STATE OF U.P AND ANR. v. JOHRI MAL

Citation: [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 560

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: V.N. KHARE, BRIJESH KUMAR, S.B. SINHA

Case summary

STATE OF U.P AND ANR. v. JOHRI MAL.pdf

Judgment text

STATE OF U. P AND ANR. v. JOHRI MAL APRIL 21, 2004 [V. N. KHARE, CJ. , BRIJESH KUMAR AND S. B. SINHA, JJ. ] Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226-Judicial Review under- Scope of-Held: Power of judicial review cannot assume supervisory governance under rule oflaw or areas reserved by supreme lax-Also decisions or actions not. having adjudicative disposition are not subject to judicial review-Scope ofreview is limited-While exercising the power, the court is concerned with the decision making process than merit of the decision for which it has to reappreciate findings offacts-Furthermore, State's action is subject to judicial review when there is a public law element-This is d_etermined in each case having regard to the nature and authority vested in the State-Nature of actions cannot be generalized nor lists of actions, either public or private, can be given. Code ofCri"! _inal Procedure, 1973-Section 24-Uttar Pradesh Legal Remembrancer Manual-Paras 7. 01 to 7. 08 and Chapter XX!

: District Government Counsel/Public Prosecutor. ::. _Appointment-Nature of-Held: ls a professional engagement and not a civil post-It is governed by. the provisions of Cr. P. C and/or executive instructions framed by State Government and does not attract Article 309-Such appointment is normally not subject to judicial revie~Non-renewal can be subject to judicial review on the ground ofarbitrariness or malice in /~ourt would not examine as to what impelled State not to renew the tenure but would invoke doctrine of 'Wednesbury Unreasonableness'. Renewal ofterm-Held: Cr. P. C.

does not provide for renewal ofterm- Manual though provides for renewal ofterm but being compilation ofexecutive orders is not law under Article 13 and also not covered by Article l 66(3)- However, in such matter State is to act fairly and reasonably and is to follow principles in the Manual-On facts, District Officer opined that tenure of DGC not to be renewed as he did not have effective control over other ADGs and the District Judge agreed thereto-Hence, non-renewal ofterm by Stcite STATE v. JOHRI MAL 561 not wholly without jurisdiction and as such does not call for interference- Executive instructions-Administrative Law-Constitution of India, 1950- Article 309, 13, 166(3) and 226.

District Government Counsel/Public Prosecutor-Appointment-Nature ofoffice-Held: District Government counsel/Public Prosecutor hold office of great importance-DOC represents the State, thus, involves public element- They cannot claim right to be appointed-Article I4 is attracted to limited extent-Furthermore, the appointment to such a post should not be political and State should not rescind it with the change in the Government. District Government Counsel-Appointment and renewal of term- 'Consultation' with District Judge-lntetpretation of-On facts, direction by High Court regarding renewal ofapplicants' terms as DGC to be considered by collegium headed by District Judge relying on Special Reference No. 1 of 1998--Correctness of-Held: Appointment ofDGC cannot be equated with the appointment ofHigh Court and Supreme Court Judges as such reliance on Special Reference No.

1 of 1998 not correct and High Court erred in directing constitution of collegium-Consultation with District Judge must be effective one-He should take his colleagues into confidence-Further, High Court's power under Article 226 not at par with Supreme Court's power under Article 142-Thus, High Court cannot direct formulation of new principle contrary to the statutory provision-Constitution of India, 1950- Articles 226 and I42. Amendment ofsection 24-Deletion ofrequirement to consult the High Court for appointment of Public Prosecutors for High Court-Correctness of-Held: Amendment ofsection 24(/) and deletion ofsub sections (4), (5) and(6) ofsection 24 is irrational-Even though Legal Remembrancer Manual lays down exhaustive provisions being complete code in itself does not render any help since law cannot be substituted by executive instructions- Section 24 being salutary, State is expected to amend the provision or consult the High Court despite deletion.

Doctrines: Doctrine of 'Wednesbury Unreasonableness'-lnvoking of 'Words and Phrases: 'Consultation'-Meaning of. District Government Counsel (DGC) are appointed by the State ofUttar Pradesh for civil, criminal and revenue courts in terms of the Legal Remembrancer Manual and their renewal is also governed by the Manual. Appointment of Public Prosecutor is governed by Cr. P. C. , 1973. However, the State of U. P. amended Section 24 ofCr. P. C and the requirement to consult the High Court for appointment of Public Prosecutors for High Court under sub-section (1) and also sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) were deleted. In the instant appeals, respondent No. 1 was. appointed as District Government Counsel (DGC) at Meerut. State Government did not renew his term as DGC, even though vacancy for the said post was notified. Respondent No. 1challenged the order. Division Bench ofHigh Court directed renewal of respondent No. 1's term as DGC since the District Judge had recommended in his favour.

High Court referring to Special Reference No. I of1998 further held that the ~istrict Judge should make recommendation by a collegium headed by himself and five judicial officers. Appellant-State filed application for recalling the Judgement passed by High Court since the District Judge or District M~gistrate did not recommend the case of respondent No. 1. High Court directed that the renewal of respondent's term as DGC should be considered afresh by the collegium headed by District Judge. Hence the present appeals. Appellant-State contented that professional engagement ofa lawyer cannot be equated with appointment on a civil post; that the District Magistrate had not recommended renewal of respondent No. l's term as DGC; and that the High Court erred in directing constitution ofa collegium.

Respondent contended that the office of public prosecutor was public in nature; that the High Court directed constitution of a collegium since the action ofthe State in appointment and/or renewal ofthe DGCs ~as arbitrary; and that proviso appended to clause (3) ofPara 7. 03 that District Officercould recommend name ofperson who has not supplied bio data for the appointment but may be considered fit, is misused. Allowing the appeals, the Coo. rt HELD: 1. 1. For a public law remedy. enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions ofthe authority need to fall in the realm of public law - be it legislative act or an executive act ofthe State or an instrumentality or a person or authority imbued w. ith public law element. The question. is· required to be determined in each case having regard to the nature and extent · ofauthority vested in the State. However, the nature ofthe action either under STATE v.

JOHRI MAL 563 public law or private law field cannot be generalised nor is it desirable to give exhaustive list ofsuch actions. 1578-B-DI Life Insurance Corporation v. Escorts and Ors. , AIR (1986) SC 1370; F. C. I and Ors. v. Jagannath Dutta and Ors. , AIR (1993) SC 1494; State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust and Ors. , 1199413 SCC 552; Assistant Excise Commissioner and Ors. v. Issac Peter and Ors. , (19941 4 SCC 104 and National Highway Authority ofIndia v. Mis Ganga Enterprises, (2003) 7 SCALE 171, relied on. 1. 2. The scope and extent ofpower ofthe judicial review of High Court under Article 226 ofthe Constitution would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi judicial or administrative.

The power ofjudicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or done the robes ofomnipresent. It is not intended either to review governance under the rule oflaw nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the supreme lax to the other · organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. The scope ofjudicial review is limited. [579-G-H; 580-A) Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; Monarch Infrastructure (P) ltd v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and Ors. , (2000) 5 SCC 287; WB. State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. ltd. and Ors. , (20011 2 SCC 451 and L. T. C and Anr. v. Consumer Education and Research Centre and Ors. , AIR (1996) SC 1811, referred to. Council a/Civil Services Unions v. Ministerfor the Civil Service, (1985) AC 374; R (Abbasi) v.

Secretpry a/State ofthe Foreign and Commonwealth Office andSecretary ofStatefor the Home Department, (2002) EWCA Civ. , 6 November 2002 and Ira Munn v. State ofEllinois, (1876) 94 US (Supreme Reports) 113, referred to. Administrative Law by Wade, 8th Edition pp. 33-35, referred to. 1. 3. It is well-settled that while exercising the power ofjudicial review, the Court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merit of the decision itself. But while examining and scrutinizing the decision making process, it becomes inevitable to also appreciate the facts ofa given case as otherwise the decision cannot be tested under the grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. How far the court ofjudicial review can reappreciate the fmdings offacts, depends on the ground ofjudicial review. Therefore, to a limited extent ofscrutinizing the decision making process, it is always open to the Court to review the evaluation of facts by the decision maker.

(581-E-H; 582-A-B) ChiefConstable ofthe North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 ALL ER 141, referred to. Administrative Law by Prof Bernard Schwartz III Edn. Little Brown Company 1991; Judicial Remedies in Public Law by Prof Clive Lewis 1992 Edn. pp. 294-552; Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice by Grahame Aldous and John Alder; Administrative Law by Wade 8th Edition pp. 551-552, referred to. 2. 1~ The Legal Remembrancer Manual clearly states that the appointment ofa public prosecutor or a district counsel would be professional in nature. It is beyond any cavil that the holder of an office of the public prosecutor does not hold a civil post. By holding a post ofdistrict counsel or the public prosecutor, neither a status is conferred on the incumbent. So far as Assistant Public prosecutors are concerned, they are employees ofthe State and hold civil posts. They are answerable for their conduct to higher statutory authority.

Their appointment is governed by the service rules framed by the respective State Government. (584-D-F] Samarendra Das, Advocate v. The State of West Bengal and Ors. , JT (2004) 2 SC 413, relied on. 2. 2. The appointments of Public Prosecutors are governed by Cr. P. C. and/or the executive instructions framed by the State governing the terms of their appointment. Proviso appended to Article 309 ofthe Constitution is not applicable in their case. Their appointment is a tenure appointment. Public Prosecutors, furthermore, retain the character of legal practitioners for all intent and purport. They, ofcourse, discharge public functions and certain statutory powers are also conferred upon them. Their duties and functions are onerous but the same would not mean that their conditions ofappointment are governed by any statute or statutory rule. (584-G-H; 585-A) 2. 3. So long as in appointing a counsel the procedures laid down under the Cr. P. C.

are followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the Court will normally not interfere with the decision. The nature ofoffice being STATE v. JOHRI MAL 565 professional in nature, courts are normally charry to over-turn any decision, unless an exceptional case is made out. Cr. P. C. does not speak of renewal or extension oftenure. The incumbent has no legal enforceable right for renewal ofits term. The action of the State in not renewing the tenure can be subjected to judicial scrutiny inter alia on the ground of arbitrariness and malice in law. The courts normally would not delve into the records with a view to ascertain as to what impelled the State11ot to renew the tenure ofa public prosecutor or a district counsel. The jurisdiction of the courts in acase of this nature would be to invoke the doctrine of'Wednesbury Unreasonableness'•. (585-B-El Associated Picture House v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 640, referred to. Om Kumar and Ors. v.

Union ofIndia, (20011 2 SCC 386, referred to. 2. 4. Cr. P. C. does not provide for renewal or extension of a term. The. Legal Remembrancer Manual provides for renewal ofthe term but it contains executive instructions which even do not meet the requirements ofclause (3)· ofArticle 166 ofthe Constitution and is not a law within the meaning ofArticle 13 of the Constitution. Evidently, the Legislature thought it fit to leave such' matters at the discretion of the State in which State is required to act fairly and reasona~ly. The State normally would be bound to follow the principles laid down in the Legal Remembrancer Manual. (586-E-Fl Union ofIndia v. Naveen Jindal, JT (2004) 2 SC I, relied on. 2. 5.

The State, while appointing a counsel, must take into account the following fundamental principles which are required to be observed that good and competent lawyers are required to be appointed for (i) good administration ofjustice; (ii) to fulfil its duty to uphold the rule of law; (iii) its accountability to the public; and (iv) expenditure from the tax payers' money. No appointment of public prosecutors or district counsel should, thus, be made either for pursuing a political purpose or for giving some undue advantage to a section of people. Retention of its counsel by the State must be weighed on the scale of public interest. State should replace an efficient, honest and competent lawyer, inter alia, when it is in a position to appoint a more competent lawyer. In such an event, even a good performance by lawyer may not be of much importance. [586-B-El 3. 1. The District Government counsel appointed for conducting civil as also criminal cases hold offices ofgreat importance.

They are not only officers of the court but also the representative of the State. On the other hand, Public Prosecutors have greater responsibility. They are required to perform statutory duties independently having regard to various provisions contained in the Cr. P. C and in particular Section 320 thereof. (59~F-GJ 3. 2. The holders of the post ofGovernment counsel have a public duty to perform. They represent the interest of general public before a court of law. Public element is, thus, involved therein. However, in the matter of engagement ofa District Government Counsel, a concept of public office does not come into play. It is the choice of the Government and none can claim a right to be appointed because it is a position ofgreat trust and confidence. However, Article 14 will be attracted to a limited extent as the functionaries named in the Cr. P. C. are public functionaries. They also have a public duty to perform. If the State fails to discharge its public duty or act in.

defiance, deviation and departure ofthe principles of law, the court may interfere. Court may also interfere when the legal policy laid down by the Government for the purpose ofsuch appointments is departed from or mandatory provisions of law are not complied with and also if a holder ofa public office is sought to be removed for reason de'hors the statute. Furthermore, the appointment such a post must not be political one. Legal Remembrancer's Manual clearly forbids appointment ofsuch a lawyer and/or if appointed, removal from his office. Therefore, District Judge and District Magistrate are duty bound to see that no recommendation is ma. de earlier nor there is any political affinity. State is not expected to rescind the appointments with the change in the Government. •. (597-E-H; 598-CJ 3. 3. The Public Prosecutors and the Government Counsel play an important role in administration ofjustice.

Efforts are required to be made to improve the management of prosecution in order to see that innocent persons may not be convicted as well as an accused guilty of commission of crime does not go unpunished and also release or direct the use of non:. punitive methods of treatment of those whose cases would best be processed. Maintenance of law and order in the society and, thus, to some extent maintenance of rule of law which is the basic fibre for upholding the rule of democracy lies in their hands. The prosecutors should not be over-burdened with too many cases of widely varying degree of seriousness with too few assistants and inadequate financial resources. (596-H; 597-A-B-CJ 4. The District Officer was of the opinion that in a district like Meerut the term of the appointment of respondent no. 1 should not be extended as he has no effective control over the other ADGs for 'taking steps'.

The approach ofthe District Officer cannot be said to be wholly irrational since the District Government Counsel is required to discharge certain administrative functions. District Judge, Meerut has also agreed thereto. Therefore, the action on the part of the State, cannot be said to be wholly without jurisdiction requiring interference by High Court in exercise of its power ofjudicial review. High Court has based its decisions on the wrong premise that the District Magistrate recommended the renewal of respondent no. l's term as DGC and as such the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. [588-C-F) 5. 1. Appointment ofthe District Government Counsel cannot be equated with the appointments ofthe High Court and the Supreme Court Judges. A distinction must be made between professional engagement and a holder of high public office.

Various doctrines and the provisions of the Constitution which impelled this Court to give meaning of'consultation' as 'concurrence' and wherein the Chief Justice oflndia will have a primacy, cannot be held to be applicable in the matter ofconsultation between the District Magistrate and the District Judge for the purpose ofpreparation ofa panel ofthe District Government Counsel. The consultation with the District Judge must be an 0 effective one. The District Judge in turn would be well advised to take his colleagues into confidence so that only meritorious and competent persons who can maintain the standard of public office, can be found out. (589-D-F) Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and Ors. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 and In Special Reference No. 1 of(l998), Re, (1998) 7 sec 739, distinguished. 5. 2. The power under Article 226 ofthe Constitution is not at par with the constitutional jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under Article 142 ofthe Constitution.

High Court has no jurisdiction to direct formulation of new legal principle or a new procedure which would be contrary to and inconsistent with a statutory provision like Cr. P. C. (589-G-H) State ofHimachal Pradesh v. A Parent ofa Student ofMedical College, Simla andOrs. , (1985) 3 SCC 169 and AsifHameed andOrs. v. State ofJammu and Kashmir and Ors. , 119891Supp. 2 sec 364, relied on. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. C. K. Rajan and Ors. , (2003) 7 SCC 546, referred to. 6. There does not exist any rationale behind deletion of the provision relating to consultation with the High Court in the matter ofappointment of the Public Prosecutors in the High Court The said provision being a salutary one, it is expected that the State ofU. P. either would suitably amend the same or despite deletion shall consult the High Court with a view to ensure fairness in action.

The submission of the State that such a step had been taken having regard to the fact that exhaustive provisions . are laid down in Legal Remembrancer Manual which is a complete code in itself cannot be accepted as a law cannot be substituted by executive instructions which may be subjected to administrative vagaries. The executive instructions can be amended, altered or withdrawn at the whims and caprice ofthe executive for the party in power. It is beyond any cavil that executive instructions do not carry the same status as ofa statute. State should bear in mind the dicta of this Court as regards the necessity to consult the District Judge. Therefore, while making appointments ofDistrict Government Counsel, State should give primacy to the opinion ofthe District Judge. Such a course ofaction would demonstrate fairness and reasonableness ofaction and, furthermore, to a large extent the action ofthe State would not be dubbed as politically motivated or otherwise arbitrary.

(600-A-E] Kumari Shri/ekha Vidyarthi and Ors. v. State ofU. P. and Ors. , (1991) 1 SCC 212; Mukul Dalal and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , (1998] 3 SCC 144; Mundrika Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, [1979) 4 SCC 701; State of U. P. v. Ramesh Chandra Sharma and Ors. , (1995) 6 SCC 527; Harpal Singh Chauhan andOrs. v. State ofU. P. , (1993) 3 SCC 552 and State ofU. P. v. UP. State Law Officers Association and Ors. etc. , (1994) 2 SCC 204, referred to. .. 7. l. The proviso appended to clause (3) ofPara 7. 03 was evidently made having regard to the fact that an advocate having a deep sense ofself-respect may not file any application for his appointment as a District Government Counsel despite calling for applications by the District Magistrate in this behalf. The District Magistrate in a given situation may have to persuade very compe! enf persons to take the offer in public interest as also in the interest of tileState.

But recourse to the said provision cannot be resorted to for 'general appointments but only in very exceptional cases in consultation with the District Judge. (599-B-D) 7. 2. A submission of bio data on the part of the advocate pursuant to issuance of a notice for appointment of Public Prosecutor~ therefor by the District Magistrate or the District. Judge would not amount to soliciting briefs within the meaning of Rule 36 of the Bar Council of India Rules as the advocates would notfile any application on their own. [598-H; 599-A] B. Rajeswar Reddy and Ors. v. K. N. Narasimhachari and Ors. , (2001) 6 ALT 104,approved. Harpal Singh Chauhan and Ors. v State of U. P. , (1993) 3 SCC 552, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 963-64of2000. From the Judgment and Order dated 11. 12. 98 of the Allahabad High Court in C. M. W. P. No. 34064of1998 WITH C. A. Nos. 967, 968, 970, 976-77, 975, 972, 973, 969, 974, 971, 965, 966/. 2000 and 6549of1999. Ranjit Kumar, R. C.

Srivastava, Ashok K. Srivastava, R. N. Keshwani, (NP), Ms. Binu Tamta, J. M. Sharma, Ms. Abba, R. Sharma, Ms. Sandhya Goswami, T. N. Singh, S. P. Sharma, Ashwilti Bhardwaj, Abhishek Atrey, Subrat Birla, S. C. Birla, Y. P. Dhamija and Ms. Rachna Srivastava for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. ... IN1RODUCTION: A short but interesting question as regards interpretation of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the relevant provisions of Legal Remembrancer's Manual relating to appointment and renewal of term of the District Government Counsel is in que~tion in this batch of appeals whi¢h arise out of various judgments and orders passed by the Allahabad High Court inC. M. W. P. Nos. 34064, 19513, 34074, 26613,40945,41178, 5665,41180, 5667 of 1998, 9809 of 1992, 9203 of1998, 3100, 3102 of1999 and 6754 of 1998.

FACTUAL BACKDROP: The State ofUttar Pradesh appoints District Government Counsel (DG<t) for civil, criminal and revenue courts in terms of the Legal Remembrancer Manual. Appointment of Public Prosecutor is governed by the Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973. The State ofUttar Pradesh, however, amended Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in terms whereof the requirements to consult the High Court for appointment of Public Prosecutors for the High Court as contained in sub-section (1) of Section 24 as also sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) thereof were deleted. Renewal ofterms ofthe District Government Counsel, are, however, governed by Legal Remembrancer Manual. The first respondent herein was appointed as District Government Counsel. (DGC) (Criminal) at Meerut on or about 7. 01. 1983. The said post is deemed to be that of Public Prosecutor '"'. ithin the meaning of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His term was renewed by an order dated 12. 03. 1996.

He was again appointed in the same capacity by an order dated 17. 09. 1997 for a period of one year. Before expiry of the said period, the respondent applied for renewal ofhis tenure. Allegedly, the District Judge and the District Magistrate did not recommend therefor. The State Government decided not to renew the term of the respondent as DGC (Criminal) and by an order dated 18. 9. 1998 he was relieved from the charge ofthe said post. By a notification dated 17. 09. 1998, the vacancy was advertised w! tereafter the respondent filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court inter a/ia praying for quashing the said order dated 18. 09. 1998. In the said writ petition, the contention of the respondent was that as the District Magistrate as also the District Judge had recommended for renewal ofhis tenure as DGC (Criminal) having found his conduct and work satisfactory, the renewal ought to h~ve been granted as a matter of course.

Despite opportunities granted in that behalf, the appellants, ho". Vever, did not file any return. By reas_on of judgment dated 11. 12. 1998, a Division Bench of t~e Allahabad High Court allowed t~e said writ application holding: "In the present case the District Judge has recommended in favour of the petitioner and no good or cogent reason has been assigned for rejecting the recommendation of the District Judge. Hence we direct the petitioner's term as DGC (Criminal) to be renewed forthwith by the State Government. " The learned Judges further opined: "The Supreme Court has observed in Special Reference No. I of 1998 that the Chief Justice of India means not the Chief Justice of India alone but in consultation with his four senior most colleagues.

No doubt this judgment was given in the context of appointments of Judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts, but in our opinion the spirit of the judgment is applicable to the present case also since the intention was to keep the administration ofjustice away from political considerations. Hence in our opinion the District Judge should not make the recommendation alone but in consultation with the two senior most Judicial Officers in the District Court and also the CJM in the case ofrecommendations for appointments in the Criminal side, and the senior most Civil Judge for appointments on the Civil side, and also the District Magistrate. In other words the recommendation shall be by a collegium headed by the Oistrict Judge and consisting of the above mentioned five members (consisting of four judicial officers and the District Magistrate). If two members disapprove the name, no recommendation will be made. No name will be recommended if the District Judge disapprov~s.

This, in our opinion, will be in ·accordance with the norms laid down in the L. R. Manual. Such recommendation will ordinarily be treated as binding on the Government unless for some strong, cogent reasons to be recorded in writing if the Government disagrees. We again make it clear that the recommendation must be made purely on merit and competence ignoring caste, creed, religion or political affiliation. " Contending that the said judgment contains an error of record as the case of the first respondent had not been recommended by the District Judge or the District Magistrate concerned, an application for recalling of the , judgment was filed by the appellant herein but the same was disposed of , directing that the question regarding renewal ofthe respondent's term as DGC (Criminal) shall be considered afresh by the collegium headed by the District Judge constituted in the said judgment and the State Government shall act on the recommendations thereof. SUBMISSIONS: Mr.

Ashok Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, would urge that the High Court proceeded on a wrong premise that the recommendations for renewal ofterms of D. G. C. (Crl. ) had been made by the District Magistrate in favour of the first respondent. Our attention in this behalf has been drawn to the opinion of the District Judge dated I Ith September, 1998 as also the letter ofthe District Magistrate, Meerut, addressed to the Principal Secretary, Justice and Legal Remembrancer, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, dated 12. 9. 1998. The learned counsel would submit that as the appointment of public prosecutor is governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and renewal thereof by the Uttar Pradesh Legal Remembrancer, the High Court committed a manifest error in directing constitution ofa collegium headed by a member ofJudiciary.. Mr.

Srivastava would argue that having regard to the fact that professional engagement of a lawyer cannot be equated with appointment on a civil post as there exists a relationship ofcl! ent and the lawyer between the State and the public prosecutor, the High Court was not correct in issuing the impugned directions. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on Harpal Singh Chauhan and Ors. v. State ofU. P. •. [1993) 3 SCC 552, State ofU. P. and Ors. v. U. P. State Law Officers Association and Ors. , [1994) 2 SCC 204 and State ojU. P. v. Ramesh Chandra Sharma and Ors. , [1995) 6 SCC 527. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the High Court felt the need to constitute a collegium keeping in view of the fact that the action on the part of the State in appointment and/ or renewal of the DGCs was found to be arbitrary.

The learned counsel would submit that the public prosecutors look after the prosecution works and, thus, the nature of office would be a public in nature having regard to the fact that they discharge public functions. Statutory Provisions: Sub-Sections (2) to (6) ofSection 24 ofCode ofCriminal Procedure read thus: "(2) The Central Government may appoint one or more Public Prosecutors, for the purpose of conducting any case or class ofcases in any district, or local area. (3) For every district, the State Govternment shall appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional l'ublic Prosecutors for the district. Provided that the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor appointed for one district may be appointed also to be a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, for another district.

(4) The District Magistrate shall, in consultation with the Sessions Judge, prepare a panel of names of persons, who are, in his opinion, fit to be appointed as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutors for the district. (5) No person shall be appointed by the State Government as the Public Prosecutor or. Additional Public Prosecutor for the district unless his name appears in the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4).

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (5), where in a State there exists a regular Cadre of Prosecuting Officers, the State Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor only from among the persons constituting such Cadre: ·Provided that where, in the opinion of the State Government, no · suitable person is available in such Cadre for such appointment that the Government may appoint a person as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, from the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4). " However, the State of U. P. by Act No. 18 of 1991 with effect from 16. 2. 1991 amended Sub-Section (I) of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the following terms: "in sub-section (I), the words "after consultation with the High Courts" shall be omitted;" By reason of the said Act, Sub-Sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 24 have also been omitted. Para 7.

01 of Legal Remembrancer's Manual defines the District Government Counsel to mean legal practitioners appointed by the State Government to conduct in any court such civil, criminal or revenue cases, as may be assigned to them either generally, or specially by the Government. The legal practitioner appointed to conduct civil, criminal or revenue cases, shall be known as District Government Counsel (Civil), (Criminal) or (Revenue), as the case may be. Para 7. 02 of the Manual lays down the power of the Government to appoint Government Counsel for each district in the State. Para 7. 03 provides that whenever a post ofany Government Counsel is likely to fall vacant within the next three months or when a new post is created, the District Magistrate shall notify the vacancies to the members ofthe Bar?

the qualification wherefor would be practice of 10 years in case of District Government Counsel, 7 years in case of Assistant District Government Counsel and 5 years in case of Sub- District Government Counsel. Clause (3) of Para 7. 03 reads thus: "(3) The names so received shall be considered by the District Officer in consultation with the District Judge. The District Officer shall give due weight to the claim ofthe existing incumbents (Additional/Assistant District Government Counsel], ifany, and shall submit confidentially in order of preference the ·names of the legal practitioners for each post to the Legal Rememberancer giving his own opinion particularly about his character, professional conduct and integrity and the opinion of the District Judge on the suitability and merits, of each candidate.

While forwarding his recommendations to the Legal Rememberancer, the District Officer shall also send to him the bio data submitted by other incumbents with such comments as he and the District Judge may like to make. In making the recommendations, the proficiency of the candidate in civil or criminal or revenue law, as the case may be, as well as in Hindi shall particularly be taken into consideration: Provided that it will also be open to the District Officer to recommend the name of any person, who may be considered fit, even though he may not have formally supplied his bio data for being considered for appointment. The willingness of such a person to accept the •. appointment, if made shall, however, be obtained before his name is recommended. " Para 7. 04 of the said Manual provides that on receipt of the recommendations C1fthe District Officer, the Legal Remembrancer may make further enquiry and submit the recommendations as also for orders of the State Government.

The decision ofthe State Government would be final. Para • 7. 05 prohibits canvassing by or on the part of a candidate which would entail disqualification. Paras 7. 06, 7. 07 and 7. 08 read thus: "7. 06. Appointment and renewal- (I) The legal practitioner finally selected by the Government may be appointed District Government Counsel for one year from the date of his taking over charge. (2) At the end of the aforesaid period, the District Officer after consulting the District Judge, shall submit a report on his work and conduct to the Legal Remembrancer together with the statement of work done in Form no. 9. Should his work or conduct be found to be , unsatisfactory, the matter shall be reported to the Government for orders. Ifthe report in respect of his work and conduct is satisfactory, he may be furnished with a deed of engagement in Form no. l for a term not exceeding three years. On his first engagement a copy of Form no.

2 shall be supplied to him and he shall complete and return it to the Legal Remembrancer for record. (3) The appointment of any legal practitioner as a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and is not appointment to a post under the Government. Accordingly the Government reserves the power to terminate the appointment ofany District Government Counsel at any time without assigning any cause. 7. 07. Political Activity-The District Government Counsel shall not participate in political activities so long as they work as such; otherwise they shall incur a disqualification to hold the post. Note: The term political activity includes membership ofany political party or local body as also press reporting work. 7. 08.

Renewal ofterm-(l) At least three months before the expiry of the term of a District Government Counsel, the District Officer shall, after consulting the District Judge and considering his past record of work, conduct and age, report to the Legal Remembrancer, together with the statement of work done by him in Form No. 9 whether in his opinion the term of appointment of such counsel should be renewed or not. A copy of the opinion of the District Judge should also be sent along with the recommendations of the District Officer. G: (2) Where recommendation for the extension of the term of a District Government Counsel is made for a specified period only, the reasons therefor shall also be stated by the District Officer.

(3) While forwarding his recommendation for renewal of the term of a District Government Counsel - (0 the District Judge shall give an estimate of the quality of the Counsel's work from the Judicial stand point, keeping in view the different aspects ofa lawyer's capacity as it is manifested before him in conducting State cases, and specially his professional conduct; and • (ii) the District Officer shall give his report about the suitability of the District Government Counsel from the administrative point of view, his public reputation in general, his character, integrity and professional conduct. (4) Ifthe Govemme~t agrees with the recommendations ofthe District Officer for the renewal ofthe term ofthe Government Counsel, it may pass orders for re-appointing him for a period not exceeding three years.

(5) Ifthe Government decides not to re-appoint a Government Counsel, the Legal Remembrancer may call upon the District Officer to forward fresh recommendations in the manner laid down in-para 7. 03. (6) The procedure prescribed in this para shall be followed on the expiry ofevery successive period of renewed appointinent ofa District Government Counsel. " A supplementary provision has been made in Chapter XXI of the said Manual for appointment and renewal of the post of public prosecutors. It inter a/ia contains the guidelines and clarifies that the appointment of DGC / (Criminal), the change of designation of the public prosecutors could not effect the basic m~ture of their professional engagement. It further provides that such professional engagement is teim~nated on either side without notice and without assigning any reason.

It is stated that the appointment of public prosecutor and Additional· Prosecutor both for the High Court and District, shall be made in accordance with Section 24 of the new Code. Para 21. 04 provides for constitution of a panel of·five years against each vacancy. It mandates that the State Government shall appoint an Additional . Public Prosecutor out of the names appeared in the panel. Paras 21. 07 and 21. 08 of the said Manual read as under: "21. 07. The appointment of Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor shall be made for the period of. three years, but·the State STATE v. JOHIU MAL [SINHA, J. ) 577 Government can tenninate such appointment at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. The State Government may extend the period of such appointment from time to time and such extension of such term shall not be treated as new appointment. 21. 08.

The District Magistrate shall, after consultation with the Sessions Judge, submit a confidential report in respect ofthe Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutors giving details about the percentage of success of cases conducted by them and the general reputation which they enjoy. Where the percentage ofsuccess is low, the reasons given by the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the same should also be commented on. After every three years he shall make a special assessment ofeach such Public Prosecutor or Additional Publi~ Prosecutor and recommend whether the person concerned should be granted extension for a further tenn of three years or for a shorter tenn only. " The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which are statu. tory in nature, govern the field.

The State of Uttar Pradesh, however, for reasons best known to it, amended Sub-Section (I) of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a result whereof, the State is not required to consult the High Court before appointing a Public Prosecutor for the High Court. Similafly, Sub-Sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 24 have also been deleted purported to be on the ground that similar provisions exfot in the Legal Remembrancer Manual. The Legal Rememberancer Manual is merely a compilation of executive orders and is not a 'law' within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India. JUDICIAL REVIEW: The power ofjudicial review is now well-defined in a series ofdecisions of this Court. It is trite that the court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a writ application in a matter governed by contract qua contract (assuming such professional engagement to be one), as therein public law element would not be involved. (See life Insurance Corporation v. Escorts ltd. and Ors.

, AIR (1986) SC 1370, F. C. /. and Ors. v. Jagannath Dutta and Ors. , AIR (1993) SC 1494, State ofGujarat and Ors. v. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust and Ors. , [1994] 3 SCC 552, Assistant Excise Commissioner andOrs. v. lssac Peter and Ors. , [1994] 4 SCC 104 and National Highway Authority of! ndia v. Ml s. Ganga Enterprises and Anr. , (2003) 7 SCALE 171) In any event, the modem trend also points to judicial restrai. nt in administration action as has been h~ld in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994] 6 SCC 651. (See also Monarch Infrastruct11re (P) Ltd v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and Ors. , (2000] 5 SCC 287 and W. B. State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. ltd and Ors. , (2001] 2 SCC 451 and. l. /. C. and Anr. v. Consumer Education and Research Centre and Ors. , AIR (1995) SC 181 l. The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or a statute or an instrument having the force of law.

For a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions of the authority need to fall in the realm of public law-be it a legislative act or the State, an executive act of the State or an instrumentality or a person or authority . imbued with public law element. The question is required to be determined in each case having regard to the nature and extent of authority vested in the State. However, it may not be possible to generalize the nature of the action which would come either under public law remedy or private law field nor is it desirable to give exhaustive list of such actions. In Council of Civil Services Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1985) AC 374 while ei:c. tending the scope of judicial review, the House of Lords decided that judicial review should not be available if the particular decision under challenge was ~ot justiciable.

However, in granting relief the Court shall take into consideration the factors like national security issue. In Constitution Reform in the UK by Qawn Oliver, it is stated at page 210: "In the CCSU case the House of Lords decided that judicial review should not be available ifthe particular decision·under challenge was not justiciable. In effect they respected the political Constitution and deferred to government in some . sensitive areas. In ·this case the Government was. alleging that for them to have consulted the unions before the decision was taken; would have provoked industrial action . at GCHQ, which would in tum have been damaging to national security. In the view of the House of Lords. this made an otherwise reviewable decision not suitable for judicial review -:- ·. not j~sticiable. Other decisions taken under the royal prerogative, which the co~rt indicated, would be non-justiciable, included treaty making and foreign affairs.

Despite the outcome of the CCSU that the prerogative is. in principle reviewable and that were it not for the national security issue the · government should have consulted the unions before imposing these / changes was a major step forward in the judicialization ofgovernment action, including the actual conduct of government, and a step away · from the political Constitution. " However, we may notice that judicial review was held to be available when justic_iability of foreign relations came to be considered in R. (Abbasi) v. Secretary ofStatefor the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2002) EWCA Civ.

, 6 November 2002 stating: "Although the statutory context in which Adan was decided was highly material, the passage from Lord Cross' speech in Cattermole supports the view that, albeit that caution must be exercised by this Court when faced with an allegation that a foreign state is in breach of its international obligations, this Court does not need the statutory context in order to be free to express a view in relation to what it conceives to be a clear breach of its international obligations, this Court does not need the statutory context in order to be free to express a view in relation to what it conceives to be a clear breach of international law, particularly in the context of human rights. " In Council of Civil Services Unions v.

Minister of Civil Service, the power ofjudicial review was restricted ordinarily to illegality, irrationality and impropriety, stating: "If the power has been exercised on a non-considerati~n or nonapplication of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power wi:. be regarded as·manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated. " The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi judicial or administrative. The power ofjudicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or done the robes of omnipr~sent.

The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to. the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition, may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court The limited scopes ofjudicial review succinctly put are : (i) Courts, while exercising the power ofjudicial review, do not sit in appeal over !

he decisions of administrative bodies; (h) a petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain welldefined grounds; (fu) an order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal; (iv) a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power ofjudicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice; and (v) the Courts cannot be called upon to undertake the Government duties and functions. The Court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and economic belief of a Judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of .. the legislative bodies. (See Ira Munn v.

State ofEllinois, (1S76) 94 US Supreme Reports 113) In Wade's Administrative Law, 8th edition at pages 33-35, it is stated: "Review, Legality and discretion- The system ofjudicial review is radically different from the system ofappeals. When hearing an appeal, the court is concerned with the merits of a decision: is it correct? When subjecting some administrative act or order to judicial review, · the court is concerned with its legality: is it within the limits of the powers granted? 'On an· appeal the question is 'right or wrong? ' On review the question is 'lawful or unlawful? ' Rights of appeal are always statutory. Judicial review, on the other hand, is the exercise ofthe court's inherent power to detem:iine whether action is lawful or not and to award suitable relief. For this no statutory authority is necessary: the court ·is simply performing its ordinary functions in order to enforce the law. The basis of judicial review, therefore, is common law.

This is none the less true because nearly all cases in administrative law arise under some Act of Parlial! 'ent. Where the Court quashes an order made by a minister under some Act, it typically uses its common law power to declare that the Act did not entitle the minister to do what he did and that he was in some way exceeding or abusing his powers. Judicial review thus is a fundamental mechanism for keeping public authorities within due bounds and for upholding the rule of law. Instead of substituting its own decision for that of some other body, as happens when on appeal, the court on review is concerned only with the question whether the act or order under attack should be allowed to stand or not. If the Home Secretary revokes a television licence unlawfully, the court may simply declare that the revocation is null and void.

Should the case be one involving breach of duty rather than excess of power, the question will be whether"the public authority should be ordered to make good a default. Refusal to issue a television licence to someone entitled to have one would be remedied by an order of the court requiring the issue of the licence. If administrative action is in excess of power (ultra vires), the court has only to quash it or declare it unlawful (these are in effect the same thing) and then no one need pay any attention to it. The minister or tribunal or other authority has in law done nothing, and must make a fresh decision. " It is well-settled that while exercising the power ofjudicial review, the Court is more concerned with the decision mciking process than tr. e merit of the decision itself.

In doing so, it is often argued by the defender of an impugned decision that the Court is not competent to exercise its power when there are serious disputed questions of facts; when the decision of the Tribunal or the decision of the fact finding body or the arbitrator is given finality by the statute which governs a given situation or which, by nature. of the activity the decision maker's opinion on facts is final. But while examining and scrutinizing the decision making process, it becomes inevitable to also appreciate the facts of a given case as otherwise the decision cannot · be tested under the grounds ofillegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. How far the court of judicial review can reappreciate the findings of facts depends on the ground of judicial review.

For example, if a decision is chatlenged as irrational, it would be well-nigh impossible to record a finding whether a decision is rational or irrational without first evaluating the facts of the case and coming to a plausible conclusion and ·then testing the decision of the authority on the touch-stone of the tests laid down by the Court with special reference to a given case. This position is well settled in Indian administrative law. Therefore, to a limited extent of scrutinizing the decision making process, it is always open to the Court to review the evaluation of facts by the decision maker. In Chief Constable ofthe North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All ER 141, the. law is stated in the following terms: "...

The purpose of judicial re,·iew is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not -to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorized or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes. of the court. " Prof. Bernard Schw~rtz in his celebrated book (Administrative Law, III Edn. Little Brown Company 1991) dealing with the present status ofjudicial review in American context, summarized as under: "If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more than media for the transmission of cases to the /Courts. That would destroy the values of agencies, created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in the complicated fields. At the same time, Court should not rubberstamp agencies; the scope ofjudicial enquiry must not be so restricted that it prevents full enquiry into the action of legality.

Ifthat question cannot be properly explored by the Judge, the right to review becomes meaningless... in the final analysis, the scope of review depends on the individual judges estimate of the justice of the case. " · · Prof. Clive Lewis in his book (Judicial Remedies in Public Law 1992 Edn. At p. 294-295) "The Courts now recognise that the impact on the administration is relevant in the exercise of their remedial jurisdiction'... Earlier cases took a robust line that the law has to be observed and the decision invalidated, whatever the administrative inconvenience caused. The Courts now-a-days recognise that such an approach is not always appropriate and may not be in the wider public interest. The effect on the administrative process is relevant to the Court's remedial discretion may prove decisive... They may also be influenced to the extent to which the illegality arises from the conduct ofthe administrative body itself, and their view of that conduct.

" Grahame Aldous and John Alder in "Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice" stated thus: "There is a general presumption against ousting the jurisdiction ofthe courts, so that statutory provisions which purport to exclude judicial · review, are construed restrictively. There are, however, certain areas of governmental activity, national security being the paradigm, which the courts regard themselves as incompetent to investigate, beyond an initial decision as to whether the government's claim is bona fide. In this kind ofnon-justiciable area judicial review is not entirely excluded, but very limited. It has also been said that powers conferred by the royal prerogative are inherently unreviewable but since the speeches of the House of Lords in Council o/Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service this is doubtful.

Lords Diplock, Scaman and Roskili appeared to agree that there is no general distinction between powers, based upon whether their source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial review can be limited by the subject matter of particular power, in that case national security. Many prerogative powers are in fact concerned with sensitive, non-justiciable areas, for example, foreign affairs, but some are reviewable in principle, including where national security is not involved. Another non-justiciable power is the Attorney General's preprogative to decide whether to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest. " In Wade's Administrative Law, 8th Edition at pages 551-552, the author states : "Rights and Remedies: Rights depend upon remedies. Legal history is rich in examples of rules of law which have been distilled from the system of remedies, as the remedies have been extended and adapted from one class of case to another.

There is no better example than habeas corpus. This remedy, since the · sixteenth century the chief cornerstone of personal liberty, grew out of a medieval writ which at first played an inconspicuous part in the law of procedure; it was used to secure the appearance of a party, in particular where he was in detention by some inferior court. Itwas later invoked to challenge detention by the king and by the Coun~il; and finally it became the standard procedure by which the legality ofany imprisonment could be tested. The right to personal freedom was almost a by-product of the procedura! rules. This tendency has both good and bad effects. It is good in that the emphasis falls on the practical methods ofenforcing any right. Efficient remedies are of the utmost importance, and the remedies provided by English administrative law are notably efficient. But sometimes the remedy comes to be looked upon as a thing in itself, divorced from the legal policy to which. it ought to give expression.

In the past this has led to gaps and anomalies, and to a confusion of doctrine to which the courts have sometimes seemed strangely indifferent. " . A writ of or in the nature of mandamus, it is trite, is ordinarily issued where the petitioner establishes a legal right in himself and a corresponding . legal duty in the public authorities. · The Legal Remembrancer Manual clearly ~tates that the appointment of a public prosecutor or a district counsel would be professional in nature. It is beyond any cavil and rightly conceded at the Bar that the holder of an office of the public prosecutor does not hold a civil post. By holding a post of district counsel or the public prosecutor, neither a status is conferred on · the incumbent. · A distinction is to be borne in mind between appointment of a Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, on the one hand, anci Assistant Public Prosecutor,· on the other.

So far as Assistant Public prosecutors are concerned, they are employees of the State. They hold Civil posts. They are answerable for their conduct to higher statutory authority. Their appointment is governed by the service rules framed by the respective State Government. (See·Samarendra Das, Advocate v. The State of West Bengal and Ors. , JT (2004) 2 SC 413). The appointments ofPublic Prosecutors, on the other hand, are governed. by the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or the executive instructions framed by the State governing the terms of their appointments. Proviso appended. to Article 309 of the C:::onstitution of India is not applicable in their case. Their appointment is a tenure appointment. Public Prosecutors, furthermore, retain the character of legal practitfoners for all intent and purport. They, ofcourse, discharge public ·functions and certain statutory powers are also conferred upon them.

Their duties and functions are onerous but the same would not mean that their conditions of appointment are governed by any statute or statutory rule. So long as in appointing a counsel the procedures laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the Court will normally not interfere with the decis~on. The nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-a-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagements, the courts· are normally charry to over-tum any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. The question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not, is primarily a matter between it and the counsel. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not speak ofrenewal _or extension oftenure. The extension oftenure ofpublic prosecutor or the district counsel should not be compared with the right of renewal under a licence or permit granted under a statUte.

The incumbent has l1'0 legal enforceable right as such. The action of the State in not renewing the tenure can be subjected to judicial scrutiny inter alia on the ground that the same is arbitrary. The courts norm<tlly would not delve into the records with a view to ascertain as to what impelled the State not to renew the tenure of a public prosecutor or a district counsel. The jurisdiction of the courts in a case of this nature would be to invoke the doctrine of 'Wednesbury Unreasonableness' as developed in Associated Picture. House v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 640. In Om Kumar and Ors. v.

Union ofIndia, (2001) 2 SCC 386, it was held that where administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the constitutional courts as primary reviewing courts to consider the correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the administrator. For judging the arbitrariness of the order, the test of unreasonableness may be applied. The action of the State, thus, must be judged with extreme care and circumspection. It must be borne in mind that the rights. of the public prosecutor or the district counsel do not flow under a statute. Although, discretionary powers are not beyond pale of judicial review, the courts, it is trite, allow the public authorities sufficient elbow · space/play in the joints for a proper exercise of discretion.

It may be true that the Legal Remembrancer Manual provides for renewal but it contains executive instructions which even do not meet the requirements ofclause (3) ofArticle 166 ofthe Constitution. Legal Remembrancer Manual is not a law within the meaning ofArticle l3 ofthe Constitution oflndia. [See Union ofIndia v. Naveen Jindal and Anr. , JT (2004) 2 SC l] The State, however, while appointing a counsel, must take into account the following fundamental priitciples which are required to be observed that good and competent lawyers are required to be appointed for (i) good administration of'Justice; (ii) to fulfil its duty to uphold the rule of law; (iii) its accountability to the public; and (iv) expenditure from the tax payers' money. Only when good and competent counsels are appointed by the State, the public interest would be safeguarded.

The State while appointing the public prosecutors, must bear in mind that for the purpose of upholding the rule of law, good administration ofjustice is imperative which in tum would have a direct impact on sustenance of democracy. ~o appointment of public prosecutors or district counsel should, thus, be made either for pursuing a political purpose or for giving some undue advantage to a section of people. Retention of its counsel by the. State must be weighed on the scale of public interest. The State should replace an efficient, honest and competent lawyer, inter alia, when it is in a position to appoint a more competent lawyer. In such an event, even a good . performance by a lawyer may not be of much importance. Howeverhmalice in law can also be aground for judicial review. The Code ofCriminal Procedure does·notprovide for renewal or extension of a term. Evidently, the Legislature thought it fit to leave such matters at the discretion of the State.

It is no doubt true that even in the matter ofextension or renew1i. I ofthe term of Public Prosecutors, the State is required to act fairty and reasonably. The State normally would be bound to follow the principles laid down in the Legal Remembrancer Manual. CORRECTNESS OFTHE HIGH COURTJUDGMENT: It appears that Shri K. S. Rakhra, District Judge? Meerut, by his letter dated l l th September, 1998, addressed to the District Magistrate, Meerut, although observed that the work and conduct. of the respondent was satisfactory _and he had not received any complaint in regard to his integrity, but it was stated: "I, however, agree with your view that the work of the D. G. C. (Crl. ) also requires effective control over his team and proper anal_ysis of the result of the trial and follow up action including remedial steps to improve the efficiency of the prosecution as a whole.

Your letter suggests that in your monthly meetings you have found that Shri Johri Mal does not exercise effective control over the ' Additional D. G. C. (Crl. ) and Assistant. D. G. C. (Crl. ) and that he has not been following the instructions given in your monthly meetings with regard to serious criminal matters. You have also found him failing to furnish complete relevant information in the meetings and that he does not have proper coordination with the S. P. O. office and that it is giving rise to administrative problems. The work of D. G. C. (Crl. ) also requires administrative skill and above average judicial knowledge. I have no objection if Shri Johri Mal is replaced by some better and experienced person having good experience ofconducting Session Trials and also having sufficient a_dministrative skill. " Acting pursuant to, or in furtherance of, the aforementioned recommendations of the District Judge, the District Magistrate in terms of his letter dated 12. 9.

1998 addressed to the Principal Secretary, Justice and Legal Remembrancer, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow stated, thus: "It is submitted in aforesaid matter that Sri Johri Mal, Advocate, was engaged on the post ofDistrict Government Counsel [Criminal], Meerut for th~ term upto 14. 9. 98 as per the order No. D 1880 [l] Seven-Judicial 3[42]/90 dated 17. 9. 97. After the term ofSri Johri Mal comes to an end, the post of District Government Counsel [Criminal] shall fall vacant w. e. f. 15. 9. 98. On analysis ofwork ofSri Johri Mal in a year, I felt that it shall not be proper to extend the period of Sri Johri Mal as District Government Counsel [Criminal] in a district like Meerut. He has no effective control over other ADGC for doing pairvi [taking steps]. Even necessary particulars are not collected for doing pairvi.

In order to make prosecutive more effective it was decided that three important cases be determined regular dates be fixed and same be got decided at the earliest, but such action could not be done effectively due to lack of co-ordination with the judicial officers. In toto his term as the District Government Counsel cannot be held as proper and satisfactory. District Judge has also con~ented to engage other appropriate D. G. C. at the place of Johri Mal and Jetter of opinion of the District Judge is enclosed. " We may notice that one Shri Narendra Deo Chaubey, U~der Secretary, Law Department, Government ofUttar Pradesh, Lucknow affmned an affidavit in support of its application for recalling of the Order dated 11th December, 1998 wherein it was categorically stated: · "That in para ? 2 of the writ petition the petitioner has made a false statement that on the renewal application ofthe petitioner the District Judge, Meerut and respondent No. 2 made favourable reports and.

the renewal of the petitioner was recommended. " The very premise whereupon the High Court has based its decisions, therefore, was incorrect. The impugned judgment, thus, cannot be sustained as it suffers from misdirection in law. A Public Prosecutor is not only required to show his professional competence but is also required to discharge certain administrative functions. The District Officer was of the opinion that in a district like Meerut the term of the appointment should not be extended as he has no effective control over the other ADGs for 'taking steps'. The approach of the District Officer cannot be said to be wholly irrational. As noticed hereinbefore, the District Judge, Meerut, has also agreed thereto. The action on the part of the State, therefore, cannot be said to be wholly without jurisdiction requiring interference by the High Court in exercise of its power ofjudicial review.

COILEGIUM: Whether the High Court was right in its direction in the light ofSpecial Reference No. l of 1998 that a collegium should be constituted? This Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Associations and Ors. v. Union ofIndia, [i993] 4 sec 441, held that the word 'consultation' is capable of giving djffere! lt meaning in different context. The word 'consultation' occurring in Article 124 of the Constitution of India was given a particular construction having regard to the relevant significant context in which the same was used. Having regard to the provisions of the Constitution, th~ court felt that the meaning of the word 'consultation' cannot be confined to its lexical definition. In Special Reference No. l of 1998, Re: (1998]7 SCC 739, this Court A. stated: "12. The majority view in the Second Judges case (1993] 4 SCC 441, is that in the matter of appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has primacy.

The opinion of the Chief Justice l. lf India is "reflective of the opinion ofthe judiciary, which means that-it must necessarily have the element. of "plurality in _its formation". It is to be formed "after taking into account the view ofsome other Judges who are traditionally associated with this function". The opinion of the Chief Justice of India "so given has primacy in the matter of all appointments". For an appointment to be made, it has to be "in conformity with the final opinion ofthe ChiefJustice ofIndia formed in the manner indicated". It must follow that an opinion formed by the Chief Justice ofIndia in any manner other than that indicated has no primacy in the matter of appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts and the Government is not obliged to act thereon. " · Appointment of the District Government Counsel cannot be equated with the appointments of the High Court and the Supreme Court Judges.

A distinction must be made between professional engagement and a holder of high public office. Various doctrines and the provisions of the Constitution which impelled this Court to give meaning of 'consultation' as 'concurrence' and wherein the Chief Justice of India will have a primacy, cannot be held to be applicable in the matter of consultation between the District Magistrate and the District Judge for the purpose ofpreparation ofa panel ofthe District Government Counsel. We would, however, like to lay stress on the fact that the consultation with the District Judge must be an effective one. The District Judge in turn would be well advised to take his colleagues into confidence so that only meritorious and competent persons who can maintain the standard of public office, can be found out.

The High Court failed to consider that the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not at par with the constitutional jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The High Court has no jurisdiction to direct formulation of a new legal principle or a new procedure which would be contrary to, and inconsistent with, a statutory provision like Code of Criminal Procedure. (See State ofHimachal Pradesh v. A Parent ofa Student ofMedical College, Simla and Ors. , [ 1985] 3 SCC 169 and AsifHameed and Ors. v. State ofJammu and Kashmir and Ors. , [1989] Supp 2 SCC 364). In Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee andAnr. v. C. K. Rajan and Ors. , [2003) 7 SCC 546, this Court held: "50... (x) The Court would ordinarily not step out of the known areas of judicial review. The High Courts although may pass an order for doing complete justice to the parties, they do not have a power akin to Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

" DECISIONS OF TIDS COURT: This Court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Ors. v. State ofU. P. and Ors. , [1991] 1 SCC 212, opined that the appointment made in the post of District Gove1111llent Counsel is not contractual in nature. It was held that the Government Law Officers including the Public Prosecutors are holders of public offices. It was further opined that even in a case of contract the State cannot act arbitrarily and such arbitrary action is liable to be set aside as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), the Court sought to draw a distinction between the powers of public authorities vis-a-vis the private authorities referring to Wade's Administrative Law, 6th Edition, page 401 to the following effect and stating: "For the same reasons there sho,uld in principle be no such thing as unreviewable administrative discretion, which should be just as much a contradiction in terms as unfettered discretion.

The question which has to be asked is, what is the scope ofjudicial review, and in a few special cases the scope for the review of discretionary decisions may be minimal. It remains axiomatic that all discretion is capable ofabuse, and that legal limits to every power are to be found 'somewhere. " We have our own reservations about the aforementioned principles of law, but for the purpose of this case, it is not necessary to advert thereto. The Article by Sue Arrow Smith on Judicial Review and Contractual Powers of authorities published in (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review, Pages 277-292 which has been referred to in Sreelekha Vidyarthi (supra), took into consideration several area5 ofEnglish Law relating to (a) Licensing ofmarket traders, (b) Dismissal ofpublic servants, (c) Public body's powers as landlord, and (d) Judicial review ofgovernment procurement.

The learned author, inter alia, observed that the possibility of review of the exercise of contractual rights in the said area which have been recognized by Canadian courts, should also be adopted by the English Courts. The learned author observes: "In other words, they should accept that these powers are reviewable as a matter of principle but that review may be negated or limited by specific policy factors, rather than continue searching for some "public law" element to the decision as a justification for applying public law doctrines to the case before them. Support for this approach is found in the judgments ofthe Court ofAppeal in Brown, Kelly and Emmett, and also, implicitly, in the recent cases on review ofprocurement; and it is a pity that the Court of Appeal did not take the opportunity presented recently in Jones v. Swansea City Council to endorse such an approach, since this clearly commended itself to the Court.

" The said Article is although thought provoking, we are bound by the decisions of this Court and a distinction between a public law element and private Jaw element although may be thin, has to be kept in view and taken into consideration while entertaining a writ application. In Mukul Dalal and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1988] 3 SCC 144, this Court held that, office of the Public Prosecutor is a public one and nobody should be appointed as a special public prosecutor at the instance of a complainant, stating: "10... To leave the private complainant to pay to the Special Public ~Prosecutor would indeed not be appropriate. We would make it clear that we do not support the conclusion ofthe High Court that as a rule whenever there is request ofappointment ofa Special Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor, the same should be accepted.

The Remembrancer ofLegal Affairs should scrutinise every request, keeping a prescribed guideline in view and decide in which cases such request should be accepted, keeping the facts ofsuch case in view. Ordinarily the special Public Prosecutor should be paid out of the State funds even when he appears in support of a private complainant but there may be some special ~ase where the Special Public Pr~secutor's remuneration may be collected from the private source. In such cases the fees should either be deposited in advance or paid to a prescribed State agency from where the Special Public Prosecutor could collect the same. In view of these conclusions and our disagreeing with the view of the High Court, the appeals shall stand allowed. Rule 22 of the Maharashtra Rules, referred to above, in our view is bad and the State Government should properly modify the same keeping our conclusions in view.

The Remembrancer of Legal Affairs of the Maharashtra Government will now decide as to whether in the three cases referred to here, the services of a Special Public Prosecutor, a Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor should be provided and in case he comes to the conclusion that such provision should be made, he should decide as to whether the State administration should pay for such Public Prosecutor or the private complainant should bear the same. There would be nq order as to costs. In Mundrika Prasad Singh v. State ofBihar, [1979} 4 SCC 701, this Court held that a Government Pleader holds a public office but he is more than an advocate for litigant. This Court observed: "14. It is heartening to notice that the Bihar Government appoints these lawyers after consultation with the District Judge. It is in the best interest of the State that it should engage competent lawyers without hunting for political partisans regardless of capability.

Public offices - and Government Pleadership is one - shall not succumb to Tammany Hall or subtler spoils system, if purity in public office is a desideratum. After all, the State is expected to fight and win its cases and sheer patronage is misuse of power. One effective method of achieving this object is to act on the advice of the District Judge regarding the choice ofGovernment Pleaders. When there were several thousand cases in the Patna courts and hundreds of cases before a plurality oftribunals, it was but right that government did not sacrifice the speedy conduct of cases by not appointing a number of pleaders on its behalf, for the sake of the lucrative practice of a single Government Pleader. It is inconceivable how he would have discharged his duties to the court and to his client ifthis crowd of land acquisition cases were posted in several courts more or less at the same time.

Adjournment to suit advocates' convenience becomes a bane when it is used only for augmentation of counsel's income, resisting democratisation and distributive justice within the profession. These principles make poor appeal to those who count, which is a pity. " This Court lamented : "17. We dismiss the special leave petition but with a sad tag, which is the message of this martyrdom. Professions shall not be concealed conspiracies with 'effete, aristocratic, protective coloration', which at the same time enables one to make a considerable sum of money without sullying his hands with a "job" or "trade". The remarks of · Tabachnik, in 'Professions For the People', about English professions , of the eighteenth century smell fresh. One could carry on commerce by sleight of hand while donning the vestments of professional altruism. To boot, one could also work without appearing to derive income directly from it. As Reader explains: "The whole subject ofpayment ...

seems to have caused professional men acute embarrassment, making them take refuge in elaborate concealment, fiction, and artifice. The root ofthe matter appears to lie in the feeling that it was not fitting for one gentleman to pay another for services rendered, particularly ifthe money passed directly. Hence, the device of paying a barrister's fee to the attorney, not to the barrister himself. Hence, also the convention that in many professional ' dealings the matter of the fee was never openly talked about, which could be very convenient, since it precluded the client or patient from arguing about whatever sum his advisor might eventually indicate as a fitting honorarium. " (1966, p. 37) The established professions - the law, medicine, and the clergy held (or continued to hold) estate-like positions : "The three 'liberal professions' of the eighteenth century were the nucleus about which the professional class of the nineteenth century was to form.

We have seen that they were united by the bond of classical education; that their broad and ill-defined functions covered much that later would crystallize out into new, specialised, occupations; that each, ultim~tely, derived much ofits standing with the establi