SODAN SINGH ETC. ETC. v. NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE & ANR. ETC

Citation: [1989] 3 S.C.R. 1038

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, S. NATARAJAN, L.M. SHARMA, N.D. OJHA, KULDIP SINGH

Case summary

(ii) the petitioners are poor people and depend on their business for their livelihood and if they are not allowed to occupy some specific places demarcated on the pavements on a permanent basis for conducting their business they may starve which will lead to violation of...

Judgment text

I .. \ SODAN SINGH ETC. ETC. v. NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE & ANR. ETC. '1 /;.. ; AUGUST 30, 1989 \"- ,.. [E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, CJ. , S. NATARAJAN, LAUT MOHAN SHARMA, N. D. OJHA AND KULDIP SINGH, JJ. J Constitution of India, 1950: Article 19(1)(g)-Street trading- • An age old vocation adopted by human beings to earn living-No "'\ justification to deny citizens right to earn livelihood using public streets for trade or business-Regulatory measures and reasonable restrictions ~ can be imposed. Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957: Street trading-Necessity to provide regulatory measures-Emphasised. Punjab Municipal Act, 1911: Street trading-Necessity to provide regulatory measures-Emphasised. ~· The petitioners in these special leave petitions and writ petitions claim the right to engage in trading business on the pavements of roads of the city of Delhi. The special leave petitions are against the judgments of the Delhi High Court dismissing their claim.

>- It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that (i) they were allowed by the respondents to transact their bnsiness by occnpying a particular area on the pavements on payment of certain charges ~· described as Tehbazari and the refusal by the municipal authorities to permit them to continue with their trade is violative of their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution; and (ii) the petitioners are poor people and depend on their business for their livelihood and if they are not allowed to occupy some specific places demarcated on the pavements on a permanent basis for conducting their business they may starve which will lead to violation of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. -'\ The respondents, on the other hand, contend that nobody bas got a legal right to occupy exclusively a particular area on the road-pavement for pursuing a trading business and nobody can claim any fundamental right in this regard whatsoever.

SODAN SINGH v. N. D. M. C. 1039 Disposing of the petitions and remitting the cases to the appropriate Division Bench for final disposal in accordance with this judgment, this Court, HELD: E. S. Venkataramiah, CJ, S. Natarajan, L. M. Sharma and N. D. Ojha ,JJ. ] Per L. M. Sharma, J. (1) A member of the public is entitled to legitimate user of the road ·other than actually passing or re-passing through it, provided that he does not create an unreasonable obstruction which may inconvenience other persons having ·similar right to pass and does not make excessive use of the road to the prejudice of the others. Liberty of an individual comes to an end where the liberty of another commences.

[IOSOC, A-Bl (2) What will constitute public nuisance and what can be included · in the legitimate user can be ascertained only by taking into account all the relevant circumstances including the size of the road, the amount of traffic and the nature of the additional use one wants to make of the public streets. This has to be judged objectively and here comes the role of public authorities. [IOSJE) (3) The right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated, cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or re-passing and for no other use. Proper regulation is, however, a necessary condition as otherwise the very object of laying out roads--to facilitate traffic-may be defeated.

Allowing the right to trade without appropriate control is likely to lead to unhealthy competition and quarrel between traders and travelliui; public and sometimes amongst the traders themselves resulting in chaos. The right is subject to reasonable restrictions under clause (6) ofArticle 19. [1052C-D) (4) The proposition that all public streets and roads in India vest in the State but that the,,State holds them as trustee on behalf of the public and the member{of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use them as a matter of right, and that this right is limited only by the similar rights possessed by every other citizens to use the pathways and further that the State as trustee is entitled to impose all necessary limitations on the character and extent of the user, should be treated as of r universal application. The provisions of the Municipal Acts should be construed in the light of the above proposition and they should receive a ~ beneficent interpretation. [1052E-G] M. A.

Pal Mohd. v. R. K. Sadarangarii, A. LR. (1985) Mad 23; C. S. S. Motor Service v. Madras State, A. LR. 1953 Mad. 279; Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P. & Ors. , [1955] l SCR 707; Harper v. G. N. Haden & Sons Ltd. , [1933] l Ch. 298; Bombay Hawkers Union & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. , [1985] 3 SCR 528 referred to. (5) The petitioners do have the fundamental right to carry on a ,. trade or business of their choice, but not to do so on a particular place, as circumstances are likely to change from time to time. Bnt that does not mean that the licence has to be granted on a daily basis; that 1 arrangement cannot be convenient to anybody, except in special circumstances. [1053F, 1057F] Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union ofIndia, [1981] 2 SCR 52; K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1982] 3 SCR 628, referred to. (6) Article 21 is not attracted in the case of trade or businessjeither big or small.

The right to carry on any trade or business and the concept of life and personal liberty within Article 21 are too remote to be connected together. [J054G] Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. , [1985] 3 sec 545, distinguished. (7) The provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, t" are clear and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi has full authority to permit hawkers and squatters on the side walks where they consider it practical and convenient. [J052G-H] (8) The provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as applicable to New Delhi area, should receive a liberal construction so that the New Delhi Municipal Committee may be in a position to exercise full authority to permit hawkers and squatters on pavements in certain areas. [J053A-C] ·-\. Pyarelal v. N. D. M. C. , [1967] 3 SCR 747 overruled. ·~ (9) A scheme should be drawn up as soon as possible containing SODAN SINGH v. N. D. M. C.

1041 f detailed necessary provisions dealing with all relevant aspects, and capable of solving the problems arising ip the situation in a fair and equit, able manner. [I057B-C] (10) The demand of the petitioners that hawkers must be permitled on ~very road in the city cannot be allowed. If a road is not wide i enough to conveniently manage the traffic on it, no hawking may be permitted at all, or may be sanctioned only once a week, say on Sundays when the rush considerably thins out. Hawking may also be justifiably prohibited near hospitals or where necessity of security measures so r demands. There may still be other circumstances justifying refusal to t'" permit any kind of business on a particular road. [1057E] '-;- (ll) Some of the llawkers ip big cities are selling very costly luxury articles including sophisticated electronic goods, sometimes imported or smuggled.

The authorities will be fully justified ~o deny to such hawkers any facility, They may frame rules in such manner that it may benefit only the poor hawkers incapable of investing a substantial amount for starting the business. Attempt should be made to make the scheme comprehensive, dealing with every relevant aspect, for exampie, the charges to be levied, the procedure for grant and revocation of the licences, etc. [I057H-1058B] -{ Per Ku/dip Singh, J. (1) The guarantee under Article I9(1)(g) extends to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The object "' of using four analogous and overlapping words in Article 19(l)(g) is to make the guaranteed right as comprehensjve as possible to jnclulje all ,.. , the avenues and modes through which a man may earn his livelihood. In a out-shell the guarantee takes into its fold any activity carried on by a citizen of India to earn his living.

The activity must of course be legitimate and no anti-social like gambling, trafficking in women and the like. [i058H-1059C] (2) Once street-trading is accepted as legitimate trade, business or occupation it automatically comes within the protection guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitutionoflndia. [I062E] . ,.. (3) Street trading is an age-old vocation adopted by human beings to earn living. It is one of the traditionally recognised business or trade in England. This is so in spite of the fact that there is a comp! thers v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, [1985] 3 sec 545. the learned counsel further said that the two respondents have been in the past allowing squatter traders on the pavements on payment of Tehbazari charges. He drew our attention tb the counter affidavit of the respondent in S. L. P. Nos. 4519-23 of 1986 at riage 146 where a resolution by the New Delhi Municipal Committee has- been mentioned ih paragraph Iil.

In the case of Delhi Municipal Corporation also several documents have been relied upon for showing that specific areas have been allowed to be occupied for the purpose of trading business from time to time. The learned counsel argued that since the two municipalities have been settling specific areas for the purpose of· squatting, it is not open to them to deny squatting rights to the petitioners and other persons situated in similar circumstarices. 9. In Pyare Lal etc. v. N. D. M. C. , [1967] 3 SCR 747 the New Delhi Municipal Committee banned the sale of cooked edibles on public streets, and prevented the petitioners, licensed vendors of potato chops and other edibles, from continuing with their business. After u~Sticcessfully moving the Punjab High Court, they came to thiS Court. The appeals were dismissed holding that persons in Ihdia cannot claim a lawful right to pursue street trading, and the N,D. M. C. was perfectly authorised to take steps under s.

173 of the Punjab Municipal Act for stopping the business. It was also obserVed that the N . D . M. C. was not empowered under ihe Act to aliow trade oh pUlilic streets on a permanent basis and that permission for sale of goods could be granted only on special occasions on temporary basis as in ihe case of festivals etc. Reliance had been placed on behalf of the petitioners on certain passages from Halsbury's Laws of England, --"" which the Court distinguished on the ground that street trading was regulated by certain statutes in England, and there were no such provisions applicable in the cases before this Court. The right to pursue street trading in India was thus negatived. Mr. Tarkunde contended that it is not correct to deny the members of the public their right to ~ engage in business on the public streets in the country. He said that this is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed both, under Article 19( l)(g) and Article 21.

According to the learned counsel, the practice of the street trading is well established for a considerable time in all the civilised countries of the world including India, England and United - States of America. Refuting the suggestion made on behalf of the ~ respondents that it was only a hawker who sells his goods while moving from door to door and place to place who is allowed on the public streets, Mr. Tarkunde referred to Halsbury's Laws of England, ""' Vol. 40, paragraphs 431 to 446 under the heading 'Street Trading in Greater London'. It was suggested that the right of the members of the public in this regard was founded on the common law right. The learned counsel further relied on the third paragraph of s. 253 of the Chapter 'Highways, Streets, and Bridges' of 39 American Jurisprudence (2nd Edition) which reads as follows: } "A municipality's power to regulate the use of streets for private gain is to be liberally construed.

The purpose of such regulations is to promote public safety, and not to regulate and control indirectly the user's business as such. There is no authority in a municipality to prohibit the use of the street by any citizen or corporation in the carrying on of a legitimate business, harmless in itself and useful to the community, which is independent of the police power f under which reasonable regulations in the promotion of the public order, safety, health, and welfare are proper. " 10. In his reply Mr. Singhvi, the learned counsel for N. D. M. C. pointed out that the first two paragraphs of the aforementioned s. 253 which are quoted below negative the right asserted on behalf of the petitioners and paragraph 3 mentioned above has to be read in that light. ~ "S. 253. Business purposes: Individuals do not have the inherent right to conduct their private business in the streets, nor can they acquire a vested right to use the streets for carrying on a commercial business.

However, individuals do have the right to use the streets to some extent for the purpose of bartering or trading with each other, or for prosecuting a business, trade, or calling, although they cannot legally carry on any part of their business in the public streets to the annoyance of the public, or supply the deficiencies in their own premises by monopolizing the street or walk. The use of public streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business for gain is generally recognised as a special or extraordinary use which the controlling public authority may prohibit or regulate as it deems proper. When a municipality does permit private individuals to have exclusive possession of the street surface for a private business use, such permit is so unusual, and beyond the ordinary authority and power of a municipality, that it may not issue such a permit in the absence of special enabling state legislation.

Assuming that such power exists, the granting of permission to a private person to so use the streets is totally within the discretion of the municipality. " -{_ The learned counsel contended that the grant of exclusive right to occupy any part of the road amounts to the negation of the Common Law theory of dedication of a road for public use. 11. Reference was also made on behalf of the petitioners to the judgment in M. A. Pal Mohd. v. R. K. Sadarangani, A. LR. 1985 Madras 23, wherein it was observed that hawker trade so long as it is proper! y regulated by public authorities could never be a public · nuisance; rather it serves the convenience of the public. and is found not only in India but also in other countries. 12. The question of applicability of the El)glish and American laws on the present aspect was considered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in C. S. S. Motor Service v. Madras State; A. LR.

1953 Madras 279 and the decision was later approved by this Court in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P. and others, [1955] 1SCR 707. After a thorough consideration of the relevant materials Venkatarama Aiyar, J, who delivered the judgment pointed out some of the basic differences in the law of this country on the present subject from the American and English laws, which render the American decisions inapplicable on certain aspects. The right to carry on business, ~ although recognised as one of the liberties protected by the American Constitution, did not acquire the full status of the freedoms expressly mentioned in the Constitution, such as, the freedom of speech, of person, and of religion; and was viewed somewhat i11 the light of an interloper or parvenu among them. The freedoms expressly mentioned in the American Constitution occupy an exalted position which was 'r denied to the unexpressed freedoms including the right to carry on business.

Under the Indian Constitution this right is one of the free· doms expressly protected under Article 19(l)(g) and is placed on the same tbdiing as freedom bf speech, etc. Further only some trades could be t:ilri'ied on by the American citizens as a matter of right and -- :i. the otliers including the transport business dn public roads only if the State perfuiited. The learned Judge observed that this is called a 'franchise; bf a 'privilege' and has an English origin. That is riot the - judgment of Venkatarama Aiyar J. , in the following terms, which has been quoted with appro~ by this Court in Saghir Ahmad's case. "The true position then is that all public streets and roads vest in the State but that the State holds them as trustee on behalf of the ·public. The members of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use them as a matter of right ~ and this right is limited only by the similar rights possessed by every other citizen to use the pathways.

The State as trustees on behalf of the public is entitled to impose all such limitations on the character and extent of the user as may be requisite for protecting the rights of the public generally. Thus the nature of the road may be such that it may not be suitable for heavy traffic and it will be within the competence of the legislature to limit the use of the streets .. 1. to vehicles which do not exceed specified size or weight. ·-. : Such regulations have been held to be valid as within the police power of the State in America. Vide 'Morris v. Budy', [1927] 71 Law Ed. 968, Sproles v. Bindfo~d', [19321 76 Law Ed. 1167, and-'South Carolina State v. Barnwell '''l: Bros. ' I1938] 82 Law Ed. 734.

For the same reason the State might even prohibit the running of transport buses and lorries on particular streets or roads if such running would interfere with the rights of pedestrians to pass and re-pass as it might if the street is narrow or conjested but ~ subject to such limitations the right of a citizen to carry on ""1 business in transport vehicles on public pathways cannot be denied to him on the ground that the State owns the highways. " r. ,,. , 13. Mr. Singhvi is correct in pointing out that the passages of the f American and English laws, as relied upon on behalf of the peti-· tioners, do not establish their right to carry on trading business on ). public streets, but for that reason their claim cannot be rejected either. The question requires to be examined further. The observations in the judgment of Venkatarama Aiyer, J. quoted above primafacie support ;:;,1 the petitioners.

They received express approval of this Court in Saghir Ahmad's case, but there is an important distillction between those cases and the present matter which cannot be ignored. In both the above cases the petitioners were claiming the right to ply transport vehicles for hire on public streets; in other words, they wanted to use the roads for transport, for which the roads were primarily laid out and -{ while so doing attempted to earn money. In the present cases before us the petitioners are desirous of conducting their trade business by sale of goods on the roads from stationary points; they do not want to make use of the roads for movement of persons or goods. The question is ~ whether this makes a material difference. 14. The primary object of building roads is undoubtedly to facili- .... tate people to travel from one point to another. Quoting several authorities Byron K. Elliott and William F.

Elliott in their treatise on the Law of Roads and Streets have defined a street as a road or public way in a city, town or village. A way over land set apart for public travel in a town or city is a street, no matter by what name it may be called. If a way is free to all people it is a highway. P. Duraisw. ami Aiyangar in his book dealing with the Law of Municipal Corporation in British India (1914 Edn. ) has observed that the primary and paramount use of the street is public travel for man, beast and carriage t' for goods. On behalf of the respondents reliance has been placed on the oft-repeated adage that public have a right of passing and repassing through a street but have no right "to be on it", which Sri Aiyangar also has mentioned at page 542 of his book. Halsbury, relied upon by both sides, has stated (Vol. 21 paragraph 107) that the right of A the public i~ ll tjzht to pass alone a highway for the purpose of legitimate tra,v.

,1, not tq 1,>c: qn it, except so far as the public's pr. ,sence is atttjbutable to a reasonable and proper user of the highway as such. These statements certaioly do not mean that a traveller has to be in pew~tuitl moticiii. ;hen lie is in·a pubii(! stie. ,i. Ii may be "ss~ntial for liim, to s\op somc:~e for various reasons~he may have to l! light fro,m, ~ ll y~liicle or pick up a ftjend, ~o)\ect certain articles or tmload goods o! illls to ta,ke some ·rest aiter a long anc! ~! renuo\ls iq\l! f! ey, WJ! a~ is, required of him is that he should not create an unreasonable obstruc-· . tion which may inconvenience other persons having similar right to piiss; he, should not make: excc:ssiye use of the road to the l'rejudic" qf tl\C: ()th "nY of another commences. Subject to this, a member of the public is t::: ~nthied to legitimate"user of the roa"d "other than ~~tualiy pas;. lng or ii:-iiassing through it. · · · · · · · ··· ·· · · · · ·· 15.

It has been sometimes argued that since a person is entitled to the user. of every part of a publi_c street, he cannot be deprived of the P, ijj~. o(any p0rtion thereof by puiti. llg up of any obstruction. This propo,sition \n its a,sec! on the proyisions of the Mad! as pty Mllajcipa~ ise of a business of selling articles after investing some capital, howsoe;er meagre. It is significant to note that the judgment in Bombay Hawkers Unwn and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporutwn anu Utlzers, I1985] 3 SCR 528, and that in Olga Tellis were delivered wnhin a week, both by Y. V. Chandrachud, CJ. and some of the counsel appearing m two cases were common, and t_hat while dealing with the rights of the squatting hawkers in the former case the learned Chief Justice confined the consideration of the right under Article ,9( ,)(g) of the Constitution. Besioes, the Court in the Olga Tellis affirmed the validity of s.

3 i4 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act on the ground that ··Removal of encroachments on the footpaths or pavements over which the public has the right of passage or access, cannot be regarded as unreasonable, unfair or UnJUSt. --4.. In this connection the Court further proceeded to say, "Footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets. The main reason for laying out pavements is to e~5ure that the pedestrians are able to go a~out their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements.

There is no substance in the argument adv;mced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing repassing, are competing claims and that the former should be preferred to the latter. No one has the right to make use of a public property for a private purpose without the requisite authorisation and, therefore, it is erroneous to contend that the pavement dwellers have . the 1:1 A, right to encroach upon pavements by constructing dwellings thereon. Public streets, of which pavements form a part, are primarily dedicated for the purpose of passage and, even the pedestrians have but the limited right of using pavements for the purpose of passing and repassing. So long as a person does not transgress the limited purr pose for which the pavements are made, his use thereof is legitimate and lawful.

But, if a person puts any public property to a use for which it is not intended and is not authorised to use it, he becomes a trespasser. The common • example which is cited in some of the English cases (see, .. for example, Hicknan v. Maisey,) is that if a person, while using a highway for passage, sits down for a time to rest himself by the side of the road, he does not commit a -'( trespass. But, if a person puts up a dwelling on the pavemen! , whatever may be the economic compulsions behind such an act, his user of the pavement would become unauthorised. " It is also worth noting that assurances had been given on behalf of the State Government in its pleading before this Court which was repeatedly mentioned in the judgment. >- 21.

On behalf of some of the petitioners it was contended that in view of the inclusion of the word "socialist" in the Preamble of the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment greater concern must be shown to improve the condition of the poor population in the country, and every effort should be made to allow them as much benefit as may be possible. There cannot be any quarrel with this proposition, but that by itself cannot remedy all the problems arising from poverty. Even \. '--.. the Constitution as it stood originally was committed to economic justice and welfare of the needy. But for that reason either then or now the other provisions of the Constitution and the laws cannot be ignored. It is, therefore, not possible to interpret the decision in Olga Tellis in the manner to interpret the decision in Olga Tellis in the manner suggested on behalf of the petitioners to bolster their case with the aid of Article 21. -t 22. During his argument Mr.

Tarkunde fairly stated that the Municipal Committee may be entitled to regulate the squatting business of the petitioners, but they must make detailed schemes in this regard. A serious concern was shown in the argument of the other learned advocates also alleging that corruption at large scale was rampant and huge amounts of money were being realised illegally by some of the servants of the Municipalities from the poor hawkers. No ,rules have been framed with respect to the choice of the persons, the area to be allowed to them or the rate of Tehbazari charges. The permission to squat was being granted on daily basis or for very short periods to the great inconvenience to the hawkers and no machinery was available to hear their grievances. A draft scheme has been prepared and filed on behalf of the petitioners with a suggestion that the respondents may be directed to adopt it. On behalf of the respondents it was said that statutory provisions are already there in this regard, .

· 1 but they had to concede that they are too sketchy and incapable of r meeting the need. We are, in the circumstances, of the view that detailed necessary provisions, dealing with all relevant aspects, and capable of solving the problems aris. ing in the situation in a fair and equitable manner, should be made; and,' the respondents should proceed as soon as may be possible. They will be well advised to consider the suggestions of the petitioners while finalising the schemes. Due regard to the requirements of the relevant laws, e. g. , Delhi Police Act, 197ey and the Delhi Control of Vehicular and other Traffic on Roads and Streets Regulation, 1980 will have to be given. 23. We would, however, make it clear that the demand of the -4. "' petitioners that the hawkers must be permitted on every road in the city cannot be allowep.

If a road is not wide enough to conveniently inanage the traffic on it, no hawking may be permitted at all, or may be sanctioned only once a week, say on Sundays when the rush consider- .... ably thins out. Hawking may also be justifiably prohibited near hospitals or where necessity of security measures so demands. There may :'~ ' still be other circumstances justifying refusal to permit any kind of ,4 business on a particular road. The demand on behalf of the petitioners . ,. that permission to squat on a particular place must be on a permanent basis also has to be rejected as circumstances are likely to change from time to time. But this does not mean that the licence. has to be granted on the daily basis; that arrangement cannot be convenient to anybody, except in special circumstances. 24.

The authorities, while adopting a scheme, should also consider the question as to which portions of the pavements should be left ~ free for pedes\rians and the number of the squatters to be allowed on a particular road. There should be rational basis for the choice of the licensees. A policy decision should be taken in regard to the articles ' which should be permitted to be sold on the pavements. It is common ; knowledge (as was taken note of in Bombay Hawkers case) that some of the hawkers in big cities are selling very costly luxury articles includ· ~ ing sophisticated electronic goods, sometimes imported or smugglea . . The authorities will be fully justified to deny to such hawkers any facility. They may frame rules in such a manner that it may benefit only the poor hawkers incapable of investing a substantial amount for starting the business. Attempt should be made to make the scheme comprehensive, dealing with every relevant aspect, for example, the ...

charges to be levied, the procedure for grant and revocation of the licences, et cetera. 25. We as a Court in a welfare State do realise the hardship to which many of the petitioners may be exposed if they are prevented·-. ,,, from carrying on the business. T)je only solution for this is the adop- , tion of the policy of full employni! ent, which even according to leading -'(' economists like Keynes will alleviate the problems of the unemployed to some extent. But as students of economics we also realise that every human activity has the 'optimum point' beyond which it becomes wholly unproductive. It is for the Government to take reasonable steps to prevent movement of people from rural areas to urban areas. That can be done by the development of urban centres in rural areas removed from each other at least by one hundred miles. This is more a matter of executive policy than for judicial fiat.

We hope and trust that in administering the laws in force the authorities will keep in view )humane considerations. With these observations we dispose of these petitions and remit them to the appropriate Division Bench for final disposal in accordance with this judgment. KULDIP SINGH, J. I have read the erudite judgment of L. M. Sharma, J, wherein it has been held that street trading, whether as an itinerant vendor/hawker or from a stationary position/receptacle/ kiosk/foot-path, is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The said right is obviously subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. It has further been held that there is no fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place in any street for the purpose of engaging himself in 'street trading. ' I respectfully agree with these findings arrived at by Sharma, J. I may, however, add few words to support these findings.

The guarantee under Article 19( l)(g) extends to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. ·Profession' means an occupation carried on by a person by virtue of his personal and specialised qualifications, training or skill. The word SODAN SINGH v. N. D. M. C. (KULDIP SINGH, l. l ' 1059 'occupation· has a wide meaning such as any regular work, prof9ssion. job, principal activity, employment, business or a calling in which an individual is engaged. 'Trade' in its wider sense includes any bargain or sale, any occupation or business carried on for subsistence or profit, it is an act of buying and selling of goods and services. It may inc\lide any business carried on with a view to profit whether manual or mercantile. 'Business' is a very wide term and would include anything which occupies the time, attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit.

It may include in its form trade, profession, industrial and commercial operations, purchase and sale of goods, and would include .. ,. . anything which is an occupation as distinguished from pleasure. The ! "~ object of . using .. four analogous and overlapping words in Article 'I 19( l)(g) is· to make the guaranteed right as comprehensive as possible ::~ ,. _ to include all the avenues and modes through which a man may earn his livelihood. In a nut-shell the guarantee takes into fold any activity carried on by a citizen of India to earn his living. The activity must of course be legitimate and not anti-social like gambling, trafficking in women and the like. Street trading is an age-old vocation adopted by human beings to earn living. In the olden days the venue of trading and business has always been the public streets but, in the course of time fairs, markets, 1 ' bazars and more recently big shopping complexes and fashionable plazas have come up.

In spite of this evolution in business and trade patterns the 'street trading' is accepted as one of the legitimate modes of earning livelihood even in the most affluent countries of the world. "' In England 'street trading· has been regulated by various Acts of Parliament. Paras 425 to 448 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth edition, Volume 40 deal with this subject. Paras 427 to 430 pertain to ~-ii 'street trading· in districts as regulated by the provisions of Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1982. Paras 427 and 428 are reproduced as under: "427- Adoption of street trading code and designation of streets. A district council may resolve that the street trading code is to apply to its district as from a specified day.

Where it has done so, it may by resolution designate any street in its district as a 'prohibited street' in which street trading is prohibited, a 'licence street' in which steel trading is prohibited without a licence granted by the district council, or a 'consent street' in which street trading is prohibited without its consent. " ,,. "428. -Street trading licences. Application for the grant or renewal of a street trading licence under the street trading code may be made by any person aged seventeen or over in writing to the district council. The council is under a duty to grant the application unless it considers that it ought to be refused on one or more of the following grounds: r ' ; ~ , I (1) that there is not enough space for the applicant to trade without causing undue interference or inconvenience to street users; , (2Y that there are already·enough traders . trading in the street from shops or otherwise in the particular goods; ..

,{ (3) that the applicant desires to trade on fewer than the . minimum number of days resolved on by the council; (4) that by reason of some conviction or otherwise he is unsuitable; (5) that he has been licensed by the council but has persistently refused or neglected to pay its fees or charges; )- (6) that he has'been granted a street trading consent by the council but has refused or neglected to pay its fees; (7) that he has without reasonable excuse failed to avail ) himself to a reasonable extent of a previous licence. The licence specifies the street in which, days on '('--' which and times between which, and describes the articles in which, the licence holder is permitted to trade, and may contain such subsidiary terms as the council thinks reasonable.

Unless previously revoked or surrendered, it remains valid for twelve months or such period as is specified in it, although if the council resolves that the street be designated a prohibited street the licence ceases to be valid when the resolution takes affect. The council may at any time revoke a licence on grounds similar to heads (1), (4), (5) ~ and (7) above, an\! the licence holder may at any time surrender his licence to the council. . _On receiving an application for the grant or renewal of a SODAN SINGH v. 'N. D. M. C. IKULDIP SINGH, J.

] 1061 licence, the council must within a reasonable time either grant the licence as applied for, or serve on the applicant a notice specifying, with its grounds, its proposal to refuse the application, to grant a licence on different principal terms, to grant a licence limited to a particular place in a street, to vary the principal terms or to revoke a licence, and stating that within seven days of receiving the notice the applicant may by written notice require the council to give him the opportunity of making representations. In this case the council may not determine the matter until either the applicant has made representations, or the time for doing so has elapsed, or the applicant has failed· to make the representations which he required the council to allow him to make. A person aggrieved by certain refusals or decisions of a . council may appeal to a magistrates' court, and appeal from the magistrates' decision lies to the Crown Court.

The council must give effect to the court's decision. If a licence holder applies for the renewal of a licence before it expires, the old licence remains valid until a new licence is granted or during the time for appealing or whilst an appeal is pending, and where a council decides to vary the principal terms of a licence or to revoke it, the variation or revocation does not take effect during the time for appealing or whilst an appeal is pending. ,, :;. (:, A licence holder may employ assistance without any further licence being required. " ···•Paras 43 lio 448 relate to 'street trading' in Greater London and in tlicity of London. London Country Council (General Powers) Act, 1947 and City of London (Various Powers) Act, 1965 provide for designation r. of streets by the London Borough Council in respect of which applications for grant of 'street trading' licences are entertained. ·There are provisions for the registration of stne: traders.

The proce- )-;d~re;,for grant of• Annual licences and the grounds on which such .. literices··may be refused, has been laid-down. There is a complete code,' in . the shape of various statutes, which regulates the business of 'street trading' in England. Trading in the streets of London from a stationary position is a common sight. Even in the famous Oxford street which is always over-crowded, there are kiosks, receptacles and I