SRI CHAND BATRA v. STATE OF U.P.
Citation: [1974] 2 S.C.R. 821; 1973 INSC 249
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG , Y.V. CHANDRACHUD
Judgment date:
Case summary
1973 INSC 249. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1973-12-19. SRI CHAND BATRA v. STATE OF U.P. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1974] 2 S. C. R. SRI CHAND BATRA v. STATE OF U. P. Dtcember 19, 1973 [M. H. Beo AND Y. v. CiiANDR,ACHUD, JJ. ] U,f', Excise Act-1, 60(a)-Whtther sm1llln1 test tnougfi to /ustlfl co11cluslo11 tlwt the liquid was ifliclt liquor-Wlittl1er oplnlo11 of the Inspector opinion ti·l~ dc•nct under s. 45 of 1ht Evidence Act. ' · The nppellant was found ·preparina illicit liquor when the raldina excise J>&rty ! 'icarcheJ the room in which he was. present. The appellant pleaded that he bad no pinion evidence under s. 45 of the Evidence Act. Disn1issina the ap{'eal, HELD : (i} It is not desirable to lay down an intlexible rule 'On questions of fact even thouah their determination reguires the adoption of scientiHc methods and tests. It is really for the court of fact to decide whether, . upon a considera.
· tion of the totality of the facts in a case, lt has been satisfactorily established that the objecu recovered from the possession of the accused included liquor of prohi· bitell strenath Hydrometer test would be enougb. if the liquid was known to con· tain alcohol becnuse it would help to determine the strength of alcoholic contents. 1"25 DI In 1he instant cr. se the false defence taken, that the appellant was not pre$ent at the house in question when it was searched, could indicate that he wanted to keep his Another case cited was Ram Ju~ v. $tate(' ), where a Divisiol' Bench of the Allahabad High Court had held that evidence based on ch~mical analysis was essential in order to establish that a substance. alleged to be Ganja, recovered from an accused person, was really Ganja. Jn tj)at case, reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Boosenna's case (supra) from which the following p~age was.
cited : "Except for a ~eneral statement contained in the evidence of the witnesses, particularly P. Ws. 1 and 4 that there was a strong smell of alcohol, emanating from the· tins, which were pierced open, there is no other satisfactory evidence to establish that the article is one coming within the definition of the expression 'liquor'. Merely trusting to the ~melling sense of the prohibition officers, and basing a conviction, on an opinion expressed by those officers, under the ciicumstances, cannot justify the conviction of the respondents. In our opinion, better proof by a technical person, who has considered the matter from a scientific point of view, is not only desirable, but even necessary, to establish that the article seized is one coming within the definition of 'liquor'. " We think that it is not desirable to lay dow11 an inflexible rule on questjims of fact even though their determination requires the adoption· of scientific methods and tests.
It is really for the Court of fact to· decide whether, upon a consideration of the totality of the facts in a case, it has been satisfactorily established that the objects recovered from the possmiou of the accused included liquor of prohibited strength. We sec no reason why an accused person in the position of the appellant. who could be presumed to have enough knowledge about· the composition and strength of the prohibited liquor could not raise this question in the Trial Court so that the prosecution may cure whatever weakness there might be in the evidence on that point. We do not think that he should be allowed to raise it at a stage when it may be difficult or impossible to adopt a conclnsive test. Another question before us is whether the Excise Inspector, whose evidence was under consideration, had sufficient knowledge to be deem-ed to be an expert within the meaning of Section 45 of the Evidence Act so that the tests adopted by him, together with all the attendant .
circumstances, could establish beyond doubt that the appellant was in· possession of illicit liquor. We think that these are also essentially questions of fact. If there is sufficient evidence led by the prosecution to establish its case it becomes the duty of the defence to rebut that· evidence. In the case before us. the appellant's Counsel cross-examined Shri C. D. Misra, P. W. ! , Excise fospector, at considerable length, but the whole of this cross-examination was directed at showing that the recoveries were not made from the possession of the appellant. No question was put to him in cross-examination to suggest that the appellant questioned the composition or strength of the liquid recover- (I) 1970 A. L. J. 1343. · ·Cd as alcohol of prohibited strenath or the competence of the Excise A Inspector to alvo his conclusion on the 1tronath of IClll adopted by him. Apia, no dofeoce evidence was led to iodlcato that the liqUid ·cou1d be anythlna else.
Theso considoratlon1 would bo 1ulftclent to disposo off tho polntl raised on behalf of the appellant In tho case boforo us. We may, however, observe that wo aaree with the High Court that tho proposition contained in Boosenna's case· (supra) B must be confined to its own facts. We find that the Excise Inspector who had deposed, at the very ·outset of his evidence, that he had put in 21 years service as Excise Inspector and had tested lacs of samples o! liquor and illicit liquor. As already pointed out, the competence of C. D. Misra to test the composition and strenath of th~ liquid under consideration was not C queatloned at all. We, therllfore,. think that this particular Excise Inspector could be treated as an expert within the mcanlna of Section 4S of the Evidence A~t. Tho Exci10 Inspector had, in addition to employing the 1nicllina teat, used all the other tests he could roasonably adopt. If hit competence to a!
vo his opinion or tho 1umclcncy of the testl adopted by him had been questioned in tho Trial Court, tho ·prose- D cution woUid have been in a position to lead more evidence on those qucatlons. We also . find that tho objects recovered from tho possc11ion of the appellant almost proclaim the naturo of his actlvltr and of the liquid which could be in his possession. On the facts and circumstances of this case, neither Boosenntis case nor any other cas~ would, we think, help the appellant. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The appellant E should surrender to his bail and serve out the sentence. P. B. R. Appeal dismissed.
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