part can be n:garded as the confession and while recording the second part the police officer should give the statutory warning and then ascertain if the person concerned is making it voluntarily, cannot be accepkd.

The requirement of law is that before recording the confession the police officer should ascertain by putting questions to the maker of it that he is making the confession voluntarily and he should also explain to him that he is not bound to make the confession and that if he makes it that can be used against him as 236 SUPREME C'OURT REPORTS [2000] 1S. C. R. evidence. In this case DSP Shinde had put questions to each of the accused who was brought before him to ascertain if he was willing to make a confession voluntarily and had also given the statutory warning to him on that day. Even after the accused had shown his willingness to make a confession Shinde had given him time not exceeding 48 hours to think over his readiness to make the confession. When the accused was brought to him again he had again ascertained if he was still ready and willing to give a statement. He had also asked him if he was making it under any pressure or coercion or threat.

Only after the accused had replied in negative he had told the accused to say whatever he wanted to state about Suresh Dube's murder. In view of these facts and circumstances it is not possible to uphold the finding recorded by the Trial Court and to accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that while recording the confessions of the accused Shinde had committed a breach of Rule 15(2). 31. As regards the breach of Rule 15(3) it has been held that Shindc did not write the certificates and the memorandums in the same form and terms as are prescribed by that rule. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the certificates and memorandums have not been recorded by Shinde in identical terms and as Ruic 15 is held mandatory the Trial Court was right in holding them inadmissible for non-compli:mce with that mandatory requirement.

Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the certificate and memorandum arc required to be written by that rule in the same form and terms. What Rule 15(3)(b) requires is that the police officer should certify under his own hand that "such confession was taken in his pn:sence and recorded by him and that the record contains a full and true account of the confession made by the person". According to that rule the memorandum should be to the following effect: "I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and hearing and recorded by me and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the stah:ment made by him.

" Writing the certificate and making the memorandum are thus made mandatory to prove that the accused was explained that he was not bound to S. N. DUBE v. N. B. BHOIR [G. T. NANAVATI, J. j 237 make a confession and that if he made it, it can be used against him as evidence, that the confession was voluntary and that it was taken down by the police officer fully and correctly. These matters are not left to be proved by oral evidence alone. The requirement of rule is preparation of contemporaneous record regarding the manner of recording the confossion in presence of the person making it. Though giving of the statutory warning ascertaining voluntariness of the confession and preparation of a contemporaneous record in presence of the person making the confession are mandatory requirements of that rule, we see no good reason why the form and the words of the certificate and memorandum should also be held mandatory.

What arc the mandatory requirements of a provision cannot be decided by overlooking the object of that provision. they m:ed not go beyond the purpose sought to be achieved. The purpose of the provision is to see that all formalities arc performed by the recording officer himself and by others to ensure "full compliance of the procedure and seriousness of recording a confession. We fail to appreciate how any departure from the form or the words can adversdy affect the object of the provision or the person making the confession so long as the court is able to conclude that the requirements have been substantially complied with. No. public purpose is likely to be achieved by holding that the certificate and memorandum should bt: in thi:: same form and also in the samt: terms as are to be found in Ruk 15(3)(b).

We fail to appreciate how sanctity of the confes&ion would get adversely affected merely because the certificate and memorandum are not st:paratdy written but are mixed up or because different words conveying tht: samething as is required are used by the recording officer. We hold that the Trial Court committed an error of law in holding that because the certificate and memorandums are not in the samt: form and words they must be regarded as inadmissible. Having gone p through the certificates and the memorandums made by Shindt: at the end of the confession& what we find is that he had mixed up what is required to be stated in the certificate and what is required to be stakd in the memorandum. he has stated in each of the certificates and the memorandums that he had ascertained that the accused was making the confes~ion willingly and voluntarily and that he was under no pressure or enticement.

It is further stated therein that he had recorded the confession in his own hand-writing (except in case of A-7 whose confession was recorded with the help of a writer). He has also stated that it was n:corded as per the say of the accused, that it was read over to the accused completely, that the accused had personally read it, that he had ascertained thereafter that it was recorded as per his say and that the confession was taken in his presence and recorded by him. It is true tliat he has not specifically stated therein that the record contains 'a full and true account of the confession made'. The very fact that he had recorded the confession in his own handwriting would imply that it was recorded in his presence and was recorded by him.

So also when he stated in the certificates and memorandums that the confession was recorded as per the say of the accused, that it was read over to him fully, that the accused himself personally read it and that he had ascertained that it was recorded as per his say, that would mean that it contains 'a full and true account of the confession' and that the contents were admitted by the accused. Thus, while writing the certificate and the memorandum what Shinde has done is to mix up the two and use his own words to state what he had done. Only thing that we find missing therein is a statement to the effect that he had ;;xplained to the accused that he was not bound to make a confession and that if he did so the confession might be used as tvidt:nce against him. Such a statement instead of appt:aring at the end of the confession in tht: memorandum appears in the earlier part of the confrssion in the question and answer form.

Each of the accused making the confession was explaim:d about his right not to make the confession and the danger of its being used against him as evidence. That statement appears in the body of the confession but not at the end of it. Can the confession be regarded as not in-conformity with Rule 15(3)(b) only for that reason? We find no good reason to hold like that We hold that the Trial Court was wrong in holding that there was a brtach of Rule 15(3) and, therefore, the confessions were inadmissiblt: and bad. 32. It was next submitted that though Section 164 Cr. P C. does not strictly apply to confessions recorded under St:ction 15 of TADA Act, the provisions contained in Sections 15(2) of TADA Act and 162(2) and 164(4) of Cr. P. C. are similar and that would imply that the rnquirements of law regarding the proct:dure for recording a confession are the same.

Both the provisions rt:quirt: that before recording confessions the accust:d must be told that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he makes it then it can be used as evidence against him. Both these provisions n:quire that before recording the confession the recording officer has to question the accused in order to satisfy himself that he is making the confession voluntarily and after recording it to issut: a certificate and memorandum to the '· effect that the accused was t:xplained about his right ta be informt:d that he was not bound to make the confession and that it could be used against S. N. DUBE v. N. B. BHOIR jG. T. NAJ,IAVAn J. j 239 him, that he believed that the confession was made voluntarily, that it was taken down in his presence and was read over to him, that it was admitted as corrected by him and that it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him. It was, therdore, submitted that the guidelines issm.

:d by the High Court for recording a confession under Section 164 Cr. P. C. are also required to be followed by the police officer ncording a confes&ion under TADA Act. Otherwise a situation may arise where in the same trial there may be a confession of an accused recorded by a Magistrate without following the guidelines contained in the High Court Manual and a confession made by another accused and recorded by a police offici::r under the TADA Act who has not followed those guidelines while the one recorded by the Magistrate may not be recorded as evidence the other one will b~ treated as evidence and can be ustd against him. In the alternative, it was submitted that even if it is held that the guidelines issued under Section 164 Cr. P. C. by the High Court are not required to be followed while recording a confossion under Section 15 of TADA Act at least the well recognised principles pointed out by this Court in Kartar Singh's case (supra) are required to be followed.

The said guidelines have been suggested by this Court as well recognised principles of fairness to be followed to ensure that the confession obtained in the pre- indictment inti::rrogation by police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police is not tainted with any vice. What is missed by the learned counsel is that while recommending those guidelines it was made clear by this Court that it is really for the Court trying the offence to decide the question of admissibility or rdiability of a confession by using its judicial wisdom. From what has been observed in the said decision it does not follow that if the suggested guidelines are not followed then the confession must be discarded as inadmissible or bad on that score or on the ground that it is not in conformity with Section 15(2) of the TADA Act and Rule 15 of the TADA Ruks. The police officer recording a confession under Section 15 is really not bound to follow any other procedure.

The ruks or the guidelines framed by the Bombay High Court for recording a confession by a Magistrate under Section 164 Cr. P. C. do not by themselves apply to recording of a confession under Section 15 of the TADA Act. Then::fore, merely because some of those guidelines were not followed while recording the confessions it cannot for that reason be held that the said co! rlessions have lost their evidtntiary value. lf while recording the confessions Shindc 240 SUPREMF COURT REPORTS (2000] 1 S. C. R. had followed all those guidelines also then that would have been a circumstance helpful in inferring that the confessions were made after full understanding and voluntarily. In this case there is nothing on record to show, except that the confessions were recorded by Shinde in police station, that they were not n:corded in free atmosphere. No other person was allowed to remain present at that time and all the accused were given time to reconsider their willingness.

After they were produced again Shinde had ascertained whether they were still willing to make confossions. All the accused were previously told that they were not bound to make a confession. Each ont; of them was warned '. hat if he made a confession then it could be used against him. 33. Shinde had tried to ascertain if any threat or inducement was given to them or whether they were ill treated or pressurized. All the accused had categorically stated that no such thing had happened. From the answers given by the accused it can be said that Shinde had good reason to believe that the accused w. :re making confossional statements voluntarily. In his evidence also h. : has stated so and nothing has been brought out in his cross examination from which it can be said that he was not so satisfied or that he did not really believe that the confessions were made by the accused voluntarily.

The learned Trial Judge hdd the confessions not voluntary as he was of the view that A-1 to A-8 and A-11 were hardened criminals and it was not belicvable that they would have one after the other iliown their willingness to make confessions. It was not even the case of the accus. :d that they wen: not tak. :n to Shinde for recording their confessions. The only suggestion that was made in his cross-examination was that he had obtained those confessions after exerting influence, coercion and physical and mental torture. We have aln:ady pointed out earlier that in absence of any specific act suggested by the defence it is not possible to accept the belated allegation made by those accused that their confessions were obtained in that manner. On careful consideration of the evidence of PJ Deshmukh and DSP Shinde, we find that all those accused had made their confessions voluntarily.

The confessions also receive independent corroboration on material points from the evidence of the two eye-witnesses and also from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 5. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that they are true and reliable and can form a safe basis for conviction of those respondents/accused who have admitted to have taken part in the murder of Suresh and in commission of terrorist acts. S. N. DUBf, v. N. B. BHUIR(G. T. NANAVATI,J. J 241 34. A-1 in his confession (Exts. 571 and 571-A) has admitted that he was a member of the gang of Manik Patil. He has further admitted therein that Manik Patil and his men were entrusted by Bhai Thakur the job of finishing Surcsh and because they had not dune their work quickly, Bhai Thakur was angry with them. So they were keeping a watch on Suresh Dube and on the day of the incident he was informed by one Kalidas Patil that Suresh was on platform No. 2.

He immediately loaded his pistol and along with A-2 to A-5 and Narain Gouda went to the railway station. Suresh was seen reading a newspaper and another person with him was standing nearby and getting his shoes polished. He crossed him and went ahead and also did Namaskar. As there wen:: many persons near the book-stall at that point of time he went ahead on the platform and again returned near that book-stall. He then took out the pistol from his pocket and fued seven shuts at Suresh. He has also stated in his confession how he and others thereafter ran away and what he and others did thereafter. A-2, A-3 and A-4 in their confessional statements (Exts. 578 and 578-A, 563 and 563-A and 584 and 584-A respectively) have also statt:d that Manik St:th had given instructions to Narendra (A-1) to finish Suresh and they were told to accompany Narendra whenever Narendra called them for help. They have admitted that on being told by A-1 that "Suresh Dube has come at Nalasupara railway station.

Let us all go'', they went to the railway platform along with A-1. They have all stated that Narendra fired shots and aftt:r Surcsh had collapsed on the platform they had run away. A-5 has also admitted in his confession that he had gone to the railway platform running along with A-1 to hdp him as decided earlier. All of them have clearly admitted that the murder of Suresh was committed on instructions of Manik Patil (A-6) and Bhai Thakur. A-6 also confessed that he was the leader of the gang and that as decided by Bhai Thakur, Don (Pendari) was to be finished by the men of Bhai Thakur and they were to finish Dube. Therefore, A-1 and his boys were keeping a watch upon movements of Sun::sh and ht: had instructed of A-1 and his boys to fmish Suresh as soon as possible. So far as participation of A-1 to A-4 in the murder of Suresh is concerned the confessions stand corroborated by the evidence of the two eye-witnesses.

The confessions of A-5 and A-6 being substantive evidence are sufficient for considering them and they also n:ceive corroboration from the confessions of A-1 to A-4 and also receive general corroboration as regards the other illegal activities committed by them from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 5 and those witnesses examined by the prosecution to prove 242 SUPREMF. COCRT RF. PORTS [2000] 1S. C. R. that they were the victims of some of the terrorist acts committed by the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil. Therefore, relying upon the commission of A-1 to A-6 and the evidence of the two eye-witnesses Amarnath and Om Prakash, we hold that Sun:sh was killed by A-1 by firing shots from his pistol and that was done in prosecution of the object of the larger conspiracy hatched by Bhai Thakur, Manik . Patil and some members of their gangs and the unlawful assembly consisting of A-1 to A-6 and some others. We, therefore, hold A-1 guilty under Section 3021. P. C.

and A-2 to A-6 under Section 302 read with Sections 120 B and 149 LP. C. We may state that the finding recorded by the Trial Court that thc death of Suresh was homicidal and that he died of the injuries caused to him by the bullets with which he Was hit has not been questioned before us. 35. To prove the terrorist acts committed by the gangs Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil, the prost:cution had examined some police officers and some others who were the victims of thL terrorist acts. The police officers examined by the prosecution were PI Tadavi (PW. 68), ASI Paradkar (P. W. 69), PSI Ram Krishna (P. W. 70), SDPO Deshmukh (P. W. 71), DIG Suradakar (P. W. 75), DGP Baraokar (P. W. 77) and ACP Vasant Pagare (P. W. 90). Pl Tadavi (P. W. 68) was attached to the Virar police station between 9. 4. 1985 and 24. 1. 1986. He has deposed that during that period he had found the three gangs operating in the area under the police station. They were the gangs of Bhai Thakur, Nizam and Kery.

Bhai Thakur's gang was a strong one and had established supremacy over others. He has further stated that modus operandi of Bhai Thakur's gang was to create pre-planned alibi while committing offence. In his cross-examination he admitted that he had not made any report to any of his superior officers regarding the activities of these three gangs. He, however, stated that he had gathered all that information through the enquiries made by him. ASI Paradkar (P. W. 69) was attached to Virar police station as police Havaldar between 8. 8. 1988 and 31. 7. 1989. PI Kukdolkar (A- 15) was Police Inspector of the police station at that time. He has deposed that Gajanan Patil and Manik Patil were residing in Nilemore village and had created fear in that locality by beating people . md the people used to be afraid of them.

He has further stated that from the police record he had come to know that three gangs of Bhai Thakur, Karu and Nizam were operating in that area and that those three gangs used to fight with one another for establishing supremacy. Manik Patil (A-6) and Gajanan Patil were members of the gang SX DU:!! -<. v. N. R BHOIR IU. T. NANAVATI, J. j 243 of Bhai Thakur. He has also deposed that he had seen Bhai Thakur/ Hitendra Thakur (! VLP. ) and Prashant Tandel (A-8) coming to the police station to meet PI Kukdolkar. He has further deposed that PI Nimbalkar, who was attached to L. CB. Thane then, often used to come to Virar and stay with Pl Kukdolkar and both of them used to call Prashant Tandel (A-8) to see them. He admitted that he had not taken any action against any ol these gangs nor he had suspected anything wrong or improper because of those met:tings. He denied that he was deposing falsely against the accused at the instance of Deshmukh. Ram Krishna Rengunthawar (P. W.

70) was a senior PSI of Virar police station from 17. 5. 1981 to 15. 8. 1982. He has deposed that during that period he had registered three offonces against Bhai Thakur. In 1984 he was attached to CID Crime. Out of those three cases two cases were transferred to CID branch and in the third case the accused were acquitted. He stated that the said two cases were compounded out of fear. But he admitted in his cross-examination that he had not made any report to any higher officer in that behalf. Deshmukh (P. W. 71) was the SDPO of the Western Railway between 1. 3. 1992 and 30. 6. 1993. He had no personal knowledge with respect to the illegal activities of the two gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil. But during the investigation made between 18. 5. 1992 and 23. 9. 1992 and also thereafter he had come to know about their illegal activities and the terror created by them in the area.

He admitted that he had not received any complaint against those two gangs for forcibly taking away any land or collection of 'haftas' or beating any member of the public. DIG Suradakar (P. W. 75) has deposed that though he had come to know about the existence of the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil and acts of violence committed by them and creation of an atmosphere of terror in that area, he had no personal knowledge about the same. PI Pagare (P. W. 90) was examined to prove the involvement of Bhai Thakur's gang in CR No. 43/84 under Sections 302, 147, 148 and 149 of IPC and 25(c) of the Arms Act at Virar police station. He had investigated that offence and submitted hi. report (Ext. 618). In his cross-examination he admitted that he did not know if A-9, Hitendra Thakur was discharged in that case. He also stated that the said case was still pending in the Thane court.

As rightly held by the learned trial Judge, the evidence of the police officers as regards the tt:rrorist acts stated to have been committed by the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil is of general nature and vogue they have referred to some cases filed agamst Bhai Thakur and members of his gang. Even if the 244 SUPREME COURT RHORTS [2000) 1 S. C. R. allegations made in those cases are believed as correct they fall short of establishing terrorist acts' as contemplated by the TADA Act. 36. The prosecution abo examined Pushpa Pendhari (P. W. 19), Bairam (P. W. 34), Kanhaya (P. W. 35), Jaffar (P. W. 40), Waman (P. W. 41), Sakharam (P. W. 42), Jajannath (P. W. 45), Subhash (P. W. 67) and Naaz (P. W. 97) to prove that the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil were engaged in committing terrorist acts. Out of these witnesses P. Ws. 34, 41, 42 and 45 have not referred to any specific terrorist act committed by those two gangs. P. W.

97 has deposed about an incident which is beyond the charge period and, therefore, her evidence was rightly not considered by the Trial Court. P. W. l9 has deposed about some acts of the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil, the nvalry between Bharat Pendhari and those two gangs and the murder of Bharat Pendhari on 14. 9. 1989 but they at the most suggest that there were gang wars. P W. 25 has deposed that his property was demandt::d and threats were given to him by Bhai Thakur and therefore he had to leave Virar. P. W. 26 has also stated that he was required to sell his land because of threats and terror of Bhai Thakur. P. W. 35 was staying in Virar since l966. He has d.. :posed that he was assaulted by the men of Bhai Thakur in 1984 and, thert:fore, he shifted to Vasai in January 1985 and for some time had gone to his native place in U. P.

What was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents was that the evidence of these witnesses even if it is believed it proves commission of illegal acts involving violence but falls short of constituting 'terrorist acts' as contemplated by Section 3 of the TADA Act. It is no doubt true that the evidence of these witnesses, except that of P. W. 19, is not specific and by itself may not be regarded as sufficient to prove terrorist acts but they provide sufficient corroboration to the admissions made by A-1 to A-6 in their confessional statements that the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil had created terror in the areas of their operation. We, therefore see no reason why relying upon those confessions and the evidence of these witnesses a finding that A-1 to A-6 were engaged in committing terrorist acts, cannot be recorded. A-7 has not confessed in clear terms his involvement in commission of terrorist acts or in the murder of Suresh.

A-8 and A-11 have also not admitted to have played any role in the murder of Suresh or in commission of terrorist acts by Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil, though both these accused have generally stated in their confessional statements about the ilkgal activities committtd by those two gangs. We, therefore, hold A-1 to A-6 guilty under Section 3(3) of the TADA Act also. S. N. Dt:BF v. N. B. BHOlR '. G. T. NANAVATI,J. ] 245 37. The charge against the police officers A-14 to A-17 was that as a part of the criminal conspiracy with Bhai Thakur and his men, they had caused evidence of commission of the offence to disappear and by that dishorn:st investigation have tried to screen the real offenders from legal punishment and tht:reby they have committed offences punishable under Sections 201, 217 and 218 read with 120-B LP. C. They are also charged for the offences punishable under Sections 3(3) and 3(4) of the TADA Act read with 120-B l. P. C.

Except the confessional statements of the co-accused there is no other indt:pendent evidence to show the involvement of A-14 to A-17 as alleged. The confessions no doubt create a strong suspicion that A-14 to A-17 were maintaining good re! ations with Bhai Thakur and A-8 (Prashant) and that tht;y had possibly helped Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil in screening the real offend1;;rs. Thi! role which they played crea. tes a strong suspicion regarding tht:ir connection with the gangs of Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil. Howt:wr, we do not think it safe to convict them only on the basis of the confessions of the co-accm. ed. 38. In the result, these appeals are partly allowed. The judgment and the order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge, Designated Court, Pune in Terrorist Sessions Case No. 32 of 1993 in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 6 (A- I to A-6) arc sct aside. Respondent Nu. I Narcndera Bhoir is convicted under Section 302 l. P. C. and sentcnced to suffer imprisonment for life.

He is also convicted under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are convicted under Section 302 read with Section 120-B and Section 149 l. P. C. and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for lifo. Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 are also convicted under Section 3(3) of the TADA Act and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 10 years. All of them are acquitted of other charges. Acquittal of the rest of the respondents is confirmed and appeals against them are dismissed. S. M. Appeals dismissed. -