STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. C. UMA MAHESWARA RAO AND ANR

Citation: [2004] 3 S.C.R. 665

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU, ARIJIT PASAYAT

Case summary

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. C. UMA MAHESWARA RAO AND ANR.pdf

Judgment text

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. C. UMA MAHESWARA RAO AND ANR, MARCH 31, 2004 [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ,] ' --+- Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1988-Sections 7, 13 & 20(/)/ Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 4 and 114-Public Servants convicted for taking gratification from complainant for clearance of tender file-High Court acquitting them on ground ofnon-availability ofcogent evidence about demand a11d acceptance ofgratification-Correctness of-Held, Courts can presume tl1e acceptance ofgratification jiwn the facts produced unless proved otherwise by accused-On facts and evidence, accused are guilty of accepting gratification-Hence, conviction upheld. Respondent-public servants were members of a Tender Opening Committee and were associated with the processing of tender files. Respondents demanded money as gratification from complainant for clearing his tender file. The complainant lodged a complaint with police about the demand of the gratification by the respondents.

The police laid a trap and caught the respondents red handed while accepting the tainted money from the complainant. Trial Court found the respondents guilty for offences under Section 1208 IPC and under Sections 7 and l3(l)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, (qgg and sentenced them to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment with fine. The High Court allowed the appeal of the respondents and acquitted them. In appeal to the Court, the appellant-State contended that the High Court made out a new case about the discrepancy of the date of complaint which was not taken as a plea by the respondents in their appeal; and that the evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 5 were cogent and credible to show that the respondents demanded and accepted money which were subsequently recovered from them.

The respondents contended that the complainant had close proximity with CBI officials and used it as a tactic to get his work done under the threat ofcomplaint before; that the complainant foisted a false case implicating them; and that the question of taking gratification from the complainant does not arise since the tender file of the complainant had already been cleared which is known to the complainant. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. 1. When Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 deals with legal presumption, it is to be understood as in terrorem i. e. in tone of a command that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act etc. , if the condition envisaged in the former part of the Section is satisfied.

The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The Section does not say that the said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fa'. '. t can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the Evidence Act. (672-H; 673-A-B( M Narsinga Rao v. State ofA. P. , (2001 ( 1 SCC 691, referred to. 1. 2. Proofof the fact depends upon the degree ofprobability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of 11 prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. In reaching a conclusion, the Court can use the process of inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved. Such inferences are akin to presumptions in law.

Law gives absolute discretion to the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks p likely to have happened. Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn --{ . from other proved facts. While infering the existence of a fact from another, the Court is only applying a process of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final conclusion to be drawn from other facts. But it could as well be final if it remains undisturbed later. Presumption in law of evidence is a rule indicating the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts, the Court can draw an inference and that would remain until such inference is either disproved or dispelled. For the purpose of reaching one conclusion the Court can rely on a factual presumption. Unless the presumption is disproved or dispelled or rebutted, the Court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof.

However, as a caution of prudence STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. C. UMA MAHESWARA RAO 667 it has to be observed that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet another discretionary presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion. 1673-C; 673-E, F-G, H; 674-AI Suresh Budharmal Kala11i v. State ofMaharashtra, 119981 7 SCC 337: Raghubir Singh v. State ofPunjab, 1197414 SCC 560; Ha:ari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn), 1198012 SCC 390; Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State ofMaharashtra, 1200018 SCC 571; Mohmccdkhan Mahboobkhan Pathan v. State ofMaharashtra, 11997110 SCC 600; The State ofAssam v. Krishna Rao, 1197313 SCC 227; C. /. \ 'i· Emden v. State ofUttar Pradesh. AIR (1960) SC 548; V. D. Jhangan v. Stale of Uttar Pradesh. 1196613 SCR 736 and State ofA. P. v. V Vasudev Rao, JT (2003) 9 SC 119, referred to. Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. ltd, 1191111 KB 988, referred to. Black's Law Dictionary; Oxford Advance Lean:er's Dictionary of Current English, referred to. 1. 2.

The evidence of PW I complainant cannot be ignored on the ground that he had earlier made grievances against some other officials. The Trial Court had carefully analysed the evidence of PW l and found the same to be credible. The evidence of PW-! coupled with those ofPWs 3 and 5 is sufficient to bring home the accusations. A bare reading of the contents ofthe co:nplaint and the date put in the complaint clearly show that the High Court was not correct j. n saying that the date of the document is incorrect. Additionally, this plea was not raised before the Trial Court. It being essentially a question of fact, the High Court could not have made out a new case regarding correctness of the date. The views ofthe High Court were also not correct when the 1 ;,... document is itself looked at. The question whether a person has authority to do the act for which bribe is accepted is of no consequence. 1677-FI Chacurdas Bhagwanffas Patel v. The State ofGujarat, 119761 3 SCC 46, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURIS. DICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 468- 469 of 1998. From the Judgment and Order dated 10. 9. 97 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Crl. A. Nos. 47 and 100 of 1995. Sanjay Karol, Ajit S. Blu;sme, Jogy Scaria and B. V. Bairam Das for the Appellant. U. R. Lalit. Y. Raja Gopala Rao and Ms. Sasmita Tripathy for the Respondent No. I Ms. K. Amareswari and Anil Kumar Tandale for the Respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. State of Andhra Pradesh questions legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High .. ,.. ' Court directing acquittal of the respondents who were accused nos. I and 2 respectively before the Trial Court i. e. Special Judge, CBI, Visakhapatnam. The respondents faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the 'Act').

The Trial Court found each to be guilty and sentenced to undergo two years RI and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 with default stipulation. They were also convicted under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the 'IPC'), sentenced to similar custodial punishment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000. But in appeal the conviction and sentence were set aside. Factual position as highlighted by the prosecution is as follows: C. Uma Maheswara Rao (A-1) was working as Deputy Secretary of Visakhapatnam Port Trust and D. Satyananda Recldy (A-2) was worki11g as Deputy Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer of Visakhapatnam Port Trust. G. Subrahmanyam (PW- I) was the General Power of Attorney holder of Mis Ramesh Chandra & Company. Both the accused were members of Tender Opening Committee and were associated with the processing of tender file No. CllBG/Sleepers1Riskl91.

The file dealt with placement of purchase order for Assam Salwood Sleepers during the period from September, 199 l to December, 1991. Aforesaid Ramesh Chandra & Company through its power of Attorney holder (PW- I) submitted their quotation at Rs. 828 per sleeper and the total tender value was Rs. 1,33,'84,702. 80. A-1 phoned to PW-I on 28. 12. 1991 at about 11. 00 a. m. and asked him to meet him in the evening at his residence for discussions with regard to tender matter and PW- 1 went to his house at 8. 30 p. m. on the same day and A-2 was also present there. Both the accused, who were Public Servants, during the discussion informed PW-I that there were many complications in the tender filt: and demanded Rs. 20,000 each to be paid as bribe to clear the file in favour of Mis. Ramesh Chandra & Co. They also told him that they would not clear the file, if he fails to meet the said demand and when PW-I expressed his STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 1·. C. UMA MAHESWARA RAO fPASAYAT, J.

] 669 financial constraints, they said that they should be paid Rs. 5. 000 each as advance and balance amount was to be paid after release of the purchase order. A-I had contacted PW-I over telephone at about 12. 00 noon on 30. 12. 1991 and asked him to keep the demanded amount ready so that he would come along with A-2 and collect the same around 8. 30 p. m. on that day at Basant Lodge, Visakhapatnam. Thereafter, PW-I lodged a complaint with the Superintendent of Police, C. B. l. Visakhapatnam on 30. 12. 1991 about the demand of bribe by the accused and on the basis of his complaint, - "+ investigation was taken up by registering a case i. e. R. C. No. l9(A)/9 I. Both the accused were caught red handed at about 10. 15 p. m. on 30. 12. 1991 in Room No. 208 of Basant Lodge, Visakhapatnam soon after they demanded and accepted bribe amount of Rs. 5,000 each from PW-I as a motive or reward for clearing the tender file in favour of Mis. Ramesh Chandra & Co.

The tainted currency notes amounting to Rs. 10,000 were recovered immediately from the polythene carry bag which was available with A-1. Both the accused abused their official position as public servants and after obtaining sanction under Section 19(1)(c) of the Act, from the Chairman, Visakhapatnam Port Trust a charge sheet was filed under Section I20B lPC \ and Sections 7 and 13 (l)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act. The accused ) denied their guilt. The prosecution in support of its case examined 32 witnesses while the accused·to substantiate their plea of innocence examined 5 witnesses. PW-2 who was takeri as witness to prove the acceptance and recovery of the money from PW-I resiled partially from the statement given during investigation. Placing reliance on the evidence of PW-I, PW-3 and PW-5, the Trial Court held that there was cogent and credible evidence to show not only demand, acceptance but also recovery ofthe money.

PW-3 was at the relevant I > time working as Preventive Officer, Customs and worked as the mediator. PW-5 was the investigating officer who received the complaint, and monitored the trap operation. In appeal, before the High Court the stand taken by the accused persons was that there was no cogent evidence regarding demand. PW-I complainant was not reliable. The so-called complaint before the CBI is dated ::0. 12. 1991. Specific stand of the rrosecution was that the complaint was made on 30. 12. 1991 as per Exts. P-3 and P-3A. PW-2 who was one of the mediators did not support the prosecution version completely. It was not possible to accept that high ranked officers would take and accept money in the presence of an unknown party. There is no consistent evidence as regards the first and the subseque'lt demands. Since A-1 was not competent to finalise 670 SUPREME COURT ! ff! •OR I~ j200~1 :; S. C. R. rhe tenders, it was not possible that he 11uuld demand money.

Further the evidence on record clearly establishes that by the time of alleged demand files had been cleared by A-1 and. therc1ure. it is not believable that the demand was made. PW-I in the guise of ;1rra11ging a dinner took revenge on the accused persons for seeking legal advice before acceptance of the tender. With these observations, the High Court set :i;id n is satisfied. The only rnnditiun tor drawing such a legal presumption ulidcr Section :! O is that during trial it "hould be proved that the accused has acccpkd or agreed to accept any gratitication. The Section docs not say that th~ said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through which fact can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the E~ idence Act. (See M. Narsinga Rau v. State of A. P.. [200! ) 1 SCC 691).

Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having e. xi. sted. The standard rc<. juired for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher Moulton l. J. in Hawkins v. Powl!! ls Tille1:rStea111 Cua/ Cu. Ltd. , (1911 (1) KB 988) observed as follows: ''Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration. because that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion". The said observation has stood the test of time and can now be followed as the standard of proof. In reaching the conclusion the Court can use the process of inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved. Such inferences are akin to presumptions in law. Law gives absolute discretion to the Court tu presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened.

In that process the Court may have regard to con1111on course of natural events, human conduct, public or private business vis-a-vis the facts of the particular case. The discretion is clearly envisaged in Section 114 of the Evidence Act. ·~ Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn from other proved facts. While inferring the existence of a fact from another, the Court is only applying a process of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final conclusion to be drawn from other facts. But it could as well be final if it remains undisturbed later. Presumption in law of evidence is a ruk indicating the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the Court can draw an inference and that would remain until such inference is either disproved or dispdled. For the purpose of rcachin~ one condusiun the Cou11 can rel) un h1ctual pre,umptiun. Unk;·; ti:. : prc·,u1Pp! i.

i11 i,; Ji,r1'"~'1 nr dispdk'll "r .... rebutted the Court can treat the presumption as tanta111ounting r. o proof. However, as a caution of prudence we have to observe that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet another discretionary presumption unless there is a starutory compulsion. This Court has indicated so in Suresh Budharm(J/ Kalani v. State ofMaharashtra, [1998] 7 SCC 337: "A presumption can be drawn only from facts a. nd not from other presumptions by a process of probable and logical reasoning". Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act says that the Court may presume that "a man who is in the possession of stolen goods soon after ~ · the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession". That illustration can profitably be used in the present context as well when prosecution brought reliable materials that there was recovery of money from the accused.

In fact the receipt and recovery is accepted. The other factor is the acceptability of the plea of loan, which the High Court itself has not held cogent or credible. We may note that a three-Judge Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Punjab, [1974] 4 SCC 560 held that the very fact that the accused was in possession of the marked currency notes against an allegation that he demanded and received the amount is "res ipsa loquitur". In Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn. ), [1980] 2 SCC 390) it was observed that there is no requirement to prove passing of money by direct evidence. It may also be proved by circumstantial evidence. In Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, [2000] 8 SCC 571 it was observed thus: "The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification.

Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawi1 is that the said gratification was accepted "as motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any offic! al act. So the word "gratification'' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. Th is will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like "gratification or any valuable thing". If acceptance ofany valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word "gratification" must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it". STATE OF ANDI IRA PRADESH''· C. UMA MAHES\VARA RAO [PASAYAT.. 1.

J675 ·fn Black's Law Dictionary, "gratification" is defined as "a recompense or reward for services or benefits. given voluntarily, without solicitation or promise". But in Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary of Current English the said word is given the meaning "to give pleasure or satisfaction to". Among the above two descriptions for the word "gratification" with slightly differing nuances as between the two, what is more appropriate for the context has to be found out. The context in which the word is used in Section 4( I) of the Act is, hence, important. In Mohmoodkhan Mahboobkhan Pathan v. State ofMaharashtra, (1997] JO SCC 600 this Court has taken the same meaning for the word "gratification" appearing in Section 4( I) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the old Act'). We quote the following observations: "7.

The primary condition for acting on the legal presumption under Section 4(I) of the Act is that the prosecution should have proved that what the accused received was gratification. The word 'gratification' is not defined in the Act. Hence, it must be understood in its literal meaning. In the Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary of Current English, the word 'gratification' is shown to have the meaning 'to give pleasure or satisfaction to'. The word 'gratification' is used in Section 4(1) to denote acceptance of something to the pleasure or satisfaction of the recipient. " The provisions of Section 4(1) of the old Act and Section 20(1) of the Act are almost identically worded. What is the concept of gratification has been succinctly stated by this Court in The State of Assam v. Krishna Rao, (1973] 3 SCC 227, through p illuminating words, after quoting Section 4 of the Act. "22. ·/n State ofMadras v. A.

Vaidiaratha Iyer, (1958] SCR 580 after reproducing the relevant provisions ofSection 4 of the Act this Court observed that where it is proved that a gratification has been accepted the presumption under Section 4 of the Act shall at once arise. It is a presumption of law and it is obligatory on the Court to raise it in every case brought under Section 4. In the reported case this Court allowed the appeal of the State of Madras and setting a~ide the impugned order of acquittal passed by the High Court restored that of the Special Judge convicting the respondent there. In C. /. Emden v. The State of U. P.. AIR (1960) SC 548 the appellant who was 676 Slll'RLME COllR I Rl·:J'OR IS j201l4j 3 S. C. R. working as a local foreman, was found to have accepted a sum of Rs. 375 from a railway contractor. The appellant's explanation was that he had borrowed the amount as he was in need of money for meeting the expenses ofthe clothing of his children who were studying in school.

The Speci~I Judge accepted the evidence of the contractor and held that the money had been taken as a bribe, that the defence story was improbable and untrue, that the presumption under Section 4 of the Act had to be raised and that the presumption had not been rebutted by the appellant and accordingly convicted him under Section 161 IPC and Section 5 of the Act. On appeal the High Court held that on the facts of that case the statutory pre·mmption under Section 4 had to be raised, that the explanation offered by the appellant was improbable and palpably unreasonable and that the presumption had not been rebutted, and upheld the conviction.

The appellant contended, on appeal in this Court, inter alia: (i) that the presumption under Section 4 could not be raised merely on proof of acceptance of money but it had further to be proved that thE money was accepted as a bribe, (ii) that even if the presumption arose it was rebutted when the appellant offered a reasonably rrobable explanation. This Cou11, dealing with the presumption under Section 4, observed that such presumption arose when it was 5hown that the accused had received the stated amount and that the said amount was not legal remuneration. The word 'gratification' in Section 4( 1) was to be given its literal dictionary meaning of satisfaction or appetite or desire; it could not be construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe. The High Court was justified in raising the presumption against the appellant as it was admitted that he had received the money from the contractor and the amount received was other than legal remuneration.

On the facts the explanation given by the accused. in agreement with the opinion of the High Court was held to be wholly unsatisfactory and unreasonable. In Dhanvantrai. v. Stale of Maharashtra, AIR (1964) SC 575 it was observed that in order to raise the presumption under Section 4( I) of the Act what the prosecution has lo prove is that the accused person has received 'gratification other than legal remuneration' and when it is shown that he has received a certain sum of money which was not a legal remuneration, then, the condition prescribed by this s1~ction is satisfieu and the presumption thereunder must be raised. In Jhangan v. State ofU. f'. ll968] 3 SCR 766 the above decisions were approved and it is observed that mere receipt of money is sufficient to raise the STATE or ANDIIRA l'RADESll 1· c llMA MAllESWARA RAO [PASAYAT. . 1. 1677 presumption under Section 4( I) of the Act. '' In C. /. Emden v. Slate of U1tar Pradesh, AIR (1960) SC 548 and V. D. Jhangan v.

State of Uuar Pradesh, [1966] 3 SCR 736 it was observed that if any money is received and no convincing, credible and acceptable explanation is offered by the accused as to how it came to be received by him, the presumption under Section 4 of the old Act is available. When the receipt is admitted it is for the accused to prove as to how the presumption is not available as perforce the presumption arises and becomes operative. These aspects were highlighted recently in State ofAndhra Pradesh v. V. Vasudev Rao, JT (2003) 9 SC 119. The evidence of PW-1 cannot be ignored on the ground that he had earlier made grievances against some other officials. The Trial Court had carefully analysed his evidence and found the same to be credible. Even if PW-2 did not support the prosecution version en some aspects yet his evidence also proves giving of money. The evidence of PW- I coupled with those of PWs 3 and 5 is sufficient to bring home the accusations.

Further, the High Court seems to have made out a new case about the alleged date of complaint. A bare reading of the contents of the complaint and the date put in the complaint as evident from Exts. P-3 and P-3A clearly show that the High Court was not correct in saying that the date of the document is 20. 12. 1991. Additionally. this plea was not raised before the Trial Court. There was even no suggestion about that aspect. Learned counsel for A-1 and A-2 submitted that suggestions were there, which is not so. What was suggested was the documents were not prepared at the time they were claimed to be. There is a guIf of difference between "time" and "date". In any event such a plea has not been taken before the courts below. It being essentially a question of fact, the High Court could not have made out a n~w case regarding correctness of the date. As noted above, the views of the High Court were also not correct when the document is itself looked at.

Much stress was laid on the accused persons not being the final authority in the tender matter. As noted in Chaturdm Bhagwandas Patel v. The State of Gujarat, [1976] 3 SCC 46 the question whether a person has authority to do the act for which bribe is accepted is of no consequence. Keeping in view the legal principles as can be culled out from decisions referred to above, applying the fact situation to them the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in directing acquittal. Not only the correct legal position was not kept in view but the analysis of the factual A position is also found to be erroneous. That being so, the judgment of the High Court is set aside. Custodial sentence of one year for each of the proved offence would meet the ends of justice, with the fine and default stipulation stipulated by the Trial Court. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated.

The accused persons B are directed to surrender to custody to serve remainder of sentence, if any. B. S. Appeals allowed. ••