STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. & ORS

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 1

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Y.K. SABHARWAL, B.N. SRIKRISHNA, P.P. NAOLEKAR

Case summary

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

• j STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. & ORS MAY 5, 2006 [Y. K. SABHARWAL, CJ. I. , B. N. SRIKRISHNA AND P. P. NAOLEKAR, JJ. ) Special Courts (Trial ofOffences Relating to Transactions in Securities) ) Act, J992: Section JO. Securities-Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. (ABFSL) made an offer to Nuclear Power Corporation Ltd. (NPCL) for placing Rs. JOO crores-Rs. 50 crores in 9% tax-free bonds andRs. 50 crores in J7% taxable bonds issued by NPCL-NPCL issued a letter ofallotment (LOA) confirming the allotment o/9% tax-free bonds ofthe nominal value ofRs. 50 crores (suit bonds)-On the same day ABFSL sold the suit bonds to the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) and issued a Cost Memo-Against the receipt ofthe said Cost Memo SCB issued a Pay Order-ABFSL, in turn, issued a Banker's Receipt (BR) acknowledging receipt ofthe sum from SCB towards the cost ofthe suit bonds and undertook to deliver the suit bonds ofthe value o/Rs.

I 50 crores, when ready, in exchange for the said BR duly discharged, and assured that, in the meantime, the suit bonds would be held on account of SCB--SCB wrote to NPCL alleging that though in ABFSL 's letter, it was stated that the original LOA was forwarded, SCB had found that only a photocopy ofthe LOA had been enclosed--SCB also requested/or issue of a duplicate allotment letter on the undertaking to return the original, if received by it, and keeping NPCL indemnified against claims, ifany, arising out of issue of the duplicate-On 29. 5.

J992, SCB requested ABFSL to confirm to NPCL the fact ofits having sold the suit bonds to SCB-On the same day, ABFSL addressed a letter to NPCL (with a copy endorsed to SCB) confirming having sold the suit bonds to SCB-ABFSL also confirmed that it had no objection to NPCL issuing a duplicate LOA to SCB-Subsequently, Canbank Mutual Fund (CMF) filled up a Transfer Deed andlodged it along with the original LOA with NPCL seeking transfer and registration ofthe suit bonds in its name--SCB filed a suit before the High Court against ABFSL, CMF and NPCL for a declaration that it was entitled to the suit bonds andfor an order directing NPCL to register the suit bonds in the name ofSCB and to hand over the same to SCB-CMFfiled a Misc.

Petition before I the Company Law Board (CLB; under Section 111 ofthe Companies Act, 1956 seeking registration of the suit bonds in its name-The suit and the petition were transferred to Special Court--Special Court held that CMF was the owner ofthe suit bonds--Correctness of-Held: The suit was not a mere declaratory suit; it must be regarded as a title suit--Notwithstanding the market practice ofdelivery ofsecurities accompanied by a signed blank transfer deed, the property in the securities can only be transferred ifthere is bona fide purchase ofthe same for value-CMF has utterlyfailed to prove its story that it had paid consideration for purchase ofthe suit bonds-CMF acquired no right, whatsoever, to the suit bonds-The suit bonds always remained the property ofSCB irrespective ofhow they found their way into the hands ofCMF--Companies Act, 1956, S. I0-Transfer ofProperty Act, 1882, Ss. 130 to 137--EvidenceAct, 1872, S. l/4-Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908, S.

11--Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, Ss. 3 and 4(2)- Specific Relief Act, 1963, S. 34. In December 1991, Nuclear Power Corporation oflndia Ltd. (NPCL) issued bonds of two series - 9% tax-free bonds and 17% taxable bonds. These bonds were permitted by the Controller ofCapital Issues to be sold to banks and financial institutions for private placement. Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. (ABFSL) made an offer to NPCL for placing Rs. I00 crores - Rs. 50 crores in 9% tax-free bonds and Rs. 50 crores in 17% taxable bonds. NPCL wrote to ABFSL confirming the allotment of the 9% tax-free bonds and the 17% taxable bonds, as requested. NPCL issued a letter of allotment (LOA) confirming the allotment of 9% taxfree bonds of the nominal value of Rs. 50 crores (suit bonds).

NPCL also said that intimation would be given in due course as to when the allotment letter duly discharged may be exchanged for bond certificates and that the interest payable on the suit bonds would accrue from the date of allotment payable on half-yearly basis. On the same day ABFSL sold the suit bonds to the appellant and in connection with the said sale issued its Cost Memo indicating the particulars of the suit bonds and the cost at which they were being sold. Against the receipt of the said Cost Memo the appellant issued a Pay Order. ABFSL, in turn, issued a Banker's Receipt (BR) acknowledging receipt of the sum from the appellant towards the cost of the suit bonds and undertook to deliver the suit bonds of the value of Rs. 50 crores, when ready, in exchange for the said BR duly discharged, and assured that, in the meantime, the suit bonds would be held on account of the appellant. Thereafter, ABFSL addressed a letter STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v.

ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. 3 ' ; to the appellant requiring the appellant to hand over its BR in lieu of the original LOA in respect of the suit bonds as well as the 17% NPCL taxable bonds, which were said to have been enclosed with the said letter. According to the appellant, in April/May 1992, when the securities scam broke out, the officers of the appellant made an investigation of its records and found that the appellant did not have in its possession the original LOA, but only a photocopy. J The appellant wrote to NPCL alleging that though in ABFSL's letter, it was stated that the original LOA was forwarded, the appellant had found that only a photocopy of the LOA had been enclosed. The appellant also requested for issue of a duplicate allotment letter on the undertaking to return the original, if received by it, and keeping NPCL indemnified against claims, if any, arising out of issue of the duplicate. On 29. 5.

1992, the appellant requested ABFSL to confirm to NPCL the fact of its having sold the suit bonds to the appellant. On the same day, ABFSL addressed a letter to NPCL (with a copy endorsed to the appellant) confirming having sold the suit bonds to the appellant. ABFSL also confirmed that it had no objection to NPCL issuing a duplicate LOA to the appellant. On 8. 6. 1992, one HPD who was acting as a broker in a large number ofsecurities transactions of banks and financial institutions was declared a 'notified person' under the provisions ofSection 3 of the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. The appellant filed a First Information Report (FIR) against HPD and its own employees alleging that, as a result of a conspiracy between HPD and its own employees, several securities and monies had been misappropriated by HPD.

Subsequently, Canbank Mutual Fund (CMF) filled up a Transfer Deed and lodged it along with the original LOA with NPCL seeking transfer and registration of the suit bonds in its name. CMF wrote to NPCL claiming that the suit bonds had been bought by it from ABFSL through a broker, HPD, and that the consideration therefor had been paid by certain adjustments between itself and ABFSL. NPCL informed CMF that it had received a request for issue ofa duplicate LOA pertaining to the suit bonds from the appellant, which was also claiming purchase of the suit bonds from ABFSL. NPCL, by another letter, informed the appellant that CMF had lodged the original LOA for registration claiming ' ' to have purchased the suit bonds from ABFSL.

The appellant filed a suit before the High Court against ABFSL, CMF and NPCL for a declaration that it was entitled to the suit bonds and for an order directing NPCL to register the suit bonds in the name • of the appellant and to hand over the same to the appellant. The said suit was transferred to the Special Court. CMF filed a Misc. Petition before the Company Law Board (CLB) under Sertion 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking registration of the suit bonds in its name. The said petition was transferred to the Special Court. The Special Court dismissed the suit filed by the appellant and allowed the Misc. Petition filed by CMF. Hence the appeal. The follo~ing question arose before the Court: Whether the Standard Chartered Bank or Canbank Mutual Fund is the owner of 9% Nuclear Power Corporation Ltd. tax-free bonds and entitled to be registered as such? Allowi'1g the appeal, the Court HELD: I.

It is clear that the appeal has been brought on the footing that Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) had fully proved its title to the 9% tax-free bonds of the nominal value of Rs. 50 crores (suit bonds) and that the Special Court had erroneously held against SCB. Looked at from any point of view, the suit was not a mere declaratory suit; it must be regarded as a title suit. [22-A[ 2. Even if the petition filed under Section 111 ofthe Companies Act, 1956 was only for the limited reliefof registering the petitioner-Canbank Mutual Fund (CMF) as the holder of the suit bonds the contention of the respondent cannot be accepted for two reasons. ln the first place, whatever might have been the limited jurisdiction of the Company Law Board (CLB) under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956, while entertaining the petition, the fact that the said petition was transferred to the Special Court by an order of this Court needs to be reckoned with. The order of th.

is Court is specific and requires the trial ofSpecial Court Suit along with Misc. Petition. The limitation of the jurisdiction of the CLB, if any, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. 5 does not apply to the Special Court which is clothed with all the jurisdiction of a civil court. Secondly, merely by filing a petition under Section Ill of the Companies Act, 1956 and by placing reliance on Section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956 the petitioner-CMF cannot succeed. It would have to go further and prove that it is validly a transferee of the suit bonds if that question is put in issue. Thus, each of the two contesting parties, i. e. SCB and CMF, would have to prove their rights and show how they are entitled to the suit bonds before any relief could be granted either in the Suit or in the Misc. Petition. (24-B-E) i Mis. Ammonia Supplies Corporation (P) Ltd. v, Mis. Modern Plastic Containers Pvt. Ltd. , AIR (1998) SC 3153 and Manna/al Khetan v.

Kedar Nath Khetan, AIR (1977) SC 536, referred to. 3. The Special Court was wrong on all the counts. On the question of res judicata, the Special Court failed to notice that the doctrine of res judicata is not merely a matter of procedure but a doctrine evolved by the courts in larger public interest. What is enacted in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I908 is not the fountainhead of the doctrine, but merely the statutory recognition of the doctrine, which rests on public policy. [26-G, H, 27-A] Canara Bankv. Standard Chartered Bank, (2002] 10 SCC 697; Daryao v. State ofUP. , (1962] 1SCR 574; Guda Vijayalakshmiv. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry, (1981] 2 SCC 646 and Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade, (1999] 5 SCC 590, relied on. 4. Section 13 of the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 does not override the doctrine of res judicata.

The provision of the Act was certainly not intended to abrogate all the established principles of law, unless they were directly in conflict with the express provisions of the Act itself. There is nothing 1 in the Act which is inconsistent with the doctrine of res judicata, per se, as seems to have been assumed by the Special Court. (27-F, G, 28-A] 5. In the absence of proper explanation it was not open to the Special Court to make inferences or assumptions with regard to terms used in the documents, for example, SCB's securities Ledger in relation to the suit bonds, which pertain to the sale and purchase of the suit bonds with different counter-parties. This document as such does not contain the description 'portfolio', but the said appellation has been ' given to it by the Special Court on its own. The Special Court has observed thereupon: "Therefore, all such transactions were entered into by the bank on behalf of one HPD, who was acting as a broker.

Therefore, they were transactions of HPD. This is amply illustrated by Exhibit-II. A portfolio represents stock held by SCB on behalf of HPD. HPD was entitled to enter into buy transactions and sale transactions in respect of securities coming under that portfolio. The portfolio was built up by SCB by purchasing securities at the instance of HPD. This is also called as building up of position. The suit contract comes under Exhibit-I I. By the suit contract, the Letter of Allotment (LOA) came within the portfolio of HPD. He was allowed to deal with the LOA under the portfolio". This inference is not readily available ex facie from the document nor was there any other evidence given by any witness explaining the document, suggesting it. [28-H, 29-A-D) 6. Further, the word "loan' used in the Security Ledger (Exhibit- 11) was seized upon by the Special Court to draw an unwarranted inference.

The Special Court has held that this term shows "lending of scrip to HPD" and has then gone on to hold as follows: "this word has to be read while construing the entries in Exhibit-ti beginning from 27. 2. 1992. The word 'loan" must be read with the column "Book Value" and the column "Profit and Loss" and "Balance". That, last column "Balance" represents HPD's outstanding to SCB. " There is no warrant, whatsoever, for such an explanation to this document as no witness has said so. Further, the word 'loan' appears to have been used in the Bank Receipt (BR) issued by Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. (ABFSL) to SCB in respect of the suit bonds. There was no justification for giving an interpretation to the word 'loan' used in any ofthe documents without any explanation by a witness. [29-0-F] 7.

The Special Court also makes a finding that the word 'Direct' used in SCB's ledger showing transaction details ofSCB from April 1991 to May 1992 (Exhibit-7) suggests that such transactions were all under the 15% arrangement. This again appears to be an inference which has been drawn by the Special Court without any supporting evidence thereto. In the replies to the interrogatories as well as the evidence ofthe witnesses no one has asserted that all transactions described as 'direct' were necessarily covered by the 15% arrangement. Although, the reply to Question no. 43 of the interrogatories, in Suit No. 14/94, di1 suggest to the contrary, the said reply not having t>een tendered in evidence and STANDARD CHARTEREO BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. 7 taken on record does not form part of the evidence before the Special Court. The Special Court is, therefore, not justified in drawing this conclusion for which there was no acceptable evidence. [29-F, G, 30-A] P. C.

Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal, (1972) l SCC 9 and Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V. P. Temple, [2003) 8 SCC 752, referred to. 8. While it may be true that the Special Court has been given a certain amount of latitude in the matter of procedure, it surely cannot fly away from established legal principles while deciding the cases before i it. As to what inference arises from a document, is always a matter of evidence unless the document is self-explanatory. None of the documents placed on record during the trial were self-explanatory; nor were they explained by any competent witness on either side. In the absence of any such explanation it was not open to the Special Court to come up with its own explanations and decide the fate of the Suit on the basis of its inference based on such assumed explanations. In fact, these inferences run contrary to the oral evidence given by PW -1 in relation to the transaction of 26. 2. 1992. [30-D-F] 9. 1.

The Special Court has also adversely commented on the conduct ofSCB in not leading evidence to prove what the 15% arrangement was. A party could not be called upon to lead evidence with regard to an issue which was no part of its case. The 15% arrangement was brought on record at the instance of CMF and the burden, if any, of proving its details lay on CMF. Although, a number of documents were produced on record as called for by CMF, there was no obligation on SCB to explain any of them. [30-G, 31-A] 9. 2. There was, therefore, transfer of the property in the suit bonds to SCB and the evidence on record is sufficient to arrive at such a conclusion. It was wholly unnecessary for SCB to go further and prove how the BR was discharged and how the LOA went out of its possession, which were the facts emphasized on behalf of CMF. Not was it necessary for SCB to lead evidence as to how HPD had intercepted the original LOA, when and in what manner. [42-B-C) Hirata! v.

Badkulal, AIR (1953) SC 225; Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR (1968) SC 1413; S. P. Chengalvaraya . Naidu-v. Jagannath, AIR (1994) SC 853; Citi BankNA. v. Standard Chartered Bank, AIR (2003) SC 4630; Mt. Bi/as Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, AIR (1915) .. PC 96; Rmrati Kuer v. Dwarika Prasad Singh, AIR (1967) SC 1134; Smt. Indira Kaur v. Shri Shea Lal Kapoor, AIR (1988) SC 1074; Murugesam Pillai v. Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sannidhi, AIR (1917) PC 6; Chow Yoong Hvng v. Chvong Fah Rubber Manufactory, (1962) AC 209; Mercantile Bank ofIndia ltd v. Central Bank ofIndia ltd.. AIR (1938) PC 52; New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) Pvt. ltd v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1964) SC 152; Vasudev Ramchandra She/at v. Pran/al Jayanand Thaker, AIR (1974) SC 1728; l. l. C. ofIndia v. Escorts Ltd, AIR (1986) SC 1370; Nagindas Ramdas v. Da/patram lccharam alias Brijram, AIR (1974) SC 471; Thru John Subramhanyam v. Returning Officer, AIR (1977) SC 1724; Bharat Singh v. Mst.

Bhagirathi, AIR (1966) SC 405; Siddik Mohamed Shah v. Mt. Saran, AIR (1930) PC 57(1); Bhagatsingh v. Jaswant Singh. AIR (1966) SC 1861; Shri i'enkataramana Devarzi v. State of Mysore, AIR (1958) SC 255; Controller ofEstate Duty v. Gvdavari Bai, (1986( 2 SCC 264 and Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul. AIR (1966) SC 735, referred to. Halsbury's laws of England: Vol. 15, p. 243, Para 451 and 453, referred to. 10. 1. A large portion of the impugned judgment is devoted to an analysis of the Securities Ledger (Exhibit-11) and raising inference thereupon. There is no doubt that Exhibit-11 is a securities ledger maintained by SCB in respect of the suit bonds. Ex facie, the Securities Ledger shows the date on which the transaction took place, the counterparty to the transaction, whether the transaction was a sale or purchase, face value of the transaction, rate of the transaction, book value, interest paid/received, profit/loss of the transaction and the balance.

The document as such does not give rise to an inference that in any of the transactions HPD had become the owner of the suit bonds. The Special Court, on account of a misreading of the evidence pertaining to the 15% arrangement, drew a conclusion from the Exhibit-11 that HPD became the owner of the suit bonds right from 26. 2. 1992 and thereafter all the transactions were those of HPD, the losses or gains being credited to the accountofHPD. The evidence on record as to the 15% arrangement is already seen. No part of that evidence can legitimately give rise to the inference that in respect of securities transacted under the said arrangement, any person other than SCB or the counterparty became the owner of these securities. The suit bonds were purchased by SCB legitimately on 26. 2. 1992 by payment of consideration to ABFSL, which STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. 9 fact is even accepted by the Special Court.

However, on an analysis of certain documents on record, the Special Court has come to the conclusion that on 9. 5. 1992 the suit bonds were sold by SCB to HPD. The transaction dated 9. 5. 1992 thus becomes crucial and has to be scrutinized to see if this inference is correct. (44-B-FJ 10. 2. While the Special Court's inferences are based upon its understanding of what the 15% arrangement was and its analysis of Exhibit-11, it totally fails to give any reason as to why the evidence of a witness from ABFSL about there being no such transaction on 9. 5,1992, backed by the purchase register of ABFSL, should be rejected. In the face of the positive evidence of ABFSL that no such transactions were there, there was no justification for not accepting the stand of SCB that entry dated 9. 5. 1992 pertaining to the suit bonds was a sham entry intended to introduce the money into the books of SCB to cover a wide gap. (45-G, 46-A] 11.

Whatever might have been the conjectures on the part of the Special Court, whatever might have been the suspicion generated on account of sham entries made by one or the other party, when it came to the crux of the issue, the Special Court has correctly answered it and negatived the case of CMF that SCB lost title of the suit bonds because the suit bonds were sold in consideration of purchase of Cantriple Units. [47-G, 48-A] 12. 1. Notwithstanding the market practice of delivery of securities accompanied by a signed blank transfer deed, the property in the securities can only be transferred if there is bona fide purchase of the same for value. The crucial question in the present case is: did CMF purchase the suit bonds for value from the antecedent title-holder? (53-F] 12. 2. When the matter was first tried by the Special Court, CMF categorically admitted that there was no evidence by which it could be established that CMF had paid consideration for acquisition ofthe bonds.

It is true that this judgment was subsequently set aside by this Court and the matter was remanded for trial along with the Misc. Petition. But this is a significant fact which the Special Court could not have overlooked in appreciation of the evidence. [54-A, BJ 12. 3. Considering the evidence as a whole, it appears that the initial stand taken by CMF in the first round of the litigation, that there was no credible evidence on which payment of consideration by CMF could be proved, was fully justified. The attempt of CMF on picking up and putting forward some of the documents, out of the several transactions entered into by them to patch up the story ofconsideration has miserably failed. There was no cause for being charitable to CMF by saying that they could prove only a part of the consideration, ergo, rest of the transactions must be deemed to have proved.

Every one ofthe arguments put forward by SCB to impugn the story of CMF that it had paid the consideration is ju~tified and the Special Court was wrong in rejecting the arguments of SCB on this count. It is, therefore, held that CMF has utterly failed to prove its story that it had paid consideration for purchase of the suit bonds on 27. 2. 1992. (57-B-D] Jagdish Narain v. Nawab Said Ahmed Khan, AIR 33 (1946) PC 59; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR (1954) SC 526; Brahma Nand Puri v. Mathra Puri, AIR (1965) SC 1506; L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Messrs. Jardine Skinner and Co. , AIR (1957) SC 357; Chuharmal Takarmal Mohnani v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, AIR (1988) SC 1384; Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil, (197712 SCC 49; France v. Clark (1884] Vol. 26 Ch. D. 257; V. S. Venkata Subbiah Chetty v. A. Subha Naidu, AIR (1916) Mad 242; Govt. ofthe United States ofTravancore and Cochin v. Bank ofCochin Ltd, AIR (1954) Tra-Co 243 (FB), Fazal D.

Allana v. Mangaldas M Pakvasa, AIR (1922) Born. 303 and Vasudev Ramchnadra She/at v. Pranlal Jayanand Thaker, AIR 1974 SC 1728, referred to. Halsbury's Laws ofEngland: 4th Edn. Vol. 6 Para 6, 8(3) and 73 and Vol. 35 Para 1204, referred to. 13. In these circumstances, the evidence on record does not prove that HPD became the owner of the suit bonds or that CMF legitimately acquired the suit bonds from HPD or any other person by paying bona fide purchase value for them. Consequently, it must be held that CMF acquired no right, whatsoever, to the suit bonds. The suit bonds always remained the property of SCB irrespective of how they found their way into the hands of CMF. [58-C, DJ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2275 of 2002. From the Judgment and Order dated 17. 1. 2002 of the Special Court at STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRIKRISHNA, J. ] 11 Bombay in Suit No. 11 of 1996. With C. A. No. 2276 of 2002. Ram Jethmalani, Aspi Chinoy, Sr.

Advs. , Tushad K. Cooper, Mahesh Agarwal, P. R. Mala, Manu Krishnan, Shilpa Singh, E. C. Agarwala and Rishi Agarwal; Advs. , with them for the Appellant. Rohit Kapadia, Sr. Adv, Shaunak Thacker, Pradeep Sancheti, Ms. Sunita Dutt, Nilesh Parekh, Rajiv Mehta, Kumar Desai, Ashwin Pandya, Nandini Gore, Ms. Manik Karanjawala, P. H. Parekh, Ms. Sweety Manchanda, Advs. , with him for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SRIKRISHNA, J. These two appeals under Section l0 of the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") are against the judgments of the Special Court constituted under Section 5 ofthe Act, by which judgments the Special Court dismissed Special Court Suit No. 11/96 and allowed Misc. Petition No. 81/ 95, which had been transferred to it.

As a result of the said two judgments of the Special Court, the claim made by the appellant-Standard Chartered Bank (hereinafter referred to as "SCB") was negatived in dismissed Suit No. 11/96, and the application made by Canara Bank as principal trustee of Canbank Mutual Fund (hereinafter referred to as "CMF") for a direction to Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "NPCL") to register CMF as the owner ofcertain bonds and to pay the interest payable thereon was allowed. FACTS: Sometime in December 1991, NPCL issued bonds of two series - 9% tax free bonds and 17% taxable bonds. These bonds were permitted by the Controller of Capital Issues to be sold to banks and financial institutions for private placement. On 24. 2. 1992 Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "ABFSL") made an offer to NPCL for placing Rs. I00 crores - Rs. 50 crores in 9% tax free bonds and Rs. 50 crores in 17% taxable bonds. On 26. 2.

1992 NPCL wrote to ABFSL confirming the allotment of the 9% tax fret: bonds and the 17% taxable bonds, as requested. On 26. 2. 1992, NPCL issued a letter of allotment (hereinafter referred to as the "'LOA") confirming the allotment of 9% tax free bonds of the nominal value of Rs. 50 crores (hereinafter referred to as the '"suit bonds"). NPCL also said that intimation would be given in due course as to when the allotment letter C:uly discharged may be exchanged for bond certificates, and that the interest payable on the suit bonds would accrue from the date of allotment, payable on half yearly basis. On the same day ABFSL sold the suit bonds to SCB and in connection with the said sale issued its Cost Memo No. 057 dated 26. 2. 1992 indicating the particulars of the suit bonds and the cost at which they were being sold i. e. @ 85 . 05 at the total cost of Rs. 42,52,50,000. Against the receipt of the said Cost Memo No. 057 from ABFSL, SCB issued a Pay Order No. 246408 dated 26. 2.

1992 for the sum of Rs. 42,52,50,000. ABFSL, in tum, issued a Banker's Receipt (hereinafter referred to as "BR") No. 23 728 acknowledging receipt of the sum of Rs. 42,52,50,000 from SCB towards the cost of the suit bonds and undertook to deliver the suit bonds of the value of Rs. 50 crores, when ready, in exchange for the said BR duly discharged, and assured that, in the meantime, the suit bonds would be held on account of SCB. On 26/27. 2. 1992, ABFSL addressed a letter to SCB requiring SCB to hand over its BR No. 23728 in lieu ofthe original LOA in respect ofthe suit bonds as well as the 17% NPCL taxable bonds, which were said to have been enclosed with the said letter. According to SCB, in April/May 1992, when the securities scam broke out, the officers of SCB made an investigation of its records and found that SCB did not have in its possession the original LOA, but only a photocopy. On 20. 5. 1992, SCB wrote to NPCL alleging that though in ABFSL's letter dated 26. 2.

1992, it was stated that the original LOA was forwarded, SCB had found that only a photocopy ofthe LOA had been enclosed. A copy of ABFSL's concerned letter was also enclosed. SCB further stated that the original LOA purportedly sent by ABFSL was not available, that a note may . ::be made in NPCL's records that the original LOA was missing and, therefore. due caution should be exercised by NPCL. SCB also requested for issue of a duplicate allotment letter on the undertaking to return the original, if received by it. and keepmg NPCL indemmfied against claims, if any, arising out of issue of the duplicate. On 295. 1992, SCB requested ABFSL to confirm to NPCL the fact of having sold the suit bonds to SCB. On the same date, ABFSL addressed a letter to NPCL (with a copy endorsed to SCB), confirming having sold the suit bonds to SCB on 26. 2. 1992. They also STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FlNANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRJKRISHNA, J.

] 13 confirmed that they had no objection to NPCL issuing a duplicate LOA to SCB. On 8. 6. 1992 one Hiten P. Dalal (hereinafter referred to as "HPD"), who was acting as a broker in a large number of securities transactions of banks and financial institutions, was declared a 'notified person' under the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. On 20. 6. 1992 SCB filed a First Information Report ("FIR") against HPD and its own employees alleging that, as a result of a conspiracy b. etween HPD and its own employees, several securities and monies had been misappropriated by HPD. On 14. 7. 1992 CMF filled up a Transfer Deed dated 13. 7. 1992 and lodged it along with the original LOA with NPCL seeking transfer and registration of the suit bonds in its name. On 3. 8. 1992, NPCL wrote to SCB that the matter with regard to issuance of duplicate LOA of the suit bonds was being considered in consultation with its solicitors. On 17. 8.

1992, CMF wrote to NPCL claiming that the suit bonds had been bought on 27. 2. 1992 from ABFSL through a broker, HPD, and that the consideration therefor had been paid by certain adjustments between itself and ABFSL. CMF claimed that it was the legitimate holder of the suit bonds as it had received them against valid consideration. On 8. 9. 1992, NPCL infonned CMF that they had received a request for issue of a duplicate LOA pertaining to the suit bonds from SCB, which was also claiming purchase of the suit bonds from ABFSL. On 8. 9. 1992 by another letter, NPCL informed SCB that CMF had lodged the original LOA for registration claiming to have purchased the suit bonds from ABFSL on 27. 2. 1992. On 30. 9. 1992 NPCL asked ABFSL to confirm if it had sold the suit bonds to SCB as NPCL had received the LOA and the transfer deed in relation to the suit bonds duly endorsed by ABFSL in favour of CMF. On 30. 9. 1992 NPCL informed CMF that as early as on 20. 5.

1992 it had received a letter from SCB conveying that the suit bonds had been transferred in SCB's favour by ABFSL and enclosing a letter of ABFSL to evidence the transaction. They also referred to another letter of 29. 5. 1992 by ABFSL confirming that ABFSL had sold the suit bonds to SCB on 26. 2. 1992 and that it had no objection to issuing/transferring the LOA/ bonds to SCB. On 9. 10. 1992 SCB wrote to NPCL stating that as the suit bonds had been issued to ABFSL, who had confirmed selling the same to SCB, the LOA from CMF may be disregarded. By another letter of 15. 10. 1992 from ABFSL to NPCL, ABFSL once again confirmed the selling ofthe suit bonds to SCB and stated that as per market practice the suit bonds had been sold with blank transfer deeds to SCB. On 6. 11. 1992 NPCL informed SCB that, since there was a dispute over the ownership of the suit bonds between SCB and CMF, the matter should be resolved between SCB and CMF, only after which necessary action would be taken by it.

On 27. 11. 1992 SCB filed Suit No. 3808/92 on the Original Side ofthe Bombay High Court against ABFSL, CMF and NPCL for a declaration that it was entitled to the suit bonds and for an order directing NPCL to register the suit bonds in the name of SCB and to hand over the same to SCB. A further declaration was sought that CMF had no right, title and interest in the suit bonds; in the alternative, SCB sought refund from ABFSL. The said suit came to be transferred to the Special Court on 25. 9. 1996 and was renumbered as Special Court Suit No. 11 of 1996. On 27. 11. 1992 CMF filed a petition before the Company Law Board (hereinafter referred to as "CLB") under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking registration of the suit bonds in its name. The original respondents to the petition were NPCL, ABFSL and HPD. SCB was subsequently joined as a party respondent. In this petition, CMF alleged that it had purchased the suit bonds from ABFSL on 27. 2.

1992 through HPD, who, according to CMF, had acted as a broker/authorised agent of ABFSL in the transaction and that the payment of the price of the suit bonds to ABFSL was made by netting of the amounts of three other transactions between CMF and ABFSL made on the same day (i. e. 27. 2. 1992). On 27. 2. 1993 NPCL contested the petition by denying the so called transaction alleged by CMF and stating that the matter was subJudice since a suit was already filed in the Bombay High Court with regard to the alleged suit bonds. ABFSL also filed a reply to the petition denying that it had sold the suit bonds to CMF and affirming their sale to SCB on 26. 2. 1992. SCB in its reply to the petition pointed out that it had purchased the suit bonds from ABFSL after paying consideration and that ABFSL had also confirmed that there had been no sale or delivery ofthe suit bonds to CMF. SCB alleged . . that HPD had wrongly and fraudulently diverted the suit bonds to CMF. On 16. 3.

1993 the CLB made an order directing all the parties to disclose the role of HPD in the transaction. On 6. 3. 1995 the petition by CMF before the CLB was transferred to the Special Court and re-numbered as Misc. Petition No. 81/95. HPD had filed no affidavit in reply to the petition when the matter was before the CLB. On 14. 6. 1996, after the transfer of the petition to the Special Court, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRIKRISHNA, J. ] J5 HPD filed an affidavit in reply in Misc. Petition No. 81195 stipulating that the contents thereof and the documents referred to could not and ought not to be referred to and relied upon or used against HPD in any proceedings as he could not be compelled to be a witness against himself in any court of law, whether civil or criminal. According to HPD's version, SCB had 'lent' the suit bonds and the 17% NPCL bonds to him on 27. 2. 1992; that he had agreed to return the same with interest; that on 9. 5.

1992 he had purchased the suit bonds from SCB and adjusted the price payable by him to SCB against a sale by him of Cantriple Units and further that, he had sold and delivered the suit bonds to CMF on 27. 2. 1992. On 25. 6. 1996, SCB replied to HPD's affidavit and denied that it had any transaction with HPD in respect of the suit bonds on 27. 2. 1992 and denied that the suit bonds were sold by SCB to HPD on 9. 5. 1992, or that it had purchased Cantriple Units from HPD. SCB also pointed out several inconsistencies and contradictions in the stand taken by HPD in his affidavit. On 27. 11. 1996, the Special Court dismissed Misc. Petition No.

81/95 by holding that CMF had admitted through its counsel that it was not in position to show that it had paid any consideration for the suit bonds to ABFSL, and, as no consideration was paid by CMF either to ABFSL or to SCB, CMF could claim no title to the suit bonds, even assuming that HPD had acted as a mercantile agent and appeared to have obtained possession ofthe LOA through/from SCB. In view ofthis, the Special Court concluded that CMF could claim no right, title and interest in the suit bonds. However, in view of the fact that SCB had already filed Suit No. 11/96, it was held that SCB's title to the suit bonds could be decided in that suit. On 23. 12. 1996, CMF preferred an appeal to this Court but failed to obtain any interim relief except a direction from this Court that the Officer on Special Duty, who was in possession of the suit bonds, would not part with the suit bonds without notice to CMF and that the decision in Suit No.

11/96 would be subject to the decision in the appeal. On 10. 1. 1997, HPD took out Chamber Summons 1/97 in Suit No. 11/ 96 for being joined as a party. The said Chamber Summons was opposed by SCB and by an order dated 20. 3. 1997, the Chamber Summons was dismissed by the Special Court taking the view that HPD was at liberty to adopt appropriate substantive proceedings regarding his alleged claim of having purchased the suit bonds from SCB on 9. 5. 1992. On 30. 9. 1997, SCB applied for withdrawal of the Suit against CMF. This application was allowed. However, the Special Court took the view that CMF was a necessary party to the Suit in spite of its earlier order holding that CMF could claim no right, title or interest in the suit bonds and by an order made on 30. 9. 1997' 1. 10. 1997 the Suit was dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of CMF which was a necessary party. SCB appealed therefrom to this Court.

Thus, both SCB and CMF, came in appeal to this Court against the orders made by the Special Court in Misc. Petition No. 81195 as also of dismissal of Suit No. 11196. By the judgment and order dated 21. 4. 1998 made in Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1997 etc. , this Court allowed both the appeals filed by SCB and CMF and remitted the matter to the Special Court for being tried de nova. Accordingly, both, the Suit and the Misc. Petition came to be tried again by the Special Court. By the judgment dated 17. \. 2002, Special Court Suit No. 1\/96 was dismissed and Misc. Petition No. 81/95 was allowed. Being aggrieved, SCB is in appeal against both the judgments. Since the impugned judgments arise out of interconnected facts, it would be convenient to dispose of both the appeals by a common judgment. Since the judgment in Misc. Petition No. 81195 merely follows the judgment in Special Court Suit No. 11/96, it would be sufficient to deal with the judgment in Special Court Suit No.

11/96, calling it the 'impugned judgment' hereinafter. Issues: The Special Court raised the following issues in the impugned judgment and answered them as under: Issues Answers I. Does the Plaint not disclose In the affirmative i. e. in favour of CMF ' any cause of action against the and against SCB Defendant No. 2 ? 2. Whether the plaintiffs were In the negative i. e. in favour ofCMF and entitled to and continue to be against SCB entitled to the suit bonds as alleged in para 8 of the Plaint ? ... STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRIKRISHNA, J. ] J7 2A. Whether the Plaintiffs prove the In the negative i. e. against SCB and circumstances in which Original BR in favour of CMF. was taken away from them as alleged in para (8) of the Plaint ? 3. Whether the alleged transaction In the affirmative i. e. in favour of dated 26/2/92 was a transaction of CMF and against SCB Hiten P. Dalal as alleged in para I(d) and 8 of the Written Statement ? 4.

Whether the alleged transaction In the affirmative i. e. in favour of dated 26/2/1992 was under an CMF and against SCB. arrangement with the Plaintiffs as alleged in paras I(d) ,7, 8 and 9 ofthe Written Statement ? 5. Whether the Plaintiffs are estopped In the affirmative i. e. in favour of from making any claim as alleged in CMF and against SCB. para I read with para 22 and 29 ofthe Written Statement? 6. Whether on 9th May 1992 the This issue is divisible in to three parts Plaintiffs purchased Cantriple Units (i) CMF has proved that SCB has of the face value of Rs. 45. 50 crores purchased cantriple units of the face for Rs. 266. 18 crores (approx. ) and value of Rs. 45. 50 crores on 9/5/ against which the Plaintiffs sold and 1992. To that extent, issue is answered adjusted various securities including in the affirmative (ii) However, CMF the suit bonds ofthe face value ofRs.

has not proved that the said purchase 50 crores and whether the Plaintiffs was against sale of the suit bonds on have applied for and got the said 91511992. To that extent the sub-issue Cantriple units of face value of is answered in the negative, (iii) CMF Rs. 45. 50 crores transferred in their has proved that in January, 1993 SCB name in January, 1993 disclosing a applied for and have got the said sale consideration ofabout Rs. 266. 18 cantriple units ofthe face value ofRs. " crores as stated in para 14 and 15 of 45. 50 crores transferred in their name. the Written Statement ? Therefore, to that extent, the subissue is answered in the affirmative. 7. Whether the Defendant No. 2. In the affirmative i. e. in favour of purchased the bonds and received CMF and against SCB. delivery thereof along with Transfer Deed as alleged in para 22 and 29 of the Written Statement ? 8. Whether the plaintiffs deliberately In the affinnative i. e.

in favour of by their act and or omission or CMF and against SCB. negligence put Defendant No. I or Hite! P. Dalal in a position to deal with the LOA and the Transfer Deed as they liked as alleged in para 21 and 29 of the Written Statement ? 9. Whether Hiten P. Dalal was In the affinnative i. e. in favour of authorised to deal with and/or deemed CMF and against SCB. to be authorised to deal with the Bonds as alleged in paras 22 and 29 of the Written Statement '? - I0. Whether the Plaintiffis entitled to As per final Order. any reliefs and if so what ISSUES BETWEEN PLAINTIFF (SCB) AND DEFENDANT NO. 3 (NPCL) ISSUES ANSWERS I. Whether this Court has jurisdiction In the affinnative. to entertain and try this Suit ? 2. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled Answer for Issue No. 2 and 3. Issues to and/or are the owners of the said between SCB & NPCL were framed securities without having received the on 2/7/I997 i. e. after Judgment and original Letter of Allotment ? Order of Variava, J.

(as he then was) dismissing Misc. Petition No. 8I of 3. Whether these Defendants are 1995 on 27/I I/I 996 (whichjμdgment entitled to a lien on the said Bonds for has been subsequently overruled by securing the repayment of the deposit the Apex Court). As stated above, at placed by them with the Ist one point oftime, there were disputes Defnednats (sic) '? between plaintiffand NPCL which disputes do not survive in view of the subsequent stand taken by SCB before this Court. Therefore issues nos. 2 and 3 do not arise for determination. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRIKRISHNA, J. ] 19 4. Whether the Plaintiffs prove that In the negative. these Defendants are bound to register any Bonds in the name ofthe Plaintiffs or to issue the said Bonds and relevant interest warrants to the Plaintiffs ? 5. What Order? As per final Order. The issues framed in Misc. Petition No. 81/95 with the answers are as follows: ISSUES FINDINGS 1.

Whether the Petitioners are bonafide In the affirmative as answered in purchasers of value without notice of the Judgment in suit No. 11 of 1996 9% NPCL Bonds from Respondent i. e. in favour of the Petitioners and No. 3 for consideration paid to against SCB. Respondent No. 3 as set out in the affidavit ofS. Ramaraj dated July 12, 1993 ? 2. Whether Respondent No. 4 are In the negative i. e. against SCB and entitled to object to registering transfer in favour of the Petitioners. of 9% NPCL Bonds in favour of the Petitioners ? 3. Whether the Petitioners are entitled In the affirmative i. e. in favour of to have the suit LOA (for 9% NPCL the Petitioners and against SCB. Bonds f. v. 50 Crs. ) transferred to their name ? 4. Whether there was collusion Does not arise. between Respondents Nos. 2, 3 and/or 4 as alleged by the Petitioners in the affidavit ofM. Nayak dated April 10, 1993 ? 5. What Orders on the Petition? As per final order.

The core issue in both proceedings pertains to 9% NPCL Tax free bonds and whether SCB or CMF is the owner of such bonds and entitled to be registered as such. fhe Special Court held that SCB had proved that it had purchased the suit bonds from ABFSL against payment of Rs. 42,52,50,000, but it dismissed SCB's suit and allowed CMF's petition for the following reasons: (I) that under the existing '15% Arrangement' between SCB and HPD, SCB had purchased the suit bonds on behalf of HPD; (2) that HPD was accordingly entitled to deal with the bonds, and (3) that HPD had delivered and sold the bonds to CMF; and thus, CMF is actually the owner. Whether these findings are justified on facts and in law has been argued before us by learned senior counsel appearing for the parties with great perseverance, ingenuity and erudition. l. Nature of the Suit and the Proceedings in the Misc. Petition: • The Special Court has taken the view that the suit filed by SCB is basically a title suit.

Originally in the suit, a money decree in the alternative had been prayed for against ABFSL, but the monetary relief was subsequently given up. following upon this, the Special Court held that even if CMF failed to prove the payment of consideration, SCB could not succeed in its 5Uit as it was a title suit. In the same vein, the Special Court held that the Suit had to fail because it was a title suit and HPD was entitled to deal with the suit bonds in his own title. And since the title suit failed, SCB could not prevent NPCL from transferring the bonds in favour of CMF. Finally, the Special Court concluded on this issue, that non-payment of consideration by CMF, as submitted by SCB, could only be questioned by HPD and not by SCB. The Special Court also held that as the Suit was a title suit, SCB was required to prove its title and could not succeed on the basis of the faults in the evidence of the defendant-CMF. Mr.

Jethmalani, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the Special Court erred in taking the view that Suit No. 11196 was a title suit in which SCB failed to have its title established. He submitted that on proper analysis, the suit ofSCB was in the nature of a declaratory suit falling within STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. (SRIKRISHNA, I. ] 21 the ambit of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which corresponds r+-to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (hereinafter referred to as the "old Act"). He placed particular emphasis on illustration (c) appended to Section 42 ofthe old Act and contended that a declaratory suit under Section 42 of the old Act, or Section 34 of the present Specific Relief Act, need not be one for declaring the title of the plaintiff, but may be one for declaring any other legal character of the plaintiff. It is difficult to accept this contention ofMr. Jethmalani. As rightly pointed out by Mr.

Kapadia, learned counsel for CMF, SCB appears to have all along claimed that its suit was a title suit. In the first place, the prayer clauses in Special Court Suit No. 11/96 read as under: "(a) For a declaration that the plaintiffs are fully entitled to 9% NPCL Tax free 'F' series Bonds (fifth Issue) ofthe Third Defendants more particularly described in Exhibit 'G' hereto and that the Third Defendant are bound and liable to register and (sic) said Bonds in the Plaintiffs' name and to issue and deliver the said Bonds to the Plaintiffs along with interest warrants in respect thereto. (b) For a declaration that the second defendants have no right, title and interest whatsoever, in relation to the said Bonds, more particularly described in Exhibit 'G' hereto and that the Second defendants are not bonafide purchasers ofthe said Bonds for value.

" The substantive prayers are for a declaration that the plaintiffs "are fully entitled" to the suit bonds and certain reliefs which are founded upon this declaration. A suit for such a declaration would certainly be a title suit so far as the suit bonds are concerned. Further, even Grounds A28 and A30 of the present Civil Appeal No. 2275/02 by SCB read: "(A28) The learned Judge erred in failing to appreciate that SCB ~ having proved its title on 26th February, 1992 its said title would prevail against the whole world until a superior title of any party was established. (A30) The learned Judge erred in failing to appreciate that thereby SCB had established its prior title to the Suit Bonds and had a better title thereto then (sic) CMF. " Thus, it is clear that the appeal has been brought on the footing that SCB had fully proved its title to the suit bonds and that the Special Court had erroneously held against SCB.

Looked at from any point of view, we are not satisfied that the Suit was a mere declaratory suit, it must be regarded as a title suit. • We shall now tum to the nature of the proceedings in Misc. Petition No. 81/95. This petition was presented under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956. Section 111(I) provides for the power of refusal by a company to register the transfer of debentures to a transferee. The transferor or the transferee has a right of appeal to the Tribunal (then, the CLB) under subsection (2) of Section 111. The nature of proceedings under Section 111 are slightly different from a title suit, although, sub-section (7) of Section 111 gives to the Tribunal the jurisdiction to decide any question relating to the title of any person who is a party to the application, to have his name entered in or omitted from the register and also the general jurisdiction to decide any question which it is necessary or expedient to decide in connection with such an application.

It has been held in Mis Ammonia Supplies Corporation (P) 1 Ltd. v. Mis Modern Plastic Containers Pvt. Ltd and Ors. , that the jurisdiction exercised by the Company Court under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956 (corresponding to Section 111 of the present Act, before its amendment by Act 31 of 1988) was somewhat summary in nature and that if a seriously disputed question of title arose, the Company Court should relegate the parties to a suit, which was the more appropriate remedy for investigation and adjudication ofsuch seriously disputed question oftitle. Mr. Kapadia, learned counsel for CMF, contended that as far as the petition of CMF was concerned, it merely invoked the summary remedy under Section 111 of the Companies Act. The only prayer made by CMF before the CLB was that it had purchased the suit bonds from ABFSL and, therefore, it was entitled to be registered as the owner of the suit bonds in the register of NPCL. Relying on Manna/a/ Khetan v.

Kedar Nath Khetan 2 and Ors. he contended that the provisions of Section I08 of the Companies ' Act, 1956 were mandatory and unless they were fulfilled, a registration of the transfer of the bonds could not be done. Further, he relied on the exemption granted from certain provisions of Section I08( I) in respect of bonds issued by a Government company. He placed reliance on Notification l. AIR 1998 SC 3153 2. AIR 1977 SC 536 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRIKRISHNA, J. ] . 23 G. S. R. 1294 (E) dated 17. 12. 1986 issued by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 620(l)(a) of the Companies Act, 195. 6.

The said Notification reads as under: "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (I) of section 620 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), the Central Government hereby directs that the provisions of subsection (I) of section 108 of the said Act, in so far as it requires a proper instrument oftransfer to be duly stamped and executed by or on behalf of the transferor and by or on behalf of the transferee, shall not apply with respect to bonds issued by a Government company, provided that an intimation by the transferee specifying his name, address and occupation, if any, has been delivered to the company along with the certificate relating to the bond, and if no such certificate is in existence, along with the letter of allotment of the bond, a copy ofthis notification having been laid in draft before both the Houses of Parliament as required by sub-section (2) of section 620 of the said Act. " It is the contention ofMr.

Kapadia that the provisions ofSection 108(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 are conditionally excluded by reason of this Notification as the suit bonds were issued by NPCL, which is admittedly a Government company. Thus, according to him, the suit bonds would be transferable by endorsement and delivery as long as the transferee gave 1ntimation as contemplated under the Notification. According to him, the terms of Section 108(1) as amended by the aforesaid Notification had been fulfilled, and, therefore, there was an obligation on the part of NPCL to register CMF as the registered holder ofthe suit bonds. Emphasising that the intention of the legislature is to enable transferability of bonds issued by Government companies with greater facility and lesser formality, he referred to provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the "TP Act").

Section 2(12) of the Companies Act, 1956 defines 'debenture' as including debenture stock bonds and any other securities of a company, whether constituting a charge on the assets of the company or not. Chapter VIII of the TP Act deals with transfers ofactionable claims. Section 137 of the TP Act, however, provides that the provisions in Chapter VIII (Sections 130 to 136) would not apply to stocks, shares or debentures. The argument is that the mode oftransfer. of actionable claims specified in the TP Act (Sections 130 to 136) has been specifically done away with. Even the mode of transfer under Section I08 of the Companies Act has been considerably relaxed insofar as bonds issued by Government companies are concerned. So far as the nature of the proceedings in the Misc. Petition are concerned, it 1s the submission of Mr. Kapadia that the only issue to be considered is whether CMF is a transferee of the bonds, and whether CMF has complied with Section I08 read with the Notification G.

S. R. 1294(E) dated 17. 12. 1986 so as to be eligible for registration as the holder of the bonds. Even ifthe petition filed under Section 111 ofthe Companies Act, 1956 was only for this limited relief ofregistering the petitioner-CMF as the holder of the suit bonds, we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Kapadia for two reasons. In the first place, whatever might have been the limited jurisdiction ofthe CLB under Section 111 ofthe Companies Act, 1956, while entertaining the petition, the fact that the said petition was transferred to the Special Court by an order of this Court needs to be reckoned with. The order of this Court is specific and requires the trial of Special Court Suit No. 11/96 along with Misc. Petition No. 81/95. The limitation of the jurisdiction of the CLB, if any, does not apply to the Special Court, which is clothed with all the jurisdiction of a civil court.

Secondly, merely by filing a petition under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 and by placing reliance on Section I08 of the Companies Act, 1956 the petitioner-CMF cannot succeed. It would have to go further and prove that it is validly a transferee of the suit bonds, if that question is put in issue.. Thus, in our view, each of the two contesting parties, i. e. SCB and CMF, would have to prove their rights and show how they are entitled to the suit bonds before any relief could be granted either in the Suit or in the Misc. Petition. II. Nature and Effect of 15% Arrangement: The Special Court has laid great emphasis on what it has called the '15% arrangement' and concluded that because of this 15% arrangement HPD became owner ofthe suit bonds, which he rightfully transferred to CMF • for consideration. The learned counsel for the appellant has severely criticised this conclusion as totally contrary to the evidence on record.

Under the instructions of the Reserve Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as "RBI"), banks and financial institutions were required to maintain a certain liquidity ratio of debt to equity. They could have ready forward transactions in securities only with other banks and only in respect of government and other approved securities. The statutory i'quidity ratio STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRIKRISHNA, I. ] 25 was maintained by sale and purchase of securities, issued by Government companies and public sector institutions. An unhealthy practice had developed among all the banks and financial institutions affected by the securities scandal, under which some securities were repeatedly shown as bought and sold in order to advance finances to ..... certain brokers. HPD was one of them.

The so called '15% arrangement' was an informal arrangement with HPD under which SCB bought securities from other counter-parties, as directed by HPD, and also sold them to such parties at such rates as designated by HPD. A desired sale price was arrived at so as to ensure that SCB obtained a return of 15% of the transaction. The evidence on record consisting of the Janakiraman Committee Report (the report of a High Powered Committee appointed by RBI to investigate into the irregularities in the funds management in commercial banks and financial institutions, in particular in relation to the dealings in Government securities) has examined this arrangement and reported upon it in Paragraphs 8. 1 to 8. 7 ofits Fourth Interim Report (March 1993), particularly with regard to the way in which the arrangement operated in SCB. The Joint Parliamentary Committee Report (hereinafter referred to as the "JPC Report") (Exhibit-26) vide Paragraphs 8. 49-8. 51 has also explained this arrangement.

There is also the evidence tendered on record in the form of replies to interrogatories in which SCB has explained the details of the scheme and how the 15% arrangement worked. The agreement between HPD and SCB was that, if SCB followed the instructions of HPD in the matter of which securities are to be bought or sold, from or to which parties, at what rates and when; SCB was assured of a net return of 15% of the outlay in the purchase of the securities concerned. If the return was less than 15%, HPD would bear the difference; ifthe return happened to be higher than 15%, HPD would be paid the difference. The evidence on record clearly bears out that this is how the 15% arrangement worked between SCB and HPD. A. Public Policy and Res Judicata: ,. _ t Mr. Jethmalani invited our attention to an earlier judgment ofthis Court 3 in Canara Bank and Ors. v. Standard Chartered Bank where the nature of the 15% arrangement was carefully considered by this Court.

Incidentally, the said judgment was delivered in a dispute between the same parties and after analysing the nature of the 15% arrangement, this Court categorically 3. [20021 10 sec 697. rejected the argument that it was opposed to public policy. This Court upheld the judgment of the Special Court rejecting the contention that the 15% arrangement was contrary to public policy. While rejecting the contention that the 15% arrangement was opposed to public policy, the Special Court had made the following findings: "The object and consideration ofthe suit contracts are purchase/sale of the securities and payment of price. Such securities contracts are normally entered into by banks. These may be for SLR purposes or in the normal course of business of the bank. It is the business of the bank to try and make profit. Thus even if these were part of the 15% arrangement, provided there was such an arrangement, would not make them against public policy if it was a genuine security transaction.

None ofthe circulars relied upon by Mr. Salve prohibit such transactions. In my opinion none ofthe circulars have any bearing on the point under consideration. The suit transactions or transactions under the alleged 15% arrangement are not against the subject matter ofthese circulars. They are also not even against any policy laid down therein. I thus see no illegality. " These were expressly approved by this Court in the judgment. It appears to us that much of the controversy about the nature of the 15% arrangement could have been avoided if the judgment in the Canara Bunk case (supra) had been kept in mind.

We notice from the impugned judgment that the decision of this Court in Canara Bank (supra) was specifically brought to the notice ofthe Special Court, but it appears to have been brushed aside on the grounds, first, that the doctrine of res judicata would not apply as Section 13 of the Act had an overriding effect; second, the exact scope ofthe 15% arrangement was not determined by evidence in the previous suit; and third, that an arrangement by which banks and public financial institutions are enabled to earn a return higher than what is stipulated by the government/ RBI, would cause inflation and the government would not be able to control .... its deficit, hence it was opposed to public policy.. The Special Court said: "In the economic sense, they are not legitimate. On this point also, therefore, there is no merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of SCB. " We are afraid that the Special Court was wrong on all the counts.

On the question of res judicata, the Special Court failed to notice that the doctrine of res judicata is not merely a matter of procedure but a doctrine evolved by the courts in larger public interest. What is enacted in Section STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. (SRIKRISHNA, J. ] 27 11 of the Civil Procedure Code ("CPC") is not the fountain-head of the doctrine, but merely the statutory recognition ofthe doctrine, which rests on public policy. (See in this connection Daryao and Ors. v. The State ofUP. 4 5 and Ors. ; Guda Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry and 6 Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and Anr. ) In the previous suit to which both SCB and Canara Bank were parties, the same issue with regard to ' 15% arrangement' with HPD was urged by CMF as a non-suiting factor, but was negatived both by the Special Court and by this Court. Issue No.

I0 in the previous suit was the relevant issue dealing with 15% arrangement, which was as follows: "Whether the suit transactions entered into by the Plaintiffs with the Canbank Mutual Fund were in fact entered into by the plaintiffs on behalf of Hiten Dalal as alleged in Para 5(d) of the Written Statement of Defendant No. l? " This was an issue raised by CMF which was defendant no. l in that suit (Special Court Suit No. 13/94). The burden of proving this issue was on the defendant and the Special Court answered the issue in the negative and observed that the counsel for defendant no. 1 had admitted that there was no evidence to support this issue. Consequently, the Special Court held that the issue was answered in the negative i. e. against defendant no. l.

Since the Special Court findings were finally upheld by this Court in the judgment reported in Canara Bank (supra) and a review petition thereagainst was also dismissed, we are of the view that it is not open for this Court to again raise the issue and take a view contrary to what had already been decided in the previous suit, particularly in view of the fact that there has been no new revelatory evidence on this issue. We are not in agreement with the view taken by the Special Court that Section 13 of the Act overrides the doctrine of res judicata. Section 13 of the Act provides: "The provisions ofthis Act shall have effect notwithstanding • anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law, other than this Act, or in any decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority".

This was certainly not intended to abrogate all the established principles of law, unless they were directly in conflict with the express provisions of the 4. [19621 1 sec 574. s. [1981) 2 sec 646. 6. [19991 s sec s9o Act itself. There is nothing in the Act which is inconsistent with the doctrine ... . of res judicata, per se, as seems to have been assumed by the Special Court. We are also unable to appreciate the thinking of the Special Court that there was something mora! ly or economically reprehensible in the arrangement which was brought about between HPD and SCB as a result of which SCB was able to earn higher n:tum. B. Evidence on Record: The evidence as to the nature of the 15% arrangement was SCB's replies to interrogatories in previous suits, tendered by CMF as Exhibits 5, 6, 8 and 9 as evidence in the present suit, the Janakiraman Committee Report and the JPC Report, which recognise and explain the 15% arrangement.

There is nothing in all the said evidence to suggest that by entering into such a contractual transaction with HPD, HPD became the owner of the bonds. The evidence, on the other hand, clearly brings out that at all times the securities transactions would be between SCB and the counter-party-banks, the legal relationship always being between the said two parties. In our view, therefore, the Special Court grossly erred in drawing a conclusion based on no evidence and attributing to the said arrangement a legal character, which was not proved on record. It also erred in ignoring the finding on the issue given in the previous Special Court Suit No. 13/94 as upheld by the judgment of this Court in Canara Bunk (supra). The Special Court has also observed that under the 15% arrangement SCB was "maintaining broker's position". While this may be appropriate jargon in a stock exchange, what exactly is the legal implication, if any, of such an expression is unclear.

We find no evidence on record to suggest that merely because of the 15% arrangement the legal ownership of the securities was transferred to HPD in any manner, since all the transactions appear to be between SCB and counter-party-banks. This would be evident from the fact that if the counter-party-banks failed to deliver the securities or failed to pay for the securities delivered, the legal • action could only be between SCB and the counter-party-banks with which the transaction took place and not by or against HPD. We are unable to accept the conclusions drawn by the Special Court with regard to some of the documents produced by CMF as defendant, about which no evidence by way of explanation was led by either party. In the absence of proper explanation, it was not open to the Special STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. (SRIKRISHNA, J.

] 29 Court to make inferences or assumptions with regard to terms used in the documents, for example, SCB's securities ledger in relation to the suit bonds (Exhibit- I I), which pertains to the sale and purchase of the suit bonds with different counter-parties. This document as such does not contain the description 'portfolio', but the said appellation has been given to it by the Special Court on its own. The Special Court has observed thereupon: "Therefore, all such transactions were entered into by the bank on behalf of HPD. Therefore, they were transactions of HPD. This is amply illustrated by Exhibit-I I. A portfolio represents stock held by SCB on behalf ofHPD. HPD was entitled to enter into buy transactions and sale transactions in respect of securities coming under that portfolio. The portfolio was built up by SCB by purchasing securities at the instance of HPD. This is also called as building up of position. The suit contract comes under Exhibit- I I.

By the suit contract, the LoA came within the portfolio of HPD. He was allowed to deal with the LoA under the portfolio. " We are afraid that this inference is not readily available ex facie from the document; nor was there any other evidence given by any witness explaining the document, suggesting it. Further, the word 'loan' used in the Security Ledger (Exhibit-I I) was seized upon by the Special Court to draw an unwarranted inference. The Special Court has held that this term shows "lending of scrip to HPD" and has then gone on to hold as follows: "this word has to be read ·while construing the entries in Exhibit- I I beginning from 27. 2. 1992. The word "loan" must be read with the column "Book Value" and the column "Profit and Loss" and "Balance". That, last column "Balance" represents HPD's outstanding to SCB. " There is no warrant, whatsoever, for such an explanation to this document as no witness has said so.

Further, the word 'loan' also appears to have been used in the BR issued by AB to SCB in respect of the suit bonds (BR no. 23728 dated 27. 2. 1992). There was no justification for giving an interpretation to the word 'loan' used in any of the documents without any explanation by a witness. The Special Court also makes a finding that the word 'Direct' used in SCB's ledger showing transaction details ofSCB from April 1991 to May 1992 (Exhibit-7) suggests that such transactions were all under the 15% arrangement. This again appears to be an inference which has been drawn by the Special Court without any supporting evidence thereto. In the replies to the interrogatories as well as the evidence of the witnesses no one has asserted that all transactions described as 'direct' were necessarily covered ... ' by the 15% arrangement. Although, the reply to Question no. 43 of the interrogatories, in Suit No.

14/94, did suggest to the contrary, the said reply not having been tendered in evidence and taken on record, does not form part ofthe evidence before the Special Court. The Special Court is, therefore, not justified in drawing this conclusion for which there was no acceptable evidence. Mr. Jethmalani contended that the chargesheet (Exhibit-4), FIR (Exhibit- 3 ), SCB's answers to interrogatories (Exhibits 5, 6, 8 and 9), details ofSCB's securities transactions during April 1991 - May 1992 (Exhibit-7), security ledger of SCB in relation to the suit bonds (Exhibit-I I), SCB's deal slips dated 9/5/92 (Exhibit-I 0), SCB's vouchers (Exhibit-12), and the Janakiraman Committee Report (Exhibit-18) were all produced by CMF; and relying on the judgments of this Court in P. C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal' and R. V. E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V. P. 8 Temple and Anr. he urged that the contents of these documents would be binding on CMF.

The Special Court has relied on these documents to arrive at a conclusion which does not arise from them. While it may be true that the Special Court has been given a certain amount of latitude in the matter of procedure, it surely cannot fly away from established legal principles while deciding the cases before it. As to what inference arises from a document, is always a matter of evidence unless the document is self-explanatory. We do not think that any of the documents placed on record during the trial were self-explanatory; nor were they explained by any competent witness on either side. In the absence of any such explanation, it was not open to the Special Court to come up with its own explanations and decide the fate ofthe Suit on the basis of its inference based on such assumed explanations. In fact, these inferences run contrary to the oral evidence given by Kalyana Raman (PW-! ) in relation to the transaction of 26. 2. 1992.

The Special Court has also adversely commented on the conduct of SCB in not leading evidence to prove what the 15% arrangement was. We fail to see how a party could be called upon to lead evidence with regard to an issue which was no part of its case. The 15% arrangement was brought on record at the instance ofCMF and the burden, ifany, of proving its details 1. [19721 1 sec 9. s. 120031 s sec 1s2. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRIKRISHNA, J. ] 31 lay on CMF. Although, a number of documents were produced on record as called for ~y CMF, there was no obligation on SCB to explain any ofthem. Learned counsel for CMF also contended that SCB failed to produce relevant documents that would have established what the 15% arrangement was. For this failure, he contended that an adverse inference should be drawn against SCB. For this proposition, he relies on the judgments of this court in Hirala/ & Ors. v. Badkulal& Ors. "'; Gopa/ Krishnaji Ketkar v.

Mohamed 10 Haji Latif & Ors. ; S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L. R 's. v. } Jagannath (dead) by L. R 's. & Ors. 11 and CitiBank N. A. v. Standard 12 Chartered Bank & Ors. • This argument is met by learned counsel for SCB. An adverse inference is a presumption which the court is entitled to draw under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 read with illustration (g) thereto. Mr. Jethmalani contended that the weight of the authorities would show that unless there are some special circumstances making it obligatory for a party .. . to produce evidence, no adverse inference can be drawn unless a party has been called upon to or ordered to produce evidence and fails to do so. Mr. 13 Jethmalani relies on Mt. Bi/as Kunwar v. Desraj Ran)it Singh and Ors. , 14 Ramrati Kuer v. Dwarika PrasadSingh and Ors. and Smt. Indira Kaur and 15 Ors. v. Shri Sheo Lal Kapoor • In Hira/al 's case (supra), this court reiterated the observations of the 16 PrivyCouncil in Murugesam Pillai v.

Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi where the Privy Council laid down the general rule ofprocedure that instead of relying on the abstract doctrine of onus of proof a party to the suit "desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts" ought not to withold from the court the written evidence in his possession. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar 's case (supra) the observation in Murugesam Pillai (supra) was reiterated and it was 9. AIR (1953) SC 225. IO. AIR (1968) SC 1413. 11. AIR (1994) SC 853. 12. AIR (2003) SC 4630. 13. AIR (1915) PC 96. 14. AIR (1967) SC 1134. 15. AIR (1988) SC 1074. 16. AIR (1917) PC 6. "~ observed: "Even if the burden ofproof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue.

It is not, in our opinion, a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the best evidence which is in their possession which could throw light upon the issues in controversy and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof. " S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra), was a situation of a fraudulent litigant basing his case on falsehood and witholding vital documents. Citibank (supra) merely relies on the observations made in Murugesam Pillai (supra) and Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar (supra), both ofwhich say that it is not a sound practice for those "desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withold from the court" the best evidence which is in their possession. On the other hand, the three authorities on which Mr. Jethmalani relied independently talce the view that unless a party is called upon to produce evidence or ordered to do so by the court and fails to do so, no adverse "' inference can be drawn against such party. Mr.

Jethmalani distinguished the two apparently contradictory lines of authorities by pointing out that in the authorities relied on by Mr. Kapadia the facts showed that there was a special obligation upon the party concerned to produce the relevant documer,ts even without being called upon or ordered to do so and that the party had failed to produce them. Further he pointed out that the observations of the Privy Council originating from Murugesam Pillai (supra) which have been reiterated in the subsequent cases including Citibank (supra) would apply only if the party is "desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts'". He rightly contends that the 15% arrrangement was neither any part of SCB's case, nor was SCB desiring to rely on the said state of facts. In the circumstances there was no obligation upon SCB to produce any documents to prove the case put forward by CMF; there was no situation in which adverse inference could be drawn against SCB. Finally, Mr.

Jethmalani also urged that irrespective ~ of what the parties did, the Special Court could have, if it was so minded, .... invoked its power under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and directed production ofall documents it considered relevant instead ofrelying on adverse inference which was doubtful in the circumstances. This is particularly so with regard to the argument of CMF that the computer spread sheets had not been produced, as paragraph 7 of the written statement of CMF indicates that CMF was aware of the existence of such sheets and yet failed to call upon SCB to produce it or seek an order for production thereof from the Special Court. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. ANDHRA BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. [SRIKRISHNA, J. ] 33 The whole thrust of the impugned judgment is that the transactions between SCB and the counter-party-banks, which were covered by the 15% arrangement were sham transactions, making HPD the owner of the suit bonds.

Where a transaction results in rights and obligations, it can never be treated as a sham transaction. (See in this connection Chow Yoong Hong v. 17 Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory . ) It was nobody's case that in any ofthe transactions under the 15% arrangement, HPD could have been sued for enforcement of any right arising therefrom between SCB and ABFSL. C. Estoppel: Issue No. 5 framed by the Special Court was whether SCB was estopped from making any claim to the suit bonds by denying the authority of HPD to deal in the suit bonds, as SCB had actually, ostensibly or negligently permitted HPD to deal with the suit bonds. Although, the Special Court answered the issue in the affirmative i. e. in favour ofCMF and against SCB, there does not seem to be any specific discussion on this issue nor any reason supporting the said finding.

It is however, true that the Special Court took the view that the direct fallout of the 15% arrangement was that HPD became the owner of the suit bonds and had the right to deal with the suit bonds as he pleased; and since this was done to the knowledge of and by acquiescence of SCB, SCB was estopped from denying that HPD had acquired any such right to deal with the suit bonds or to transfer them to any other person. The Special Court has taken the view that the transactions reflected in the Security Ledger (Exhibit-11 ), indicated funding of the broker by SCB and that it was something like a 'running account' of HPD in the books of SCB, which had opened with an entry of 26. 2. 1992 and was settled on 9. 5. 1992. It then observed: "Under Exhibit-11, the suit scrip of9% NPCL bonds was made available to HPD for raising finances either by sale, pledge or Ready Forward. It was bought for HPD as he had assured a fixed return to SCB. The (sic) HPD was entitled to trade.

He was entitled to take position in the market on the suit bonds bought for him as he h;s assured a fixed return. He was entitled to take a position on suit bonds. He took that position through SCB. Therefore, SCB had taken his position under Exhibit-II. Under the above arrangement, SCB could claim return of the security or equivalent money value only from HPD as the transactions in Exhibit-11 are 17.. [1962) AC 209, page 216. under 15% Arrangement. Therefore, SCB cannot claim any relief against CMF. They can only claim relief against HPD. SCB is estopped from claiming any relief against CMF. SCB, therefore, has no right to object to the transfer of bonds by NPCL in favour of CMF. " Learned counsel for SCB however, criticised the impugned judgment of the Special Court on the ground that this finding, though not made specifically, but diffusedly over the impugned judgment arises from a misapprehension as to the exact natur