SWAMY SHRADDANANDA @ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

Citation: [2007] 7 S.C.R. 616

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, MARKANDEY KATJU

Case summary

SWAMY SHRADDANANDA @ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA.pdf

Judgment text

SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA MAY 18,2007 [S. B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ. ] -+- Penal Code, 1860-ss. 302 and 201-Murder of wife-Circumstantial evidence-Conviction and death sentence by Court beloW-:Jn appeal-HELD Per Sinha J : Conviction justified-On facts there is one weak link in the hypoihesis that the murder was meticulously planned-Taking an overall view death sentence altered to life imprisonment-Per Katju, J. : Jn view of difference ofopinion, matter referred to larger Bench-Evidence Act, 1872s, 27-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-s. 235 (2)-Sentencing-Death sentence-Principle of Proportionality. The appellant-accused was prosecuted for murder ofhis wife. According to prosecution, the deceased was a rich and beautiful muslim lady. She was married and had four daughters. When she met the appellant, she sought his assistance to manage her properties. Appellant came to the deceased and started living with her.

The deceased got separated from her husband. Thereafter appellant married the deceased. She executed General Power of Attorney and Will in favour ofthe appellant. Despite the marriage, the parents and one of the daughters (PW 5) of the deceased were in her contact. PW 5 lost contact with the deceased since May 1991. Several times, when she fried to contact the deceased, she was mislead by the appellant about her whereabouts. When she was convinced that the appellant is telling a lie, she filed a complaint in Police Station about missing ofthe deceased. Thereafter appellant had sought anticipatory bail, and the same was granted to him. The case was given to Central Crime Branch. When the appellant was interrogated, he confessed to have drugged the deceased and putting her in a wooden box 'G had buried her in the backyard of the house. At the instance of the appellant, the body of. the deceased was exhumed. -The proceedings of the exhumation was videographed.

The articles found in the box were identified by the mother and servant ofthe deceased as belonging SWAMYSHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 1·. STATEOF KARNATAKA • ~ to the deceased. The skeletal remains were subjected to autopsy. PW 1, a doctor ... "t had conducted Photo Superimposition Method Test on the skull. Investigating team recorded the statements ofthe witnesses including those who had dealing about the properties of the deceased. Documentary evidence was collected. Accused was charged u/ss. 302/201 IPC. Trial court finding him guilty of commission ofoffence u/ss. 302 and 201 IPC, sentenced him to death. In appeal and death reference, High Court heard the appellant- accused on the question ofsentence in view of his pleas that he was not given opportunity of • ""' ~ hearing before imposition ofsentence. Appellant in his statement accepted to be instrumental in burying the dead body. The High Court confirmed the conviction as well as the sentence. Hence the present appeal.

In view ofthe difference in opinion on the question ofsentence, referring the matter to the larger Bench, the Court HELD: Per Sinha, J. I. I. The various circumstances leading to the pointing out the guilt of the appellant have been established, the cumulative effect whereof would show that all the links in the chain are complete and the ..... \ -\' conclusion of the guilt is fully established. [Para 47] [643-A] Alolce Nath Dutta and Ors. v. State ofWest Bengal, (2006) 13 SCALE 467, relied on. Sharad Birdhichand Sardo v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622, referred to. 1. 2. The death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. The identity of the dead body has also been established. The circumstances in which the ,F deceased married the appellant have also not been disputed. Their marriage ', .. ,. , was proved by PW-8. Appellant also did not deny or dispute that he had been living with the deceased at all material times at the address where the incident allegedly took place.

It has furthermore not been disputed that she had not been seen on and from 28. 05. 1991. It has also not been seriously disputed that the deceased was last seen in the company of the appellant. [Paras 17 and 32) [633-E, 638-B) 1. 3. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that there is a material -·~ difference between 'may be' and 'must be' and furthermore in a case of this nature the evidence must be considered with more than ordinary care lest ... .. not admissible in evidence. What was admissible only was that part of the ~confession leading to the discovery of fact in terms ofSection 27 of the lbdian Evidence Act The proceedings were conducted in the presence ofthe accused, which were videographed and marked as M0-18. Discovery ofthe last remains of the deceased was . '1 relevant fact, which was, thus, admissible in evidence. Appellant had pinpointed the exact place which was to be dug up. He marked the exact area.

He also made an oral statement that the box was buried beneath the area so marked, location whereof showed that it was a big area, flooring of which had been well plastered with cement having Cuddapah stone slabs. The video showed that the slabs had been laid there much earlier and were not of recent origin. [Paras 38 and 39) (640-E, G; 641-B-C) -,.. Aloke Nath Dutt and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2006) 13 SCALE 467; Pulukuri Kottayya v. King Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 67; Jajfar Hussain Dastagir v. State ofMaharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 872; Shamshuk Kanwar v. State ofU. P. • (1995) 4 SCC 430 and State ofMaharashtra v. Damu, (2000) 6 sec 269, relied on. ... Shri Shankar Gopal Patil and Ors. v. The State ofMaharashtra, (2000) ~A 5 Bom. CR 360, referred to. SWAMYSHRADDANAl'\DA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATEOf KARNATAKA 619 1. 6.

It cannot be said that only because the investigating team having regard to the purported confession made by the appellant had already known that a dead body had been buried in the house, Section 27 ofthe Evidence Act would not be attracted. In his statements before the investigating officer, appellant made a confession; but what was admissible in evidence is only that part which would come within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act and not the rest The court while analyzing the evidence and appreciating the same cannot take note of confession made before the police. (Para 4411642-E, Fl 1. 7. What was, therefore, relevant for the purpose ofSection 27 of the Evidence Act was that at the instance of the appellant himself a particular place which had been pin pointed by him had been dug and remains ofa body and other articles were recovered. (Para 461 (642-H) 1. 8. The prosecution . case must rest on the other materials brought before the court from the confession.

It is also not permissible to start with the confession and find corroborative evidence thereof and come back to the confession again for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion of guilt. J (Para 45) (642-G) .... 2. 1. Rarest of rare doctrine only has a statistical dimension i. e. incidence of particular type of murder in a given sample, rarest of rare benchmark can also be used in the context of other parameters such a brutality, planning, society's reaction et all. It can not be conclusively said that murder of wife for usurping property is a particularly rarest ofrare incident It could, of course, be a rare incident. (Para 971 (656-H; 657-A-BI 2. 2. There may be cases and cases where even on circumstantial evidence, a death penalty may be imposed. No universal rule is meant to be ; laid down. ! Para 861 (653-C-D) ... Bishnu Prasad Sinha and Anr. v. State ofAssam, (2007) 2 SCALE 42, referred to. 2. 3.

It has been a fundamental point in numerous studies in the field of Death Penalty jurisprudence that cases where the sole basis of conviction is · circumstantial evidence, have far greater chances of turning out to be wrongful convictions, later on, in comparison to ones which are based on fitter sources .... of proof. Convictions based on seemingly conclusive circumstantial evidence should not be presumed as full proof incidences and the fact that the same 620 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs (2007) 7 S. C. R. are circumstantial evidenc~ based must be a definite factor at the sentencing " stage deliberations, ~onsidering that capital punishment is unique in its total irrevocabi/ity. Any characteristic of trial, such as conviction solely resting . ' on circumstantial evidence, which contributes to the uncertainty in the culpability calculus, must attract negative attention while deciding maximum penalty for murder. fPara 891 f654-H; 655-A-BI ....... Merritt v. State, 52 Ga.

82, 85 (1874) and Jackson v. State, 14 Ala. 26, 29-30 (1883); UnitedStates v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 267 S. D. N. Y. > (2002), referred to. _) S. M. Phillipps, Famous Cases of Circumstantial Evidence with an Introduction on the Theory ofPresumptive Proof50-52 (1875), referred to. ,,... 2. 4. In the instant case, confession before police was taken as a gospel truth. It seems that the judicial mind has a role to play in that behalf in imposition ofsentence. fPara 93( f655-Hf 2. 5. Another aspect which needs to be considered is, as according to the rule that sentencing should involve analysis about the nature ofcrime as >well as the accused is the effect oftwo pointers relating to the nature ofcrime. ~ Firstly, the case does not seem to be an instance ofwhat is called a diabolical murder. Second point relates to planning which went into committing the murder. It is agreed that accused deliberately came close to the beautiful and wealthy lady.

He must have had his intentions and calculations in that regard. To that extent intention behind the marriage can be imputed. Butto infer from that the murder was a pre-planned murder will be going a bit too far as he did not know the opportune date when the servant would be leaving the house. He could not have known the servants would receive a telegram and ask for leave. Without their leaving the place, the plan, ifthere was any, could not have been executed. This is one weak link in the hypothesis that the murder was ..... 't· meticulously planned. fParas 94 and 9511656-A-B; D-El Kashmir Singh v. State ofHimachal Pradesh, (19901Supp1 SCC 133, relied on. Simon and Ors. v. State ofKarnataka, 1200412 SCC 694, referred to• .... '· 2. 6. There is growing demand in the international fora and in particular • the second Optional Protocol to the International Covenants on Civil and r~ - Political Rights and the Protocol to the American Constitution on Human SWAM,.

SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA>: STATEOF KARNATAKA L Rights abolished that death penalty should be abolished. (Para 50) (643-EI .... . , ' :/ Mithu v. State ofPunjab, (1983) 2 SCR 6903, referred to. Reyes v. R. , (2002) UKPC 11 : 12 BHRC 219; Hughes, R. v. (Saint Lucia), (2002) UKPC 12, Fox v. The Queen, (2002) 2 AC 284, Bowe v. The Queen, (2006) 1WLR1623 and Coard and Ors. v. The Attorney General (Grenada), (2007) UKPC 7, referred to. ~' 2. 7. The jurisdiction to impose death penalty should not be invoked +unless there exists an extra-ordinary situation to find that it comes within the purview of "rarest of rare" cases. The approach of the courts should not be to confine its thought process to the identification of a "rare" case. The expression "rarest of rare" case has been evolved by a Constitution Bench of this Court and, thus, demands a meaningful application. (Para 52) (643-G-Hl Bachan Singh v. State ofPunjab, (198311 SCR 145, followed. Aloke Nath Dutta and Ors. v.

State of West Bengal, (20061 3 SCALE ~ 467, relied on• . , 2. 8. Scholarship on sentencing which has been quite diverse in its prescriptions certainly has consensus on the point' that any decision oh sentencing aspect would require assessi"g more than one variables and single minded pursuit of any one sentencing ideal would be discounting on other equally urgent parameters and objectives. India does not have a sentencing policy, unlike some other countries. Section 354 (3) Cr. P. C. suggests that Indian law furthers statute induced sentencing guidance in part Therefore it has to be given full colour. In our country, therefore, each case may have to be considered on its own merit. (Paras 58, 59 and 61) (646-C, D, FJ Harbans Singh v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1982) SC 849, referred to. The Queen v. Julie McGinley and Michael Monaghan, (2003) NICC t and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972) referred to. Halliday Report of 2001 (Making Punishments Work) referred to. 2. 9.

There is a clear and discernible necessity of caution to set the maximum punishment in an olfence. And also by Implication there must be l intensive and exhaustive inquiry into accused related parameters before r OA (!! ' MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA •. STATEm 11. ARNATAKA 625 1. 5. It cannot be said that there was no reason for the appellant to murder the deceased since the deceased had executed a will in his favour. It is well settled that a will comes into operation only on the death of the testator. The deceased was only in her forties, and her natural death may have occurred several decades later. The appellant was obviously not willing to wait for so long before he could grab her property and hence he decided to murder her. I No doubt no poisonous substance was detected in the skeleton ofthe deceased,> and hence the prosecution case that the accused mixed poison in her tea could not be firmly established.

However, even ifthe exact method of murder has not been established by the prosecution, there is no doubt that it was the appellant who murdered the deceased. (Para 28) 1668-B-C) 1. 6. Appellant was in a dominating position over the deceased who had become dependant on him, and he took full advantage ofthis situation. He had motive and opportunity for committing this ghastly crime. (Para 29) (668-G-H) 2. 1. The facts ofthe present case clearly fall within the category of rarest of rare cases, deserving death sentence. It is a case of pre-planned and cold blooded murder diabolically conceived and cruelly executed. (Paras 6 and 9) (659-H; 660-G-H) Bachan Singh v. State ofPunjab, (1983) l SCR 145, followed. Machi Singh v. State ofPunjab, (198313 SCC 470 and Holiram Bord/oi v. State ofAssam, (200513 SCC 793, relied on. Aloke Nath Dutta and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2006) 13 SCALE 467, referred to. 2. 2.

No doubt there has been a growing demand in the international for a that the death penalty should be abolished. However, in India the death penalty cannot be abolished by a judicial verdict as death sentence is contemplated by the Constitution and the l. P. C. Thus Article 72 (l)(c) of the Constitution specifically mentions that the President of India has the power to grant pardons, reprieves or suspension ofany death sentence; Similarly Article 72 (3) also contemplates the power in the Governor ofthe State ofsuspend, remit or commute a death sentence. Hence, it is held that the Courts have no power to impose a death sentence it would be amending the Constitution by a judicial verdict. Again, if it is held that the Courts have no power to impose death . sentence merely because the death sentence has been abolished· in some -- ! 'foreign countries in Europe or because there is a demand in the international fora.

that death sentence should be abolished, it would be really amending the Constitution. This Court has no power to amend the Constitution by a judicial verdict. The Constitution can only be amended by Parliament in the manner prescribed by article 368 of the Constitution. This Court cannot arrogate to itself the power ofParliament under the Constitution and must maintain selfrestraint. Moreover, what has happened in foreign countries cannot be automatically applied to our country where the situation is different. + [Para 71 [660-B-EJ Aloke Nath Dutta's and Ors. v. State ofWest Bengal, (2006) 13 SCALE 467, dissented with 2. 3. The Court cannot legislate or amend the law. There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution and this Court must riot ordinarily encroach into the legislative or executive domain. [Para 8J (660-F) Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. The Workman ofIndian Drugs ;.... and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. , (20071 I' SCC 408, relied on. 2. 4.

There cannot be an absolute principle of law that merely because there has been a long lapse of the time from the commission of the offence and the final conviction and sentence by this Court the death penalty can never be imposed. It all depends on the facts ofeach case. It is well known that nowa-days a long interval of time frequently occurs between the commission of the offence and the final conviction by this Court (because of the delays in the trial, appeals, etc. ) and hence any absolute principle oflaw that merely because ofthis long interval death penalty cannot be imposed is laid down, then in all such cases merely because of lapse of time death penalty ~annot be imposed 1 even though the murder was cold blooded, diabolical and' heinous. This again would be amending the Constitution by a judicial verdict. Moreover this would give encouragement to the accused and their lawyers to delay proceedings in Court (by unnecessary adjournments, interlocutory applications, etc.

) to avoid ~he death penalty. [Para I0[ (661-A-CJ · 2. 5. It also cannot be said that in cases of circumstantial evidence ordinarily the death penalty should not be awarded. No such absolute -r _i proposition of the law can be laid down. It all depends on the facts of each case. Criminals have been hanged even on the basis ofcircumstantial evidence. SWAMY SHRADDAl'ANDA@MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STAll: OF KARNATAKA [S. B. SINHA. J. ] 627 ..... ,. _ -+· There is no principle of law that only direct evidence is strong and reliable while circumstantial evidence is weak and unreliable. Circumstantial evidence can be as strong aqd reliable as direct evidence, but the only requirement is that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that there is chain of links which connects the accused with the crime. (Para lll 1661-E-Fl CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 454 of ...... 2006. ... From the Judgment and Order dated 19. 9.

2005 of the High Court of Kamataka in Criminal Reference No. and Criminal Appeal No. 06 of2005 and 1086 of2005 respectively. Alok Vagrecha, Viresh Kumar Yadav, Banay K. Das and Varindar Kumar ' Sharma for the Appellant. Sanjay R. Hegde, Anil Kumar Mishra and Vikrant Yadav for the Respondent. . -, U. U. Lalit, Rana Mukherjee, Siddharth Gautam and Goodwill Indeevar ~ for the Intervenor. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. I. Appellant herein was convicted and sentenced to death for committing murder of his wife on or about 28. 05. 1991 at their residential house situate at 81, Richmond Road, Bangalore. The deceased was earlier married to one Akbar Khaleeli who was in the diplomatic service in the Government of India. She had four daughters. The deceased along with her children in ·the year 1983 visited the Maharaja of Rampur. There she was introduced to the appellant. Appellant at the relevant time was assisting the \> Rampur royal family.

In regard to the management of her landed properties, ... the deceased sought for his assistance. She had inherited huge properties including House No. 81, Richmond Road, Bangalore from her mother. She had inherited some other properties during her marriage. Some litigations in respect of the said properties had been going on. 2. Mr. Khaleeli on his assignment as diplomat of Iran went to the said country. The deceased together with her daughters started living at Bangalore. "-' Y AC-. UAly} MURALI MAl>UHARMlSHRA v. STATE m KAR. ,'-AI A1'. A l> 8 'i1'HA. JJ 629 great details as to the manner in which he had killed his wife and disposed -.. '+ bf her dead body. He also disclosed as to how a wooden box of size 2 x 7 x 2 was made. a pit was dug and how the dead body was buried there.

He narrated that how with the help of Raju he had put the box into the pit covered with mud and on the next day with the help of some masons brought by the said Raju kadapa stone slabs were put on the pit and the adjacent land and cemented the place. 6. In the said statement, he stated: ~ ~ "If I am taken I will show the place where the wooden box was prepared and the person who prepared it, the persons who transported the box and the people who helped in digging out the pit and the crow bar, spade, pan used for digging pit, the cement bags and the spot where Shakerah is buried and I exhume the dead body of the deceased and show you. The statement what all I had earlier given to Ashnknagar Police was a false statement given intentionally just to escape myself. " 7. An Executive Magistrate Syed Ejaj Ahmad (PW-3) was called for exhumation of the dead body. He asked a doctor to conduct exhumation -~ ·+ proceeding. On 30. 03. 1994, Dr.

Nissar Ahmed (PW-14) came to the place of occurrence for the said purpose. Appellant was asked as to whether he was ready to show the spot as per his earlier statement. The entire proceeding of exhumation of the dead body was video-graphed. It took place at about I0. 30 a. m. on the said day. Appellant with a chalk piece marked the spot. Coolies accompanying the party as per instructions of the appellant himself, dug the earth of the said place whereupon a box was noticed. The plank of the lid of the wooden box was removed. A bed, a nighty, pillow and bed sheets were recovered. Channaiah who had come along with Dr. Nissar Ahmed removed the scalp, skull and hairs of the head which were detached from the skull and / + other bone pieces. He also removed the pieces of the bones. Another Doctor Shri Thiruvanakkarasu also came there. They joined the bones and fixed the skull and mandible in orderly manner. It was found to be that of a human skeleton. The mother of the deceased Smt.

Gauhar Taj Namazie identified a ring which was embedded with red stone and two other black rings as belonging to the deceased. The nighty which was recovered was identified to be belonging to the deceased by the maid servant who had been working 'r in the house. - ~ 8. The post mortem examination commenced at 4. 45 p. m. on 30. 03. 1994 which ended at about 6 p. m. 9. Appellant was, thereafter, charged for commission of murder of his wife. Before the learned Trial Judge, 39 prosecution witnesses were examined. There was no eye-witness to the occurrence. The prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence. 10. The learned Trial Judge, as noticed hereinbefore, found the appellant guilty of commission of offence under Sections 302 and 20l of the Indian I-- -r- "' Penal Code and sentenced him to death. l l. Appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court. A reference was also made by the learned Judge in terms of Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12. The.

circumstances which were found to be existing by the High Court for proving commission of the offence are said to be : "(a) Motive - Murder for gain ~~ (b) The deceased Shakereh was last seen alive in May 199 l when she + . , was residing at No. 81, Richmond Road, Bangalore along with accused and his wife. (c) Strange conduct of the accused after 28-5-91 (d) A wooden box (M0. 5) was got prepared and brought to the house by the accused. (e) Discovery of the wooden box containing a skeleton and feminine articles buried in the backyard of the said house of the accused and I" the deceased in furt~erance of information furnished by the accused. -+ " T' (t) Fixing. the identity of the skeleton as that of the deceased with the ~ r= help ofskull and the admitted undisputed photograph ofMrs. Shakereh by photo Super-imposition method. (g) Fixing the identity of the skeleton as that of the deceased on the . basis of DNA finger printing. . JI (h) Identifying some of the articles like MOs.

5, 6, 8, 11 to 17 along ( with the skeleton in the box as belonging to the deceased. SWAMY SHRADDAJIOANDA@MURALI MA! l;OHAR MISHRA"· STATEOF KARl'ATAKA [S. B Sll"HA. J. ) 63 J (i) The last circumstance put forth i. e. , the attempt of the accused to ..... ~ mislead or to give false explanation. " 13. Before the High Court, a contention was raised that before imposition of sentence, the appellant had not been granted adequate opportunity to make a representation as was mandatorily required under Sub-section (2) of Section 235 ofthe Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973. The High Court gave the appellant an opportunity of being heard. Before the High Court, the appellant accepted that he was instrumental in burying the dead body stating: _.. ,. - "The accused submitted that he is innocent and has been illegally convicted.

He submitted that as the family members of the deceased (parents and daughters) had filed number of cases against the deceased, she was mentally depressed and was taking number of sedative pills/ drugs; that she died naturally in May 1991 and as he feared adverse consequences, especially repercussions from her family members and community people, he buried her body in the backyard -· of his house without informing anybody. He submitted that though this fact was not stated by him in the trial court, as he could not bear L... i, it any more and after thinking over the matter for the last few years, + he has decided to come out with this truth. He submitted that as he is innocent, his conviction be set aside and he be acquitted.

So far as the sentence is concerned, he submitted that as now he is 61 years old and suffering from serious ailments like diabetes, hypertension and hernia and as he is in custody for the last 11 years, mercy be shown to him by reducing the capital punishment, if ever the court decides to convict him. " 14. The High Court, however, affirmed the judgment ofconviction and sentence. -+ 15. Mr. Alok Vagrecha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant raised the following contentions in support of this appeal: / (i) A First Information Report having been already lodged by PW- 5, a second report by the Investigating Officer - PW-37 lodged on 28. 03. 1994 (Ex. P-171) was illegal. (ii) The purported recovery of the wooden box containing some -~ articles and the bones which were not admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act as the location of the dead body was already known, the purported statement made by the appellant (Ex.

P 175) being wholly inadmissible in evidence, consequent recovery ofthe dead body would also be inadmissible. In this connection our attention has been drawn to the fact that the appellant was given an opportunity to have the services of a lawyer during interrogation. (iii) If the prosecution case is true that the appellant had administered sedative to the deceased on 28. 05. 1991 in the afternoon, the courts below should have also taken into consideration that in. ..... view ofthe statement ofthe investigating officer that the appellant -+ at about the same time on 28. 05. 1991 was found to be in the company of one Rekha Handa, a former Miss India, the prosecution case must be held to have not been proved as against the appellant. (iv) A Will and General Power of Attorney having already been executed by the deceased, the appellant could not have any motive to kill her.

(v) The purported circumstances on the basis whereof the judgment ofconviction and sentence have been rendered does not complete ~ -+ all the links in the chain as tbere had been (a) no recovery of drug; (b) motive had not been proved; and (c) there was no proof that she died of poisoning. (vi) The purported recovery ofdrug on 31. 03. 1994 by the Investigating Officer was wholly inadmissible in evidence. (vii) The High Court having recorded that the deceased did not meet any violent death, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and in any event the death sentence should not have beeri imposed. "'! "" -+ (viii) The High Court committed a serious illegality in relying upon the statement made by the appellant before it as being confession of his guilt although the same was meant to be used for the purpose of hearing on the question of sentence only. 16. Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, on the other hand, supported the judgment.

The learned counsel would contend that the court while analyzing the evidences brought on records . ,,-should keep in mind the following facts: -- (a) The deceased was a beautiful woman. She had a husband and SWAMY SHRADDA. ,AM>A@ M\;RALI MAl'OHAR MISHRA "· STATEOt KARNATAKAIS. B. Sl:"HA. J. ) -... .. four daughter (b) She was an owner of huge property (c) She met her death at the age of 40 years. (d) Appellant although could enjoy all the luxuries of life, he had greed for more money and, therefore, hatched a plan to murder the deceased wherefor he got prepared a wooden box, took advantage of temporary absence of the two old servants and at ~ ~ the opportune moment administered sedative to the deceased. (f) Despite her death, he had been operating the bank account which was a joint account and had been acting on the basis of the General Power of Attorney.

(g) He kept PW-5 at dark although she had been constantly making enquiry in regard to the whereabouts of the deceased for one and half years. (h) The manner in which the dead body was found categorically ...... , shows the vicious mind of the appellant as the bed-sheet was ... ,_ found on her face, her jewelery was found on the top ofthe body, the deceased had nighty on her person and, thus, it was essentially principally a planned murder. 17. We have not doubt that the deach of the deceased was homicidal in nature. The identity of the dead body has also been established. The circumstances in which the deceased married the appellant have also not been disputed. Their marriage was proved by PW-8 T. H. Lokeshminarayana. Appellant also did not deny or dispute that he had been living with the deceased at all material times at 81, Richmond Road, Bangalore. It has .. furthermore not been disputed that she had not been seen on and from + 28. 05. 1991. 18.

We have noticed hereinbefore the circumstances which are said to have been found by the courts below. The law in this behalf is now no longer res integra. 19. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622, this Court held: --y "l 53. A close analysis ofthis decision would show that the following condition. s must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (I) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be draw41 should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be provt. J" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p.

1047] "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can cor:vict and the mental dis•ance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. " (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the ·D hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, + (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. " 20.

In regard to the circumstantial evidence in a case of death by poisoning, this Court opined: "So far as this matter is concerned, in such cases the court must carefully scan t'ie evidence and determine the four important circumstances wf'ich alone can justify a conviction: (I) there is a clear motive for an accused to administer poison to the deceased, (2) that the deceased died of poison said to have been administered, ~AMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHARMISHRA •. STATEOF KARNATAKA (S. B. SINHA. J. ] 635 (3) that the accused had the poison in his possession, .. ~· (4) that he had an opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased. " [See also Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [2006) 13 SCALE467] 21. We may proceed to consider the matter keeping in view the aforementioned legal principle in mind. 22. Dr. Nissar Ahamed who examined himself as PW-14 in his evidence proved the exhumation of the dead body.

It, as noticed hereinbefore, was conducted by the Taluka Magistrate PW-3. Upon removal of the detached skull, mandible, carpal and tarsal, palm and bones from the pit of feet, all the said bones were assembled on plastic paper. A Human skeleton was formed. There was a foul smell. According to him, all the bones were intact. The skeleton was that of a human body. In the post mortem examination, it was found: "Decomposed and Skeletanised body removed from the wooden box described. The body was removed in piece meal from the box as the ... bones were easily coming out from the joints and body was assembl~d in anatomical position which consists ofskull with black hair measuring E . 25" long. " It was further noticed: "The bones one below the other are: Skull bone with mandible, two clavicles, two scapulae, bones ofupper limbs and lower limbs, vertebral column, pelvis and carple and tarsal bones. The decomposed tissue were greish white in colour emitting foul smell.

All bones were intact skull shows female characteristic feature, articulate well with were each other. Skull suture completely obliterated endocrenaly, partially obliterated exocreinaly. All teeth erupted showed attrition. The stature was calculated from long bones and average taken from the bones. Right Femur - 46 ems. Right Tibia - 39 ems. - -,. Left Humorus - 32. 5 ems and estimated stature is 5'4" to 5'6" Four Pieces of body of sternum fused. " 23. All the internal organs were found to be decomposed and liquefied. He, however, reserved his opinion in regard to the cause of death pending chemical analysis. The doctor preserved skull and mandible for super imposition and visera and hair for chemical analysis report and bone marrow hair and soft tissues for DNA Fingerprinting. 24. PW-14 on the basis of the s:tid FSL report formed his opinion that the cause of death cannot be furnished as the percentage/ amount of Chlodiazepoxide consumed had not been furnished.

ln regard to the effect of Chlordizaepoxide on human body, however, his opinion was as under: ·"The effect of Chlordiazopoxide on human body depengJ; upon the dosage. They are weight gain, as a result of increase appeti\e, anxiety, nausea, vertigo, impaired sexual function, menstrual irregularities, skin rashes, agramlocytosis etc. " ln regard to the effect of over dose of the said medicine, it was stated: "Effects of over dose are rare, as the drug has got remarkable safety margins. A few deaths have been reported at doses grea~er than 700 mgs as per the literature. The symptoms are respiratory and cardiovascular, dis-function due to the suppression of higher centers in the brain. " 25. PW-14 in his cross-examination opined that the death ofthe deceased was homicidal. According to him, if the deceased had consumed only one or two tablets of Equibrom and her body was put in a box and lid was closed suddenly, an unexpected death may occur due to natural causes also.

It is not a case where the dead body was not identified to that of the deceased. Blood sample of PW-5 was taken. Blood samples of Mirza Gulam Hussain Namazie and Gauhar Taj Begum Namazie had also been taken. PW-20 ~rimannarayan, Chief Medical Officer of Bowring Hospital, in his evidence, spoke about the G. result of the ONA analysis in regard to taking of the blood samples. 26. The bones were sent for DNA test to Hyderabad Forensic Science Laboratory through Forensic Science Laboratory, Bangalore. The test was conducted by Dr. Laljit Singh, Scientist, who was examined as PW-24. According to him, he and Dr. G. V. Rao (PW-17), another scientist in Hyderabad together carried the process of DNA isolation and testing from Exs. A to D, ,.. _ SWAMY SHRAODANA1'0A@ Mt;RALI MANOHAR MISHRA •·. STATEOf KAR1'ATAl. A [S. B SINHA. J. ) ~ "r i. e. , from blood of the father, teeth of the deceased, hair of the deceased and blood of the mother in two tests being Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and HI.

:A DQ typing both the tests confirmed that the deceased was the offspring of the said Mirza Gulam Hussain Namazie and Gauhar Taj Begum Namazie. 27; PW-17 Dr. G. V. Rao categorically stated that in carrying out DNA fingerprinting they followed the same procedure as in the case of blood samples received earlier whieh were examined. He proved the report prepared . > by him and Dr. Laljit Singh on 4. 10. 1995 which was marked as Ex. P-155. ... 28. PW-I Dr. T. R. Kumari was an Assistant Director of Forensic Science Laboratory. She gave her opinion on 15. 09. 1994 which was marked as Ex. P- 125 stating: "I. Presence of Clonazepam was detected in article no. l(a) & l(b). 2. Presence of Alprazolam was detected in article No. l(b) & l(f). ~ 3. Presence of Diazepam was detected in article No. I(c). ... 4. Presence of Chlodizepoxide was detected in No. l(e), Ill & IV. I. 5. No poison was detected in article No. l(h). " 29. Dr. T. R.

Kumari (PW-I) conducted the Photo Superimposition Method Test on the skull, which was marked as MO- I along with the admitted photograph of the deceased, which was marked as M0-3. According to the said witness, anthropometric characters or land marks of the skull and the superimposed admitted photographs matched. She prepared a report, which was marked as Ex. P-2. Her qualification as an expert to conduct the said test is not in doubt. Even otherwise, she holds a Ph. D. degree in Forensic Science. She has been awarded a medal for her research work by the Madras Forensic Society of India. She has also undergone special training in photo superimposition and has submitted a number of papers thereon. Her report as also the report of PW-17 are relevant evidences. 30. The qualification of the expert has not been questioned before us.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has not raised any contention which would point out that the methodology conducted by the ~ -~ experts in carrying out the study was in any manner unscientific or raised any suspicion as regards the correctness thereof. 31. It is borne out from the records that even the photographs were brought by PW-I before the trial court. Identity ofthe skull vis-a-vis the other parts of the body, thus, categorically goes to show that the same was that of the deceased, Smt. Shakereh. 32. It has also not been seriously disputed that the deceased was last seen in the company of the appellant. The fact that she had not been seen alive from May, 1991 also stands fully established. 33. We will hereinafter notice the circumstances which existed in ~. establishing the commission of the crime. 34. PW-5 Sabah Khaleeli, was the daughter of the deceased through her first husband.

She in her deposition categorically stated that she had spoken to her mother on 19. 04. 1991. She was not available on phone from May, 1991 onwards. Gauhar Namazee (PW-25) was the mother of the deceased. She in her deposition stated that she had last seen the deceased on 13. 04. 1991. She had not been cross-exainined on the said point. It is also not disputed that PW-18 and PW-19, who were husband and wife, were engaged by the deceased. They saw the deceased in the company of the appellant in the morning of28. 05. 1991, for the last time. The said witnesses were staying in a servant quarter in the said premises. PW-18 was working as gardener-cumhandyman; whereas PW-19 was working as maid servant, since 1988. They stated in unison that they had seen the deceased at about 07. 30 A. M. on that day. According to PW-19, she went to the kitchen to prepare tea for the couple and kept the tea cups on the dining table.

She in no uncertain terms stated that the cups of tea were taken by the appellant to the bed-room where the deceased was reading a newspaper. PW-19 while sweeping the house was called by the deceased and was instructed to clean the articles kept in the showcase instead of sweeping. They, however, received a telegram at about 10. 00 a. m. whereby they were informed that the sister-in-law of PW-19 was sick at Gudisuvarapally in the State of Andhra Pradesh. They sought for leave and some money. They were permitted to leave Bangalore and were asked to collect the requisite amount after some time. They came back to their quarters and started packing their goods. At about 1. 30 p. m. they went back to the house. PW-18, however, was said to have been asked by the appellant herein to shift a wooden box kept in the guest house to the bed room before leaving.

They together with some others took a large wooden box from the guest house and kept the same inside the bed room, where they found the deceased sleeping on the bed. They were thereafter paid a sum of Rs. 1,200/- towards their salary and additional sum of Rs. 500/- towards travelling expenses. They left for their home. They came back after a couple of days, but did not find SWAMYSHJW)DANAl\'DA@ML'RALI MANOHARMISHRA '" STA11'0F KARNATAKA[S. B. SINHA. J. ] 639 the deceased. The said two witnesses in their depositions corroborated each ~ 1 other. 35. We have noticed hereinbefore that the appellant had applied for grant ofanticipatory bail in July, 1992 i. e. after the missing complaint was filed by PW-5. In the said application for bail, the appellant himself disclosed that the deceased had left for unknown destination in the month of May, 1991, allegedly because of her agitated mental condition. ~ ~ '" 36.

If it is proved that the deceased died in an unnatural circumstance in her bed room, which was occupied only by her and her husband, law requires the husband to offer an explanation in this behalf. We, however, do not intend to Jay down a general law in this behalf as much woulcl depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Absence of any explanation by the husband would lead to an inference which would lead to a circumstance against the accused. 37. We may, however, notice that recently in Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State ofBihar & Anr. , [2007] 1 SCALE 19 : JT (2007) I SC 239, ..... ~ this Court opined : "Once the prosecution has been able to show that at the relevant time, the room and terrace were in exclusive occupation of the couple, the E' burden of proof Jay upon the respondent to show under v·hat circumstances death was caused to his wife. The onus was on him. He failed to discharge the same.

" This legal position would appear from a decision of this court in Nika Ram v. The State of Himacha/ Pradesh, AIR (1972) SC 2077 wherein it was held: ~ "It is in the evidence ofGirju PW that only the accused and Churi deceased resided in the house of the accu. sed. To similar effect are the statements of Mani Ram (PW 8), who is the uncle of the accused, and Bhagat Ram school teacher (PW 16). According to Bhagat Ram, he saw the accused and the deceased together at their house on the day ofoccurrence. Mani Ram (PW 8) saw the accused at his house at 3 p. m. , while Poshu Ram, (PW 7) saw the ~ accused and the deceased at their house on the evening of the day of occurrence. The accused also does not deny that he was with the deceased at his house on the day of occurrence. The house of the accused, according to plan PM, consists of one residential room one other small room and a varandah. The correctness of that plan is proved by A. R. Verma overseer (PW 5).

The fact that the accused alone was with Churi deceased in the house when she was murdered there with the Khokhri and the fact that the relations of the accused with the deceased, as would be shown hereafter, were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. " Jt. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State ofMaharashtra, JT (2006) 9 SC 50, the law is stated in the following terms: "Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succe1::ds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission ofcrime they were seen together or the offence took place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission ofthe crime... " 38.

We have noticed hereinbefore as to why the investigation was taken over by the Central Crime Branch. As the interrogation of the appellant, while in custody ofthe police, revealtd the possibility of the deceased having been buried in the backyard of her residential house, the Investigating Officer requested the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to conduct exhumation proceedings, who in turn, authorized the Taluka Executive Magistrate (PW-3) to do so. Confession ofthe accused was not admissible in evidence. What was admissible only was that part of the confession leading to the discovery of fact in terms of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The proceedings were conducted in the prese~ce ofthe accused, which were videographed and marked as M0- 18. The learned Trial Judge as also the learned Judges of the High Court had the benefit of watching the said videograph.

The High Court in its impugned judgment recorded : "The videograph and the inquest proceeding disclose that a large wooden box was found buried in the backyard of the house of the accused and the deceased and contained a skeleton. The videograph 1 .... recording which is not disputed by the accused, clearly discloses and shows that it was the accused who was pointing out the exact spot SWAMY SHRADDANANDA @MURALI MANOHAk "llSHRA "· STATEOF KARNAT AKA[S. 8. Sl! ';HA, J. ) 64} to be dug up in the big backyard and in fact marked the area with a ~ .... chalk. The videograph further showed that the backyard flooring was of well laid Cuddapah stones properly cemented. In such a situation, in our view, nobody except the person who buried the box could have the knowledge of its burial. " 39. Discovery of the last remains of the deceased was a relevant fact, which was, thus, admissible in evidence. Appellant had pinpointed the exact place which was to be dug up. He marked the exact area.

He also made an ' )oral statement that the box was buried beneath the area so marked, location whereof showed that it was a big area, flooring of which had been well plastered with cement having Cuddapah stone slabs. The video showed that the slabs had been laid there much earlier and were not of recent origin. 40. In Aloke Nath Dutta (supra), in regard to applicability of Section 26 and Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was stated : "The policy underlying behind Sections 25 and 26 is to make it a substantive rule of law that confessions whenever and wherever 11111111 made to the police, or while in the custody ofthe police to any person .... ' whomsoever unless made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be presumed to have been obtained under the circumstances mentioned in Section 24 and, therefore, inadmissible, except so far as is provided by Section 27 of the Act. " 41. Pulukuri Kottayya v.

King Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 67 is an authority for the proposition that "fact discovered" envisaged under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given in that behalf must relate distinctly to that effect, stating : >- "The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of infoimation received from a . person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police Officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as related distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. " It was further observed : ~ "In their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered" within the section as equivalent to thP. object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is .

produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the infonnation given must relate distinctly to this fact. " "lnfonnation supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery ofa knife, knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the infonnant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. " 42. An attempt was made by the Bombay High Court to take a different view in Shri Shankar Gopal Patil & Ors. v. The State ofMaharashtra, (2000) 5 Born. CR 360. 43. The legal proposition propounded in Pullukuri Kottaya (supra) has been considered by this Court in Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of ·.. Maharashtra, (1969] 2 SCC 872, Shamshuk Kanwar v. State ofUP. , (1995] 4 SCC 430 and State ofMaharashtra v.

Damu, (2000] 6 SCC 269, wherein this Court reiterated it with approval. - 44. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, in our opinion, was not correct to contend that only because the investigating team having regard to the purported confession made by the appellant had already known that a ·dead body had been buried in the house, Section 27 of the Evidence Act would not be attracted. In his statements before the investigating officer, he made a confession; but what was admissible in evidence is only that part which would come within the purview of Section 27 ofthe Evidence Act and not the rest. The court while analyzing the evidence and appreciating the same cannot take note of confession made before the police. 45. The prosecution case must rest on the other materials brought before the court.

It is also not pennissible to start with the confession and find corroborative evidence thereof and come back to the confession again for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion of guilt. 46. What was, therefore, relevant for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act was that at the instance of the appellant himself a particular place which had been pin pointed by him had been dug and remains ofa body and other articles were recovered. SWAMY SHRAOOMANOA (r;> MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATl: Uf KARNATAKA (S. B. SINHA. J. ) 64J 47. The various circumstances leading to the pointing out the guilt of ~" the appellant and appellant alone have been enumerated by us hereinbefore. From our discussions, it is evident that each of the circumstances had been established, the cumulative effect whereof would show that all the links in the chain are complete and the conclusion of the guilt is fully established. 48.

We are not oblivious of the fact that there is a material difference between 'may be' and 'must be' and furthermore in a case of this nature the evidence must be considered with more than ordinary care lest the shocking nature of crime induce an instinctive reaction against a dispassionate judicial • scrutiny of the facts and law. {See Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1952) SC 159]. 49. The question, however, is as to whether in a case of this nature death sentence should be imposed. In Aloke Nath Dutta (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider a large number of decisions taking different ,views in regard to the interpretation of the words "rarest of rare cases" as I: adumbrated in Bachan Singh v. State ofPunjab, [1980] 2 SCC 684. ... SO.

This Court had also the occasion therein to notice the growing ~ demand in the international fora and in particular the second Optional Protocol to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and the Protocol to the American Constitution on Human Rights abolished that death penalty should be abolished. 51. Recently, the Privy Council in Reyes v. R. (2002) UKPC 11 : 12 BHRC 219 and Hughes, R. v. (Saint Lucia) (2002) UKPC 12, noticing the decision of this Court in Mithu v. State ofPunjab, [1983] 2 SCR 6903, opined that the mandatory death punishment is unconstitutional. {See also Fox v. The Queen (2002) 2 AC 284, Bowe v. The Queen (2006) I WLR 1623 and Coard & Ors. v. The Attorney General (Grenada), (2007) UKPC 7]. ~ 52.

Abolition of death penalty is not being and, in fact, cannot be advocated; but what requires serious consideration is as to whether the jurisdiction should not be invoked unless there exists an extra-ordinary situation to find that it comes within the purview of "rarest of rare" cases. The approach of the courts should not be to confine its thought process to the identification of a "rare" case. The expression "rarest of rare" case has been evolved by a Constitution Bench ofthis Court and, thus, demands a meaningful application. t 53. It is interesting to note that Bhagwati, J. in Bachan Singh v. State f ~1 ofPunjab, [1982] 3 SCC 24, while expressing his dissenting opinion, noticed as under : "...

This arbitrariness in the imposition ofdeath penalty is considerably accentuated by the fragmented Bench structure of our courts where Benches are inevitably formed with different permutations and· combinations from time to time and cases relating to the offence of murder come up for hearing sometimes before one Bench, sometimes before another sometimes before a third and so on. Professor ~ Blackshield has in his article on Capital Punishment in India published in Volume 21 ot the Journal of the Indian Law Institute pointed out how the practice of Bench formation contributes to arbitrariness in the imposition ofdeath penalty. It is well known that so far as the Supreme Court is concerned, while the number of Judges has increased over the years, the number of Judges on Benches which hear capital punishment cases has actually decreased. Most cases are now heard " by two-Judge Benches.

Professor Blackshield has abstracted 70 cases in which the Supreme Court had to choose between life and death ,_ while sentencing an accused for the offence of murder and analysing >these 70 cases he has pointed out that during the period April 28, 1972 to March 8, 1976 only 11 Judges ofthe Supreme Court participated in 10 per cent or more . :>f the cases. He has listed these 11 Judges in an ascending order of leniency based on the proportion for each Judge of plus votes (i. e. votes for the death sentence) to total votes and pointed out that these statistics show how the judicial response to the question of life and death varies from judge to judge. It is significant to note that out of 70 cases analysed by Professor Blackshield, 37 related to the period subsequent to the coming into force ofSection 354, sub-section (3) ofthe Code ofCriminal Procedure, ~ 1973.

Ifa similar exercise is performed with reference to cases decided by the Supreme Court after March 8, 1976, that being the date up to which the survey carried out by Professor Blackshield was limited, the analysis will reveal the same pattern of incoherence and arbitrariness, the decision to kill or not to kill being guided to a large extent by the composition of the Bench. Take for example Rajendra Prasad case decided on February 9, 1979. In this case, the death sentence imposed on Rajendra Prasad was commuted to life imprisonment by a majority , / 1~~ consisting of Krishna Iyer, J. and Desai, J. , A. P. Sen, J. dissented and was of the view that the death sentence should be confirmed. Similarly SWAMY SHRADDAl\A~DA (!!! MURALI MA1'0HAR MISHRA "· STATEOF KARNATAKA [S. B. SINHA. J. ) 645 in one of the cases before us, namely, Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, when it was first heard by a Bench consisting of Kailasam and Sarkaria, JJ. , Kailasam, J.

was definitely of the view that the majority decision in Rajendra Prasad case9 was wrong and that is why he referred that case to the Constitution Bench. So also in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, the majority consisting of Krishna Iyer, J. and Desai, J. took the view that the death sentence imposed on Dalbir Singh should be commuted to life imprisonment while A. P. Sen, J. stuck to the original view taken by him in Rajendra Prasad case 9 and was inclined to confirm the death sentence, It will thus be seen that the exercise of discretion whether to inflict death penalty or not depends to a considerable extent on the value system and social philosophy of the Judges constituting the Bench... " 54. We are not oblivious of a line of decisions of this Court where the doctrine of proportionality has been applied, even in the matter of awarding death penalty. [See State ofRajasthan v. Kheraj Ram, [2003] 8 SCC 224, Bablu @Mubarik Hussain v.

State ofRajasthan, [2006] 14 SCALE 15 and Shivu and Anr. v. R. G. High Court ofKarnataka and Anr.. [2007] 3 SCALE 157] 55. In this case we need not go into the correctness or otherwise of the said view. Although it is also not necessary to do so, we may notice some development of law in this regard. 56. Criminal Justice Act 1991 of England famously hailed doctrine of proportionality as the guiding principle. But since the 199I legislation, field of sentencing has seen much reform and Criminal Justice Act of2003 presents a fresh set of sentencing objectives.

Section 142 of the Act delineates the following as the purposes of sentencing: "142 Purposes of sentencing (1) Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have regard to the following purposes of sentencing- (a) the punishment of offenders, (b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence), (c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, (d) the protection of the public, and (e) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences. " 57. In this context, a reference should also be made of the Halliday Report of2001 (Making Punishments Work) which has some interesting insights to offer on the sentencing structure in England and Wales. In the same vein, a White Paper in 2002 has made a case of reforms and suggested a shift from the proportionality principle. 58.

In fine, scholarship on sentencing which has been quite diverse in its prescriptions certainly has consensus on the point that any decision Qn sentencing aspect would require assessing more than one variables and single minded pursuit of any one sentencing ideal would be discounting on other equally urgent parameters and objectives. 59. We do not have a sentencing policy, unlike some other countries. England has the concept of "guideline judgments" which is considered as a judge managed sentencing model rather than a statute induced one. Section 354 (3) suggests that Indian law furthers statute induced sentencing guidance in part. Therefore it has to be given full colour. 60. We have no practice of referring such matters to superior courts for laying down the guidelines relating to imposition of sentence under various situations. [See The Queen v. Julie McGinley and Michael Monaghan, (2003) NICC I] 61. In our country, therefore, each case may have to be considered on its own merit.

' 62. It may be ofsome interest to note that Furman v. Georgia [408 U. S. 238 (1972)] ruled on the requirement for a degree of consistency in the application of the death penalty. Justice Stewart held that: "The penalty ofdeath differs from all other forms ofcriminal punishment, not in degree, but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic T purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute . ' SWA~IY SHRADDAl'ANDA ii!! MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATEOF KARNATAKA [S. B. SINHA. l ] 647 renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity. ..... ••••••••• These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.

For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in l 967 and l968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact ... been imposed. " >- 63. Justice Brennan while interpreting Eighth Amendment (Amendment VIII: (Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted) of US Constitution observes in Furman: "In determining whether a punishment comports with human dignity, we are aided also by a second principle inherent in the Clause - that the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment. This principle derives from the notion that the State does not respect human dignity .... when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment -': that it does not inflict upon others. Indeed, the very words "cruel and unusual punishments" imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments. " 64.

It is important to refer to Harbans Singh v. Union of India AIR (1982) SC 849 at this juncture. In that case three people were sentenced to death by the trial court for playing an equal part in jointly murdering a family of four persons. The sentence of all the three was confirmed by the High Court. Each of them moved to the Supreme Court by different Special Leave Petitions before three separate benches. One of the accused's petition was dismissed and he was actually executed. Another's petition was allowed and his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. And the petition of the third one was also dismissed. He filed a review petition, which was also dismissed, and the Executive refused clemency. He then moved another petition before the Supreme Court bringing to light this arbitrariness. The Supreme Court recommended the President to commute his sentence. Chandrachud J. while lamenting the death of dead accus~d said: ..

~ "The fate of Jeeta Singh has a posthumous moral to tell. He cannot profit by the direction which we propose to give because he is now beyond the process of human tribunals. " 65. Bentham's discourse on determination of minimum punishment and maximum punishment serves as a yardstick in this context. Bentham in his landmark treatise Principles ofPenal Law propose to establish a proportion between crimes and punishments. But he cautions against an oracular understanding than an instructive one. We here further go in the details of what doctrine of proportionality holds in the realm of sentencing. The first rule of proportionality mandates: "The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what ,. is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence. " -. "( While talking of minimum punishment Bentham observes: "Punishments may be too small or too great; and there are reasons for not making them too small, as well as not making them too great.

The terms minimum and maximum may serve to mark the two extremes of this question, which require equal attention. With a view of marking out the limits of punishment on the side of the first of these extremes, we may lay it down as a rule:- ,_. That the value of the punishment must not be less in any case than r what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence. By the profit of the crime, must be understood not only pecuniary profit, but every advantage real or apparent, which has 9perated as a motive to the commission of the crime. " 66. It is to be appreciated here that statutorily decided minimum sentence takes into account the basic value of the crime and suffice to outweigh the profit of the offence. The moot question relates to parameters to decide the maximum punishment. Setting the trail ofcaution on the side ofdetermination of maximum punishment Bentham posits: 1 "Punishment, whatever shape it may assume, is an evil...

The minimum of punishment is more clearly marked than its maximum. What is too little is more clearly observed than what is tuo much. What is not sufficient is easily seen, but it is not possible so exactly to distinguish an excess. An approximation only can be attained. The · irregularities in the force of temptations, compel the legislator to increase his punishments till they are not merely sufficient to restrain the ordinary desires of men; but also the violence of their desires SWA. '\IY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [S. B. Sll\llA. J. ] 649 when unusually excited. ... ' The greatest danger lies in an error on the minimum side, because in this case the punishment is inefficacious; but this error is least likely to occur, a slight degree of attention sufficing for its escape; and when it does exist, it is at the same time clear and manifest, and easy to be remedied.

An error on the maximum side, on the contrary, is that to which legislators and men in general are naturally inclined-antipathy, or a want of compassion for individuals who are represented as - > dangerous and vile, pushes them onward to an undue severity. It is on this side therefore, that we should take the most preparations, as on this side there has been shown the greatest disposition to err. " 67. On the same point Beccaria in his historic work Of Crimes and Punishments denounced retributive basis of punishment. "The aim ofpunishment can only be to prevent the criminal committing new crimes against his countrymen, and to keep others from doing likewise. Punishments, therefore, and the method of inflicting them, should be chosen in due proportion to the crime so as to make the - ~ most efficacious and lasting impression on the minds ofmen, and the least painful impressions on the body of the criminal.

For a punishment to be efficacious, it is enough that the disadvantage of the punishment should exceed the advantage anticipated from the crime; in which excess should be calculate the certainty ofpunishment and the loss of the expected benefit. Everything beyond this, accordingly, is superfluous, and therefore tyrannical. " 68. There is a clear and discernible necessity of caution to set the maximum punishment in an offence. And also by implication there must be intensive and exhaustive inquiry into accused related parameters before employing the maximum sentence by a court of law. Therefore discretion to the judiciary in this respect (to declare the maximum punishment) is ofutmost critical and seminal value. Reasons must be detailed setting clearly why any punishment other than the maximum punishment will not suffice. This is general and age-old rule of sentencing which has been statutorily recognized under section 354(3). ~· -- 69.

Reference to the decision of other jurisdictions and/or the recent trend in the international fora has not been referred to by way of precedents or even a persuasive value but the court in this age cannot afford to put down (2007) 7 S. C. R. blinkers on its window to the outside world. 70. It is noteworthy to mention here the Law Commission in its Report of 1967 took the view that capital punishment acted as a deterrent to crime. While it conceded that statistics did not prove these so-called deterrent effects. It also said that figures did not disprove them either. 71. Tracing the judicial vie 'I on Death Penalty, one can start with the Jagmohan Singh case (1973) where it agreed with the Law Commission that ... unfortunately due to her infatuation fell into his clutches. 28. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no reason for the appellant to murder the deceased since the deceased had executed a will in his favour.

In my opinion, this argument is not tenable because it is well settled that a will comes into operation only on the death of the testator. The deceased was only in her forties, and her natural death · may have occurred several decades later. The appellant was obviously not T --willing to wait for so long before he could grab her property and hence he decided to murder her. No doubt no poisonous substance was detected in the skeleton of the deceased and hence the prosecution case that the accused mixed poison in her tea could not be finnly established. However, even ifthe exact method of murder has not been established by the prosecution, I have no manner of doubt that it was the ll. ppellant who murdered the deceased. 29. During the course of hearing of the case we asked learned counsel for the appellant as to what was the profession or qualification ofthe accused,; but he could not give any satisfactory answer.

It seems to us that the accused t is a cold-blooded, scallywag and rascal who had no proper qualificatio~ or profession. Such diabolical and cunning rogues are to be found in abundance nowadays. It is the total commercialization ofsociety which is responsible for this recent phenomenon. People have become greedy and wish to amass wealth by short cuts, even by committing heinous crimes. The appellant had changed his name and had become a 'Swamy'. By some dubious means he had ingratiated himself into the house of the Nawab of Rampur and there he developed contact with the deceased, who was evidently having differences • with her husband. The accused pretended to be a very simple and innocent person and this made the deceased start depending on him, particularly for (' looking after her property matters. The deceased brought the accused to her house in Bangalore where the deceased married her and thereafter he determined to grab all her property after killing her.

All the property transactions in this connection and other evidence (narrated above) point only to this conclusion. The accused is an unmitigated and diabolical rogue who could go to any extent, including murder to achieve his object of grabbing huge amount of property of the deceased. He was in a dominating position over the deceas'ed who had become dependan~ on him, and he took full advantage of this r situation. He had motive and opportunity for committing this ghastly crime. ;..... SWAMYSHRAOOANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATEOf KARNATAKAIKATIU. J. ) 669 30. In my opinion, this case clearly comes within the category of rarest A of rare cases and there will be gross travesty ofjustice if the death sentence is not affirmed. Hence, I dismiss this appeal and confirm the death sentence on the accused. ORDER In view of the difference of opinion with regard to the quantam of B punishment, the matter is referred to larger Bench. T K. K. T. · Referred to larger Bench. .....