STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. SESHACHALAM

Citation: [2007] 10 S.C.R. 53

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, H.S. BEDI

Case summary

STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. SESHACHALAM.pdf

Judgment text

STATE OF TAMIL NADU r v. SESHACHALAM SEPTEMBER 18, 2007 [S. B. SINHA AND H. S. BEDI, JJ. ) Service Law: Stepping up ofpay-Secretariat ofTamil Nadu Government- Employees recruited through a common selection test under "One Unit" Scheme-Later, Departments ofFinance and Law separated from the level ofSuperintendent (Section Officer)-Resulting in few employees in these two departments gettingpromotion to higherposts earlier than their seniors in other Departments recruitedthrough "One Unit" Scheme-GovernmentissuingG. O. Ms. No. 126dated25. 9. 1998 stepping up pay ofaffected existing employees as one time measure- ~4 0. A. filed by retired employees rejected by Tribunal, inter alia, on ground oflong delay-HELD: the Government under G. 0. Ms. dated 25. 9.

1998 laid down a policy for providing financial benefits to existing employees with prospective effect as a one time measure- No arrears ofpay waspaid-Variouspros and cons were examined- Besides, delay or /aches is a relevant factor for a court oflaw to determine the question as to whether claim made by applicant deserves consideration-Article 14 in such a situation would not be attracted only because a cut offdate has been fixed-The same per se cannot be said to be arbitrary-Constitution ofIndia-Article 14-Delay/ Laches-Natural justice-Legitimate expectation. In the State of Tamil Nadu, different Departments of its Secretariat were made "one unit" in the year 1961 for the purpose ofappointment and promotion. However, later, byG. O. Ms. No. 1290 dated 5. 6. 1970 the Finance and Law Departments were excluded from "one unit" system in that though the posts in the cadre of Assistant, Assistant Section Officer.

Typists/Personal Clerks in these two Departments continued to be filled up from the common t--· list ofcandidates, further promotions were effected from amongst -( the employees allotted thereto. GOMs No. 3288 (Public Service Department) was issued on 29. 10. 1971 specifying Finance and Law Departments as separate units from the level of Superintendent (Section Officer). Two employees filed application before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in 1990 claiming promotion and scale ofpay at parwith those who were working in the Finance Department and were juniors to them but were promoted to higher posts in Finance Department. The application was allowed and pursuant to the 1 directions ofthe Tribunal, the Government amended the relevant service rules and issued GOMs. No. 126 dated 25. 9. 1998 providing, inter alia, that pay of seniors in "one unit" recruited on or before 28. 1.

1994 would be stepped up on par with their juniors in Finance Department by upgradation ofscale accordingly and this stepping up would be purely a person-oriented upgradation and would not entitle the employee to any daim for arrears of pay. The respondents, who had retired much prior to issuance of the G. O. dated 29. 5. 1998 filed applications before the Tribunal claiming fixation oftheir pay at par with their juniors in Finance Department. Their applications were dismissed by the Tribunal holding, inter alia, that they should have raised the dispute long back when their juniors had been given promotions and as the . ipplications were filed after 20 years, the same could not be entertained. However, the High Court having allowed the writ petitions ofthe respondents, the State Government filed the instant appeals. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. 1. The employees of the Finance and Law Departments were being treated differently for a long time.

The respondents never questioned the purported different treatment meted out to them by the State either by making representations or by filing any application before the State Administrative Tribunal. However, pursuant to the observations made by the Tribunal in an O. A. in its order dated 16. 4. 1993, the State amended the Rules with retrospective effect. The said Rule is still i~ force. Validity of the said Rule has not been questioned by the respondents. Different treatments meted out to the employees of the Finance and Law / - -~ STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM 55 Department vis-a-vis other departments is now covered by Rules, but despite the same, the State intended to assuage the feelings of the employees by issuance of GOMs No. 126 dated 29. 5. 1998. [Para 9] (64-A-D] 1. 2. Interpretation of GOMs No. 126 dated 25. 5.

1998 would depend upon the backdrop ofthe events in which it was made but it is trite that the intention of the maker ofthe policy must be drawn from the language used therein. For this purpose the document should be read in its entirety. The said notification was issued upon considering various factors including pendency ofa large number ofmatters before the Administrative Tribunal on the issue. The State intended to lay down a policy for providing financial benefits with prospective effect. No arrears of pay was to be paid. The upgradation sanctioned was to lapse in the event of retirement of the individuals or their promotion to the upgraded post. The said upgradation were to be subject to the terms and conditions contained in clause 12 ofthe said G. O. , a readingwhereofwouM clearly lead to only one conclusion that it was meant to be applied to the existing employees.

By reason thereof, on upgradation, the seniors were required to continue to perform the duties attached to the existing post till they get their normal promotion to the next higher category. Itwas meant to be a one time affair. Various pros and cons therefor were examined. Avenues available to the Staff were taken into consideration. [Paras 9and14] (64-D-E; 68-D-H; 69-A] 1 Bannari Ammar. Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Qfjicer & Ors. , (2005] 1 SCC 625, and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector andE. Tl 0. andOrs. , [2007] 5 SCC 447, relied on. 1. 3. It would, therefore, be incorrect to construe that the notifications applied to all who had been recruited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service on or before 28. 1. 1994. Additional benefits have been accorded by reason ofthe said notification. A person who fulfills the conditions, thus, would be entitled to the benefits provided for therein.

Those who had not fulfilled the same could not claim any benefit thereunder. For the said purpose, the Court should not give a strained or extended meaning thereto. While construing such a notification, the financial impact thereofis also required to be taken into consideration. [Para 15) [69-B-C] State ofA. P. & Anr. v. A. P. Pensioners' Association & Ors. , [2005) 13 SCC 161 and Union ofIndia & Anr. v. ManikLal Banerjee, [2006] 9 sec, relied on. R. L. Marwaha v. Union ofIndia & Ors. , [1987] 4 SCC 31 and State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] 3 SCR 284, held inapplicable. 2. Assuming that the cause ofaction for filing the applications by the respondents arose in view of the observations made by the Tribunal in its order dated 16. 4. 1993, but then in terms ofthe Act and the Rules, the respondents were required to file a proper application within a period of one year only. Opinion of the High Court that GOMs No. 126 dated 29. 5.

1998 gave a fresh lease of life having regard to the legitimate expectation is based on a wrong premise. Delay or late. hes is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or latches on the part of a Government servant may deprive him ofthe benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 ofthe Constitution oflndia would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour ofthose who are alert and vigilant. [Paras 10and11] (65-C-F] 3. Legitimate expectation is a part ofthe principles of natural p justice. However, no fresh right can be created by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. By reason thereof only the existing right is saved subject, of course, to the provisions of the statute. (Para 11) [65-F-G] State ofHimachal Pradesh andAnr. v. Kailash ChandMahajan and Ors. , [1992] 2 SCC 351; Government ofWest Bengal v. Tarun K Roy a~Ors.

, [2004) 1 SCC347; Chariman, UP. JalNigamandAnr. v. Jaswant ~, Singh andAnr. , (2006) 12 SCALE 347 and New DelhiMunicipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. , (2007) 4 SCALE 204, relied on. 4. Only because a cut offdate has been fixed, the same per se cannot be said to be arbitrary as some date is required to be fixed for that purpose. As to what, therefore, is necessary for this purpose is that classification must be rational and in order to pass the test: (1) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and (2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. (Paras 12 and 18) (66-E-F; 70-F) K. S. Krishnaswamy etc. v. Union ofIndia and Anr. , (2006) 12 SCALE 307, relied on. The State ofJammu and Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors. , [1974] 1SCC19 and UP. RaghavendraAcharya andOrs. v. State ofKarnataka and Ors. , (2006) 6 SCALE 23, held inapplicable. CIVIL APPELLATE ruRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1938 of 2007.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21. 04. 2006 ofthe High Court ofJudicature at Madras in Writ Petition No. 7971 of2004. D· WITH --1. C. A. Nos. 1940, 1941, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1947,1949, 1950, 1952, 1954, 1955, 1957, 1958, 1960of2007. M. S. Ganesh, V. G. Pragasam, S. Joseph Aristotle and S. Prabu Ramasubramanian for the Appellant. Dr. A. E. Chelliah, R. Venkatramani, Vasanthakumari Chelliah, K. Rarllanujam, A Annapurai, Dinesh Kumar Garg, R. Anand Padmanabhan, Pramod Dayal, S. Lesi and Namachivayam (for P. Narasimhan) for Respondent. Caveator-In-Person. The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. 1. These appeals involving identical questions of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed ofQy this cornmonjudgment. 2. Respondents herein have been working in the Secretariat ofthe Government ofTamil Nadu. Each and every department in the Government Secretariat prior to 1961 had a separate unit for appointment, promotion etc.

The State, however, amended the Special Rules in the year 1961 whereby all the departments in the Secretariat were made the ''one unit'' for the purpose of appointment and promotion. Appointments in the Secretariat at all entry level posts, i. e. , Junior Assistants (subsequently redesignated as Assistants), Assistants (subsequently re-designated as Assistant Section Officers), Typist/Personal Clerks were to be made from the common list ofcandidates selected by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission. Promotion to different higher posts in different departments was also being made from amongst those employees. The Government ofTamil Nadu, however, by issuing G. 0. Ms. No. 1290 dated 05. 06. 1970 excluded the Finance and Law Departments from the "one unit" system.

Whereas posts in the cadre of Assistants, Assistant Section Officers, Typists/Personal Clerks continued to be filled up from the common list of candidates, but in Finance and Law Departments, further promotions were effected from amongst the employees allotted thereto only. Appointments to Finance Department, however, were made at random and probably in terms ofthe option exercised by any particular candidate. Many persons, who have, thus, been ranking higher were employed in "one unit" >--. departments whereas some of the candidates ranking lower were employed under fortuitous circumstances in the Finance Department. The employees working in the Finance Department, therefore, obtained promotions much ahead of their peers or even seniors who were discharging their duties in other departments coming within the "one unit". 3. G. 0. Ms. No. 3288 (Public Services Department) was thereafter issued on 29. 10. 1971 specifying Finance and Law Departments as I;' ..

_ separate units from the level ofSuperintendent (Section Officer) and above. Admittedly, however, Rule 4 of the Special Rules of the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service was amended in that behalf The said policy, however, is said to have been implemented. Two employees, S. Kalaiselvan and S. Sivasubramanian, filed an Original Application before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in the year 1990 claiming promotion and scale of pay at par with those who were working in the Finance Department and who were said to be juniors to them but had been promoted to higher posts in Finance Deparnnent. The said Original Application was allowed by the Tribunal by an order dated 16. 4. 1993 opining that there existed no guidelines to allot any employee to the Finance Department, vis-a-vis, , I - -~ STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,]. ] 59 other departments and, thus, the employees working in other departments could not have been deprived ofthe benefit ofpromotion.

It was furthermore pointed out that even Rule 4 ofthe Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service had not been amended by the said GOMs No. 1290 dated 05. 06. 1970. 4. The Government of Tamil Nadu thereafter amended the Service Rules with retrospective effect from 05. 06. 1970 by issuing G. O. Ms. No. 30 Personnel and Administrative Reforms (D) Department dated 28. 1. 1994. Upon issuance ofthe said Government Order, an application for review was filed but the same was dismissed by the Tribunal by an order dated 30. 1. 1995. The Government was thereafter advised to implement the order of the Tribunal by giving promotion to the concerned employees with retrospective effect from the date on which theirjuniors had been promoted as Assistant Section Officers in the Finance Department. Sanction was also accorded for creation oftwo supernumerary posts, namely, posts ofAssistant Section Officers in the respective departments.

Several representations thereafter were made by persons said to be similarly situated claiming promotion and parity in the scale of pay as compared to their counterparts in the Finance Department. A large number ofOriginal Applications were also filed before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. Upon consideration ofvarious pros and cons, the Government ofTamil Nadu issued a GOM bearing No. 126 dated 29. 5. 1998, relevant paragraphs whereofread as under : ~ "10. The Government accordingly direct that:- (i) the pay ofthe seniors in One Unit who have been recruited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service on or before 28. 1. 1994, shall be stepped up on par with their juniors in the Finance unit by upgrading the posts held by them to the Scale ofpay applicable to the juniors with immediate effect.

(ii) The stepping up oftheir pay on par with the juniors in the Finance Unit by upgrading the posts held by them to the scale of pay applicable to the junior ordered in sub-para (1) above is purely a person-oriented upgradation and no new posts will be created for this purpose. (Iii) The upgradation sanctioned for the seniors will lapse in the event ofthe retirement efthe individuals concerned or their promotion to the upgraded post in their normal tum. (iv) The pay ofthe other seniors in the One Unit in the same cadre will be stepped up on par with immediatejuniors in the Finance Unit, with effect from the date ofissue ofthis order.

(v) In respect ofthe Typists/Personal Clerks/Personal Assistants, in One Unit who have not relinquished their right for promotion as Assistant Section Officer, and are still awaiting their tum for promotion as Assistant Section Officer, their pay shall be upgraded to Assistant Section Officer scale on par with their immediate junior in the Finance Unit who got his promotion as Assistant Section Officer. 11. The benefits ofupgradation ofpay ofthe seniors on par with theirjuniors as per Commission's Seniority list ordered in sub-paras (i) to (iv) ofPara 10 above, shall also be ex1ended to those seniors in the Finance Unit who were recruited before 28. 1. 1994 and or drawing less pay than their juniors in One Unit. 12. The upgradation ordered above is subject to the following terms and conditions : (1) The upgradation ordered will involve only stepping up ofpay ofthe senior on par with his junior in the upgraded scale of pay. (2) It does not entitle him to any claim for arrears ofpay.

xxx xxx xxx These orders shall come into force with effect from the date of issue ofthe orders. 13 ... 14. The 'Departments of Secretariat concerned shall issue --"-- necessary orders for upgradation ofposts and for stepping-up r of the pay of the Seniors in One Unit in the upgraded scales ordered in para 10 above, after obtaining necessary individual undertaking in the fonnat enclosed from the seniors concerned to the effect that they accept the tenns and conditions ofthis order. 5. The said Government Order further stipulated that undertaking should be given by the seniors getting upgradation of their pay with their juniors in the Finance Department in the fonnat enclosed to the effect that they accept the tenns and conditions thereto. Respondents before us, save and except R. Ragothaman in CA No. 1955 of2007 indisputably had retired much prior to issuance ofthe said Government Order dated 29. 5. 1998.

They also made representations before the appellant demanding fixation oftheir pay at par with theirjuniors in the Finance Department. As the said request was not acceded to, a large number of original applications were filed before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. By a common judgment pronounced on 20. 1. 2004, the Tribunal dismissed the said applications opining that the same were barred by limitation. It was held that the applicants having retired long back and having filed applications between 1998 to 2003 and the promoters having retired as Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries and in some cases as Additional Secretaries, they should have raised the dispute long back when their juniors had been given promotions in the Finance Department and as the original applications were filed after 20 years, the same could not be entertained. 6.

Aggrieved by the said order ofthe Tribunal, respondents filed writ petitions before the High Court ofJudicature at Madras. By reason ofthe impugned judgment dated 21. 4. 2006, a Division Bench ofthe High Court, inter alia, held that the cause ofaction for filing the original application arose only upon issuance of GOMS No. 126 dated }.. _ 29. 5. 1998 and in that view ofthe matter it cannot be said that the original applications filed by the respondents suffered from delay and latches and/or otherwise barred by limitation as GOMS No. 126 applied also in respect of those who had retired before 29. 5. 1998; It was also ~-- ( opined that the respondents who had not been in service on or before 28. 1. 1994 came within the scope and ambit of the said GOMs.

Although GOMs 126 provided for operation with prospective effect and by reason thereofpast benefits were not made available, the same should be construed in consonance with the provisions contained in Article 14 ofthe Constitution ofIndia, holding : "There is no specific clause in G. O. Ms. No. 126 excluding the applicability ofthis G. O. to the persons who had retired before 29. 5. 1998. The G. O. itselfrecites that the Government wanted to provide a solution to the long standing problem and had decided to take a sympathetic view to effect lasting and equitable solution to the long standing issue so as to redress the grievances ofthe seniors in the One Unit by upgrading the pay ofthe seniors in One Unit on par with their immediate juniors in the Finance Unit. Keeping in view the explicit intention ofthe Government, it is apparent that the G. O. had been issued as a beneficial measure and the provisions in such G. O.

are to be liberally construed so as to benefit the employees for whose benefit the G. O. was avowedly issued. It is not disputed that the petitioners were in service on and before 28. 1. 1994 and therefore, they fall within the scope and ambit of the impugned G. O. Once they are covered under the said G. O. , the benefit ofthe said G. 0. will flow automatically. '' T It was further held that the said Government Order applied not only to the existing staffbut also to the retired employees and as such beneficial interpretation to the said Government Order should be given as the said provisions have to be read in consonance with Article 14 ofthe Constitution oflndia. 7. Mr. M. S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf ~ ofthe appellants, would submit that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment in so far as it failed to take into consideration that : __...

_ \ (i) no explanation was offered by the respondents for not preferring there claim petitions prior to or immediately after the announcement of the order dated 16. 04. 1993; (ii) the High Court committed serious error in interfering with the finding offact arrived at by the Tribunal; (iii) doctrine oflegitimate expectation does not postulate conferment ofany right which has been lost for any reason whatsoever; and (iv) as in terms of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, no employee has any fundamental right ofpromotion, upgradation, allocation ofany particular department or to receive any benefit after superannuation the impugned judgment is unsustainable. 8. Mr. Venkataramani, Dr. A. E. Chelliah, senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondents and caveator-in-person on the other hand contended that : --- -number ofmatters before the Administrative Tribunal on the said issue. The State intended to lay down a policy for providing financial benefits with prospective effect.

Various pros and cons therefor were examined. Avenues available to the State were taken to into consideration. Only thereafter it was directed : "The Government, after careful consideration ofall these points y and also the related issues involved, have decided to take a sympathetic view and attempt a lasting and equitable solution to this long standing issue, so as to redress the grievances ofthe seniors in the One Unit, by upgrading the pay ofthe seniors in One Unit on par with their immediatejuniors in the Finance Unit. " 10. It is one thing to say that the State had come up with a policy decision which is beneficial to all the employees irrespective ofthe fact ~ as to whether they had reached the age of superannuation or not, the only criteria being that they were recruited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service on or before 28. 1.

1994 but it is another thing to say that the claim petitions filed by the responders were based on the success oftheir I --t- colleagues before the Administrative Tribunal in the year 1994. The employees working in the Finance Department had been promoted long back. We have noticed hereinbefore that some of them retired as Additional Secretaries whereas the respondents retired as merely Assistants. Presumably, promotions to the employees of the Finance Department were given systematically over a long period oftime but no such grievance was made nor any application was filed before the appropriate forum. Such grievance, in our opinion, should have been raised or proper application before the Tribunal should have been filed long long back. It was in the aforementioned situation, the Tribunal was ofthe opinion that their applications were barred by limitation.

Assuming that the cause ofaction for filing such applications arose in view ofthe observations made by the Tribunal in its order dated 16. 4. 1993 passed in Original Application No. 166of1990, but then in terms ofthe Act and the Rules, the respondents were required to file a proper application within a period ofone year only. It is borne out from the records that, in fact, 62 such applications were already pending when GOMs No. 126 was issued. 11. Some ofthe respondents might have filed representations but filing ofrepresentations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or latches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or latches on the part of a Government servant may deprive him ofthe benefit which had been given to others.

Article 14 ofthe Constitution oflndia would not, in a situation ofthat nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant. Opinion ofthe High Court that GOMs No. 126 dated 29. 5. 1998 gave a fresh lease of life having regard to the legitimate expectation, in our opinion, is based on a wrong premise. Legitimate expectation is a part ofthe principles ofnatural justice. No fresh right can be created by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. By reason thereof only the existing right is saved subject, ofcourse, to the provisions of the statute. {See State ofHimachal Pradesh & Anr. v. Kai/ash Chand Mahajan & Ors. , [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 351}. 12. We may notice that in Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K Roy & Ors. , [2004] 1 SCC 347, this Court held: "The respondents furthe1more are not even entitled to any relief on the ground ofgross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition.

The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar (supra). The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant ofsome reliefto the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court oflaw. " See also Chairman, UP. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh & Anr.

, (2006) 12 SCALE 347 and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors. , (2007) 4 SCALE 204. Only because a cut offdate has been fixed, the same per se cannot be said to be arbitrary as some date is required to be fixed for that purpose. Recently, this Court in KS. Krishnaswamy etc. v. Union ofIndia & Anr. , (2006) 12 SCALE 307 held: "Nakara ·; case (supra) was a case of revision of pensionary benefits and classification ofpensioners info two groups by drawing a cut off line and granting the revised pensionary benefits to employees retiring on or after the cut- offdate. The criterion made applicable was "being in service and retiring subsequent to the specified date". This Court held t11at for being eligible for liberalised pension scheme, application ofsuch a criterion is violative ofArticle 14 ofthe Constitution, as it was both arbitrary and discriminatory in nature.

It was further held that the employees who retired prior to a specified date, and those who retired thereafter formed one class of pensioners. The attempt to classify them into separate classes/groups for the purpose of pensionary benefits was not founded on any intelligible differentia, which had a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The facts ofNa. ''Xlra 's case (supra) are not available in the facts of the present case. In other J_ words, the facts in Nakara's case are clearly distinguishable. " 13. In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.

, [2005] I SCC 625, a Division Bench of this Court, as regards applicability ofdoctrine ofpromissory estoppel, opined : "In order to invoke the doctrine ofpromissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itselfby the party invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles ofequity must for ever be present in the mind ofthe Court. 20. In Shrijee Sales Coporation and Anr. v.

Union of India, [1997] 3 sec 398 it was observed that once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which can override individual equity the principle would be applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated for operation ofthe promise. Ifthere is a supervening public equity, the Govenunent would be allowed to change its stand and has the power to withdraw from representation made by it which induced persons to take certain steps which may have gone adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such withdrawal. Moreover, the Government is competent to rescind from the promise even ifthere is no manifest public interest involved, provided no one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be rectified. Similar view was expressed in Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd Meerut etc. etc. v. P. P. State Electricity Board and Ors. , AIR (1997) SC 3810 and in Sales Tax officer and Anr. v. Shree Durga Oil Mills and Anr.

, [1998] 1 SCC 573 and it was further held that the Government could change its industrial policy if·the situation so warranted and merely because the resolution was announced for a particular period, it did not mean --L that the government could not amend and change the policy under any circumstances. Ifthe party claiming application ofthe doctrine acted on the basis ofa notification it should have known that such notifica#on was liable to be amended or rescinded at any point of time, ifthe government felt that it was necessary to do so in public interest. '' {See also Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector and E. T. IO. and Ors. , [2007] 5 SCC 447]. 14. Interpretation ofGOMS No. 126 would, no doubt, depend upon the backdrop ofthe events in which it was made but it is trite that the intention ofthe maker ofthe policy must be drawn from the language used therein. For the said purpose, the entire document should be read in its entirety.

Original Application No. 166of1990 was filed by two serving employees. The State could in obedience to the Tribunal's order create two supplementary posts and promote them thereto so as to treat them at par with their juniors working in the Finance Department. The Notification envisages a personal pay by way of stepping up ofpay. It was given the prospective effect. No arrear of pay was to be paid. The upgradation sanctioned was to lapse in the event of retirement of the individuals or their promotion to the upgraded post. The said upgradation were to be subject to the terms and conditions contained in clause 12 of· the said order, a reading whereof would clearly, in our opinion, lead to only one conclusion that it was meant to be applied to the existing employees. By reason thereof, on upgradation, the seniors were required to continue to perform the duties attached to the existing post till they get their normal promotion to the next higher category.

Upgradation oftheir ,/ -f ( posts was further dependant on the fact as to whether they had been promoted in their normal course only. It was meant to be a one time affair. In respect ofsome categories ofemployees, the question ofupgradation was deferred as specified in paragraph 12(6). 15. It would, in our opinion, therefore, be incorrect to construe that the notification applied to all who had been recmited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service on or before 28. 1. 1994. Additional benefits have been accorded by reason of the said notification. A person who fulfills the conditions, thus, would be entitled to the benefits provided for therein. Those who had not fulfilled the same could not claim any benefit thereunder. For the said purpose, the Court, in our view, should not give a strained or extended meaning thereto. While construing such a notification, the financial impact thereof is also required to be taken into consideration. {See State ofA. P. & Anr. v. A. P.

Pensioners''Association & Ors. , (2005] 13 SCC 161 and Union ofIndia & Anr. v. Manik Lal Banerjee, [2006] 9 SCC 643}. 16. Reliance placed by the learned counsel on R. L. Marwaha v. Union ofIndia & Ors. , [1987] 4 SCC 31 is misplaced. This Court in the said decision was considering validity ofa subordinate legislation whereby retrospective effect was granted. It was not a case where pensionary benefit was granted to a class ofemployees. The benefit was meant to be accorded to the existing employees only. 17. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Venkataramani on the following passage of The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] 3 SCR284: "The learned Attorney-General, appearing in support of these ·appeals, however, contends that while a reasonable classification of the kind mentioned above may be a test of the validity of particular piece of legislation, it may not be the only test which will cover all cases and that there may be other tests also.

In answer to the query ofthe Court he formulates an alternative test in the following words :Ifthere is in fact inequality oftreatment and such inequality is not made with a special intention ofprejudicing any particular person or persons but is made in the general interest of ' t-'I administration, there is no infringement ofarticle 14. It is at once obvious that, according to the test thus formulated, the validity of State action, legislative or executive, is made entirely dependent on the state ofmind ofthe authority. This test will permit even flagrantly discriminatory State action on the specious plea ofgood faith and ofthe subjective view ofthe executive authority as to the existence ofa supposed general interest ofadministration. This test, ifaccepted, will amount to adding at the end ofarticle 14 the words "except in good faith and in the general interest ofadministration. " This is clearly not permissible for the Court to do.

Further, it is obvious that the addition ofthese words will, in the language of Brewer, J. , in Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. W H Ellis, (165 U. S. 150), make the protecting clause a mere rope ofsand, in no manner restraining State action. I am not, therefore, prepared to accept the proposition propounded by the learned Attorney-General, unsupported as it is by any judicial decision, as a sound test for determining the validity ofState action. " This Court therein was dealing with the provisions ofthe West Bengal Special Courts Act. The said decision, in our opinion, has no application with the facts and circumstances ofthis case, particularly, when in the said decision itself, it has been pointed out that Article 14 does not insist that every piece oflegislation must have universal application and it does not take away from the State the power to classify person for the purpose of legislation. 18.

As to what, therefore, is necessary for this purpose is that classification must be rational and in order to pass the test : (1) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and (2) the di:fferentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. 19. Equally misplaced is the decision of this Court in The State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors. , [1974] 1 SCC 19, wherein this Court, inter alia, held that educational qualification can be held to be a criteria for valid classification for different scales of pay. Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, held: ) ___,_ >- "The social meaning ofArticles 14 to 16 is neither dull uniformity nor specious 'talentism'. It is a process ofproducing quality out oflarger areas ofequality extending better facilities to the latent capabilities ofthe lowly.

It is not a methodology ofsubstitution of pervasive and slovenly mediocrity for activist and intelligent-but not sn0bbish and uncommitted-cadres. However, if the State uses classification casuistically for salvaging status and elitism, the point of no return is reached for Articles 14 to 16 and the Courts jurisdiction awakens to dadden such manoeuvres. The soul of Article 16 is the promotion of the common man's capabilities, over-powering environmental adversities and opening up full opportunities to develop in official life without succumbing to the sophistic argument ofthe elite that talent is the privilege ofthe few and they must rule, wriggling out ofthe democratic imperative of Articles 14 and 16 by the theory ofclassified equality which at its worst degenerates into class domination. " 20. Reference has also been made by Mr. Venkataramani to decision of this Court in UP. Raghavendra Acharya & Ors. v. State ofKarnataka & Ors.

, (2006) 6 SCALE 23 wherein it was held that pension is not a bounty and it is a deferred salary. This Court is not concerned herein with such a situation. In the said decision, this Court was concerned with a case where an employee retiring on a particular date was to receive 50% of the pension on the enhanced salary. In the fact situation obtaining therein that as the revision ofpay and consequent revision in pension had come into force and by reason ofa notification, the modality ofcomputing the pension was required to be determined, those who had fulfilled the conditions laid down therein were held to be entitled to the benefits provided for thereunder holding that the concerned employees had a vested right therein. 21. For the reasons aforementioned, we regret to express our inability . 1.. _ to agree with the view ofthe High Court. The impugned order ofthe High Court is, therefore, set aside. The appeals are allowed.

In the facts and circumstances ofthe case, however, there shall be no orders as to costs. RP. Appeals allowed.