STATE OF UITAR PRADESH & ORS. v. RADHEY SHYAM NIGAM & ORS. ETC. ETC

Citation: [1989] 1 S.C.R. 92

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI, S. RANGANATHAN

Case summary

, (supra) which conclusively held that in a case where Section 5-A was out of the way, publication of both notifications under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 in the same issue of the Gazette is not irregular....

Judgment text

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J: These appeals by special leave arise from the decision of the High Court of Allahabad. These involve common question. It would, however, be appropriate to deal with the ... facts of Civil Appeal No. 1845 of 1986 which is an appeal from the decision of the High Court of Allahabad in Writ Petition Nos. 8145 and 8146 of 1985 decided on 20th November, 1985. The other two Civil Appeals deal with identical questions. In order to appreciate the controversy involved it would be necessary to refer to certain facts of the case. Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act was enacted by the U. P. Legislature in 1973. On or about 11th of September, 1974, Lucknow had been declared to be a development area by notification. On or about 24th of September, 1984 Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 was made effective subsequent to the 24th of September, 1984.

On the 8th of December, 1984 a Notification under section 4(1) and a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme (Gomti Nagar) Phase-II was published. On the 28th December, 1984 Notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of L. D. A. Office/Nagar Maha Palika :-t- Office and other offices on B. N. Road was published. On the 2nd January, 1985 Notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of Dalibagh Housing Scheme was published. On the 4th of February, 1985 Notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of Extension of Kursi Road upto Mahanagar through Vishnupuri was published. On ,. , I . 21st February, 1985 Notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme (Somti Nagar), Ph:ise-III was published.

In respect of the several of these matters on diverse dates several writ petitions had been moved ~ and orders were passed by the High Court staying taking over of possession of the diverse 1ands, if not already taken over. , in case notifications under section 4(1) and section 6 of the Act have 'been passed simultaneously. y As mentioned hereinbefore, W! f- are concerned in these appeals with the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 20th November, 1985 in Writ Petitions Nos. 8145 and 8146 of 1985. The petitioners before the High Court and the respondents herein are owners of plots situated in village Sonera, Tehsil Kichha, District Nainital. Their land was being acquired under the provisions of the Act. A Notification under the said Act was issued on 6th of May, 1985 ~\ declaring that the land in question including the respondents' land was needed for a public purpose, namely, for construction of market yard for the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kichha.

The Notification further contained a declaration that since there was urgency for the acquisi- ..... tion, the provisions of Section 17(1·A) and Section 17(4) of the Act shall apply and the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act shall not \ apply. On the same day, that is to say, on 6th of May, 1985 another Notification was issued by the State Government under Section 6 of ~ the Act making declaration that_the land in dispute was required for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of market yard for the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kichha. That Notification also contained a direction as contemplated by Section 17(1) and (1-A) of the Act authorising the Collector to take possession of the land even before the declaration of the award under Section 11 of the Act. Both the aforesaid notifications were published on the same day, namely, the 22nd of May, 1985. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed two ~ writ petitions challenging the validity of the said notifications.

It was urged on behalf of the respondents before the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad that in view of the amendments introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. STATE OF U. P. v. R. S. NIGAM IMUKHARJI, J. ] 97 .... ;. _ 68 of 1984) the declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act A, could not have been made on the same day on which the notification under section 4 of the Act was published, it submitted that now after the amendment, the Notification under Section 6 of the Act. can only be issued after the Notification under Section 4 was published. The High Court found substance in the said submission. According to the High Court, prior to the amendment of the Act by the Amending Act -"' No.

58 of 1984 it was permissible for the Government to issue Notificalion under Section 4 of the Act and to make declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act simultaneously and it was further permissible to publish both the notification simultaneously as held by -... -1, this Court in Smt Somawanti & Ors. v. State of Punjab, 11963] 2 SCR 775. The High Court noted that normally after the issue of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act objections are invited as contemplated by Section 5-A of the Act and after holding enquiry the Collector ) 1 plain meaning has to be ascertained and the statute has to be read as a whole and in the context and that statutory rules should be harmoniously read with the statute. The basic principle, it was reiterated at page 325 of the report, of construction of every statute was to find out what is clearly stated and not to speculate upon latent imponderables. The scheme of the Act also must be looked into.

In interpreting the statutes it is safer to rely on the obvious meaning rather than to investigate the imponderables. _:.. ,· It is true that the expression "after the date of the publication of the notification" introduced in Section 17(4) can be explained away as making no change from the provisions of law by reading it along with the amendment made in Section 4 whereby in different situation in section 4, the last date of publication of the notice has been deter- \ mined as the date of the publication of the notification and similarly in / · Section 6 a date of the publication of the notice has been provided for. But the words "after the date of the publication of the notification" in sub-section (4) of Section 17 read simpliciter clearly indicate that declaration under Section 6 had to be made after the publication ofthe notification meaning thereby subsequent to the date ofthe publication of the notification.

It appears to us that there is nothing in the scheme of the Act which militates against such a construction. At times where emergency provisions are invoked emergent action may be taken but ·¥ in such a situation in view of the state of law that was before it, the legislature has made a conscious change which cannot be explained away merely because this is as a consequence of the changes in Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on Lord Howard STAIB OF U. P. v. R. S. NIGAM IMUKHARJI, J. ] 107 de Walden v. ! RC, [1948] 2 AER 825 for the proposition that no alteration in meaning by alteration of language can result unless the requirement of the English language demand it or those requirements permit it and the sense of the section demands it. In our opinion, in this case in view of the alteration of the language and meaning and the meaning of the language used and the sense will be in consonance with the interpretation that the change was intended.

Similarly, in Hopes v. Hopes, I1948] 2 AER 920, it was the proposition that changes in the word may be because the draftsman wanted to improve the style. But in this case the style is not improved and the expression 'after the date' as indicated above, becomes otiose. It is job of the Court to interpret the intention of the legislature by the words used. The fairest and the most rational method to interpret the will of the legislature is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made by signs, the most natural and probable, says Blackstone in his 'Commentaries on the Laws of England' {fascimile of 1st edition of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979) Volume, I, p 59. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. The words have to be understood in their usual and most known signification.

If that be so, then the legislature must have had some intention fo chosing the expression 'after' before "date of publication of the notification" in sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act while making amendment by Amending Act No. 68 of 1984. It is true that there were some changes giving the meaning of the date of the publication in Section 4(1) and (2) as well as Section 6(2) of the Act. But for that, there was no need for the use of the expression 'after the date'. If that be the position, then we must accept the interpretation put upon the amended clause by the High Court in the judgment under appeal. It will, however, be upon to the appellants to issue a fresh declaration under section 6, if so advised, within the period contemplated in the proviso to section 6(1) of the Act read with its first explanation. In that view of the matter the apppeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. In the view that we have taken, Civil Appeals Nos.

1843 and 1844 of 1986 are also dismissed without costs. N. V. K. Appeals dismissed.