SRINIVASA REDDIAR AND OTHERS v. N. RAMASWAMY REDDIAR AND ANOTHER
Citation: [1966] 3 S.C.R. 120; 1965 INSC 303
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR , K.N. WANCHOO, V. RAMASWAMI, P. SATYANARAYANA RAJU
Judgment date:
Case summary
1965 INSC 303. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1965-12-16. SRINIVASA REDDIAR AND OTHERS v. N. RAMASWAMY REDDIAR AND ANOTHER. Read the judgment and...
Judgment text
·,. l26 , SUPREME COURT REPORTS·--:~ (1966) 3 S. C. R. SRINIVASA REDDIAR AND OTIIERS v. N. RAMASWA'. \IY REDDIAR AND ANOTIIER • December 16, 1965 B- [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J. , K. N. WANCHOO, V. RAMASWAMI AND P. SATYANARAYANA RAJU, JJ. ) Limitation Act (9 of 1908), Arr. 134-B-A/icnation by manager of properties of religious enduwmenl as his ow11-Sui1 for declaration of • title by alienee-lf governed by article--Star1ing point of limitation. The lands in dispute had been gran~ed in inam to a temple. By about 1929 1he then manager of lhe temple disposed of all those propertiea under various saJe-deedo;, resigned his position and left the village. Ho was therefore removed from the management of the 1cmple and other persons had 1aken up the position as de facto managers from 1929. A:; a result of successive alienation. o; of the properties. the appellants became eolitlcd 10 1hem. In 1951.
lhe respondenls were appoimed truslees of lhe temple and under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endow- I> menls Act, 1951. they applied, to the Magis1ra1e. for possession of the • properties and the Magislrate ordered delivery of possession. Before the order could be executed the appellant lerse possession by 1st January, 1929, and as the alienor was still alive. the plea of adverse possession could not be -;u. ,tained under that article. In appeal to this Court it was contended that article 134-B would not apply to the pment case but that Art. 144 would apply, because. the • 1ransfers were effected by the alienor on the representations that the properties belonged to him as his separate property; and that even if the article applied, the decision of the High Court was erroneous, because the transferor had hcen removed from management more than 12 yean before the suit was filed. HELD : Though Art.
134-B applied to the facts of the case, since the appellants had acquired title to the propert'cs by prescription. the ; . decree passed by the High Court. in so far as it was against the appellants, should be set a~ide. Column 1 of the article provides for suit, brought .. inter alia, by the manager of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment to recover posses- sumption made by Mr. Tatachari is well-founded, the appellant>' title to the three transactions in question would have to be upheld. '\ It is well-known that the law of limitation in regard to suits instituted to set aside unauthorised· alienation of endowed property . by a Shebait or a Mahan! or a manager of a Hindu religious endow- • ment was very uncertain prior to the decision of the Privy Council (I) Mr. Justice B. K. Mukheriea on 'Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust" II Edn. (1962) p. 282. (21 L. R. 27 I. A. 69. (3) L. R. 37 I. A. 147- - ·, '\. . \ . \ . .. \\ .. ' ' . . . in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v.
Ba/usamiAyyar & Others. (') That • is why subsequent to the said decision; any discussion about the question of limitation relating to such suits necessarily begins with . a reference to the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Vidya V aruthfs case. In that case, the Privy Council held that the. endowments of a Hindu math are not "conveyed in trust", nor is the head of the math a "trustee" with regard to them, save as to specific property proved to have been vested in him for a specific ·object. The question which the Privy Council had to consider in that case was whether Art. 134 applied to a suit in which the • • validity of a permanent lease of part of the math property granted by the head of a math was challenged. Article 134 covers suits "brought with a view to recover possession of immovable property ·Conveyed or bequeathed in trust ·or mortgaged. and afterwards transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable· consideration. These words used in column 1 of Art.
134 necessarily raise ·the question ·as to whether the head of a math is a trustee within their meaning; and Mr. Ju5tice Ameer Ali, who spoke for the 1 Privy Council, answered that question in the negative. In consequence, the argument that Art. 134 applied, _was repelled, and it was held that Art. 144 would govern such a case. In fact, it is substantially because of this decision that Articles 134-A, 134-B and 134-C and Articles 48A and 48B came to be inserted in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act by Amending Act I of 1929. At the same time, s. 10 of the Limitation Act was amended by addition of an explanatory clause which · provided, · inter a/ia, that for the purposes of s. 10, any property comprised in a Hindu religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose, and the manager of any such property shall be deemed to be the· trustee thereof. As we have already noticed, these newly added provisions in the .
Limitation Act came into force on the 1st January, _1929. Reverting then to the question as to whether a transfer effected by the manager of a temple in regard to properties belonging to the . teniple falls outside the purview of Art. 134-B if it is shown to have . been made on the basis that the transferor treated the properties as his own, it does appear that the two earlier Privy Council 3 -· -decisions in Gnanasambanda's(') and Damodar Das's( ) cases lend some support to the contention. In Gnanasambanda's case, it was held by the Privy C9uncil that where hereditary trustees of II a religious endownient sold their hereditary right of management (I) L. R. 48 I. A. 302. (2) L. R. 27 I. A. 69. (3) L. R. 37 I. A. 147. SRINIVASA v. RAMASWAMY (Gajendragadkar, C. /. ) 127 A and transferred the endowed property, the sales were null and void, in the absence of a custom allowing them; and that the possession taken by the purchaser was adverse to the vendors and those claiming under them.
In appreciating the effect of this decision, it is necessary to bear in mind that the plea of limitation with which the Privy Council was concerned in that case was based on Art. 124 B of the Limitation Act. Article 124 relates to suits filed for posses- • • sion of a hereditary office, and the limitation prescribed for such suits starts when the defendant takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff. It is clear that in that case, what had been sold was the hereditary office, as well as the properties belong- <: ing to the endowment; and so, it was plain that limitation began as soon as the purchaser took possession of the office under Art. 124. It is true that immovable properties belonging to the temple had also been sold; but the Privy Council expressly ruled that there • was no distinction between the office and the property of the endowment. The one is attached to the other; but if there is, . D . Art.
144 of the same Schedule is applicable to the property; and that bars the suit after 12 years' adverse possession. It may be permissible to state that this latter observation was made in 1899 Jong before the Privy Council enunciated the true legal position in regard to the status of the managers of Hindu religious endowments in Vidya V aruthi's case('). E Similarly in Damodar Das's case('), while dealing with the validity of an 'ikramama' of a debuttar property executed by the manager of the property, the Privy Council observed that from the date of the ikramama, the possession of the transferee was adverse to the right of the idol and that led to the conclusion that the suit F instituted against the transferee was barred by limitation.
There is no discussion about the status and character of the Chela who made the transfer nor about the right of the succeeding Chela to challenge the validity of the transfer effected by his predecessor which was subsequently recognised by the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi's case('). G These two judgments have, no doubt been incidentally referred to by the Privy Council in Mahant Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi • Lal and Others('), and in Mahadeo Prasad Singh and Others v. Karia Bharti,(') though the decision in the said two cases proceeded in the light of the legal position enunciated by the Privy B Council in Vidya Varuthi's case('). (I} L. R. 48 I. A. 302. (2} L. R. 37 I. A. 147. (3} L. R. 60 I. A. 124. (4) L. R. 62 I. A. 47 . • 128 SUPllEMB COUJ. T llEPORTS (1966) 3 S. C. R. It would thus be seen that the observations made by Mr. Justice Mukherjea on which Mr.
Tatachari relies, really purport to extend the principle which has apparently been mentioned by the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda's case{'). It does appear that Mr. • Justice Mukherjea had expressed this view as a Judge of the Calcutta High Coun in the case of Hemanta Kumari Bam v. Sree 2 Sree lshwar Sridhar Jiu,( ) and had relied on the two Privy Coun- 1 cil's decisions in Gnanasambanda's(') and Damodar Dais cases ( ). • In the case of Hemanta Kumari Basu('), the attention of Mukherjea J. was drawn to the fact that in an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Coun in Ronald Duncan Cromartie and Franci~ Arthur • Shephard Sutherland, v. Sri lswar Radha Damodar Jew and Others,(') D. N. Mitter, J. , had made observations which were inconsistent with the view which Mukherjea, J. was dis~d to take; but the learned Judge commented on the said observations by • saying that they were open to criticism. Thus, on the question raised by Mr.
Tatachari before us, there does appear to be some divergence of opinion in the Calcutla High Coun itself. No other decision has been cited before us which has accepted the proposition that if any part of the property belonging to a Hindu religious endowment is transferred by its manager, the transfer is void and the possession of the transferee becomes adverse to the endowment from the very beginning. In fact, as we have already indicated, in the case of Gnanasambanrla(' 'i what had been transferred unauthorisedly, was the religious office itself and all the properties appertaining thereto.
It is open to doubt whether the said decision could lead to the inference that if a nart of the property is transferred by the manager of a religious endowment on the basis that it belongs to him and not to the religious endowment, the transfer is void ab initio, with the result that the possession of the transferee is adverse to the reli~ious endowment from the very beginning, and the succeeding manager's right to challenge the said transfer would be lost if his predecessor who made the transfer lives for more than 12 years after effecting the transfer. ,/ . In the words of Sir John Edge, who spoke for the Privy Council in Nainapi/lai Marakayar and Other< v. Ramanathan Chettiar and Others(•), w in the case of a Shebait a grant by him II (I} LR. 27 I. A. 69. (2) I. LR. (1946) II Cal. 38. (3) LR. 37 I. A. 147. (4) (1935) 62 C. L. J. 10. (5) LR. 51 I. A. 83 alp. 97 . • SRINIVASA v. RAMASWAMY (Gajendragadkar, C. J.
) 12~· in violation of his duty of an interest in endowed lands which he has no authority as Shebait ·to make may possibly under some circumstances be good as against himself by way of estoppel, but is not binding upon his successors. " It is not easy to see why the· successor's right to challenge an unauthorised alienation made by his predecessor should be affected adversely if the alienation is • made by his predecessor on the basis that the property belonged to• • him and not to the religious endowment. However, we do not think it necessary to decide this point in· the present case, because, in our opinion, the . plain words of Art. 134-B do not permit such a plea to be raised. Colul]):n 1 of Art. 134-B provides for suits brought, inter alia, by the manager of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment to recover possession of immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration.
The period prescribed for such suits is 12 years, and the time from which the period begins to run is the death, resignation or removal of the transferor. Confining ourselves to the first column of Art. 134-B at this stage, the question which we have to decide is : does this article permit any distinction to be made between transfers effected by a previous manager on the basis that the property transferred belongs to the religious endowment, and those made by him on the basis that the said property is his own private property ? If the property is transferred by the manager on the basis that it belongs to the endowment, Art. 134-B clearly applies; but does it make any difference to the application of Art. 134-B if the transfer is made on the other basis that the property belongs not to the endowment, but to the manager himself ? In either case, the successor who challenges the alienation, will have to prove that the property in fact belongs to the religious endowment.
Once that is proved, is it necessary for him also to show that the transfer was made on the basis that the property belonged to tb religious endowment ? In our opinion, such a limitation cannot be read in the words used by the said article. Article 134-B applies to all cases where it is shown that the immovable property was comprised in the endowment and that it has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. The successor has to prove three facts : ( 1) that the property belongs to the religious endowment; (2) that it was transferred by a previous manager; and (3) that the transfer was for a valuable consideration. The character of the rep1 esentations made by the previous manager in regard to his relation with the property which is the subject-matter of transfer, is irrelevant for the purpose of Art. 134-B. All transfers made would fall within Art.
134-B if the three essen-tial facts are proved by the successor of the transferor manager of the Hindu religious endowment. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Tatachari is justified in contending that the transfers with which we are concerned in the present appeal fall outside the purview of Art. 134-B inasmuch as they are effected by the alienors on the representations that the properties transferred belonged to them as their separate properties. On the findings recorded by tho • High Court, it is clear that the properties belonged to the temple; that they have been transferred by persons who must be deemed to be the previous managers of the temple; and that they have been transferred for valuable consideration. The present suit has been brought against respondents I to 3 who are appointed trustees of the temple by respondent No. 4; and so, all the ingredients prescribed by the first column of Art. 134-B are satisfied.
That is why • we must reject the ingenious argument urged before us by Mr. Tatachari that Art. 134-B does not apply to the present case. We may, in this connection, refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Mahant Sudarsan Das v. Mahant Ram Kirpal Das and 1 Others. ( ) In that case, the question which arose for the decision of the Privy Council was whether Art. 134-B applied to a case where debuttar property had been sold in an execution sale, and the Privy Council held that it did not. "To aoply Art. 134-B to an execution sale", observed Lord Radcliffe, "involves a reading of that article which would construe the words "transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration" as covering an execution sale under court process, and the word "transferor" as extending to the judgment-debtor whose land is sold. It is not only that t! te words themselves do not properly bear that meaning.
Apart from that, what is in all essentials the same question was considered on several occasions by courts in India before Art. 134A imd I 34B had been added to Art. 134. That Article contains the analogous phrase "transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration", and there was a uniform current of decision to the effect that these words were incapable of app]vin~ to an execution sale. " What was said by the Privy Council about the impropriety of including an execution sale within the meaning of Art. 134B can, with equal justification, be said about introducing words of limitation in the said article which alone can exclude transfers made by the previous manager of the Hindu religious ~ndowment on the basis that the property transferred belonged to (ll L. R. 77 I. A. 42 at pp. 49-SO. SRINIVASA v. RAMA5WAMY' (Gajendragadkar, CJ. ) 131 him. Therefore, we must deal with the present appeal on the basis that Art. 134-B applies to the facts of the present case. Mr.
Tatachari then contends that even on the application of Art. 134-B, the decision of the High Coun is erroneous, because on the facts proved in this case, the High Court should have drawn the legal inference that the transferor had been removed more than 12 years before the suit was filed. He contends that the question < as to whether on facts proved in the present case, an inference can be drawn that· the previous manager or trustee had been removed, is a mixed question of fact and law, and the High Court was in • error in reversing the decisions of the courts below by holding that the title of the temple had not been lost by adverse possession before ·C the suit was filed. For deciding this question, it is necessary to refer to some material facts. The transferor is Pachaikandaswamiar. The appellants' case before the trial Court was that Pachaikandaswamiar had resigned his position about 27 years ago, and that even if Art.
134-B applied, ' limitation should be held to have commenced from the date when the alienor either resigned his office or was removed from it. In dealing with this aspect of the matter, the learned trial Judge has examined the oral evidence led on behalf of the parties. He assumed that Pachaikandaswamiar and his son were alive at the E date of the suit. Even so, he found that they had left the village and had taken no part whatever in the management of the worship of the temple. In fact, almost all the properties belonging to the temple had in course of time, been alienated and the alienors were no longer interested either in the temple or in staying in the village ' itself.
Raju Iyer, who was examined as a witness by the appellants, F stated that he and Amirthalinga Iyer had been performing the worship of the temple for the past 27 years, and he added that the alienor and his son had left the village more than 25 years ago, and but for very casual visits to the village, they had never taken any interest in the temnle or in the management of its affairs. In fact, Ranga Raju Raddiar, whom the resnondents examined, <; admitted in reply to the questions put by the Court that since 25 years or so neither Pachaikandaswamiar nor Chinnaswami Iyer had performed any pooja in the temple. He substantially corroborated the statement of Raju Iyer that Raju Iyer and Amirthalinga Iyer ' ' had been performing the worship of the temple. Another witness, Chandrasekara Iyer by name, whom the respondents examined, also admitted that Pachaikanda had sold away all his properties and had left the village.
Besides, when respondents 1 to 3 were appointed as trustees of the temple, a notice was issued by the 132 SUPllBll1! comT l. l! PO. TS (1966J 3 S. C. ll. office of Assistant Commissioner for Hindu Religious Endowments, Tiruchirappalli, on the 19th June, 1948, in which it was specifically averred that there were no legally constituted trustees for Sri Pachaikantha Udayavar Temple, Eragudi, and it was mis- • managed; and so, it was proposed to appoint legally constituted trustees for the said temple. This notice was served on witness Raju Iyer and Amrithalinga Iyer, Chinnasamy Iyer, and Rangaraja • Reddiar, who were performing the worship and acting as de facto managers of the temple. It is remarkable that this notice describes Amirthalinga Iyer and Chinnasamy Iyer as de facto trustees of the temple. It is on these facts that the learned trial Judge held that the alienor must be deemed to have resigned his office or left it.
The lower appellate Court does not appear to have considered or made • any specific or clear finding on this aspect of the matter. It, however, held that the transferor and his family had been claiming beneficial interest in the properties all along and that they were • not holding the same as managers of the trust. That is why he confirmed the finding of the trial Judge on the question of adverse possession, though on a somewhat different ground. The High Court has relied on the fact that the alienor is still alive, and so, it thought that the plea of adverse possession could not be sustained. Unfortunately, the question as to whether the facts proved in this case did not show that the alienor had been removed from office by other persons who were in management of the temple de facto, has not been discussed by the High Court.
In our opinion, all the facts which have been brought on the record • in relation to this aspect of the matter, clearly show not only that the alienor disposed of all the property and left the village, but also that for the last 25 years or so, the management has been taken over by other persons who are acting as de facto managers of the temple. This evidence appears to us to show that the ' alienors had been removed from management of the temple, and other persons have taken up the position as de facto managers: and this position has lasted for more than 25 years. If that be so, • there is no escape from the conclusion that more than 12 years . have elapsed since the date of the removal of the previous manager • who transferred the pronerties in question: and so, if a suit were brought by respondents I to 3 on the date when they were apoointed trustees by respondent No. 4, it would be barred under Art. 134-B.
On that view of the matter, we must hold that the trial Judge and SRINIVASA v. RAMASWAMY (Gaiendragadkar, CJ. ) 133 A the lower appellate Court were right in decreeing the appellants' suit in its entirety. We must accordingly set aside the decree passed by the High Court in regard to the transfers covered by Exts. A-3, A-6 and A-12, and restore that of the lower appellate • Court. In the circumstances of t]jis case, we direct that parties should bear their own costs. B Appeal allowed• • • . .. , • • •
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