SURJIT SINGH v. MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD

Citation: [2008] 6 S.C.R. 683

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: H.K. SEMA, MARKANDEY KATJU

Case summary

SURJIT SINGH v. MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 6 S. C. R. 683 SURJIT SINGH v. MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD. (Civil Appeal No. 5354 of 2002) APRIL 21, 2008 (H. K. SEMA AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ. ) Indian . Telegraph Rules; Rr. 2(PP) and 443: Disconnection of Telephone - Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. disconnecting telephone lines in the name of husband for non-payment of dues of telephone line in the name of wife - Correctness of- Held: Wife of the appellant is a house-wife having no independent source of income and, thus, economically dependent on him - Telephone line of relative, on whom subscriber is economically dependent, can be disconnected on ground of non-payment of telephone bill by the nominal subscriber - Intention of the legislature in framing r.

443 was that payment of the telephone bills should be made promptly - Rule 443 has to be construed in the context in which it was made and the purpose and object which it has to achieve - A literal interpretation of the rule would frustrate its object - Hence, a purposive construction of the rule in question has to be adopted - Construing so, authorities were right in disconnecting telephone line of the appellant at his residence and at his business premises for non-payment of dues in the name of his dependent wife - Interpretation of ... Statutes - Mimansa Rules of Interpretation - Linga/Lakshna principle - Applicability of Words and Phrases: 'Subscriber' - Meaning of in the context of r. 2(PP) of the Indian Telegraph Rules. • Respondent disconnected two telephone lines of the appellant, one at his residence and the other at his business premises for non-payment of arrears of telephone dues in connection with the telephone line in the name of his wife.

Challenging the order of the authorities, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court. Appeal filed thereagainst was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, the present appeal. Appellant contended that in terms of Rule 443 the Indian Telegraph Rules, telephone lines in his name could not have been disconnected because of non-payment of dues in respect of the telephone line in the name of his wife. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1 Wife of the appellant is a housewife, who • is living with him at his residential premises. It has not been alleged that she has an independent source of income by doing some business or by some service etc. In these circumstances, it can be inferred that the payment of the bill of the telephone line in the name of his wife was being made by the appellant himself since his wife has no independent source of income and is economically dependent on him.

(Para - 10) [690-8, C, DJ 1. 2 In the case of a person who is economically dependent on another who is paying his telephone bills, the telephone line in the name of such other relative on whom the subscriber is dependent can be disconnected for non-payment of the telephone bills of the nominal subscriber. (Para -19) [693-A, B, CJ 2. 1 It is true that on a literal interpretation of r. 443 of the Indian Telegraph Rules, the contention of counsel for the appellant would have to be accepted. However, in this case, the literal rule has neit to be adopted, because this Court has to see the intention of the rule. The intention : I NIGAM LTD. obviously was that payment of telephone dues should be made promptly, otherwise the telephone department will suffer. This Court, therefore, to take an interpretation which effectuates and furthers the intention of r. 443, i. e. the telephone bills should be paid in time. (Para - 21) [693-D, E] 2.

2 In the case of a wife who is a housewife and is economically dependent on her husband, obviously the telephone bills in connection with the telephone line in her name are being paid by her husband and not by herself. Hence, a purposive construction has to be adopted in this case and not to go by the literal rule of interpretation. (Para - 22) [693-F] 2. 3 No doubt, ordinarily the literal rule should be applied while interpreting a statute or statutory rule, but 0 the literal rule is not always the only rule of interpretation of a provision in a statute, and in exceptional cases the literal rule can be departed from. It follows that to interpret a statute one has to sometimes consider the context in which it has been made and the purpose and object which it seeks to achieve. A too literal interpretation may sometimes frustrate the very object of the statute, and such an approach should be eschewed by the Court. (Paras - 23 & 24) [693-G, H; 694-D, E] R. L. Arora vs.

State of Uttar Pradesh and others (1964) 6 SCR 784 - followed. 3. In the Mimansa system, the literal rule of interpretation is called the Shruti (or Abhida) principle, and ordinarily it is this principle which is to be applied when interpreting a text. However, there are exceptional situations when one has to depart from the literal rule nnd then certain other principles have to be resorted to e. g. (1) the Linga (also called Lakshana) principle or the suggestive power of words or expressions, (2) the V C:l1i ~). This is the way in which the word Ajyani also has come to mean another class of bricks. 51. The Pranabhrit maxim applies in the present case also because we have to fill life (i. e. given an appfopriate interpretation) to the word 'subscriber' in Rule 443 of the Indian Telegraph Rules. 52. The Pranabhrit maxim is often used in the interpretation of text by treating it as illustrative and not exhaustive.

The 0 illustrative rule of interpretation is a departure from the literal rule which normally has to be adopted while construing a text. However, sometimes departures from the literal rule are permissible, and one of such departures Is the Illustrative rule. To give an example, in Sanskrit there is an oft-quoted statement "Kakebhyo Dadhi Rakshitam" which means "protect the curd from the crows". Now in this sentence the word 'crow' is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The statement does not mean that one should protect the curd only from crows but allow it to be eaten up by cats, dogs or to get damaged by dirt or filth etc. It really means that one should protect the curd from all dangers. Hence the word 'crow' in the above statement is only illustrative and not exhaustive. 53. We can take another example. In the U. S. Constitution, Article 1 Section 8 states that Congress (the American Parliament) can raise Armies and Navies.

There Is no mention of an Air Force there, obviously because there were no aircraft in 1791 when the U. S. Constitution was promulgated. The first aircraft was invented by the Wright brothers in 1903. However, today's reality is that a modern Army cannot fight without air cover. Amendment to the U. S. Constitution is a very ardous and lengthy procedure because it requires two-third majority of both Houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourth of the States. By the time this is done, the enemy may invade and occupy the country. Hence the words 'Armies and Navies' have to be interpreted as illustrative and not exhaustive, and they really > mean all armed forces necessary for the security of the country (which would include an Air Force, also). :. r 54. Thus Article 1Section8 of the U. S. Constitution has to be interpreted not by applying the Shruti rule (literal rule), but by applying the Unga rule.

The words 'Armies and Navies' in Article 1 Section 8 are to be construed not literally but as suggestive. In other words, they are only illustrative, and they really mean all Armed Forces necessary for the security of the country. 55. We may also refer to Maxwell's 'Interpretation of Statutes' where it is stated : .. , "But it is another elementary rule, that a thing which is within the letter of a statute is not within the statute unless it be also within the real intention of the Legislature, 'and the words, if sufficiently flexible, must be construed in the sense which, if less correct grammatically, is more in harmony within that intention. Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense; and to adhere rigidly to its literal and primary meaning in all cases would be to miss its real meaning in many.

If a literal meaning had been given to the laws which forbade a layman to "lay hands" on a priest, and punished all who drew blood in the street, the layman who wounded a priest with aweapon would not have fallen within the prohibition, and the surgeon who bled a person to save his life, would have been liable to punishment. On a literal construction of his promise, Mohammed 11. 's ~ sawing the Venetian Governor's body in two, was no breach of his engagement to spare his head; nor Tamerlane's burying alive a garrison, a violation of his pledge to shed no blood. " Maxwell also states: "The words of a statute are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used and the object to be attained.

" (emphasis supplied) 56. Thus, in both systems of interpretation, the Mimansa system as well as Maxwell's system, it is emphasized that the intention of a statute has often to be seen to properly interpret it, and it is not that the Court can never depart from the literal rule 0 of interpretation. It all depends on the context, the subject-matter, the purpose for which the provision was made, etc. . 57. As already stated above, while construing Rule 443 we have to give an interpretation which subserves the intention of the Rule which is that telephone bills should be promptly paid, otherwise the department will be short of the funds needed for financing the telephone services which are to be rendered to the consumers. After all, the salary of the employees of the telephone department have to be paid, the telephone equipment has to be maintained, repaired and kept up-to-date. Sometimes new technology has to be introduced.

There may be various other requirements for which funds may be required, and all these can only be possible if the telephone bills are paid in time. Hence, in our opinion, the word 'subscriber' in Rule 2(pp) has to be given a wider meaning, as already stated above. 58. In view of the above, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. S. K. S. Appeal dismissed