STATE OF KARNATAKA v. RAJU

Citation: [2007] 9 S.C.R. 970

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT, P.P. NAOLEKAR

Case summary

STATE OF KARNATAKA v. RAJU.pdf

Judgment text

STATEOFKARNATAKA v. RAJU SEPTEMBER 14,2007 fDR. ARIJITPASAYAT ANDP. P. NAOLEKAR,JJ. ) Penal Code, 1860; Section 376: Rape ofa minor below 12 years ofage:_Trial Court found the accused guilty of offence punishable u/s. 376 and imposing sentence of 7 years- Sentence reduced to 3~ years by High Court-On appeal, Held: Measure of punishment in a case ofrape must depend upon conduct ofthe accused,. state and age ofthe victim and gravity ofcriminal. act-Crime ofviolence upon women need to be severally dealt with-In a case of rape, s.

376(2) shows the legislative mandate in imposing a sentence, which could be extended to life imprisonment, thus, reflects the intent oJ stringency in sentence-In operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the cqrrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix-In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the provisions of law, reduction of the sentence by the High Court without assigning any special and adequate reasons, is unsustainable and, thus, set aside and sentence as imposed by the trial Court restored-Sentencing. Proportion between crime and punishment-Discussed in the context of ser. tencing. ,... Proviso-Construction of-Discussed in the context of sentencing u/s. 376 /PC. A girl, aged less than 12 years, was allegedly sexually ravished by the accused-respondent. First Information Report was lodged and police investigated the matter. On completion ofinvestigation, charge-sheet was filed by the Police.

The trial comi convicted the accused under Section 376 IPC. An appeal was preferred by the accused before the High Court. The same was disposed of by the High Court maintaining the conviction but sentence was reduced to 3Yz years. Hence the present appeal. H. 970 STATE v. RAJU 971 Appellant contended that in a heinous crime like rape, the High Court was not justified in reducing the sentence by referring to certain circumstances which are not only irrelevant but also cannot constitute special reasons warranting reduction in sentence. Amicus Curiae submitted that though the offence of rape is a heinous crime but while sentencing an accused the same should be tempered with mercy.

Though such a plea was not taken before the trial court, High Court indicated some reasons which may not be sufficient to justify the reduction in the sentence per se, yet as it exercised judicial discretion, there is no need for interference; and that both the Courts below have noted that the victim was aged about 10 years, and in such a case, stringent punishment is provided for in terms ofS~tion 376(2)(1) IPC. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:l. 1. In sub-section (2) of Section 376 l. P. C. more stringent punishment can be awarded taking into account the special features indicated in the said sub-section. The present case is covered by Section 376(2)(1) IPC i. e. when rape is committed on a woman when she is under 12 years ofage. Admittedly, in the case at hand the victim was 10 years of agr at the time of commission ofoffence. (Para 7) (975-CJ 1. 2. It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be consi ara 8) (975-F, GJ 2. 3.

The legislative mandate to impose a sentence, for the offence of rape on a girl under 12 years of age, for a term which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to life and also to fine reflects the intent of stringency in sentence. (Para 9) (975-G; 976-A) 2. 4. In operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and temp_ered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was pfanned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct ofthe accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area ofconsideration. (Para l lj (976-F, GI Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State ofTamil Nadu, (1991) 3 SCC 471, reli~d on. Law in Changing Society by Friedman, referred to. 2. 5.

Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite oferrant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination ofsentences. (Para 141 (977-D, E) 2. 6. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances C? f each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarde~ for an offence, the aggravati_ng and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. (Para 15) (977-G, HJ ' . Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State ofCal/ifornia, 402 US_J83: 28 L. D. , relied on. 2. 7. In the absence ofany foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts ofeach case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitabl~ distinguished.

[Para 15) (978-A, BJ Shailesh Jasvantbhai and Anr. v. State ofGujarat and Ors. , (2006) 2 sec 359, relied on. 3. Considering the legal position and in the absence ofany reason which could have been treated as "special and adequate reason" reduction of sentence as done by the High Court is clearly unsustainable. The trial court should have imposed sentence of 10 years in terms of Section 376(2)(f) IPC. However, since the State has not questioned the sentence as imposed, the sentence as imposed by the trial court is restored. [Para 17) [978-C, DJ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 782 of 2001. From the Judgment and Order dated 11. 02. 2000 of the High Court of Kamataka in Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 1995. Sanjay R. Hegde for the Appellant. Ashok Bhan and S. Wasim A. Qadri for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. l.

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court reducing the custodial sentc. nce of respondent to 31/2 years instead of seven years as was imposed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Gulbarga, in SC No. 61/1993, after convicting the respondent for an offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The victim (PWl) was aged less than 12 years when she was sexually ravished by the respondent en 31. 1. 1993 at about 12. 30 p. m. 2. On the basis of First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') lodged at the police station law was set into motion. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed and accused faced trial and he pleaded innocence. - Prosecution placed reliance on the evidence of victim and the medical evidence. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 376 IPC. An appeal was preferred before the High Court.

The same was disposed of by the High Court maintaining the conviction but sentence was reduced to 31/2 years, since the High Court felt that in view of certain special reasons the custodial sentence was to be reduced to 31/2 years. 3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the State submitted that in a heinous crime like rape the High Court was not justified in reducing the sentence by referring to certain circumstances which are not only irrelevant but also cannot constitute special reasons· warranting reduction in sentence. Since the accused was not represented in this appeal in spite of service of notice, Mr. Ashok Bhan, appeared as Amicus Curiae at our request. ' 4. According to learned Amicus Curiae, though the offence of rape is a heinous crime but while sentencing an accused the same should be tempered. with mercy.

Though such a plea was not taken before the trial court, High Court indicated some reasons which may not be sufficient to justify the reduction per se, yet as it exercised judicial discretion, there is no need for interference. It has to be noted that the victim was less then 12 years of age at the time of occurrence. In fact both the trial C The courts are obliged to respect the legislative mandate in the matter of awarding of sentence in all such cases. Recourse to the proviso can be had only for "special and adequate reasons" and not in a casual manner. Whether there exist any "special and adequate reasons" would depend upon a variety of factors and the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in that behalf of universal application. l0. These aspects were highlighted in Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan, (2006] 3 SCC 771. 11. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands.

Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality ofcriminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine ~. · offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis ofreally relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v.. State ofCallifornia, (402 US 183: 28 L. D. 2d 711) that no fonnula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in detennining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime.

In the absence ofany foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances gennane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. ~\ 16. These aspects were highlighted in Shailesh Jasvantbhai and Anr. V. State ofGujarat and Ors. , [2006] 2 sec 359. . 17. Considering the legal position and in the absence of any reason. which could have been treated as "special and adequate reason" reduction of sentence as done by the High Court is clearly unsustainable. The trial court should have imposed sentence of I 0 years in tenns of Section 376(2(t) IPC. But State has not questioned the sentence as imposed, the sentence as imposed by the trial court is restored. The High Court's order reducing the sentence is set aside. ~ 18. The appeal is allowed. S. K. S. Appeal allowed. ·< ;J..