SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH STANDING COUNSEL & ANR

Citation: [2008] 12 S.C.R. 132

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR, MARKANDEY KATJU

Case summary

SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH STANDING COUNSEL & ANR.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 12 S. C. R. 132 l>, SWARAN SINGH & ORS. V. STATE THROUGH STANDING COUNSEL & ANR. (Criminal Appeal No. 1287 of 2008) AUGUST 18, 2008 [ALTAMAS KABIR AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ. ] 1 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989- s. 3 (1) (x) - Charges under- Of three accused - For calling a person 'Chamar' - Quashing of charges sought - Held: Calling a member of Scheduled Caste as 'Chamar' with intent to insult or humiliate is an offence - Ascertainment of the intent, however, is matter of evidence - 'Chamar' though is name of a Caste, is often used in derogatory sense - While interpreting the provision popular meaning of the word 'chamar' should be taken into account and not its etgmological meaning - On perusal of FIR prima "' facie criminal case is made out against accused Nos. 2 and ":" 3 - The act was done in public view with intent to insult or humiliate the informant- Accused No.

1 though uttered the word in derogatory sense, but since it was not done in public view, he is not liable to be charged -Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 482 - Constitution of India, 1950 -Article 21. Words and Phrases - 'Chamar' - Meaning of in the context of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. ,. J:- Appellant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were charged u/s 3 (1) of Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, on the basis of FIR alleging that the appellants had addressed him as 'Chamar'. Against the order of framing charges, appellants filed Criminal Revi- ~ sion which was dismissed by High Court. Hence the present appeal. STANDING COUNSEL & ANR. ~"' Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. 1 It is true that Chamar is the name of a caste among Hindus who were traditionally persons who made leather goods by handicraft.

However, today the word 'Chamar' is often used by people belonging to the socalled upper castes or even by OBCs as a word of insult, abuse and derision. Calling a person 'Chamar' is nowa- { days an abusive language and is highly offensive. In fact, the word 'Chamar' when used today is not normally used to denote a caste but to intentionally insult and humiliate someone. [Paras 13 and 21] [139, B; 141,D] 'The People of India' by Watson Kaye; 'The Tribes & Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh' by W. Crooke; 'The Chamars of Uttar Pradesh' by A. B Mukerji; 'The Chamar Artisans' by Satish Kumar Sharma; 'The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western India' by W. Crooke - re- >: ferred to .. ,. 1. 2 While interpreting Section 3(1 )(x) of Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the purpose for which the Act was enacted, has to be seen.

It was obviously made to prevent indignities, humiliation and harassment to the members of SC/ST community, as is evident from the Statement of objects & reasons of the Act. Hence, while interpreting Section 3(1 )(x) of the Act, the popular meaning of the word 'Chamar' ~ is to be taken into account, which it has acquired by usage, and not the etymological meaning. If one goes by the etymological meaning, the very object of the Act would be frustated, and hence that would not be a correct manner of interpretation. [Para 22] [141,E-F] 1. 3 Calling a member of the Scheduled Caste 'Chamar' + with intent to insult or humiliate him in a place within publie view is certainly an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. Whether there was intent to insult or humiliate by using the word 'Chamar' will of course depend on the con- text in which it was used.

The SC/ST communities are also ~ equal citizens of the country, and are entitled to a life of dignity in view of Article 21 of the Constitution. [Paras 24 and 29] [142,C; 143,F] 2. 1 At this stage all that the High Court can see in the petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. or in a writ petition, is whether on a perusal of the FIR, treating the allegations to ). be correct, a criminal offence is prima facie made out or not or whether there is any statutory bar. A perusal of the FIR clearly shows that, prima facie, an offence is made out against the appellants 2 and 3. Treating the allegations in the FIR to be correct an offence under Section 3(1 )(x) of the Act is prima facie made out against appellants 2 and 3 because it prima facie seems that the intent of the appellants was to insult or humiliate the first informant, and this was done within the public view. The trial has still to be held and the appellants will have an opportunity of estab- ')( lishing their innocence in the trial.

However, at this stage . . y. the FIR against them cannot be quashed and the trial must proceed. [Paras 8, 25 and 26] [137,H; 138,A; 142,D-E-F] Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736; State of Orissa vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 - referred to 2. 2 It is not correct to say that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1 )(x) of the Act. The provi- . ):sion does not use the expression 'public place', but instead the expression used is 'in any place within public view'. There is a clear distinction between the two expressions. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the _;f.. municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies. [Paras 27 and 28] [142,G-H; 143,D-E] -"I ,. ,.. 3.

It is eviden_t from a perusal of the FIR that appellant No. 1 joined appellant Nos. 2 and 3 in insulting the informant, and he also used the word 'Chamar' in a derogatory sense. However, a perusal of the F. l. R. shows that he did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the F. l. R. to show that any member of the public was present when he uttered these words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence, no prima facie offence is made out against appellant No. 1. [Paras 33 and 34] [144,F-H] Case Law Reference (2005) 13 sec 540 Referred to Para 8 (2006) s sec 736 Referred to Para 8 CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 'i No. 1287 of 2008 "" From the final Judgment and Order dated 22. 1. 2007 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No. 285-287 of 2006 Gaurav Bhatia, Abhishek Chaudhary and Samir Ali for the Appellants. Ashok Bhan, Asha G. Nair, D. S.

Mahra and Vinay Kumar Garg for the Respondents. ,. 1... , The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MARKANDEY KATJU, J. 1. Le~ve granted. 2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment & order dated 22. 01. 2007 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 285-287 of 2006. _i 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. Appellant No. 1 Swaran Singh is the husband of appel- ~ lant No. 2, Smt. Simran Kaur and father of appellant No. 3, Ms. Tarjeet. They· reside on the first floor of the premises M-39, Greater Kailash-11, New Delhi. The ground floor of the said premises was occupied by one Shri Umesh Gupta, a businessman. 5. It appears that an FIR at Police Station C. R. Park, New Delhi was filed against the appellants by one Vinod Nagar. The )__ FIR read as follows: f- ''To SHO P. S. Chittaranjan Park New Delhi. Sub: Complaint against Smt. Simran Kaur and her daughter resident of M-39, 1st floor, G. K. -11, New Delhi :.

Sir, f. I, Vinod Nagar S/o Sh. Ram Singh Nagar R/o A-113, Dakshin Puri, New Delhi and work with Sh. Umesh Gupta at M-39, Ground Floor G. K. -11 as driver since last one year. I belong to Khatik Caste. I usually stand near the Car which is parked at the gate. Smt. Simran Kaur and her daughter (whose name I do not know but I can identify her) whenever cross near by since last 15-20 days speak that I am a chuda-chamar and whenever they come I should not come ). in the way. It hurts my emotion and when I tried to tell this to her husband Sh. Sarwan Singh he also said that you are actually a chuda-chamar and hence they are not saying anything wrong. When I told happening to my employer Sh. Umesh Gupta and he talked to Sardar Sarwan Singh and on this Sarwan Singh misbehaved and said that he ~will not let we people stay there. I also came to know that Sarwan Singh has filed a Court case against my employer Sh. Umesh Gupta.

I did not complain earlier because this man may stop saying these words to me. About today on ,:.. · 10. 122004 around 8. 45 a. m. in the morning when I came to duties to the house of Sh. Umesh Gupta Ji, I took the keys and started cleaning the vehicle. At that time both mother and daughter threw dirty water on me and said that chuda-chamar why did you come and Simran Kaur - joined his wife and daughter in insulting Vinod Nagar, and he also used the word 'Chamar' in a derogatory sense. 34. However, a perusal of the F. l. R. shows that Swaran Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There ~{ is nothing in the F. l. R. to show that any member of the public _...... _ \ was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that thE:; place where he uttered them was a piace which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence in -our opinion no prima facie offence is made out against appellant no. 1. > 35.

The High Court in the impugned judgment has ob- A served (in paragraph 16) that the question whether the appellants indeed uttered the offending words with intention to humiliate the complainant, are matters of evidence. We fully agree with this view. Hence, we find no merit in the appeals of appellants 2 and 3, and they are accordingly dismissed. However, B the appeal of appellant No. 1 is allowed, and the proceedings against him are quashed. There will be no order as to costs. K. K. T. Appeals disposed of.