T. P. DAVER v. LODGE VICTORIA NO. 363, S. C. BELGAUM
Citation: [1964] 1 S.C.R. 1; 1962 INSC 378
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: SYED JAFFER IMAM , J.L. KAPUR, K. SUBBA RAO, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1962 INSC 378. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1962-12-12. T. P. DAVER v. LODGE VICTORIA NO. 363, S. C. BELGAUM. Read the judgment and case details on...
Judgment text
1 THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS T. P. DAVER v. LODGE VICTORIA NO. 363, S. C. BELGAU~f (S. J. IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, K. SunnA RAo, and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ. ) Domestic Tribunal-Masonic Lodge-So. ,rce of power to expel 111e11,bers-Contract by which they become tnember. e applied to such bodies as Lodges. One has t? s~e broadly m the circumstances of each case whether the prmc1ples of natu- ral justice has been applied. In the circumstances of this case, , 1 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPOkTS 3 particularly when it is found that the appellant bad not raised any objection, it cannot be said that the resolution passed by the Lodge \'ictoria ;, bad for violating any principles of natural justice. · Maclean v. Tke Workers Union, [1929] I Ch. 602, referred to. Law 198 expressly confers :i jurisdiciion ,on a Daughter Lodge to try a member if he commits an offence, the iurisdic- tion conferred on it cannot be excluded by Law 128 wl1ich is a general law.
The word 'offence' in the context 11f Law 198 can only n·1ean the infringement of laws of thr. Dt}ngbter J. JOdge. In the present case' the rules relat. ing- 110 r. rej11dice caused to hiln hy iltis failf1rt: anc\ since hr. nevrr n1arle a rrnnpla111t of jt before any of.. the f\VO appel- late bodies, he has waivf'U thf' rrquiren1t'! nt o'f the rule. From the facts nntl circu1hsta11ces of thr. ca~ ... ', partic11larly wh~n it is fourid that the appellant did not.. faise any o:ljection, tt . -nnnot he said that the re. ~olution passed';by the Lodge \Tirt0ria is bad for viola. ting natural justice. Sine~ Civil Courts have no jur1s .. diction to decide on the nu~rit8... Q. _f a decision given hy a domes- tic tribunal and since bnth courts below have found concur- rently that the Dani:hter Lodge has :icied in g-ood faith and since no cxcCptionaI1 circumstance has been shown, this Court \vill not examine th~ merits of the decision. / • CIVIL APPELLATE ]URISDtCTION: Civil Appeal No.
414ofl960. Appeal from the judgmen,t ·and decree. date1 September 25, 1958, of the Myso~e High Court in Regular Appeal (B) No. 256 ol 1956. Naraindas G. Mc1lkani and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. Bishan Namin and 8. P. Ve1·ma, for the res- pondent No. I. 1962. December 12. The Judgment of the Court Wl\S delivered by SuBBA RAO, J. -This appeal on certificate re- )atcS' to an internal dispute of the rncmllers of 1! 1962 ~ T. P. D«Olr v. IA4• J'itt•ia No 363, S. C. Belgaum ' 1962 T. P. Dawi '" LoJ11 Victoria No. 363, S. C. B1/gaum Sulla fl<>•, J. 4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. Masonic Lodge called tl1e "Lodge Victoria No. 363 S. C. " at Belgaum. · There is a Scotish institution known as "Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Scotland" at Edinburgh, hereinafter called the "Grand Lodge of Scotland". Under its supervision there arc Provincial or District Grand Lodges spread throughout the world.
There are Daughter Lodges under the superintendence of the District Grand Lodges. The Grand Lodge of Scotland is governed by its own written Constitution and Laws. There is also a srparate Constitution and Laws for every District Grand Lodge. One such District Grand Lodge known as "The Grand Lodge of All Scotish Freemasonary in India and Pakistan" has its headquarters at Bombay. The aforrsaid daughter Lodge at Bclgaum is directly under the said District Grand Lodgr and is governed by the Constitution and Laws of the latter. The appellant was a mrmber of the Lodge Victoria, having joined it in the year 1948. On October 16, 1952, the srcond respondent made a complaint against the appellant to the Master, Lodge Victoria, alleging that the appellant was guilty of 12 masonic offences. It was alleged therein that, as the appellant had committed masonic offences, he should be tried by the Lodge for the charges levelled against him under Law 198 of the Constitution.
On October 20, 1952, notice of the said complaint was issued to the appellant and he was required to send to the Secretary of the Lodge his answers to the charges within 14 days from the date of the notice. He was also informed that he was entitled to be present and to state his defence at the special meeting to be held on November 8, 1952. On the same day, the Secretarv of the Lodge sent notices to all the members or' the Lodge asking them to attend the said special meeting convened for considering and ) ·{ I s. c. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 5 passing judgment on the said complaint. On October 'L7, 1952, the appellant submitted his answer in extenso to the various charges levelled against him in the complaint; in that answer he requested that "my complete replies be read in toto to the brethren assembled to decide this matter. and I be informed of the total number of brethren present and the number of votes cast one way or the other.
" A perusal of that reply also shows that the appellant understood the charges levelled against him as rela- ting to certain offences alleged to have been commi- tted by him and his reply proceeded on that basis. On November 8, 1952, the special meeting of the Lodge was held and the minutes show that 18 mem· bers attended the meeting, that each charge was read at the meeting, that comments of the members were invited and that decision was taken on each of the charges. Each of the charge was put to vote and tlie members present unanimously held that every one of the charges levelled against the appellant was established. In the result they passed a resolution excluding the appellant from the Lodge until the exclusion was confirmed by the District Grand Lodge under Law 199 of the Constitution. On November 15, 1952, the said decision was communi· cated to the appellant. On November 24, 1952, the appellant preferred an appeal against that order to the District Grand Lodge.
On October 5, 1953, a meeting of the District Grand Lodge was convened to consider the appeal and the appeal was dismissed. It was noted in the proceedings of the· District Grand Lodge that though earlier an adjourn· ment was given to enable the appellant to appear in person at the meeting, he remained absent. On a farther appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland, the said Lodge considered the sentence imposed on the appellant as one of "suspension sine die" and recommended to the Lodge Victoria to review the suspension after a period of 12 months. if the appellant applied for reinstatement. It does not 1962 T. P. Darer •• Lodge Victoria No. 363, S. C. Belgaum Subba Rao, J, · 1962 T. P. Da1"1 ! v. ' Lodgt Victoria NrJ. 363, s. c. e,lgaum Sub! • Rao, J. ' I I I I t SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. appear that the appellant filed any application for review. On September 7, 1954, the appellant . instituted a suit in the Court.
of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum, for a declaration that the resolution of the Victoria Lodge dated November 8, . 1952, was illegal and void and that he continued to be a member of the Lodge despite the resolution, for an injunction to restrain the officers and servants of the said Lodge from preventing him from exer- cising his rights therein, and for recovery of damages. To that suit he made· the ·Victoria Lodge, the first ·defendant ; the complainant, the second defendant ; ·the Secretary of the Lodge, the third defendant ; and · the District Grand Lodge, . Bombay, the· fourth defendant. The defendants contested the suit. The . learned Civil Judge dismissed the suit. c--The appeal filed by the appellant to the High Court of Mysore was also dismissed~ The . present appeal has been filed on a certificate issued by the-said High Court.
'· ' Learned counsel for the appellant raised before us all the contenti'Jns which his client ·had unsuccess- fully raised in the courts below. Before we advert to the said contentions it would be convenient to notice briefly the law on the subject relevant to the present enquiry. The source of the power of associations like clubs and lodges to expel·_. their members is the contract on the . basis of _which they become members. This principle has been restated by Lord Morton in Bonsor v. . Jiusicians' Union,('). There, one . Bonsor, who. became a member of a trade union, was expelled. In that context Lord Morton . observed : · "\Vhen 1-fr. Bonsor applied to join the respon- dent union, and his application was accepted, a contract came · into existence between ·--1'. lr. Bonsor and the respondent, whereby Mr. Bonsor agreed to abide by the, rules of the (I) (1956] A. C. 104, 127. f'l_ 1 S. C. R. _ SUPREME COURT REPORTS - 7 • respondent union, and the unio~-impli~dly agreed that 1fr.
Bonsor would not be e:i,cluded by the union or its officers otherwise than in accordance with the rules". This contractual origin of the rule of expulsion has its corollary in the cognate rule that in expelling a member the conditions laid down in the rules must be - strictly -complied·with. In . Maclean v. The Workers' Union, (1), the contractual foundation of the power is described thus : "In such a case as the present, where the tribunal is the result of rules adopted by persons who have formed the association known as a trade union, it seems to me reasonably clear - that the rights of the plaintiff against the defendants must depend simply on the contract, - and that the matenal terms of the contract must be found in the rules". Proceeding on that basis, the learnedJudge observed: "It is : certain, therefore, that a domestic tribunal is. bound to act strictly according to its rules and is under an - obligation to act honestly and in good faith.
" - The same idea was expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Ezra v. l,fahendra Nath Banerji(') th_us: _ " •••...... \Vhere the rule provides in . any parti- cular respect - that some condition must be fulfilled, then that condition must be strictly complied with, since the power of expulsion is itself dependent on the terms of the rule. " The next question is whether the -doctrine of strict compliance with the rules implies that every ,_v minute deviation from the rules, whether substantial or not, would render the act of such a body void. The answer to this -question will depend _upon the (1) (1929] I Ch. 602, 623. (2) I. L. R. (19W) 2 Cal. 88, 109, 1902 T. P. Dtwer v. L. ige Vict11ri• • 383, S. C. Belgaum. Subht1 Ra. 11, J. 1952 T. P. Dai·er •• Lod;1 Victoria }lo. 363, S. C. Bdgaum suiba R. u, J. ' . ""/, ·,,.. ,. -_- ·,.. '\ ~ • I 8 .. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. . .
' nature 'of the rule infringed ; whether a rule is mandatory or directory depends upon each rule, the purpose for which it is · made and the setting in which it appears. We shall consider this aspect of the doctrine when we deal with. the argument of the learned counsel thaf in the present case the rules have not been complied with. · The scope of the jurisdiction of a civil court vis-a-vis·· the· decisions of tribunals is also well settled. In Maclean v. ·The Workers' Union ( 1 ), Maugham,J. , observed: "It appears to me. tbat we have no power to review the· ~vidence any . more .. than have a power to say whether the tribunal i::ame to a right conclmion. " :-\,. -, Much to the same effe~t the Judicial Committee observed in L. A. P. O' Beilly v. 0. 0. Gittens, ('). .. " .....................
It is important to bear in ' mind that neither the learned judge nor their Lordships' Board is entitled to sit as a Court of appeal from the· decisions of a domestic tribunal such as r the Stewards of the Trinidad Turf Club". Later on the Privy Council stated: "All these matters, however, · are essentially matters· for the domestic tribunal to decide as it thinks right. Provided that the tribunal does not exceed its jurisdiction and acts honestly and in good faith, the Court cannot intervene, even· if it thinks that· the penalty is severe or that a very strict standard has been applied". ·· · ' , . . Another aspect which niay also be noticed is how far and to what extent the doctrine of bias may be (I) [1929] l Ch, 602, 628. · (2) A. I. R. 11949) P. C. 313, 316, 317. _j ?.. _ ' ' t6"·~ ... ; ! ' I , • ... •• ' ---- - ... 1 S. C. R. · SUPREME COUF .. T REPORTS 9 ---~--- invoked in · the case of domestic tribunals like those of clubs. The observations of 11augham . J. in .
Maclean'B case(') in· this context may· be noticed. The learned Judge observed in that case. thus : . "A ·person who joins an association governed by rules under which he may. be expelled, ... : . • ....... •..... : ... •...... has in my judgment no legal right of redress if he be expelled according to the ·rules, ·however ·unfair and unjust the rules · or the action of the expel\jng tribunal may be provided that it acts in good faith ........... : .. . . ....................... The phrase, "the principles of natural justice," can only ·mean in this connection the principles of fair play so deeply rooted in the minds of modem Englishmen that · a provision for an inquiry necessarily imports that the accused should be given his chance of defence and explanation. On that point there is no difficulty. Nor do I doubt that in most · .
cases it is a reasonable inference from the rules that if there is anything of the nature of a lis between two persons, neither of them should sit on the tribunal. "··. · · · · · · · · '· ! i Another difficulty that one is 'confronted with in proceedings held by committees constituted by clubs . is to demarcate precisely the line between the prose- cutor and the Judge. · Maugham, J. noticed this. difficulty and observed in ]}faclean's case ( 1 ) at p. 626 · thus: · "In many cases the· tribunal . is necessarily entmsted. with the duty of appearing to, act as· prosecutors as wen as that of judges;" for there is no one else· to prosecute .. For example: in a case where a council is charged with the duty of considering the conduct of any member whose conduct is disgraceful! and of expelling him if found guilty of such an offence, it cons- tantly occurs that the matter is brought to· the . (1) (1929] I Ch. 602, 628. 1962 T. P. Dar:1r v. Lndge Victoria J{o. 363, S. C.
B,/gaum • Suh6a Rao, J. ' ~ ' . \ ' T. P. Dt1rer \ v. LDtige Victoria No. 363, S. C. Bel;aum Su5ba Rao, J. 10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19G4] VOL. attention of the council by· a "report of ·legal proceedings in the press. The member is summoned to appear before the council. The council's duty is to cause him to appear and to explain his conduct. It ·may be that in so acting the council are the prosecutors. · In one .. sense they are; but if the regulations show that the council is bound to act as I have mentioned and to that extent to act as prooecutors, it seems to be clear that the council is not disqua- lified from taking the further steps which the rules require. " Though it is advisable for a club to frame rules to avoid conflict of duties, if the rules sanction such a procedure, the party, · who has bound· hiffiself by those rules, cannot complain, unless the enquiry held pursuant to such rules discloses . malafides or •unfair treatment.
· The following principles may be gathered from the above discussion .. (1) A member of a masonic lodge is bound to abide by the rules of the lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules. (2) The lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules, whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each case, having regard to· the well settled rules of construction in that regard. . (3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited; it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from decic sions of such · a body; it can set aside the order of . such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles of natural justice as explained in the decisions cited supra. . .. • Bearing the said principles in mind; we shall now proceed to consider the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant. J· 1 S. C. R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11 The first contention is t-hat Lodge Victoria has nu jurisdiction to decide on the question whether a member committed a masonic offence, for, it is said, ,ud: ·,ffcnu> arc within the jurisdiction of a District Grand L'ldgc-. lbrnb,ty. The question falls to be decided on a comtruction of the relevant Laws of the Lodge: The said Laws read : ' Lmo l! JS,. Every Daughter Lodge shall be entitled to try any member accused of any offence. A complaint, in writing, shall be served on the accused brother, by registered letter posted to his last known address, speci- fying the offence of which he is charged, which he shall be entitled to answer in writing within fourtccu nable him to file his case before the Lodge and that in the instant case no such additional period w:is given to him. That is so. The position, therefore, is that the appellant was given notice of the hearing as required by the law, but he was not given the entire period prescribed thereunder.
The question is whether this error in the proced11re vitiated the trial. It is obvious that the appellant wa> not prejudiced. He never mad. : a complaint of it. Indeed in his answer he made it clear that he would not be present at the inquiry. The Law itself enabled him to apply for further time, but he did not ask for it, as he did n0t want to appear at the meeting. He did not raise this objection either in the appeal before the District Grand Lodge or in the second appeal before the Grand Lodge of Scotland. Before the said appellate Lodges he took • 1 $. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 17 the decision on merits. Indeed, by his answer and subsequent conduct he clearly waived the said I( requirement of the Law. Can he now be allowed to rely upon a breach of the procedural rule to invali- date the proceeding ? In our view, he cannot do so. There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of a Lodge and the irregular exercise of it in the matter of the taking of p! Ocedural steps.
A party to a dispute can certainly waive his objections to some defects in procedure. In this case, the appellant could have taken objection for his being given a 1 shorter period of notice than prescribed under the Law for his appearance before the meeting of the Lodge. He did not do so. The appellant has, by his aforesaid conduct, clearly waived his right under the said Law. Having waived it, he is now precluded from relying upon the said defect. We, therefore, hold tha~ it is not open to the appellant to rely upon the said defect for invalidating the proceeding. The argument that the members of the Lodge were both the prosecutors and the judges, and there- fore the principles of natural justice have been viola- ted has not much force in the context of the present enquiry. We are dealing with a case of a Lodge and not with that of a tribunal or a court. It is true that the earlier resolution, Ex.
1 H, shows that 11 members of the Lodge , were not well disposed towards the appellant; but here we are concerned with the com- plaint filed by the 2nd respondent. Notice of the complaint was given to all the members of the Lodge. ~ It may be that some of them did not like the appe- llant, and one of them is the complainant himself. But 22 members of the. Lodge met and unanimously held, after considering the complaint and the answer given by the appellant .. that he was guilty. If the appellant had any objection for one or some of the members taking part in the meeting, he could have " raised an objection, but he did not do so. The rules 1962 T. r. v- v. Lodg1 Victoria "Vo. 363 J C. Blliaum Subba Rao, J. 1962 T·P. Dacer •• Uxlge Vicloria No. 353, S. C. Btlgawn Subba Rao, J. 18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. governing tribunals ·and courts cannot mutatis mutandi8 be applied to such bodies as Lodges.
We have to sec broadly in the circumstances of each case whether the principles of natural justice have been applied. In the circum,tarces of this case, particu· larly when we find that the appellant had not raised any objection, we cannot say that the resolution passed by the L'. ldgc Victoria is bad for violating any principles of natural justice. Lastly an attempt was made to persuade us to resurvey the entire matcri<il to ascertain the correct- ness or otherwise of the decision of the Lodge. A, we have pointed out earlier, civil courts have no juris- diction to decide on the merits of a decision given by a private a5sociation like a Lodge. Both the courts below have held that the Daughter Lodge has acted in good faith in the matter of the complaint -against the appellant. That is a concurrent finding of fact; and it is the practice of this Court not to interfere ordinarily with concurrent findings of fact.
There are no exceptional circumstances for our departing from the ~aid practice. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs. ' , • • ..
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